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         ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis considers the potential for tribunal adjudication in family law, particularly for custody 
and access cases. The central argument is that a paradigm shift away from adversarialism may 
enable experimentation with a holistic tribunal-based family law settlement system, at least for 
family law cases in which a best-interests-of-the-child determination is required. It is suggested 
that within a holistic tribunal “settlement system,” multi-disciplinary mediators and adjudicators 
could share decision-making responsibility, nurture tribunal expertise and develop transparent 
decision-making guidelines, while adjudication could be relegated to a secondary, inquisitorial 
component. New empirical research on mediation and adjudication processes in selected 
tribunals is reported, which I argue is relevant to the potential for an alternative institutional 
approach to family law dispute resolution. I conclude that there appears to be sufficient potential 
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It is the first day of trial. I’ve worked with the father for almost a year. He has told 
his story, and I’ve re-told it on his behalf, in four formal offers of settlement, 
written briefs for three court conferences, mediation submissions, and, finally, in 
the materials now before the court. His struggle for meaningful role in his three-
year old son’s life has been packaged by me in multiple ways. 
 
The parties were never married; the mother is testifying, and the father finds this 
unpleasant and at times infuriating. During a break he is assured by his counsel 
(for whom I am an associate) that the mother’s account will be challenged on 
cross-examination, and he will have a turn to tell his side of the story.  
 
Cross-examination of the mother begins with all the drama for which the father 
could have hoped. It is archetypal – she is quickly unnerved, becomes hesitant, 
and slowly unravels. The father’s hopes palpably rise; the exposure of the 
mothers’ irrationality will surely lead the judge to sympathize with his claim.  
 
The judge eventually interrupts counsel’s cross-examination to say she doesn’t 
approve of its tone – it is inappropriately aggressive. Counsel immediately backs 
off, now showing excessive politeness to the witness. As soon as the mother leaves 
the witness stand, the judge says she would like to speak to the parties. From the 
bench, she delivers a rebuke to them for asking a stranger to make decisions about 
their child. She tells them how much better it would have been for the child if they 
had settled. She asks them if they both hope to attend the little boy’s wedding; they 
do. The judge warns that if they proceed along the path they are on it is unlikely 
they will both be invited. She repeats several times that she is not as qualified as 
the parents to understand what is best for this child. She suggests the trial be 
interrupted for a settlement conference or further mediation. She ends the day by 
expressing hope that we can all be on a settlement track by morning. 
We retreat with the father to one of the rooms in the courthouse designed for 
private consultation, whereupon he erupts over the preceding negotiations, 
conferences and mediation, all of which involved professional fees, and all of 
which were met with stonewalling. He is incensed that the judge has insisted 
upon a return to negotiation and has “weighed in” after hearing the “other 
side” for an entire day and not having heard “his side.” He accuses his counsel 






   
    
In the trial described above, the judge’s admonition finally undid the mother’s intransigence; the 
parties settled the next day, on terms more favourable to the father than any of the four 
settlement offers that had earlier been rejected. Privately, in chambers, the judge confided to 
counsel that she “did not like” the settlement but had signed off because “at least it’s 
consensual.” Despite this apparent “win,” the father was unnerved. The outcome was the result 
of a court process in which he had not been heard, and it seemed random, with no apparent 
connection to what “justice” or the law required. 
 
This thesis builds upon a frequently noted paradigm shift occurring in Anglo-American legal 
systems, particularly in the area of family law,1 away from adversarialism and toward a more 
collaborative, inter-disciplinary and problem-solving paradigm (Hybrid? Post-Adversarial? 
Therapeutic? Vulnerability?) not yet fully formed. 
 
                                               
1 See: Jana B. Singer, “Dispute Resolution and the Post-Divorce Family: Implications of a Paradigm Shift” 
(2009) 47 (3) Fam. Ct. Rev. 363; Final Report of the Family Justice Working Group of the Action Committee 
on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters, “Meaningful Change for Family Justice: Beyond Wise 
Words” infra, footnote 23. 
Unlike the judge, I am aware that the mother has refused to settle on any terms 
which would allow him more than minimal access to the child, and her own 
lawyer has characterized her, privately, as irrationally stubborn. I am aware that 
his legal fees and trial retainer have necessitated a substantial second mortgage. 
I am aware that he has literally and figuratively exhausted all avenues for 
settlement, has come to court as a last resort and has been chastised for doing so, 
at least in part because the decision-maker disapproves of the decision-making 





Social and legal developments which appear to have contributed to, or seem symptomatic of, this 
paradigm shift include: the large population of self-represented litigants in all dispute-resolution 
forums,2 the very low percentage of cases which proceed to trial in all areas of the law,3 growth 
in the number of problem-solving family courts in the United States,4 and efforts to expand their 
therapeutic orientation to other areas of the law;5 the establishment of Family Relationship 
Centres and the Less Adversarial Trial system in Australia,6 and proposals released in October 
2018 by the Australian Law Reform Commission aimed at “redevelopment” of the Australian 
family justice system;7 the current, ongoing “radical reorganization” of family courts in the UK;8 
the implementation of family law reform initiatives in Ontario, such as the Mandatory 
Information Program,9 Family Law Information Centres,10 and court-adjunct mediation;11 the 
pending expansion of Unified Family Courts,12 substantive law and process reforms contained in 
British Columbia’s Family Law Act13 and similar reforms contained in proposed amendments to 
                                               
2 Julie Macfarlane, “The National Self Represented Litigants Project: Identifying and Meeting the Needs of 
Self Represented Litigants, Final Report” infra, footnote 128. See also: Rachel Birnbaum and Nicholas Bala, 
“Experiences of Ontario Family Litigants with Self-Representation” infra, footnote 122. 
3 Law Commission of Ontario, “Towards a More Efficient and Responsive Family Law System: Interim 
Report” online: http://www.lco-cdo.org/en/family-law-reform-interim-report 
4 Barbara A. Babb, “Re-evaluating Where We Stand: A Comprehensive Survey of American Family Justice 
System,” (2008) 46 (2) Fam. Ct. Rev. 230. 
5 Judith S. Kaye, Delivering Justice Today: A Problem-Solving Approach, 22 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 125 (2004). 
6 Jennifer E. McIntosh, Hon. Diana Bryant and Kristen Murray, “Evidence of a Different Nature: The Child 
Responsive and Less Adversarial Initiatives of the Family Court of Australia” (2008) 46 (1) Fam. Ct. Rev. 125 
at page 126. 
7 Australian Law Reform Commission, “Review of the Family Law System: Discussion Paper” online: 
https://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/review-family-law-system-discussion-paper 
8 Lisa Parkinson, “The Place of Mediation in the Family Justice System” (2013) 25 Child & Fam. L.Q. 200 at 
page 200. 
9 Nicholas Bala, “Reforming Family Dispute Resolution in Ontario: Systemic Changes and Cultural Shifts” in 
Middle Income Access to Justice, Michael J. Trebilcock, Lorne M. Sossin and Anthony J. Duggan (eds.) 
(University of Toronto Press, 2012) at page 281-282. 
10 Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, Family Law Information Centres, online: 
https://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/family/infoctr.php 
11 Supra, footnote 9 at page 289. [Bala, “Reforming Family Dispute Resolution] 
12 Philip Epstein, Epstein’s This Week in Family Law Fam. L. Nws. 2018-13. 





the Divorce Act; 14 academic literature and popular media accounts which have drawn attention 
to problematic aspects of family court systems,15 and further literature which has pointed out the 
potential for tribunal processes in “areas of vulnerability” in family law;16 the inclusion of 
“multi-disciplinary approaches” and “legal problem-solving” in law school curricula; the 
emergence of “vulnerability theory” as a way of interpreting the institutional effects of law and 
legal systems;17 and, finally, the December 2017 proposal of the Australian Parliament to test a 
Parenting Management Hearing Panel, a multi-disciplinary administrative tribunal for “less 
complex” children’s matters in which parties are self-represented.18 
 
The central argument of this thesis is that the noted paradigm shift may facilitate experimentation 
with alternative institutional approaches to family law dispute resolution. This thesis explores the 
potential for a tribunal-based family justice system, at minimum for cases involving children’s 
best interests. I argue that the longstanding recognition that family litigation is damaging to 
children and separated families has become incompatible with social norms to the extent that it 
may legitimately be considered a new and serious social problem that requires an innovative 
solution. I argue that a novel jurisdiction in family law may be created by a holistic tribunal 
“settlement system” in which multi-disciplinary mediators and adjudicators function as equals, 
tribunal expertise is nurtured, and transparent decision-making guidelines are developed. 
Adjudication in a settlement system could be relegated to a secondary, accessible, and 
inquisitorial component. 
                                               
14 Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.). 
15 See: infra, footnote 23. [Family Justice Working Group Report] 
16 Kent Roach and Lorne Sossin, “Access to Justice and Beyond” (2010), 60 Univ. of Toronto L.J. 373.  
17 Martha Albertson Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject, Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition” (2008-
2009), 20 Yale J.L. & Feminism 1. 





Vulnerability theory is a rapidly growing theoretical approach to law, which I apply to family 
court systems; by way of introduction, vulnerability theory calls for a “responsive state” to place 
the needs of  the “vulnerable subject” at the centre of social policy.19 It emphasizes substantive 
rather than formal equality, examines the effects of social institutions on the populations they 
serve,20 and unmasks illusions about autonomy and choice.21  
 
The empirical research conducted for this project explores decision-making in four selected 
Ontario tribunals, which I argue have points of similarity to family law adjudication. Research 
methods include participant observation, ethnography, and interviews with tribunal members. 
Through the empirical research and administrative law literature review, many aspects of 
tribunal culture are explored, including the administrative law principles upon which the subject 
tribunals are based, the processes they are permitted to employ, how they are actually employed, 
and views among the members interviewed as to the effects of tribunal processes upon 
vulnerable populations.  
 
There is an acknowledged imbalance between the scope of this project and the topic with which 
it engages. I ask the reader to consider this thesis a “thought experiment” in which the potential 
for a family law tribunal is imagined in the context of the reported functioning of family court 
systems, select administrative law tribunals, and administrative law principles. Expert input from 
multiple disciplines (family and administrative law, constitutional and criminal law; social work 
                                               
19 Supra, footnote 17. [Fineman, Anchoring Equality] 
20 Ibid. [Fineman, Anchoring Equality] 





and psychology) would be required, as well as extensive additional research, to move beyond the 
thought experiment stage.  
 
I have not explored untapped potential of family court systems, for a number of reasons. First, a 
full comparative institutional analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. Second, there are many 
precedents for implementing a new policy agenda through an administrative tribunal process 
including instances in which tribunal jurisdiction was previously exercised by the Superior 
Courts (such as the Worker’s Compensation Board, Worker’s Compensation Appeal Tribunal, 
Ontario Labour Relations Board, and Financial Services Commission, now re-constituted as part 
of the Licensing Appeal Board) suggesting that in the context of a new policy agenda, transition 
to a tribunal can be a natural progression. Finally, a pattern of reform has been identified with 
respect to the Ontario family law court system that consists of attaching “new reforms and 
offices to the system, without considering the complexity of the entire structure,”22 which has 
been portrayed as less than ideal.23 To the extent that it may, one day, be timely to rebuild the 
family justice system “from the ground up,”24 there is, in my view, every reason to consider 
alternative institutional approaches.  
                                               
22 Noel Semple and Carol Rogerson, “Middle Income Access to Justice: Policy Options with Respect to 
Family Law,” in Middle Income Access to Justice, Michael J. Trebilcock, Lorne M. Sossin and Anthony J. 
Duggan (eds.) (University of Toronto Press, 2012) at page 448. 
23 Final Report of the Family Justice Working Group of the Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil 




24 Supra, footnote 22 at page 421. [Semple and Rogerson] The authors refer to the prospect of re-building the 





In Chapter One, institutional analysis is discussed, the application of vulnerability to family 
dispute resolution is introduced, and social changes that suggest new norms, and may be 
propelling the paradigm shift referred to above, are briefly noted.  
 
Chapter Two reviews the operation of existing family dispute resolution systems, as disclosed in 
academic literature and prior research, with an emphasis upon self-represented litigants, the 
value of structured decision-making in family law, the importance of truth-finding in the 
application of the best-interests-of-the-child test, and the effect upon self-represented litigants of 
formal court processes. Under the heading “But We Do That Already” I discuss a potential 
objection to this thesis – that family law court systems have been so thoroughly and effectively 
reformed as to render this paper moot. Much of the research and literature cited is critical of 
family court systems; I note that it is taken from credible sources and its aggregation is not 
gratuitous. The intention is to illustrate the importance of overcoming the “implementation gap” 
referred to in the Family Justice Working Group Report,25 and to identify areas in which 
alternative institutional approaches appear to warrant further research and consideration. It is not 
meant to convey a lack of respect for the Ontario family law bench and bar, or to imply that no 
aspects of existing court systems should inform the exploration of different institutional 
approaches. As Nigel Stobbs writes, a paradigm shift “is about the evolution of disciplines, not 
progress by the total rejection of the cumulative disciplinary matrix.”26 
 
Chapter Three is comprised of a vulnerability theory analysis.  
                                               
25 Supra, footnote 23. [Family Justice Working Group Report] 
26 Nigel Stobbs, “Nature of Juristic Paradigms: Exploring the Theoretical and Conceptual Relationship 







In Chapter Four, academic literature and prior research as to the features of administrative law 
and tribunal adjudication are discussed. The essential components of adversarial and inquisitorial 
models are identified, and I suggest that in custody and access cases which require adjudication, 
decision-making should be more inquisitorial and less adversarial.  
 
Chapter Five sets out the methodology used in the empirical research component of this project 
and summarizes briefly the characteristics of the four tribunals in which hearings were observed 
and interviews conducted. Tribunal members who participated in interviews were asked to 
recount their experiences and perceptions with respect to tribunal adjudication and settlement 
processes. The empirical data is reported upon in narrative form in Chapter Six and attached in 
chart form as Appendix B. 
 
Chapter Seven identifies the assumed policy goals of a hypothetical family law tribunal and 
discusses the capacity of tribunal processes to achieve them. Relevant reports and commentary 
with respect to family court systems are briefly considered as well, with the caveat that a full 
comparative institutional analysis is beyond the scope of this project. The chapter concludes by 
identifying areas in which further study is recommended. 
 
In Chapter Eight the potential for therapeutic justice and efficiency in tribunal systems is 
discussed, as is the potency of adversarial ideology and symbolism, and the strength of 
entrenched interests. Arguments relevant to the constitutional validity of a family law tribunal 





ideological obstacles to tribunal adjudication in family law and are increasingly becoming 




























1.         FRAMEWORK, THEORY AND SOCIAL POLICY 
 
Adjudication is a form of social ordering.27 
 
This chapter discusses institutional analysis, and reviews theoretical perspectives and social 
movements which, I argue, are relevant to the paradigm shift referred to above.   
 
1.1  Institutional Analysis 
 
The words “court” and “tribunal” are sometimes used interchangeably, and in a casual sense they 
both refer to adjudicative bodies. Not so here; I use “court” to refer to a traditional legal 
decision-making forum built upon adversarial principles, with broad plenary or statutory 
authority to apply the law, and in which certain formalities are routinely observed: judges and 
court staff are robed (as are lawyers in the Superior Court), lawyers bow to judges, processes are 
governed by complex and detailed rules,28 and surroundings are at least somewhat stately and 
distinctly hierarchical. The word “tribunal” is used here to connote an entity that is legislatively 
created under administrative law principles, with a limited and specific mandate and a narrow 
statutory power of decision granted for the purpose of implementing an articulated policy 
agenda, and often (but not always) designed to be relatively informal and “user-friendly,” with 
the expectation of serving large numbers of self-represented parties.29 While the Ontario 
Provincial Courts were created by the Courts of Justice Act,30 (unlike the Superior Courts of 
Justice, which have plenary authority) and, like tribunals, these courts have the power to 
                                               
27 Justice Thomas A. Cromwell, “Neither out Far nor in Deep: The Zuber Commission and the Problems of 
Civil Justice Reform” 37 U.N.B.L.J. 94 (1988). 
28 In Ontario: Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 under Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 
43.; and in family law: Family Law Rules, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, O. Reg.114/99. 
29 Raj Anand, “A Checklist for Administrative Law Today” 27 Can. J. Admin. L. & Prac. 235 at page 235. 





establish and adapt their processes through practice directions and specialized rules of procedure, 
and like tribunals, they deal with large numbers of self-represented parties and have adapted to 
better assist them, tribunals exist as part of a distinct legal culture. A false equivalency between 
courts and tribunals, as the terms are used here, trivializes administrative law principles, norms 
and structures.  
 
This thesis examines the potential for administrative processes to ameliorate some problems in 
some aspects of family litigation; it is not a fulsome comparative institutional analysis, which 
would typically involve a blend of law and economics and critical legal studies,31 and would 
require a multifaceted examination of the economic and social effects of both court and tribunal 
processes,32 including new empirical research on family courts and far more extensive empirical 
research on tribunal functioning than is provided here. Most important, it would canvass the 
experiences of tribunal users and fully investigate the potential benefits of newly proposed 
reforms to family court systems, particularly the recently approved and much celebrated 
expansion of Unified Family Courts in Ontario. Indeed, it seems safe to assume that positive and 
successful developments in family law practice and dispute resolution exist that have not been 
discussed in literature reviewed for this project. Within the narrow scope of this project, I believe 
it is reasonable to focus upon problems in family law court systems which appear to remain 
unsolved, given that credible (in some instances, authoritative) family law research and 
commentary has been used to identify them, with the caveat that very recent reforms may have 
mitigated these problems in ways that have not yet generated study and commentary. 
                                               
31 Edward L. Rubin, “The New Legal Process, The Synthesis of Discourse and Microanalysis of Institutions” 
(1995-1996), 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1393 at page 1403. 






Despite that a wholesale institutional analysis has not been undertaken, the questions raised in 
such an analysis: How does law operate in the world? What are the “human ends served by 
justice systems?” 33 How do different institutions attempt to achieve similar policy goals?34 
provide a framework for discussion. The question of how law operates in the world here 
concerns adjudication in family law court systems and select tribunals. As noted, problems are 
identified through prior research and literature, and tribunal processes that may help to address 
these problems are identified similarly, with the addition of the empirical research conducted for 
this project. The “human ends” of justice systems considered in this project are those that prior 
research suggests are significant and, to varying degrees, unmet in existing family law dispute 
resolution systems. They include access to justice in all of its forms, and in particular, access to 
authoritative dispute resolution that does not disadvantage self-represented litigants and is not 
damaging to families and children. The question of how different institutions attempt to achieve 
similar policy goals is addressed through a discussion of the potential for tribunal processes to 
address needs that remain unmet in family court systems. This analysis does not pretend to be 
exhaustive, and it is obviously not conclusive of either the potential for tribunal processes in 
family law or the potential for further reformed court processes. It is an initial foray into complex 
question.  
 
                                               
33 Hanoch Dagan, “The Realist Conception of Law” (2007), 57 U. Toronto L.J. 607. 
34 Gregory Shaffer, “Comparative Institutional Analysis and a New Legal Realism” (2013), Wis. L. Rev. 607 





The idea of a family law tribunal is not original to this thesis. A tribunal or “tribunal-like” 
approach to family law has previously been suggested by academics and judges. Kent Roach and 
Lorne Sossin have suggested:  
[t]he increased resources that would be required to add the middle class to legal aid might 
better be directed at more fundamental reallocation of resources, including the 
replacement of a costly court-based system in areas such as family law with a holistic 
tribunal structure.”35  
 
Alberta Justice Hugh Landerkin has recommended a staged approach to custody and access 
disputes, described as “closer to an administrative tribunal.”36 An analysis of the potential for 
administrative systems in family law is contained in the 1999 prize-winning paper of then-
undergraduate law student Kathy Carmichael; she envisions a comprehensive, non-adversarial 
administrative system to process divorce applications and provide a wide range of related 
services.37 Very recently, the government of Australia announced a four-year pilot project to test 
an administrative tribunal “designed to provide a multi-disciplinary alternative to court 
proceedings for less complex children’s matters where parents are not legally represented.”38 
Decision-making panels comprised of family lawyers, social workers, child development experts 
and psychologists will conduct Parenting Management Hearings (PMHs) designed to assist self-
represented parents to resolve child-related disputes. The plan is to give PMHs “powers to make 
                                               
35 Supra, footnote 16 at page 375. [Roach and Sossin] The authors also recommend clear law and note that 
access to justice must be situated in the context of social and economic redistribution. 
36 The Honourable Hugh F. Landerkin, “Custody Disputes in the Provincial Court of Alberta: A New Judicial 
Dispute Resolution Model” (1996-1997), 35 Alta. L. Rev. 627. 
37 Kathy Carmichael, “New Directions: Divorce and Administrative Law, Department of Justice” (1999), 
online: http://www.cfcj-fcjc.org/sites/default/files/docs/hosted/17456-new_directions.pdf  
Carmichael wrote this paper, for which she won a Department of Justice “Dispute Resolution in Law Studies” 
award, as a University of New Brunswick law student.  The paper is still posted on the Department of Justice 
website (http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/dprs-sprd/prog/award-prix/awardr-prixr.html), and a synopsis with a 
link to the full text also appears on the Canadian Forum for Civil Justice website, under the heading “Context-
specific Dispute Resolution” (http://www.cfcj-fcjc.org/clearinghouse/context-specific-alternative-dispute-
resolution). 





binding determinations on simple family law matters, which would otherwise require 
consideration by family law courts, and its processes are intended to be fast, informal, non-
adversarial and more inquisitorial. 39 
 
There are, of course, obstacles to a tribunal approach to family law dispute resolution, some of 
which have constitutional underpinnings and therefore vary among different jurisdictions; further 
obstacles have been suggested in the form of a need for strong legal powers to deal with 
domestic violence cases and issue contempt of court orders, and a need for advanced legal 
reasoning in complex cases.40 Obstacles to tribunal jurisdiction are, of course, fundamental 
concerns that would be resolved by expert analysis in the context of a larger project. Within the 
limited remit of this paper, potential arguments with respect to the constitutional validity of a 
family law tribunal and the availability of strong tribunal powers are briefly discussed.  
 
It is not difficult to explain the policy motivation to create deeply reformed family law dispute 
resolution processes. There is now a preference for settlement in all areas of the law, and existing 
research on the experiences of litigants, lawyers and judges in Canadian family court systems, 
reveals persistent criticism, despite decades of reform, which extends beyond custody disputes 
and implicates all areas of family law. Much of this criticism, set out in some detail below, has 
emanated from the judiciary, including commentary from Justices of the Supreme Court of 
                                               
39 Parliament of Australia, Parenting Management Hearings, online: 
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/Budget
Review201718/ParentingHearings 
40 Noel Semple and Nicholas Bala, “Reforming the Family Justice System” (2013) Paper prepared under 






Canada, the British Columbia Court of Appeal, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice and the 
Ontario Provincial Court, and from highly esteemed Canadian academics.  
 
It has been asserted in the literature that despite societal and institutional preference for 
settlement of family law disputes, some cases “cannot or should not settle,”41 and it has become, 
in my view, increasingly trite to say that adversarial processes are inappropriate for cases 
involving children.42 Accepting both of these propositions, there is an obvious need for 
accessible, authoritative adjudication that is not based upon adversarial processes for cases that 
cannot or should not settle. This is not a novel insight; indeed, the 2018 Australian Law Reform 
Commission Review of the Family Law System Discussion Paper,43 notes that a key concern 
which emerged in responses to its prior Issues Paper44 is that developments in alternative dispute 
resolution do not help families who need an adjudication process; it states that they “continue to 
face a process that is ill-suited for dealing with family relationship issues” and cites very 
familiar-sounding reports as to the damaging effects of family litigation.45  
 
It is noted in comparative institutional analysis scholarship that institutions create patterns of 
perceiving matters which independently affect outcomes.46 This is one of any number of 
                                               
41 Ibid., at page 9. [Semple and Bala, Reforming the Family Justice System] The authors note that apart from 
the characteristics of the parties and the nature of the dispute, reproducing public values, creating precedent 
through the imposition of outcomes consistent with legal entitlements, clarifying important or novel points of 
law, resolving constitutional challenges, and facilitating settlement through the shadow of the law are further 
reasons that some cases should not settle.  
42 See: supra, footnote 7. [Australian Law Reform Commission, Discussion Paper] See also: J.A. Jolowicz, 
“Adversarial and Inquisitorial Models of Civil Procedure” (2003), 52 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 281 at page 281. 
43 Ibid. [Australian Law Reform Commission, Discussion Paper] 
44 Infra, footnote 309. [Australian Law Reform Commission, Issues Paper] 
45 Ibid., at page 138. [Australian Law Reform Commission, Discussion Paper] The Report notes stakeholders 
reports “that the litigation process tends to entrench or exacerbate existing hostilities between the parties, with 
adverse implications for the wellbeing of children.”  





“process effects” which may result in an institution producing outcomes which not only fail to 
reflect legal entitlements, but also undermine the policy rationale of the institution itself. I argue 
here that the negative process effects of family court systems described by judges and academics 
beg the question: what is the policy rationale for the resolution of family law disputes through a 
court system in an era that vastly prefers settlement?  The policy rationale for a tribunal, on the 
other hand, is often easy to identify; it is inherent in its specific mandate. Its processes are 
designed at the legislation stage or by the tribunal itself to best serve its mandate, suggesting a 
coherence between policy and function. Moreover, tribunals may be created to “adjust 
interests,”47that is, not only make decisions about existing rights, but empower a weaker party or 
population through conscious process design choices, as part of a mandate to achieve policy 
goals.  
 
It has been said that it is difficult to treat tribunals as a coherent sector of administrative justice, 
given their broad range of mandates and statutory powers,48 and that the scope and complexity of 
administrative law creates significant methodological challenges for comparative tribunal 
study.49 To at least partially address this concern, I have chosen to study four tribunals with 
different features and mandates, but sufficient similarities to suggest some harmonized values 
and to have been “clustered” under an umbrella organization known as “Social Justice Tribunals 
of Ontario:” the Child and Family Services Review Board, Landlord and Tenant Board, Social 
Benefits Tribunal, and the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.  
                                               
47 H. W. Arthurs, “Three Faces of Justice - Bias in the Tripartite Tribunal” (1963) 28 Sask. Bar Rev. 4 at page 
147. 
48 Lorne Sossin, “Independence, Accountability and Human Rights” online, 
http://www.justice.gov.yk.ca/pdf/Lorne_Sossin_Article.pdf at page 4. 
49 Janina Boughey, “Administrative Law: The Next Frontier for Comparative Law” (2013), 62 (1) I.C.L.Q. 55 






Some of my experiences of the family court system are set out anecdotally, at the outset of this 
paper and in the chapter “Courts and Family Law.” Anecdotal recollections are based upon 
memory, and are not offered as “research,” but rather, as illustrations, in part, of experiences that 
motivated my interest this project.50 Throughout the balance of this paper a few of my 
observations of tribunal hearings are reported ethnographically. These ethnographic accounts are 
based upon detailed and thorough contemporaneous notes and are included as research. Both 
ethnographic research and anecdotal recollections are included as singular examples of observed 
or experienced events and are not meant to betray the complexity of any institution or role, that 
is, they are not intended to be generalized to the whole. 
 
 
1.2 Theoretical Supports    
 
 Law can no longer maintain itself as an autonomous discipline.51 
 
This paper is not intended to contribute to the larger discussion of the nature of law and does not 
argue for the merits of one theory over another, which is beyond its scope; instead, it suggests 
that certain legal theories provides a framework for interpreting the effects of existing legal 
processes52  and help to create a bridge between “what is” and “what ought to be.”  
 
One such theoretical framework is legal realism,53 which began as a challenge to the formalist 
assumption that law is determinate, outside the social climate, different from, and superior to, 
                                               
50 My experience in family law practice consists of three years as an associate in a litigation firm, from 2007 to 
2010; I previously worked as a corporate and commercial lawyer. 
51 Supra, footnote 31 at page 1394. [Rubin]  
52 Margaret Davies, “Legal Theory and Law Reform” (2003) 28 Alternative L. J. Vol. 4 at page 168. 





politics.54 New legal realism emphasizes the importance of empirical research and moves beyond 
the analysis of appellate opinions to the analysis of decision-making processes and the potential 
distortion of these processes by systemic forces which, in family law, might include settlement 
pressure, coercive mediation, and bargaining outside the shadow of the law.55 A branch of new 
legal realism, critical legal studies, is focused on the big picture: it locates the indeterminacy of 
law beyond the interpretations of individual judges, in the larger sphere of fragmented political 
cultures in which law can serve a rationalizing function for culturally embedded privileges and 
disadvantages; in effect, to maintain existing power structures with scant consideration for social 
justice.56 A further branch of new legal realism known as new governance theory advocates for a 
problem-solving, collaborative approach to both the creation and implementation of law.57  
 
Legal realism emphasizes the tensions inherent in law and “hints at” institutional features that 
can alleviate these tensions.58 Vulnerability Theory, another new branch of new legal realism,59 
goes a giant step further; it interrogates the extent to which social institutions (such as legal 
systems) perpetuate patterns of privilege and disadvantage among the populations they are meant  
to serve, and emphasizes state responsibility to justify or remedy institutional effects that fail to 
further a substantive equality agenda.60 Vulnerability theory calls for a “responsive state,”61 and, 
in my view, strongly resonates with family law reform literature which recommends “a more 
                                               
54 Brian Z. Tamanaha, “Understanding Legal Realism” (2008-2009), 87 Tex. L. Rev. 731 at page 731. 
55 Stewart Macaulay, “Contracts, New Legal Realism and Improving the Navigation of the Yellow Submarine” 
(2005-2006), 80 Tul. L. Rev. 1161. 
56 Supra, footnote 31 at page 1427. [Rubin] 
57 Victoria Nourse and Gregory Shaffer, “Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a 
New Legal Theory” (2009) 95 Cornell L. Rev. 61 at page 88. 
58 Supra, footnote 33 at page 613. [Dagan] 
59 Supra, footnote 57 at page 76. [Nourse and Shaffer] 
60 Martha Albertson Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State” 60 Emory L.J. 254.  





dramatic shift to non-adversarial approaches,” through “drastic change,” “fundamental overhaul” 
and a “paradigm shift”62 in family law dispute resolution.  
 
It is admittedly a sharp turn from vulnerability theory to law and economics, which focusses 
upon the individual choices of autonomous and presumably empowered (that is, not vulnerable) 
rational economic actors. This turn is made here for two reasons: 1) it has been noted in law and 
economics literature that the ability of tribunal systems to target specific policy objectives may 
make a tribunal model “better suited to specific areas of vulnerability,” including “at least some 
areas of family law;”63 and 2) despite that law and economics is unconcerned with power 
imbalances, which it takes as a given, and it is skeptical of the ability of governments to increase 
“net social welfare,”64 a behavioural law and economics analysis is an alternative to vulnerability 
theory for examining who benefits and who loses (that is, patterns of advantage and 
disadvantage) through the operation of law and legal systems. Such an analysis is well beyond 
the scope of this paper but is recommended as a subject of further study. 
 
 
1.3 Social and Legal Movement 
 
We experience ourselves, our thoughts and feelings as something separate from the rest. 
A kind of optical delusion of consciousness.65  
  
An analysis of the capacity of dispute resolution processes to serve human ends by meeting a set 
of goals must, naturally, identify these goals. Certain goals, such as efficiency, are 
uncontroversial but may be variously interpreted; is the standard “bare efficiency” (the number 
                                               
62 Supra, footnote 23. [Family Justice Working Group Report] 
63 Supra, footnote 16 at page 15. (Westlaw) [Roach and Sossin] 
64 Michael J. Trebilcock, “Law and Economics” (1993), 16 Dalhousie L.J. 360 at page 376.  





of cases processed and how long it takes to process them) or something more nuanced that 
accounts for user experience and fairness? Absent targeted social science research, it is risking 
hubris to claim an understanding of social consensus sufficient to justify a new social policy 
agenda. Having acknowledged that, the following is ventured. 
 
Much evidence suggests that the self-represented litigant phenomenon is now a durable socio-
legal fact, and, moreover, the population of self-represented litigants is becoming large and 
diverse enough to suggest, in areas such as family law, that the self-represented are no longer 
marginalized as against the mainstream, they have become the mainstream. Ample empirical 
research, including my own, supports the now-mainstream status of self-represented litigants, 
which, in turn, suggests several things: first, this “group” occupies a significant place in justice 
systems, and their perceptions of the way they are treated translates into confidence (or the lack 
of it) in these systems.66 Second, designing justice systems to serve the interests of self-
represented litigants is not a matter of tailoring justice to the quirks of individuals or outliers; nor 
is it a “nanny state” solution for the underprivileged. Third, the increasing diversity of self-
represented litigants (more to the point: low income is no longer the defining feature of self-
represented litigants) makes it difficult to dismiss vulnerability theory’s proposition that the 
population of self-represented litigants could include almost any one, at almost any time, and 
social policy goals should address this common risk.  
 
                                               
66 Ronald Staudt and Paula L Hannaford, “Access to Justice for the Self Represented Litigant: An 





Efforts to improve access to justice often contain a “substantive equality” argument and are 
driven by “ethical demand.”67 An example deeply relevant to this project is the reform of spousal 
support law in Canada. In a period known as the “trilogy era,” broad-based dissatisfaction 
developed with meagre, short-term spousal support awards premised upon the “formal equality” 
of separated spouses. Support orders were based upon un-nuanced and often unrealistic 
assumptions about the ability of ex-spouses who had been financially dependent in marriage, 
usually women, to become financially independent after separation.68 In Moge v. Moge69 the 
Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged academic writing on the “feminization of poverty” and 
departed from the prior line of precdent.70 Carol Rogerson and D.A. Rollie Thompson 
subsequently created the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (“SSAG”) pursuant to which the 
quantum and duration of spousal support are standardized within ranges, calculated by applying 
factors such as years worked during marriage, children and their ages, length of marriage, and so 
on. The effect was to incorporate individual circumstances into the analysis of a spouse’s ability 
to become self-sufficient after separation. The threshold issue of entitlement to support was left 
to be determined based upon individual circumstances. It is difficult to overstate the significance 
of the SSAG, which have profoundly improved outcomes for separated women and their 
children. 
 
                                               
67 “Ethical demand” refers to demand for innovation in response to the misalignment of a system or law with 
perceived norms or social values. See: Martha Fineman and Anna Grear, “Introduction, Vulnerability as 
Heuristic – an Invitation to Future Exploration” in Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for 
Law and Politics, Anna Grear, Martha Albertson Fineman (eds.) (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., Jan. 28, 2014).  
68 Carol Rogerson, “Spousal Support After Moge” (1996), 14 Can. Fam. L. Q. 281; and, Carol Rogerson, “The 
Canadian Law of Spousal Support” (2004-2005), 38 Fam. L.Q. 69. 
69 Moge v. Moge, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813.  





Follow-up research indicates the SSAG, despite being advisory only, were quickly and widely 
adopted by Canadian trial courts, and endorsed by appellate courts;71 they have gained 
tremendous status and legitimacy. The British Columbia Court of Appeal has gone so far as to 
suggest the SSAG should invariably be applied in the absence of articulated reasons as to why 
they should not. This presumptive approach has been endorsed by the Ontario Court of Appeal, 
although it has been criticized in other provinces.72  
 
Whatever social forces might have resisted the SSAG, (lingering support for formal equality, 
men’s rights groups preferring the status quo, individualized justice enthusiasts chafing at 
standardization…) were seemingly overcome. The SSAG were propelled by the prior 
development of a rule-based mindset with respect to financial outcomes in family law, the prior 
struggles of courts to reconcile spousal support with prevailing notions of formal gender 
equality,73 and forceful arguments in the literature about the “feminization of poverty.”74 In 
retrospect, the SSAG seem to be an instance of ethical demand enabling the law to respond to the 
“vulnerable subject.”  
 
As suggested above, it has increasingly been recognized that adversarial processes, sometimes 
associated with a “winning at all costs” ethic, are unsuitable for family law dispute resolution.75 
                                               
71 Carol Rogerson and D.A. Rollie Thompson, “Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines Three and a Half 
(almost) Years Later: Cases, Criticisms and Responses, Revisions” Family Law Source (Westlaw). See also 
Carol Rogerson and D.A. Rollie Thompson, “The Canadian Experiment with Spousal Support Guidelines” 
infra, footnote 151.  
72Julien D. Payne, “Recent Developments in Family Law in the Common Law Provinces” (2011), 38 Advoc. 
Q. 292 at pages 325-326. 
73 Supra, footnote 68, at page 281. [Rogerson, After Moge]  
74 See: Moge v. Moge, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813. 
75 See: supra, footnote 7. [Australian Law Reform Commission, Discussion Paper] See also: Michael King, 





Indeed, the stated goals of family court reform initiatives, which almost invariably emphasize the 
importance of alternative consensual dispute resolution processes, illustrate that norms now 
support non-acrimonious divorce. A celebrity couple’s press release announcing their “conscious 
uncoupling” was derided as pretentious, but nonetheless conveyed an idea with social currency. 
Vulnerability theory clearly emphasizes human connectedness and interdependence, as do 
popular spiritual movements and academics in a variety of fields.76 For example, in a 
vulnerability theory analysis of climate change, “existential assets” were defined as systems of 
belief that include religion and perhaps politics, which may foster “an ethic of human oneness 
that can serve as a catalyst for an equitable global climate regime in which all communities can 
be resilient.”77 It is abstract, yet entertaining, to consider that neuroscience has discovered an 
interdependence between the right and left hemispheres of the brain – they reportedly have more 
overlapping functionality than was previously thought, and what is more, it has been 
convincingly argued that a left brain orientation (described as a sort of disease, or at least 
dysfunction) has become culturally dominant over the past century, resulting in a lamentable loss 
of “betweenness” among people.78 To venture deeper (literally), quantum mechanics has 
demonstrated that simply measuring the spin of one particle can instantaneously change the spin 
of another, far away, seemingly separate particle, which some consider an explanation for 
telepathy (the ultimate connectedness), and which Einstein famously referred to as “spooky 
action at a distance.”79  
                                               
76 See: Martha Minow, “Lawyering for Human Dignity” (2002-2003), 11 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol'y & L. 
143. 
77 Atieno Mboya, “Vulnerability and the Climate Change Regime” (2008) 36 UCLA J. Envtl. L & Pol’y 79 at 
page 93. 
78 Iain McGilchrist, The Master and his Emissary, The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World, 
(Yale University Press, 2009) at pages 393-397. 






I argue that cultural approbation of a more “enlightened” approach to divorce, the mainstream 
status of self-represented litigants, a legal realist, evidence-based approach to law and social 
policy, and the emergence of vulnerability theory as a way of understanding what law is and 
ought to be, all combine to suggest growing potential to build a family law settlement system  
designed for self-represented parties; in other words, a legitimate social policy goal upon which a 






This chapter has outlined the scope of the institutional analysis undertaken in this thesis and 
discussed vulnerability theory as a theoretical support for placing the institutional effects of 
social institutions upon vulnerable populations at the centre of social policy. Changing social 
norms with respect to family dissolution have been suggested as further support for considering  
alternative institutional approaches to family law dispute resolution and it has been suggested 
that a transition from courts to tribunal, at least for custody cases, is neither a novel nor radical 
















































This chapter reviews prior research and writing as to the progress of the access to justice 
movement, the reported experiences of self-represented litigants, the value of structured 
decision-making, the importance of truth-finding, and the effects of formality in court-based 
family law dispute resolution processes. It discusses some potential objections to this project 
The parties had a highly conflictual marriage. Eventually the wife abruptly left, 
taking the children to her parents’ home in another town, and later informing the 
husband that the marriage was over. The husband, unemployed, poorly educated 
and volatile, was from a wealthy family. He hired an excellent lawyer and brought 
an application for interim custody based upon the wife absconding with the 
children. The wife, who earned little more than minimum wage, was represented at 
various times but in the main was self-represented. The husband was awarded 
interim sole custody. 
 
Years later there had not yet been a trial. Both sides had ordered private 
assessments that took a very long time to produce; the court was booking well into 
the future not only for trials, but for the series of mandatory pre-trial conferences; 
counsel had other commitments; custody was only one issue between the parties 
and despite repeated orders for disclosure the husband was not forthcoming, 
creating further delay from which he benefitted.  
 
Throughout this time, the children remained enrolled in school near the father’s 
home, continued their friendships and close relationships with extended family 
members. The wife had moved in with her parents, who lived over an hour’s drive 
away. 
 
At the Trial Management Conference, the last in a series of conferences in which 
settlement was explored and encouraged, the conference judge urges the couple to 
come to terms yet wearily remarks that the history of the case gives him little 
reason to hope they will. 
 
On the literal verge of trial, in the courthouse, the husband’s lawyer presides over 
a long and intense last-ditch settlement meeting, during which the wife is self-
represented, and the parties finally reach an agreement. Settlement seemingly 
enabled by the arrival of the wife’s understanding that she cannot overcome the 
status quo established at the outset and, perhaps, the husband’s realization of his 






under the heading “But We Do That Already” and briefly discusses innovative court models and 
systems. 
 
2.1  Access to Justice 
 
Access to justice is a matter of political will.80 
The Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General’s “Four Pillars” family law reform initiative, 
launched in 2008, was based upon submissions to the Attorney General by a number of 
stakeholder groups, including the Ontario Bar Association, the ADR Institute of Ontario and the 
Ontario Association for Family Mediation, with support from the Ontario Collaborative Law 
Federation and the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts.81  The “Four Pillars” were 
hailed for representing the arrival of sufficient consensus to mobilize reform;82 although sparse 
funding and a piecemeal approach to implementation were initially noted as concerns.83 It has 
since been asserted that the Four Pillars have resulted in better access to information, improved 
intake processes, improved access to legal advice, and  streamlined court processes.84 Surveys of 
Ontario Family Law Information Centre users and participants in similar programs in British 
Columbia have reported that eighty percent of study participants regard program services as 
effective,85 although concerns remain over underfunding and heavy reliance upon volunteer 
lawyers and law students.86 
 
                                               
80 Supra, footnote 16. [Roach and Sossin] 
81 Barbara Landau et al., “Home Court Advantage; Creating a Family Law Process That Works” Ontario Bar 
Association (2009). 
82 Supra, footnote 9 at pages 271. [Bala, Reforming Family Dispute Resolution] 
83 See: supra, footnote 22 at page 413. [Semple and Rogerson]  
84 Supra, footnote 9 at pages 280-297. [Bala, Reforming Family Dispute Resolution] 
85 Supra, footnote 22 at page 420. [Semple and Rogerson] The authors report that “relatively high” numbers of 
survey subjects were not yet involved in a court process. 





Following the Four Pillars reforms, numerous studies have indicated that low and middle-income 
groups in Canada continue to have significant unmet legal needs.87 The 2010 Ontario Civil 
Needs Project found that in family law matters thirty percent of low and middle-income 
Ontarians have unmet legal needs, and in general, almost eighty percent of Ontarians believe the 
justice system privileges the wealthy.88 In 2011, Ontario Chief Justice Warren K. Winkler 
characterized the family justice system as “in crisis” and “in desperate need of repair,”89 and the 
Rule of Law Index, published in the same year by the World Justice Project, placed Canada 
among the top ten countries in the world with respect to various categories related to upholding 
the rule of law, but in the category of “access to civil justice,” ranked Canada sixteenth out of 
twenty-three high income countries.90 Similarly, a 2012 White Paper reported that seventy 
percent of self-represented litigants surveyed across Canada indicated that their needs are not 
adequately serviced in all types of courts.91 The White Paper pointedly describes what is at stake 
in the access to justice movement: whether meaningful access to justice systems is a legitimate 
societal expectation, or a privilege:92 
The justice system and its stakeholders must recommit to the core dispute resolution 
purpose for which the system was designed: to provide a meaningful, fair, just and 
accessible venue for citizens– represented or not –to resolve their disputes.93 
 
                                               
87 Justice Thomas A. Cromwell, “Access to Justice: Towards a Collaborative and Strategic Approach” 33d 
Viscount Bennett Memorial Lecture (2012), 63 U.N.B.L.J. 38. 
88 Ontario Civil Needs Project Steering Committee Report (2010), online: 
http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/may3110_oclnreport_final.pdf 
89 Warren K. Winkler, “Address to the Carleton County Law Association” online: 
http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/coa/en/ps/speeches/2011-Annual-Institute-Family-Law-CCLA.htm# 
90 Supra, footnote 87. [Cromwell, Towards a Collaborative] 
91 Trevor C.W. Farrow, Diana Lowe, Bradley Albrecht, Heather Manweiller, Martha E. Simmons, Addressing 
the Needs of Self Represented Litigants in The Canadian Justice System: A White Paper Prepared for the 




92 Ibid., at pages 24-25. [Farrow et al., White Paper] 






The Family Justice Working Group Report94 was released in 2013 by the Action Committee on 
Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters, a committee of the Canadian Bar Association 
formed with the encouragement of Supreme Court of Canada Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin, 
and comprised of leaders in civil and family justice.95 The Report describes substantive family 
law as “highly evolved and comprehensive,” and the procedures by which it is applied as 
“increasingly complex, unaffordable and inaccessible.”96 The Report lists changes in the practice 
of family law over the past twenty-five years, including “revised rules and forms, increased 
involvement of judges in settlement discussions, legal information programs, subsidized 
mediation, post-separation parenting programs and the adoption by the legal profession of “non-
adversarial approaches to family law,” 97 and concludes:  
Canadians do not have adequate access to family justice. For many years now reports 
have been telling us that cost, delay, complexity and other barriers are making it 
impossible for many Canadians to exercise their legal rights.98 [emphasis added] 
 
The Family Justice Working Group Report has an activist tone; it states that “good ideas alone 
are not enough,” suggesting it is time for “concrete action and full implementation of ideas that 
have been on the books for some time now.”99 As noted above, the Report states that family law 
research and previous inquiries have indicated a need for “a more dramatic shift to non-
adversarial approaches,” and uses language such as “drastic change,” “fundamental overhaul” 
and “paradigm shift.”100 The Report contains thirty-three specific recommendations aimed at 
                                               
94 Supra, footnote 23. [Family Justice Working Group Report] 
95 Ibid., at page 1. [Family Justice Working Group Report] 
96 Ibid. [Family Justice Working Group Report] 
97 Ibid., at page 2. [Family Justice Working Group Report] 
98 Ibid., at page 8. [Family Justice Working Group Report] 
99 Ibid., at page 3. [Family Justice Working Group Report] 





more consensual processes, revised substantive law, access to legal services, and reformed court 
processes. Broad policy goals include: a “cultural change” in the justice system, a client-centered 
perspective (in place of a “professional- centered” or “access-to-lawyers” orientation), expanded 
legal aid funding, a greater role for paralegals and other non-lawyer experts, post-resolution 
support for families, completing the unification of family courts in Ontario, and increased 
funding for all family justice programs and services.101 The 2013 Access to Civil & Family 
Justice: A Roadmap for Change Report also calls for deep reform, suggesting a child-centred 
multi-disciplinary model for family dispute resolution.102 
 
Justice Cromwell has remarked that “a mountain of evidence” indicates that lack of access to 
courts and lawyers is only one aspect of the access to justice problem.103 The overarching 
concern which undermines the accessibility of courts, and drives demand for alternatives to 
courts, is the well-known potential for family litigation to worsen conflict and damage long-term 
relationships. Indeed, the messaging of family courts appears to be “Danger - Do Not Enter.” In 
case this assertion strikes the reader as hyperbolic, the following passage from Judge Harvey 
Brownstone’s book Tug of War: A Judge's Verdict on Separation, Custody Battles, and the Bitter 
Realities of Family Court,104 illustrates the point:  
Everyone who works in family law, including judges, agrees on two things: family court 
is not good for families, and litigation is not good for children. The emotional carnage 
resulting from family litigation, and its impact on the unfortunate children of warring 
parents, cannot be overstated. And yet, family courts everywhere are jammed with 
couples asking judges to decide who gets custody of their children, how often the 
                                               
101 Ibid. [Family Justice Working Group Report] 
102 Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters. “Access to Civil & Family Justice: A 
Roadmap for Change” (2013), online: 
http://www.cfcj-fcjc.org/sites/default/files/docs/2013/AC_Report_English_Final.pdf 
103 Supra, footnote 87 at page 39. [Cromwell, Towards a Collaborative] 
104 Harvey Brownstone, Tug of War: A Judge's Verdict on Separation, Custody Battles, and the Bitter 





children will see the noncustodial parent, how the matrimonial property is to be divided, 
and how much spousal and/or child support must be paid. More surprisingly, an 
alarmingly high number of people appear in court without a lawyer and try to navigate 
the court process on their own, without any idea of their rights and obligations, the 
procedural requirements, the rules of evidence, or the types of orders a court can and 
cannot make. As you might expect, the results for these people are often extremely 
frustrating at best and disastrous at worst…105 
 
Justice Brownstone has been quoted in academic literature106 and government sponsored 
research,107 suggesting the weight of his views extends beyond the popular culture audience for 
which Tug of War appears to have been written. 
 
A similarly alarming tone is evident in the following comments of Quinn, J. in the 2010 case, 
Bruni v. Bruni,108 which was reported in the Globe and Mail:109  
This is yet another case that reveals the ineffectiveness of Family Court in a bitter 
custody/access dispute, where the parties require therapeutic intervention rather than 
legal attention. Here, a husband and wife have been marinating in a mutual hatred so 
intense as to surely amount to a personality disorder requiring treatment.110 
  
 
Chief Justice Warren K. Winkler’s commentary, referred to above, includes a specific reference 
to the “stress that the court procedure places on the participants in an already highly emotional 
dispute,” and compares the effect of the legal system on family disputes to “throwing gasoline on 
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a fire.”111 The now-retired Chief Justice asserted a need for “dramatic and pragmatic revision” of 
the manner in which family law services are delivered.112  
 
The apparent intractability of the problems discussed above is illustrated by a 2016 study 
undertaken by Michael Saini, Rachel Birnbaum and Nicholas Bala, 113 in which new empirical 
research was conducted to better understand the experiences of parents in family law 
proceedings. The authors note that over the past four decades, services for separating families 
have been expanded; they summarize these developments as follows: mandatory attendance at an 
information program, improved information services at courts, special support services for 
domestic violence cases, improved access to legal advice through duty counsel for low income 
litigants, representation through legal aid for the lowest income groups for a limited range of 
issues  (with greater access for domestic violence cases), early access to alternatives to litigation 
including court- connected mediation which is government-subsidized for low and middle 
income parties, increased use of judicial case conferencing and case management, and continued 
services of the Ontario Office of the Children’s Lawyer. While the authors note there has not yet 
been comprehensive, coordinated research on the effects of recent family law reforms, they 
report a current and growing awareness of the need to improve court services to improve access 
to justice: 
Despite the efforts since 2010 to increase family dispute resolution services in Ontario, 
with a particular emphasis on mediation, at best many parents continue to experience 
dissatisfaction, while at worst many feel overwhelmed with the emotional and financial 
strain during a family breakdown. In this study we found that many reported that they do 
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not know enough about what services there are or how to access them. This is consistent 
with what has been found in prior studies114…This study highlights the need for a broad 
public policy discussion about the appropriate role of government in meeting the needs of 
families and children post-separation.115 
 
The authors of this recent study surveyed 241 parent-litigants, a relatively large number of whom 
had received advice from a lawyer (72.6% had received advice; 27.4% had not) and interviewed 
an additional 22 parent-litigants. Specific, seemingly persistent, problems identified in the 
interview component of the study, reported in 2016, include: 
- the court process provides the opportunity for ex partners to use children as a means of 
manipulation and retaliation for issues that occurred during the relationship; 
- many parents are concerned about the financial strain caused by litigation as well as the 
emotional stress associated with the court process; 
- the majority of parents describe the court process as inadequate for addressing their 
needs, resulting in decreased finances, increased stress, and increased conflict; 
specifically, the length of the family court process, the lack of enforcement of court 
orders, financial strain, emotional strain, “social risks,” the lack of helpful online 
resources and free legal advice, and access to therapeutic support; 
- the emotional impact of the court process seems to exacerbate emotional vulnerabilities 
related to the family breakdown; 
- online services are unhelpful and unclear, “makes it sound super easy and anyone can do 
it” but not relevant for the majority of people who are separating; and  
- half an hour with a free lawyer is not enough. 
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The persistence of the problems for children in connection with high conflict family law 
litigation is illustrated in a 2017 review of the Ottawa Coordinated Case Management Project for 
High Conflict Custody and Access Cases, in which by-now familiar themes are repeated. It states 
that the issues involved in family law are increasingly complex, both legally and clinically, and 
the problem is complicated by increasing numbers of self-represented litigants, the adversarial 
nature of the legal system, delays inherent in the court process, and diminished government 
funding for family services. Most important, in my view, it states that high conflict family 
litigation can “exacerbate and perpetuate parental conflict leaving children at risk of negative 
long-term adjustment,”116 specifically: “lower school performance, behavioral problems, 
psychological and social adjustment difficulties, lower self-esteem, and mental health issues such 
as depression and eating disorders and alcohol and drug problems.”117   
 
2.2  Self-Represented Litigants  
 
 Many of my lawyer friends freely admit that they could not possibly afford their own 
services... It must be asked whether, for a large segment of the population, we have a 
functioning civil justice system at all.118 
 
(a)  Experiences of Self-Represented Litigants 
 
Reports on the rate of self-representation in Canadian family law cases vary, in part because 
parties may be represented or not at various stages of a proceeding. The federal government 
estimated, as of 2012, that between sixty-four and seventy-four percent of parties are self-
represented at the time of filing a court application, and forty to fifty-seven percent are self-
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represented when appearing in court.119 Birbaum and Bala quote Justice Winkler’s estimate of 
seventy percent, on average, and further cite Ontario government data that estimates the rate of 
self-representation at sixty-two percent in 2006-2007, and fifty-four percent in 2010.120 
American research indicates a rate of self-representation of over eighty percent in family law 
cases.121 According to recent Canadian empirical research studies, the number of self-represented 
litigants is likely to increase.122  
 
Among senior members of the judiciary, Chief Justice McLachlin has remarked that for self-
represented litigants, “[p]utting the facts and the law before the court may be an insurmountable 
hurdle;” 123 Chief Justice Finch of the British Columbia Court of Appeal has remarked that courts 
are not the appropriate venue for solving underlying social problems, and it is unrealistic for 
courts to address “mental illness, substance abuse, poverty, lack of education, inadequate or no 
parenting, and dysfunctional relationships,” as these problems require “well-considered, 
evidence-based policy solutions;”124 and Justice Cromwell has observed that the delay and added 
cost associated with self-represented litigants may “even jeopardize the rights of other, 
represented litigants.”125Commentary contained in the Canadian Judicial Council’s Statement of 
                                               
119 Government of Canada, Department of Justice, online: https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/fl-lf/divorce/jf-
pf/srl-pnr.html 
120 Rachel Birnbaum and Nicholas Bala, “Views of Ontario Lawyers on Self-Represented Litigants” (2012), 63 
U.N.B.L.J. 99 at pages 123-124. 
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Principles on Self Represented Litigants and Accused Persons, summarizes the problem as 
follows:  
Self-represented persons are generally uninformed about their rights and about the 
consequences of choosing the options available to them; they may find court procedures 
complex, confusing and intimidating; and they may not have the knowledge or skills to 
participate actively and effectively in their own litigation... the average person may be 
overwhelmed by the simplest of court procedures.126  
 
Birnbaum and Bala’s recent research on the experience of self-represented family litigants in 
Ontario, reports that sixty-four percent of those surveyed describe the family court system as 
“difficult or very difficult” to navigate,127 and Julie Macfarlane’s National Self Represented 
Litigants Project study describes the awkward fit between self-represented litigants and 
adversarial court systems, as follows: 
The foundational principle of the justice system (even in family matters) is adversarial 
advocacy. Judges and lawyers are accustomed to framing every interaction in these terms. 
Self-represented parties who lack training in law do not fit easily into this framework; 
and when the make efforts to adopt this strategy, they are often seen as unreasonable, 
ignorant and obstructive.128 
 
The Macfarlane report points to an urgent need for innovation in dealing with self-represented 
litigants; its recommendations include: intensive face-to-face interaction at the intake stage; more 
process-related and tactical online information, and less emphasis on substantive law, interactive 
information systems; access to counseling services, re-thinking duty counsel, adopting a 
coaching model for legal advice services, onsite mediation services preceded by an orientation 
session, expanding the scope of what non-lawyers can do, and re-orienting the justice system 
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toward self-represented litigants through a multi-professional, problem-solving approach.129 The 
study reports that the personal costs of self-representation occur on a scale which “commands 
recognition,” and may include the depleted savings, employment instability as a result of time 
devoted to litigation, and various mental and physical health issues, including debilitating 
anxiety over court appearances.130  
 
 
(b)  Reasons for Self-Representation 
 
Not surprisingly, research suggests that self-representation is primarily a result of the inability to 
“afford” legal services.131  The concept of “affordable” is not straightforward. Even those with 
sufficient assets or resources to pay for or finance legal representation may decide that the 
financial sacrifices involved, often compared to the cost of a university education or simply 
“using up the family assets,” are too great. Legal aid is, of course, only available to those with 
income below the regulated threshold, although greater access to representation is available in 
domestic violence cases,132 with the result that among cases where eligibility is based upon 
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Both legal and cultural factors have been suggested to account for ever-rising numbers of self-
represented litigants including, “Legal aid cuts...Mistrust of lawyers. The "do-it-yourself" 
credo. An unwillingness to accept legal advice. TV lawyer shows that make it look easy.”133  
 
Birnbaum and Bala’s research referred to above indicates that a significant minority of self-
represented litigants regard representation as unnecessary; they do not believe lack of 
representation negatively affects outcomes.134 The Ontario Civil Legal Needs Project reports an 
increasing desire on the part of litigants to take control of their legal problems, and concludes 
that a majority of Ontarians obtain legal advice when faced with legal problems, which they 
generally find satisfactory, but still indicate a preference for taking part in solving legal 
problems.135  
 
It obvious that a shift in power dynamics has occurred as a result of information technology. The 
Canadian Bar Association has acknowledged that some clients now question “the basic value 
proposition of lawyers,” 136 and has urged the legal profession to adapt to new expectations, 
noting that clients now demand lower costs, more participation in decision-making and better 
information on risks and potential outcomes, all of which is in keeping with other commentary 
suggesting an hourly billing structure is less well tolerated among those who are capable of 
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gaining significant information and understanding by self-informing.137 Indeed, the term “digital 
divide,” coined to capture the privilege once associated with access to computers and the 
capacity to fully exploit their uses, already seems anachronistic. To the extent such a divide 
remains, it likely applies to only the very marginalized – those who are perhaps more likely to 
gain access to legal aid. 
 
The self-help ethic is now supported by an increasingly diverse range of resources, propelled by 
information-technology. At least 540 Canadian law and legal process blogs and podcasts are now 
reported to exist, featuring advice and commentary from lawyers, academics and social justice 
advocates.138 The Macfarlane study referred to above combines research with activism; it is a 
component of the “National Self-Represented Litigants Project,” which is “committed to 
assisting all those affected by the self-represented litigant phenomenon,”139 and recently acquired 
intervenor status in Pintea v. Johns,140 in which an order dismissing the claim of a self-
represented litigant, with costs, was reversed by the Supreme Court of Canada.  
 
As all of the above suggests, the concept of self-help, in the context of individuals dealing with 
social institutions, seems increasingly perceived as much as a reflection of competence, 
autonomy and self-reliance, than as piteous disadvantage – a status claim implying spare time, 
intellectual capacity, and a refusal to succumb to traditional (and for some, discredited) power 
structures.141 It is important to note the obvious fact that not all self-represented litigants are 
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equally empowered by the self-help ethic; as the research noted above points out, only a minority 
of self-represented litigants believe representation is irrelevant to outcomes. To the extent there 
has been an evolution from stigma to status, it may explain the growing number of middle class 
self-represented litigants, but it does not necessarily imply that court processes have ceased to be 
a source of profound difficulty, and in family law cases, damage, for self-represented parties 
(and their dependents) as a whole. 
 
Finally, the Macfarlane study referred to above indicates that self-represented parties question 
the inability of paralegals to provide family law services.”142 Paralegals were active in Ontario 
family law proceedings prior to 2007, at which time the Law Society of Ontario assumed 
responsibility for their licensing and simultaneously excluded family law from the scope of 
permitted paralegal practice. According to the Law Society, the “complexity of family law 
requires expertise only a lawyer can provide.” A motion to reinstate paralegals in family matters 
was put forward in 2010 but withdrawn following a vigorous campaign of opposition by the 
Ontario Bar Association and the Family Lawyers Association.143 Bertrand, Birbaum and Bala 
report in a 2014 study that seventy-five percent of judges surveyed approved of family law 
paralegals, but only twenty-five percent of lawyers shared that view.144 The Attorney General of 
Ontario and the Law Society of Upper Canada, as it then was, conducted a review of family legal 
services in 2016, which recommended the development of a specialized license for paralegals 
which would allow them to provide specified family law legal services, such as legal advice 
document preparation, representation in mediation, and court appearances up to, but not 
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including, trial. This recommendation was opposed by the family law bar; the Law Society has 
nonetheless indicated support for the proposal, and a new regulatory framework may yet 
emerge.145  
 
2.4  Clear Law: Structured Decision-Making  
 
 
Broad discretion and vague legal standards have been criticized for creating uncertainty in the 
negotiating environment, encouraging swift positioning and pursuit of claims because outcomes 
are unpredictable, and leading other claims to be abandoned due to the costs and other barriers 
inherent in “individualized justice systems;”146 that is, court systems. Mnookin and Kornhauser 
point out that “different rules give various amounts of bargaining chips to the parties,” and an 
inability to understand the rules - because they are not articulated or articulated only vaguely - 
results in the need for legal advice to understand one’s “bargaining chips” and forecast probable 
outcomes.147   
 
An inability to assess probable outcomes may encourage extreme positions and contribute to the 
need for expert evidence to substantiate these positions, which lengthens the dispute resolution 
process, and advantages the party with deeper financial resources and greater capacity to 
withstand the inherent stresses. Moreover, immediate financial needs, often coupled with 
inaccurate information about a spouse's finances, may lead the weaker party to feel greater 
settlement pressure, and thereby frame their negotiation goals in terms of what they believe they 
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can reasonably (and more easily) expect to get, rather than actual entitlements.148 A study of 
lawyers’ views on the self-represented litigant phenomenon arrives at the important, but 
unsurprising, conclusion that women who are victims of domestic violence are “especially 
vulnerable to making unfavourable economic settlements;”149 the need to ensure the quality of 
settlement in cases of high parental conflict is well understood.150 
  
In family law the preference for rule-based law or vague law varies depending upon context; in 
the application of the best-interests-of-the-child test broad discretion is generally considered 
necessary to achieve the “individualized justice” deemed essential in these cases, whereas in the 
determination of child support and more recently, spousal support, a high degree of structure is 
seen as beneficial. The effect of structure on the negotiating environment can be illustrated by 
again looking at spousal support. According to a review study, the most frequent application of 
the SSAG takes the form of lawyers shaping the expectations of both payor and recipient clients, 
and preliminary evidence suggests fewer spousal support cases now require adjudication.151 
What is more, Carol Rogerson has noted a “hunger” among lawyers and judges for additional 
guidance with respect to the discretionary entitlement aspect of spousal support law which, as 
noted, the SSAG do not address.152  
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Legal custody presumptions have come and gone; the shift from paternal preference for custody 
based upon a child’s status as property of the father to maternal preference for custody occurred 
in step with the first wave of feminism, which advocated for a different concept of the child: as a 
person in need of nurturing and protection. Under the subsequent “tender years doctrine” the 
mother was the preferred custodial parent for very young children.153 The second wave of 
feminism in the 1960s emphasized “formal equality,” and in much the same way that formal 
gender equality led to declining awards of spousal support, rising numbers of women in the 
workforce coupled with a formal equality framework contributed to rejection of the tender years 
doctrine by 1972,154 in favour of complete reliance upon the “gender neutral” best-interests-of-
the-child test. 
 
An influential American Law Institute Report155 states that the best-interests-of-the-child test 
was better suited to the era of maternal preference presumptions, which allowed for its consistent 
and relatively straightforward application. The Report acknowledges that the maternal preference 
presumption is no longer socially viable but endorses the use of alternative presumptions, which 
have become the subject of “gender wars.”156 The rationale for presumptions is obviously to 
foster consistency and predicable outcomes, and consequently less litigation and a fairer 
negotiating environment. For example, a presumption in favour of the “primary caregiver” would 
make it less likely for custody litigation to be used as a bargaining chip, that is, less probable that 
                                               
153 Linda Elrod and Mildred D. Dale, “Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum Swings in Child Custody: The Interests 
of Children in The Balance” (2008), 42 F.L.Q. No. 1, 381 at page 391. 
154 Richard A. Warschak, “Parenting by the Clock: The Best Interest of the Child Standard, Judicial Discretion, 
and the American Law Institute Approximation Rule” (2011-2012), 41 U. Balt. L. Rev. 83 at page 92.  
155 American Law Institute, “Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, Analysis and Recommendations” 
(2002), 8:1 Duke J. Gender L. &  Pol’y, 1 online, 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1038&context=djglp  
156 Elizabeth Scott and Robert E. Emery, “Gender Politics and Child Custody: The Puzzling Persistence of The 





a primary caregiver will make economic concessions to retain this role. Some American 
jurisdictions have adopted the “primary caregiver” presumption, and where it has not been 
adopted, it is often used as a factor in the application of the best-interests-of-the-child test.157 As 
the name suggests, the person who acted as the primary caregiver before separation is presumed 
to become the custodial parent, sometimes interpreted as “sole custody” – a “winner-take-all 
outcome – and sometimes with parenting time and responsibilities of the non-custodial parent 
determined on a case by case basis. This approach is not as uncomplicated as it might seem; it 
requires factual determinations as to which parent performed what proportion of nurturing tasks, 
or in some interpretations of the presumption, which parent is the primary “psychological 
parent.” It is a retrospective exercise, however, and in that sense easier to apply than the best-
interests-of-the-child test, which requires a prospective determination of probable future 
outcomes.  
 
A somewhat different presumption, the “approximation rule,” divides parenting time and 
responsibilities after separation in accordance with parental care-taking functions prior to 
separation, subject to a number of exceptions. Critics of the approximation rule argue that: it 
increases post-separation conflict as it is difficult to apply, as it requires a more thorough 
analysis of parenting patterns than the primary caregiver presumption; it provides a poor estimate 
of parental contribution to the child’s best interests, as it conflates quantity and quality of child 
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care;158 and, it may lead to the “commodification of relationships”159 whereby parties modify 
their behaviour to affect legal outcomes. Despite these criticisms, the approximation rule, like the 
primary caregiver presumption, has the benefit of being a retrospective test and seems consistent 
with the evolution in Canada toward a general societal expectation that parents should share, in 
some proportion, in the care of their children.”160  
 
Finally, a presumption in favour of shared parenting, reportedly pursued by “fathers’ rights 
advocates,”161 has twice been proposed in Canada in the form of amendments to the Divorce 
Act.162 It was opposed by mothers’ advocacy groups and the Canadian Bar Association, and both 
times failed to pass.163 It has been observed that there is a lack of reliable empirical research on 
the effects of different custody arrangements, and although, in general, shared parenting is 
thought to be beneficial for amicable post-separation families that can bear the additional costs, it 
is not the norm, and on average fathers reportedly have significantly less parenting time than 
mothers in both separated and intact families.164 A sort of middle ground, in the form of express 
support for shared parental responsibility together with a principle of maximizing the parenting 
time of each parent (the latter of which already exists in Canada under the Divorce Act) was 
legislated in Australia in 2006.  
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In support of more structured family law it has been observed that abstract goals of equality and 
gender neutrality have unduly overshadowed the need for practical and workable decision-
making following separation, and the “entire area is permeated with symbolism that relates only 
tangentially to the realities of divorce.”165 Further, an examination of symbolism and metaphor in 
child custody dispute resolution suggests that inherited myths and symbols affect outcomes as 
much as evidence and reasoning.166 To the extent this is so, the value of “individualized justice” 
is diminished. Which is not to suggest presumptions are value-free; one criticism of the “primary 
caregiver” presumption is that in its application by judges it can be affected by contested notions 
of the ideal family, with the result that mothers who work outside the home are less likely than 
“stay-at-home mothers” to be regarded as the primary caregiver, regardless of the actual 
childcare responsibility undertaken.167   
 
The well-known effects of vague legal standards on the negotiating environment have been 
tolerated, presumably based upon the assumption inherent in adversarial systems that there can 
always be a trial in which power imbalances will be compensated for, with the assistance of legal 
representation or judicial activism. This assumption is undermined by “barriers to justice” in 
their many forms, discussed above.  
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The best-interests-of-the-child test has been described as both entrenched and contested; 168 and 
as “more an aspiration than a legal rule to guide custody decision-making.”169To the extent that 
the test does not allow for the assessment of probable outcomes, it adds to the disadvantages 
suffered by weaker parties. This, combined with the genuine preference for settlement in custody 
and access cases (quite apart from the institutional forces that drive settlement pressure) and the 
reported appetite for more structure in family law decision-making, combine to suggest potential 
ethical demand for a more structured approach to the best-interests-of-the-child test.  
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The mother is a high-status professional with a suspected drug problem, living 
in another province; the father works in a family business. The child, a girl, is 
about 4 years old. The parents have been separated, on and off, since shortly 
after her birth. Both have retained excellent lawyers, over a period of years. 
Both have anger problems – more precisely, their relationship is almost entirely 
characterized by mutual contempt and outbursts of rage. The child flies to 
access visits to see her father, accompanied by various friends and family. 
There are occasionally scenes, on at least one occasion resulting in the 
intervention of airport security and police.  
 
Every kind of formal and informal conference has been prepared for and 
attended by counsel during the years leading up to the point at which the wife’s 
out-of-province lawyer telephones the husband’s lawyer to report that the wife 
is now alleging the child was sexually assaulted by a relative, a boy about ten 
years of age, in the presence of his younger sister during the child’s last access 
visit. The allegation specifically concerns inappropriate touching at a family 
event, while the children were playing out of sight of the adults. The wife’s 






















Family law disputes, especially custody cases, are highly fact driven. Indeed, precedent is not 
always easy to find, or even considered relevant, because of the enormous variation in fact 
patterns. A distinction is sometimes drawn between fact-finding and the more strenuous (some 
would say, unrealistic)170 task of “truth-finding.” This chapter discusses the importance attached 
to accurate findings of fact in custody proceedings.171  
 
The archetypal adjudication paradigms, traditionally seen as competing and oppositional, are the 
adversarial and inquisitorial models. A detailed list of the attributes of each is set out below; 
broadly speaking, in a purely adversarial model the parties define the issues, determine the 
evidence needed and obtain it, and present their cases to a single judge in a highly structured, 
rule-bound and performative process. A purely inquisitorial model vests control in the decision-
maker to determine scope of the issues and the evidence needed, gather evidence and conduct 
                                               
170 See: Carrie Menkel-Meadow, “The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural 
World” (1996-1997), 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 5 at page 5. The author writes that “truth is elusive, partial, 
interpretable, dependent on the characteristics of the knowers as well as the known, and most importantly 
complex.” 
171 Clayson-Martin v. Martin, 2015 ONCA 596 at para. 109. (CanLII) 
Following a discussion with the husband’s lawyer, the wife’s lawyer reports the 
incident to the children's aid society in the husband’s jurisdiction.  
 
The local police immediately contact the parents of the accused children, as it is 
apparently the obligation of the society to report all sexual assault allegations 
to police. Ultimately, all of the children (including the four-year old) attend at a 
police station, where they are interviewed separately on video about the alleged 
assault. The parents of the accused children are incensed.  
 
The new video evidence is interpreted and summarized by the parties’ lawyers, 
new affidavits are drafted and sworn, medical professionals are consulted, 







investigations; parties may or may not have a role in presenting evidence and questioning 
opponents. Despite that the actual processes currently used in both Anglo-American and 
European courts (and tribunals) are highly varied and seldom conform to either paradigm, these 
archetypes remain useful reference points.  
 
Adversarial ideology holds that that truth rises out of the dust of courtroom conflict;172 however, 
adversarial systems have a long history of attracting criticism for their lack of efficacy in truth-
finding,173 including from judges. For example, Jerome Frank writes: 
Even apart from differences in lawyer skills and resources, few attorneys believe that 
adversarial combat is the most effective way to determine the truth about past events… 
Lawyers tend to scoff at the truth and stress that it is unknowable whether such a thing 
even exists. Finding out and revealing the truth is not their job. Instead, lawyers view the 
adversarial system as a vehicle to deliver a desired result for a client. Often that objective 
requires an attorney to confuse the issues or obscure the truth.174 
 
Similar criticism is far-ranging; it can be found in Roscoe Pound’s 1906 analysis of the “sporting 
theory of justice,”175 Jerome Frank’s “Fight Theory” Versus the “Truth” Theory,”176 and in the 
memoirs of a defense lawyer in the O.J. Simpson trial.177  
 
In defense of adversarial truth-finding in criminal proceedings it has been maintained that the 
intense partisanship of adversarial proceedings, reflected in party-driven fact-finding, party-hired 
                                               
172 Christopher Slobogin, “Lessons from Inquisitorialism” (2013-2014), 87 S. Cal. L Rev. 699 at page 710.  
173 Ibid. [Slobogin] 
174 Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial, Myth and Reality in American Justice (Princeton University Press, 1949) at 
page 288; see also: Jerome Frank, “The Cult of the Robe” (1945), 28 Saturday Review of Literature 41. 
175 Gerald W. Hardcastle, Adversarialism and the Family Court: A Family Court Judge's Perspective, 9 U.C. 
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experts, and lawyer-coached witnesses, is a form of protection afforded to the accused, warranted 
by the very high stakes of criminal trials, the higher standard of proof, and the disproportionate 
power and resources of the state.178 This rationale is understandable but it does not contradict a 
study on high rates of wrongful criminal conviction, which reports, “[t]he number of wrongful 
convictions each year is in the “thousands to tens of thousands...well above insignificant or 
tolerable levels,” and recommends the use of blended adversarial and inquisitorial processes in 
criminal trials;179 nor does it go to the heart of the question of truth-finding. Relatively recent 
academic literature conveys profound doubt as to the efficacy of truth-finding in adversarial 
systems;180 for example, one author’s remarks: “if one were asked to start from scratch and 
devise a system best suited to ascertaining that in criminal cases…it is inconceivable that one 
would create a system bearing much resemblance to the criminal justice process we now have in 
the United States.181  
 
It seems significant for family law that a study reported in the law and economics literature 
concludes that inquisitorial approaches are more effective in circumstances where the one party 
is unaware of disclosure defects in material provided by the other;182 that is, a common concern 
with respect to income determination in child and spousal support cases. The study recommends 
that judges, rather than parties or their lawyers, control the production of evidence in cases for 
                                               
178 John H Langbein, “The German Advantage in Civil Procedure” (1985) 52 (4) University of Chicago Law 
Review 823 at page 842.  
179 Keith A. Findley, “Adversarial Inquisitions: Rethinking the Search for the Truth” (2011-2012), 56 N.Y. L. 
Sch. L. Rev. 911 at page 912.  
180 See: supra, footnote 170 at page 6. [Menkel-Meadow] See also: ibid., at page 912. [Findley]; supra, 
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which fact-finding is critical. It is, in my view, convincingly noted in the family law literature 
that:  
The binary nature of the adversarial system and its particular methods and tactics often 
may thwart the goals any legal system183…Binary, oppositional presentations of facts in 
dispute are not the best way for us to learn the truth; polarized debate distorts the truth, 
leaves out important information, simplifies complexity, and obfuscates rather than 
clarifies.184 
 
As Carrie Menkel-Meadow elegantly puts it, in family law “there may be more than just two 
sides to every story.”185  
 
The importance of truth-finding in the application of the best-interests-of-the-child test was noted 
by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Clayson-Martin v. Martin.186 Moreover, the Court suggested 
that there is a corresponding effect upon expectations as to judicial conduct:  
In this case the trial judge’s primary obligation was to determine the children’s best 
interests. In this context, I am particularly reluctant to criticize him for questioning 
witnesses in an attempt to get at the truth.187 
 
Similarly, in Metis Child, Family and Community Services v. A.J.M. et al.,188 an appeal following 
child protection proceedings in which the judge had asked 150 questions of twenty witnesses, 
and it was alleged on appeal that sixteen interventions and 117 questions suggested bias, the 
Manitoba Court of Appeal held: 
Where the welfare of children are concerned, the trial judge may intervene as much as is 
necessary in order to clarify the facts, confirm his understanding of expert testimony and 
generally make sure his appreciation of the evidence is correct.  If necessary, he or she 
may intervene to keep the proceedings moving along efficiently.  This is true in custody 
cases, but even more necessary in child protection cases where the state with all the 
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resources at its disposal is intervening in a substantial way in the relationship between 






Classically designed courtrooms are immediately distinguishable from rooms with other 
functions and have been characterized as having a “paralyzing effect” on all but seasoned 
courtroom participants.190 Even empty, before the arrival of gowned judges, lawyers and court 
staff, courtrooms convey a mix of authority, tradition, formality and hierarchy.  
 
American jurist and legal realist scholar Jerome Frank challenged many aspects of traditional 
adversarial processes, including sartorial formality.191 He characterized judicial robes as 
“heartless relics of the past,” and “priestly trappings” that create “an air of judicial aristocracy” 
and symbolize the notion that “courts must always preserve ancient ways, the past is sacred, and 
change impious.”192 He argued that the effect of robes in particular, and formality in general, 
runs deeper than their disquieting effects on the uninitiated. Long before the self-represented 
litigant phenomenon, Frank made several observations that now seem prescient: the 
administration of justice can be undermined by formality, as witnesses who are merely 
uncomfortable may appear to be disingenuous; informality encourages plain speaking, which is 
needed to further the progress of law from the “private possession of a professional guild” to 
something comprehensible to the “man on the street;” and finally, the need for fear of authority 
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is the mark of an “immature society.” It seems important to note Frank’s perspective is not 
universally appreciated,193 and it some research suggests that more respect is accorded to 
decisions made in an atmosphere of formality.194  
 
Studies of courtroom dynamics indicate that aspects of courtroom design, such as sightlines and 
proximities among lawyers, judges, jurors and witnesses, affect perceptions of lawyer 
competence, and in alternative dispute resolution settings it has been demonstrated that even the 
location of tables and chairs can change behavior.195 For example, a study of the effects of spatial 
dynamics upon the effectiveness of mediation processes it was found that some physical settings, 
such as a those that allow “cross corner interaction” between parties and a mediator seated at the 
same table, tend to bring people together and encourage interaction.196 These studies suggest that 
efforts to adapt courtrooms to therapeutic, less adversarial processes face inherent challenges. 
Indeed, the deep significance of structure and symbolism is reflected in courtrooms built in post-
war Germany and post-apartheid South Africa197 – with glass walls and literally level “playing 
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2.6  But We Do That Already… 
Many reform initiatives are, understandably, ad hoc attempts to address specific 
problems with little thought given to the causes of the problem or to the impact of the 
proposed "solution" on the system as a whole. 198 
 
In casual discussions of this project, I have been met with the view that the practice of family 
law and the attendant court processes have been so extensively reformed that a tribunal model 
could not improve upon this new reality. This perspective is addressed below through a brief 
review of some of the more important developments in family law dispute resolution in Ontario 
and in other jurisdictions. 
 
 (a)  Less Adversarial Processes  
 
Ontario family court systems have incorporated less adversarial processes with the goal of 
making family court processes less damaging to families, and more accessible and for self-
represented litigants,199 including mandated (albeit limited) judicial assistance for self-
represented litigants and time-limited free mediation services (in some locations, for some 
litigants). Some court locations provide information programs and student clinics to assist with 
the preparation of documents. The Family Law Rules200 have been amended to allow judges to 
appoint a single expert,201 and a new summary judgment rule has been implemented202 with the 
goal of promoting proportionality and overcoming the problem of long-standing interim orders 
made with limited information. Some of these innovations are relatively new and untested and 
may prove to be effective and beneficial.  
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Despite a lengthy history of reform and further reform proposals, as noted above, the Family 
Justice Working Group Report points to an “implementation gap,” which it attributes to lack of 
funding and failure of the justice system to completely embrace non-adversarial processes; 
indeed, the Report suggests there is “still untapped potential for non-adversarial values and 
consensual dispute resolution processes.”203  The attribution of this implementation gap, in part, 
to justice system culture is disturbing given that cultural change within established systems is, as 
a matter of common sense, slow.  
 
(b)  Changing Roles of Lawyers and Judges  
A Law Commission of Ontario study reports that the skills relevant to family law decision-
making include facility with the Family Law Rules,204 applicable statutes and case law, as well as 
an understanding of the relevant social issues, which may include domestic violence, power 
dynamics, mental health, and high conflict.205 The knowledge, skills and training required for 
specialized family law judges are considered to reach well beyond traditional judicial roles and 
to include effecting “changes in parental behaviours and attitudes.”206 It has been recommended 
that judges undertake training in child development, and lawyers have been encouraged to 
become therapeutic actors, in part through multidisciplinary training as part of law school 
curricula.  
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It has further been suggested in family law writing that legal professionals, lawyers and judges 
alike, begin to see legal services as part of a larger, “seamless system of social services” for 
families, and accept the need to work on an even footing with other professionals.207 While 
family law lawyers have undoubtedly made immense practice changes (anecdotal reports suggest 
aggressive strategies are now derided as “old school”) it seems unlikely that the vision of a 
seamless system of social services can be realized through reliance upon extra training and the 
good intentions of judges and the family law bar.  
 
The American literature describes some judges as “activists” who are energized by new judicial 
roles, and others as uncomfortable or openly opposed to change.208 The Macfarlane study 
similarly concludes that judges vary widely in their apparent willingness or ability to adapt to 
self-represented parties, and sets out contrasting reports of incivility on the part of some judges, 
and ready assistance on the part of others.209 This “Jekyll and Hyde response” to self-represented 
litigants has been attributed to an unsurprising systemic ambivalence to the presence of self-
represented litigants within a system premised upon representation.210 In the result, the role of 
judges is no doubt being shaped by new realities and institutional expectations, but on a highly 
individualized basis.   
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(c)  Multi-Disciplinary Decision-Making  
 
Judges with this type of caseload [family law]...need to have access to services such as 
family court counsellors, mediators, parenting coordinators, mental health professionals, 
and children's lawyers, attached to the court and easily accessible, to facilitate change in 
the behaviours and attitudes of parents who are not acting in their children's best 
interests...211 
 
Multidisciplinary input is widely considered desirable for family law cases,212 especially custody 
cases, for the obvious reason that custody cases involve predictions about future outcomes based 
upon social, developmental and psychological factors outside the expertise of most judges. This 
is consistent with an apparently growing recognition in many fields that decision-making is 
becoming more complex and is enhanced by multi-disciplinary perspectives.213  
 
It must be emphasized that in family law judges are not the problem; it is the ill-fit between 
judicial experience and qualifications and the requirements of family law, particularly custody 
and access disputes, that is problematic. Not only are judges often underqualified to apply a legal 
test requiring a prediction of the future effects of competing parenting plans, sometimes with 
insufficient or dubious information,214 in my view, they are over-qualified to make holiday 
access orders. 
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Bala and Saunders have observed that there is ongoing controversy in family law about the 
appropriate role of expert witnesses.215 In the family court system, clinical input is primarily 
obtained through expert evidence in the form of custody and access assessments,216 a practice 
that has attracted debate on several fronts, including as to judicial over-reliance upon outside 
assessments. Judicial comfort in assessments is understandable; as others have observed, courts 
are not well-positioned to weigh evidence and custody cases because in general, evidence is 
personal, behavioral and difficult to verify, and in particular, parental closeness to a child is 
important but difficult to prove.217 
 
In Canada, judges in family proceedings may appoint a mental health professional to perform an 
assessment of the child and parents, and provide a report.218 Of course, one or both parents may 
obtain a private assessment as well. A judge-ordered assessment may be paid for by the parties, 
in proportions determined by the court, or a judge may request an assessment through the Office 
of the Children’s Lawyer (OCL). The OCL determines whether a particular case warrants its 
attention and accepts about fifty percent of requests.219 Obtaining assessments can be 
problematic, as indicated in a 2017 study:  
As with many other issues related to the family justice system, some of the most pressing 
challenges concerning experts relate to a lack of resources and inadequate access to the 
services of qualified mental health professionals for this type of work. Lack of training, 
education, and support has resulted into a few professionals who can do this type of 
work, and often significant delays in getting access to those who do it.220  
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This study suggests that reliability is a further problem. Private assessments are performed by a 
variety of actors, and social workers, psychologists and psychiatrists use a variety of 
methodologies,221 none of which are standardized.222  The problem is taken a step further by 
concerns about the uneven qualifications of experts hired to critique the reports of other 
experts.223 
 
It should be noted that a research project which examined the consistency between assessment 
recommendations and custody decisions in Ontario found a low overall concurrence rate of fifty-
two percent (compared to concurrence rates of over ninety percent in other jurisdictions) variable 
depending upon the source of the recommendation. The Ontario data reportedly demonstrated an 
overall concurrence rate for OCL social worker custody recommendations of fifty-two percent, 
whereas for OCL lawyer recommendations the concurrence rate was eighty-three percent.224 The 
author suggests that this difference may be the result of less judicial deference to social workers 
than to lawyers (and to psychologists and psychiatrists, who typically conduct assessments in 
other jurisdictions) with the proviso that further research is needed to confirm this conclusion.225 
The difference in overall Ontario and international concurrence rates is attributed to delays in the 
Ontario family court system which result in “stale” assessments that are of little use in judicial 
decision-making.226 
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The most common complaint among judges about expert witnesses is a tendency among 
assessors to abandon neutrality and become advocates for one side.227 The law of evidence 
requires that expert evidence which suggests an opinion regarding an “ultimate issue” be subject 
to special scrutiny as to its admissibility;228 the reported tendency on the part of assessors to 
become “hired guns”229 suggests it is essential that assessments be subject to informed scrutiny.  
 
Accountability is a further problem; despite that experts are not permitted to offer an opinion on 
the ultimate issue; in cases where judges over-value assessments, they may effectively transfer 
decision-making authority to social workers and mediators.230 Indeed, over-reliance on 
assessments has been characterized as “almost as a form of delegated fact finding on behalf of 
the court,” essentially introducing an “inquisitorial element” into family law court 
proceedings.231 Finally, statutes containing criteria for the application of the best-interests-of-the-
child test (which lend at least minimal structure to the test) do not apply to recommendations 
made in custody assessments, for which the sole criterion is the broad best-interests-of-the-child 
concept.232 
 
Custody and access assessments create dual problems of cost and delay. The cost of an 
assessment was recently reported as typically ranging from $5,000 to $10,000, at minimum, and 
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assessments can take months to complete,233 delaying the resolution of cases involving children, 
“who experience added stress as their cases are prolonged.”234  
 
Should a judge wish to rely upon information outside an assessment or other party-produced 
evidence, there is the problem of judicial notice. Bala and Saunders explain that self-directed 
judicial education can be useful, but is problematic; that is, although there is thought to be more 
scope for the admission of independent judicial research on “social framework facts” in family 
law cases, this practice has been accepted as a ground of appeal.235 They write that while judicial 
education programs offer programs on “social context” issues, (such as child development and 
family dynamics) judges should be cautious about using this knowledge as the information 
conveyed in judicial training programs is general in nature and may not easily be applied in 
specific cases, or may represent only one of any number of credible perspectives and it may be 
difficult for a judge to assess its reliability.236 They further note that if counsel provides social 
science literature, and opposing counsel objects, this material should not be received by the 
court.237 These limitations seem significant given that psychological and social science literature 
can be highly relevant to custody decision-making; indeed, it has been noted that assessment 
recommendations are often more highly dependent upon social science literature than the results 
of child-specific testing.238  
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The importance of clinical input in family law dispute resolution is illustrated by a recent 
initiative aimed at identifying high conflict family cases and isolating them for special treatment 
within the Ottawa family court system, through an experimental multi-disciplinary model. The 
goals of the Ottawa Coordinated Case Management Project for High Conflict Custody and 
Access Cases (“CCMP”) are taken from the report of Action Committee on Access to Justice in 
Civil and Family Matters,239 and include reducing family conflict and improving communication 
through early connection between families and “appropriate multidisciplinary family services,” 
and coordinating and integrating the delivery these services. The CCMP was implemented for a 
small number of cases in 2011 and expanded in 2015.240  
 
A 2017 review of the CCMP concludes that the project was useful in cementing the goal of a 
community-based approach to high conflict family law. It also notes that cases took longer to 
resolve in the CCMP model than in a control group, which was attributed to these cases 
receiving more attention, and the wait lists attached to some services to which families were 
referred. Feedback from participating families was reportedly sparse; the two parents who 
responded noted “no difference in the CCMP model” and complained about a lack of follow up. 
Among lawyers it was remarked that the CCMP revealed unmet needs, including: a need for 
more judges with experience in case management and in working with high conflict families; a 
need for more communication and collaboration between the Project’s “service advisory 
committee” and lawyers and judges; a need for a project manager to oversee and monitor the 
overall CCMP; and a need for more follow-up with parents and lawyers after service advisory 
suggestions are made. It was further noted that the cost of the project appeared to raise questions 
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about its sustainability.241 Participating judges noted that parents lacked financial resources to 
pay for such services, but unanimously supported intensive case management approach for high 
conflict families. Most interesting from the perspective of this project, the authors conclude that 
the study demonstrated a need for “a more integrated collaborative approach,”242 that is, social 
services working alongside lawyers and courts. 
 
 (d)  Information and Triage 
 
   
Some information services are intended to operate as a self-help tool; it has been argued that 
government sponsored information is generally of limited utility to those subject to other barriers 
to justice, such as lack of education, trauma, language problems, isolation or disability.243 The 
argument is that self-help should not be a policy foisted upon individuals who already face 
disadvantages in daily life,244 and moreover, government support for the self-help ethic may lead 
to unwarranted assumptions on the part of self-represented parties as to the level of litigation 
preparation that may be accomplished by reading brochures.245 In other words, although 
information services are an important component of access to justice, they may be seen as 
substituting information for meaningful assistance.246 For example, a connection has been 
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claimed between the “gutting” of legal aid in British Columbia and the proliferation of 
government sponsored self-help information.247  
 
Other information services are designed to explain court process and alternative options; for 
example, the Ontario Mandatory Information Program (MIP), which does not act as a self-help 
tool, but rather explains court and alternative dispute resolution processes with the intent of 
“informing parents of current understandings about the risks involved in exposing children to 
conflict and protracted litigation, and encouraging them to exhibit behaviours and make legal 
decisions in child-related matters that take their children's needs into account...” 248 The Parent 
Information Program, which operated in Ontario until September 1, 2011, when it was replaced 
with the MIP, was reviewed in a recent study, which found the program was rated as “very 
helpful” by a large majority of respondents along dimensions such as improving understanding 
of legal processes and the availability of alternatives. Six-month follow-up surveys 
demonstrated a continuing statistically significant effect upon knowledge, attitudes and 
parenting behaviour.249 
 
A recently expanded network of Family Law Information Centres provides written information 
as well as interactive “information about separation and divorce and related family law issues, 
family justice services, alternative forms of dispute resolution, local community resources and 
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court processes.”250 At designated times, Information and Referral Coordinators are available to 
make referrals and assist self-represented litigants to understand their needs. 
 
Although it may be a question of semantics, Ontario family court systems appear to contain 
elements of both “tiered” and “triage” approaches. As in tiered systems, legal and parenting 
information is provided, usually without professional assistance, as a preliminary step to 
encourage settlement, and if settlement does not ensue the parties may attempt mediation in 
which a custody and access assessment may be recommended; failing settlement, a court 
application may be filed, which leads to a multi-layer conference process, and may also result in 
a referral to the Office of the Children’s Lawyer; if the case is not settled through the conference 
process, a trial is scheduled.251 The alternative to a tiered system is a “triage” approach, in which 
cases are assessed early on to identify the issues in dispute and the level of conflict, and the 
parties are swiftly engaged with service providers most likely to lead the parties to settlement.252  
 
A triage process has been characterized as an alternative to both a tiered approach and a 
mandatory mediation model in which mediators perform a triage function by screening out cases 
inappropriate for mediation.253  Elaborate triage systems reportedly involve trained court staff 
interviews of all family litigants at the time of filing a court application, with referrals to the 
most appropriate government or subsidized program, which may include mediation, counseling, 
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or custody assessment, as part of a comprehensive gatekeeping function designed to optimize the 
use of publicly funded services.254 As noted, this may be the role of Family Law Information 
Centres, although not all services associated with triage systems appear to be publicly funded or 
subsidized in Ontario.  
  
In Ontario, various forms of “informal” triage operate: the Office of the Children’s Lawyer 
performs a “limited form of triage” by deciding which cases to accept and whether they warrant 
clinical investigation, child representation, or both; mediators are expected to perform a “limited 
gate keeping function” by identifying cases for which mediation is not appropriate; family 
lawyers in private practice may engage in “a kind of triage” by identifying cases that are suitable 
for collaborative processes and those that should commence with a court application; and 
Ontario judges perform “informal triage” in case conferences and interim motions by 
encouraging mediation of appropriate cases, suggesting the involvement of an assessor or a 
referral to the Ontario Office of the children’s lawyer. Bala notes that this function is undertaken 
with limited information and depends upon the initiative of individual judges. In addition to the 
foregoing, Information and Referral Coordinators provide procedural and substantive legal 
information, referrals and limited assistance with forms. Bala has characterized Information and 
Referral Coordinators (as of 2012) as performing a voluntary form of triage, and suggests that 
due to inadequate training and resources, use of these services should not be mandatory.255 
 
There are arguments for and against all of these approaches; for example, triage may be seen as 
an additional bureaucratic layer, whereas mandatory mediation immediately engages the parties 
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in settlement efforts, but may not be suitable or worthwhile in all cases.256 There seems to be 
increasing emphasis upon the benefits of triage; Saini, Birnbaum and Bala’s 2016 research on 
court-related services in Ontario indicates that existing information and referral services are 
“provided by non-lawyers and do not formally triage cases,”257 and suggests a need for a better 
triage system “to identify and direct cases to the type of service and program that matches the 
different levels of conflict.”  
 
 
(e)  Legal Advice: Duty Counsel (Provincial Courts) 
 
Recent research has reported that assistance from court adjunct counsel sometimes leaves self-
represented parties “more confused, and even panicked, than before,” due to short and 
sometimes hurried sessions, and has recommended a re-assessment of summary advice 
services.258 The concern noted above with respect to some information services applies here, 
too; investing in self-help tools that provide inadequate assistance to those who most need help 
risks diverting resources away from other initiatives which might increase meaningful access to 
justice.259  
 
In Ontario Provincial Courts “duty counsel” and “advice counsel” are funded by Legal Aid 
Ontario and available onsite to meet with family law litigants.260 In brief informal interviews 
with Provincial Court duty counsel lawyers, it was explained that on a busy day, onsite lawyers 
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meet with as many twenty clients, allocating about twenty minutes to each.  Litigants rarely see 
the same lawyer more than once; the point is to provide basic summary advice and, very rarely, 
to appear in court. There are income eligibility criteria, but they are not the same as for a legal 
aid certificate, and there is no requirement to provide proof of income or assets. Duty and advice 
counsel do not assist with forms; this is the role of students at Family Law Information Centres, 
and Provincial Court litigants who require this sort of assistance are referred to a Superior Court 
Family Law Information Centre.  
 
 
(f)  Case Management 
 
The Ontario Family Law Rules261 have established a specialized case management system for 
family law intended to smooth the litigation process and facilitate settlement. Some form of case 
management is seemingly an essential component of dispute resolution systems. It has been 
observed that the conference process is not uniformly understood by self-represented family law 
litigants, 262 and lack of preparation can make conferences unproductive.263 For cases unlikely to 
settle, multiple pre-trial processes likely exacerbate conflict, as each step requires the parties to 
literally re-invest in their respective positions. For cases that are capable of settlement, it is far 
not clear that judicial conferences are consistently or ideally suited to pursuing that goal. 
Moreover, extreme cases may reportedly involve pre-trial conferences and hearings before five 
to ten different judges over a period of years, during which uncertainty endures and the needs of 
the family continually change.264 
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Refined case management systems are frequently at the centre of family law reform proposals. 
Justice Landerkin’s proposal referred to earlier suggests a one-family, one-judge approach 
combined with a modified three-stage case management system in which a single judge meets 
with the parties to gather information, after which the same judge conducts mediation; if parties 
do not reach an agreement, mediation is followed by an informal “mini-trial” which may proceed 
with adjournments and consent orders; at the conclusion of the mini-trial a non-binding decision 
is delivered, which if not acceptable to the parties, is followed by a full trial before a different 
judge. 265 Bala, Birnbaum and Martinson have proposed a system of “differentiated” case 
management,266 whereby judicial roles vary in the course of the case management process, 
depending upon the requirements of each case.267   
 
 
(g)  Counselling 
 
The British Columbia Family Law Act268 allows judges to order counselling, and in the 
Australian Less Adversarial Trial system the court may order an investigation by a mental health 
consultant. In Ontario, judicial opinion is reportedly divided over the power of courts to order 
counselling,269 suggesting there is no clear legislative or common law basis upon which courts 
can rely.    
 
                                               
265 Supra, footnote 36. [Landerkin] 
266 Supra, footnote 206. [Bala, Birnbaum, and Martinson] 
267 Ibid., at page 409. [Bala, Birnbaum, and Martinson] 
268 Supra, footnote 13. [B.C. Family Law Act] 






In Toronto there are some subsidized counselling services, such as Families in Transition, a 
social service agency affiliated with the United Way that charges fees on a sliding scale based 
upon income, and typically has a wait list of several months. The potential to combine 
counselling and adjudication services in court systems obviously exists, as illustrated by the 
report on the CCMP and the study of the Toronto IDVC referred to earlier; its efficacy seems to 




(h)  Alternative Dispute Resolution 
 
 (i)  Settlement 
 
In many jurisdictions around the world, a very high percentage of cases settle in all areas of the 
law; indeed, a 2012 HiiL Report asserts that on a worldwide basis judges in official courts now 
primarily supervise the settlement process.270 In the United States the overall rate of settlement 
for civil litigation cases has been estimated at ninety-eight percent.271 The Law Commission of 
Ontario reports that that the proportion of family law cases that result in judicial decision-making 
of any kind is in the minority, and only two to five percent of cases proceed to trial.272  
 
It has been suggested that high settlement rates, combined with generally declining levels of 
conflict following separation, indicate that existing family law systems work “reasonably well” 
for the majority of separating families.273 In my view, the fact that settlement is ultimately 
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reached is not a reliable indicator of the effectiveness of existing processes. Cases that eventually 
settle may first proceed some distance through the court system, and profound costs (of every 
kind) may have been incurred in settlements reached on the courthouse steps.274  
 
The term “settlement mission” refers to the pressure to settle that is now exerted at every stage of 
the family dispute resolution process by lawyers, judges, dispute resolution officers, mediators 
and others.275 A recent international family law conference reported that pressure to settle is felt 
by both parties and mediators in court-adjunct family mediation, and recommended policies be 
adopted to counteract this pressure by encouraging mediators not to “over-aggressively push for 
settlement where settlement is neither appropriate nor desired by the parties.”276 Others have 
noted the effects of pre-trial processes on settlement pressure, including judges sometimes 
pushing for settlement to the point of acting as “coercive mediators.”277  
 
As noted above, in my view, the policy rationale for resolving family law disputes through the 
court system in an era that not only prefers settlement, but discourages the use of courts, is 
unclear. The obvious answer is that courts are a fallback mechanism for the enforcement of legal 
entitlements, the structure that casts the “shadow of the law.” However, it is explicit in Mnookin 
and Kornhauser’s analytical framework that the shadow of the law is only effective if it is clear 
and well-defined, and its source accessible. In family law cases settlement is encouraged for all 
the standard reasons: efficiency, cost, superior outcomes, better “buy-in;” however, settlement is 
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also encouraged because of the well-known potential, as noted above, for family trials to 
permanently rupture ongoing family relationships to the detriment of children. In 2006, Rollie 
Thompson recounted that, “for middle class people, family litigation has been described as “a 
catastrophic experience – expensive, painful, requiring extraordinary financial arrangements with 
lenders or lawyers, and to be avoided whenever possible.”278  
 
The recent family law research and literature discussed in this chapter does not appear to have 
been eclipsed by reform. In my view, to the extent that trials are portrayed as a disastrous 
outcome in and of themselves, an “avoidance imperative” is created: a “process effect” that has 
negative implications for access to justice, both in terms of access to authoritative adjudication 
and access to a fair negotiating environment. The result of valorizing settlement while 
adjudication is problematized is, in my view, to problematize both.  
 
It must be noted that others have rejected the argument that encouragement of settlement by 
court systems is “ineffectual or inappropriate;”279 however, I argue here that judicial systems 
ought not to encourage settlement without also facilitating good settlements. In the Ontario court 
system, good settlements may be impeded by relatively short onsite mediation that may be 
ineffectual or perceived as coercive; reliance upon judge-led case conferences, which are a sub-
optimal settlement mechanism; and a trial process that the system itself acknowledges is 
damaging and which “good parents” avoid.  
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The overwhelming institutionalized preference for settlement within family court systems has, in 
my view, made the well-known, indeed seminal, work of Owen Fiss and Mnooken and 
Kornhauser newly compelling. Fiss’ controversial piece Against Settlement, 280 which is echoed 
in feminist literature,281 argues against the assumption that all settlements are good settlements, 
in part because of inequities inherent in the bargaining environment. Written in 1983, when the 
popularity of Alternative Dispute Resolution was growing rapidly, Fiss expressed the unpopular 
view that power imbalances (more subtle than those that would currently disqualify a family 
from mediation) are problematic for the integrity of private negotiations. He wrote:  
 
The disparities in resources between the parties can influence the settlement in three 
ways. First, “the poorer party may be less able to amass and analyze the information 
needed to predict the outcome of the litigation, and thus be disadvantaged in the 
bargaining process.” Second, he may need the damages he seeks immediately and thus be 
induced to settle as a way of accelerating payment, even though he realizes he would get 
less now than he might if he awaited judgment. All plaintiffs want their damages 
immediately, but an indigent plaintiff may be exploited by a rich defendant because his 
need is so great that the defendant can force him to accept a sum that is less than the 
ordinary present value of the judgment. Third, the poorer party might be forced to settle 
because he does not have the resources to finance the litigation, to cover either his own 
projected expenses, such as his lawyer's time, or the expenses his opponent can impose 
through the manipulation of procedural mechanisms such as discovery. It might seem that 
settlement benefits the plaintiff by allowing him to avoid the costs of litigation, but this is 
not so. The defendant can anticipate the plaintiff's costs if the case were to be tried fully 
and decrease his offer by that amount. The indigent plaintiff is a victim of the costs of 
litigation even if he settles.282 
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Published 1984, “Against Settlement” is a foundational piece in alternative dispute resolution 
literature, and continues to engender discussion and debate.283 Its central theme is that private 
bargaining permits disputes to be resolved according to personal preferences, rather than law and 
legal principles, which may erode public values, that is, moral ideals about justice, rights and 
social cohesion, and permit individual interests to replace redistributive justice.284 A number of 
interpretations of the piece were presented in a 2009 symposium titled “Against Settlement 
Twenty-Five Years Later,” including one in which “Against Settlement” is interpreted as a 
warning that subordinating judicial adjudication to alternative dispute resolution may lead to a 
social, political and cultural drift toward neoliberalism, away from state responsibility for social 
well-being.285  
 
It is generally accepted that the state has an interest in protecting “vulnerable” members of 
society,286 but how this should be reflected in accessible adjudication is far from clear; indeed, it 
has been argued that the promotion of non-subsidized mediation contributes to the privatization 
of dispute resolution and may weaken the public perception of dispute resolution as a 
fundamental state responsibility.287 Differing perspectives on the need for accessible adjudication 
in family law are illustrated in the following judicial commentary:  
One view is that while alternative dispute resolution should be readily available, this must 
not be provided instead of courts, which should remain at the center of family law. This is 
because alternative dispute resolution operates in the shadow of the law. That is to say 
that alternative dispute resolution is influenced by family law statutes and leading cases 
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and the courts play a pivotal role and interpreting the law and providing a forum whose 
decisions are disseminated publicly. This is vital for the evolution of the law. 
Additionally, courts serve to protect rights of the vulnerable, offer resolution where the 
alternative dispute resolution fails, and provides for parties who seek enforcement or 
wish to appeal the outcome of an alternative dispute resolution process… a family law 
system must be designed so that it is accessible for all who need it.288 [Emphasis added] 
 
In the 2016 study of parents’ experiences of family litigation referred to earlier, the authors note 
that government has an important role to play in providing services to separated parents, and that 
further research is required to guide them in this regard.289 Government responsibility for access 
to justice in a “substantive equality” sense is implicit in vulnerability theory, and also resonates 
with observations made in law and economics literature that, “access to justice must be situated 
in the context of social and economic redistribution,” and “only the political branches of 
government can advance the unfinished access to justice agenda.”290  
 
It is troubling that criticism of the family courts is often addressed primarily by referring to the 
benefits and accessibility of non-court processes. An excerpt from of online discourse illustrates 
this point. In 2017, two mediators associated with “Family Dispute Resolution of Ontario,” a 
well-known Toronto mediation firm, posted a response to a series of Christie Blatchford’s then-
recent National Post columns, which, they describe as being about “those feeling unfairly treated 
by the family courts,” portraying “indifferent judges, biased laws and tragic endings,” and 
concluding that “the family law system is broken.” The mediators’ response to Blatchford was, 
in part, as follows:  
But the real story is this. The vast majority of separating Canadians resolve their family 
law disputes peacefully, affordably, and in a way that allows their children to live happy 
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and healthy lives. Not as interesting as Blatchford’s stories, but the family law system is 
not as broken as you might think. 
 
We know this because we are among the hundreds of skilled, affordable family dispute 
resolution professionals who resolve these cases every day. Some of us do it as family 
mediators working in the courts Blatchford describes, where hundreds of cases are settled 
each year with free and subsidized mediation, available to virtually every separating 
couple in the province. Others of us do it as privately hired mediators, arbitrators and 
collaborative professionals… 
 
Significant progress is happening. Family Law Information Centres in family courts have 
Information & Referral Coordinators who, for free, provide a vast array of support and 
information for separating couples. Free and subsidized family mediation programs 
across the province are universally rated very highly. Counselling, legal advice and 
supports for victims of violence are now available through the Family Court Support 
Worker program. 
 
The number of “self-reps” in family court (over 70% in some) is a significant problem. 
Judges spend too much time explaining procedure to unrepresented parties, leaving 
insufficient time to deal with trials, motions and case conferences. But here too, there is 
progress.  
 
The recommendations of the Bonkalo Report (to expand the use of family law paralegals) 
may assist those who cannot afford lawyers to be better prepared and to understand the 
court process. Legal Aid Ontario has introduced Certificates specifically for those in 
mediation— meeting a real need. But income thresholds are still too low and funding 
continues to fail to meet demand. 
 
There are real challenges and we cannot stop seeking answers. But there is also a lot that 
is working well and getting better. Blatchford’s stories are important to hear and more 
important to be placed into context.291 
 
Despite that this was written by stakeholders, it is illustrative of a mindset in which progress in 
alternative dispute resolution is equated to progress in family law dispute resolution in total. As 
noted above, the point made in the Australian Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper – that 
developments in alternative dispute resolution do not help families who need an adjudication 
process – is, in my view, compelling.292 While only a small percentage of  cases fall into the 
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category of those that “cannot or should not settle,” if one accepts that an accessible alternative 
to settlement would improve the negotiating environment, benefits would be conferred upon 
parties whose cases can and do settle. Moreover, if one accepts that the consequences for 
children of adversarial family litigation are a matter of public interest, the percentage of cases in 
which this interest is engaged no longer seems legitimately determinative.   
 
The deterrence of trials by court systems is not unique to family law cases; it has been argued 
that the real function of all civil trials is no longer dispute resolution, but the deterrence of 
trials,293 and the resulting emphasis on alternative processes has been described as “negotiated 
process rationality.” 294 Again, I suggest that family law is different; a court system that promotes 
alternative dispute resolution as the only rational choice because of the system’s own negative 
effects seems less like “negotiated process rationality” than abandoning a vulnerable population 
to a sub-optimal settlement environment. As Mnookin and Kornhauser have pointed out, if the 
role of the legal system is to emphasize settlement, “the inadequacies of our current system are 
readily apparent.”295  
 
 
 (ii)  Mediation 
 
In the UK, at least ten American states, and now British Columbia, attendance at an informal 
mediation or assessment session is mandatory before a family law court application involving 
children may be commenced.296  
                                               
293 Supra, footnote 55. [Macaulay] 
294 Ibid., at page 1168. [Macaulay] 
295 Supra, footnote 147 at page 996. [Mnookin and Kornhauser]  
296 See: supra, footnote 246 at page 341. [Doughty and Merch]; supra, footnote 121. [Applegate and Beck]; 






The two paradigmatic styles of mediation are “facilitative” and “evaluative.” Roughly speaking, 
the former, sometimes called “interest-based,” focusses upon identifying needs and interests, 
assessing options, and encouraging the parties to resolve the dispute as independently as 
possible. Highly interest-based mediation is described as including: no consideration of legal 
entitlements but ensuring that both parties “feel heard,” encouraging parties to “work out their 
problems in a spirit of compromise; 297 and, providing a cathartic forum for discussion, 
regardless of outcome. 298 Facilitative mediation has been characterized as well-suited to custody 
and access disputes as it is more future-oriented, and more likely to improve, or at least not 
further damage, the ongoing parental relationship.299 It has been suggested that judges are not 
ideally suited to act as facilitative mediators, given that it is at odds with their training and judges 
are expensive resource.300 Evaluative mediation is more “rights-based” and examines the 
strengths and weaknesses of legal positions and forecasts litigation outcomes.301 It is the style of 
mediation typically adopted by judges in the Ontario case conferencing process,302 and is thought 
to be less likely to foster joint problem solving, both in the course of mediation and between the 
parties, following settlement.303 There are, of course, any number of mediation styles that 
combine elements of both, and mediators within the same system may interpret their roles very 
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differently and conduct very different processes. It is not surprising that “resource intensive” 
mediation is considered most effective in family law cases.304  
 
Ontario’s court-integrated mediation program, implemented as part of the Four Pillars reforms, 
provides two hours of free onsite mediation to parties referred to mediation by a judge or Dispute 
Resolution Officer, which may be followed by eight hours of subsidized offsite private 
mediation, with fees set on a sliding scale based upon income. Commentary on the onsite 
mediation program has noted some concerns, including the relatively short initial time allotment, 
and the lack of any mechanism to ensure that parties have prior legal advice.305 
 
According to interviews with court staff in Toronto, most clients of court-adjunct mediation 
services are self-represented. The percentage was estimated at about eighty percent, and while 
mediators may suggest parties obtain legal advice in advance of mediation, there is no 
requirement to do so. In Toronto, court-adjunct mediation is available at the Superior Court only; 
there is no onsite mediation at the Provincial Court level. There is reportedly no uniformity in 
mediation styles or the manner in which self-represented litigants are informed (or not) of legal 
entitlements in the course of on-site mediation. Mediators in court-adjunct mediation have 
various types of training including in law and social work; depending upon availability, social 
workers are reportedly the preferred mediators for custody disputes.  
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It has been maintained in the literature that efforts to achieve settlement should be pursued 
through processes, and by individuals, most likely to achieve this result; that is, for custody 
cases, through facilitative mediation by non-judges.306 I would extend this argument to every 
stage of the dispute resolution process, including adjudication; that is, all dispute resolution 
processes ought to be conducted by the most qualified professionals.   
 
2.8 Innovative Court Models and Systems 
(a)  Problem-Solving Courts 
 
Two waves of change have been identified in the evolution of Anglo-American legal processes; 
the first aimed at improving efficiency by creating specialized rules and case conference 
processes (as occurred in Ontario with the enactment of the Family Law Rules307) and the second 
aimed at developing a problem-solving approach for categories of cases marginalized within the 
court system.308 A problem-solving approach attempts to address the behavioral problems and 
risks that underlie a dispute, with the goal of achieving a more sustainable resolution. It connects 
parties to relevant support services and may involve judicial oversight of progress with respect to 
desired behavioral change, through “part-heard proceedings.”309 The Australian Law Reform 
Commission Discussion Paper describes a problem-solving approach as follows:   
Problem-oriented courts attempt to facilitate a team approach and encourage close 
collaboration between agencies involved in the justice process. The problem-oriented 
court acts as the ‘hub’ connecting various ‘spokes’, such as drug and alcohol treatment 
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agencies, community based corrections, probation services and domestic violence 
agencies, forming a holistic and integrated approach. This approach encourages 
magistrates and judges to take a pro-active and overtly leading role in the creation of 
better, well coordinated services for clients.310 
 
A study of the “international problem-solving court movement,” reports that specialized 
problem-solving courts have been accepted in the United States with “enthusiasm, boldness and 
pragmatism,” whereas in Canada and some other common law jurisdictions the movement has 
been marked by “moderation, deliberation and restraint.”311 The American Unified Family Court 
model, which provides divorce, custody and access and child welfare services, emerged in the 
1990s, and has reportedly changed the way family law cases are resolved: 
Both the methods and goals of legal intervention for families in conflict have changed. 
The roles of judges and lawyers are fundamentally different and less important in this 
new regime where dispute resolution has largely moved out of the courtroom to 
"problem-solving" teams. Taking a "holistic" approach, these interdisciplinary teams seek 
to address both legal and non-legal problems facing the families that come to courts 
seeking legal remedies. These developments have profound implications for the family 
justice system. They also reflect a broader jurisprudential shift away from the traditional 
values of the adversary system in both civil and criminal justice.312 
 
Commentary suggests judicial actors are most comfortable with self-represented litigants in 
problem-solving courts.313 There are some reported problems, however, including concerns that 
the goals of problem-solving models are insufficiently funded, making it difficult to implement a 
mandate to provide inter-disciplinary holistic services, and moreover, that it may simply ask too 
much of judges and court systems to expect them to adopt to a multitude of roles. As one 
commentator remarked: 
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 Courts with their “limited remedial imaginations,” may not be the best institutional 
settings for resolving the non-legal issues proponents wish to place within their authority. 
As a result, the restructured family courts may be incapable of achieving the formidable 
task of “provid[ing] coordinated holistic services ... to address the physical and mental 
needs of the family.”314 
 
A problem-solving model has not been adopted in all American family courts; recent 
commentary suggests the use of widely divergent dispute resolution processes. It has been 
claimed that many American states “practice more reluctance than implementation”315 with 
respect to problem-solving methods, and that Canada and Australia are more advanced in the use 
of therapeutic processes.316 Conversely, others write that family courts “across the country” have 
embraced a paradigm shift away from adversarial processes, and judges now function more as 
ongoing conflict managers than as adjudicators, although [e]ven a restructured Family Court may 
be incapable of achieving the formidable task of improving the well-being and functioning of 
families and children,” and “the more comprehensive and forward-looking tasks envisioned by 
the new paradigm call for very different skill sets and institutional capabilities.” 317 
 
(b) Ontario UFCs and the IDVC 
In Ontario, Unified Family Courts (UFCs) currently operate in seventeen locations,318 excluding 
Toronto. The Federal Budget passed in February 2018 approved funding for the expansion of 
UFCs to approximately one-half of Ontario Superior Courts, which will make UFCs available to 
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roughly one-half of the province’s population,319 with plans to complete a province-wide 
expansion by 2025.320 This is a very significant development which has been the subject of 
decades of reform advocacy.321 
 
An important rationale for UFCs is jurisdictional; if a divorce is sought, the federal Divorce 
Act322 governs custody and support; if no divorce is sought provincial legislation governs 
custody and support, in Ontario under the Family Law Act323 and the Children’s Law Reform 
Act.324 In UFCs, proceedings under all of the above statutes, as well as the Child, Youth and 
Family Services Act325 can be heard in the same court.  
 
UFCs were reportedly inspired by the “multi-door courthouse” concept in which doors in the 
same hallway lead to different process options.326 UFCs offer mandatory information programs, 
non-mandatory free on-site mediation for two hours, reduced fee offsite mediation, community 
referral coordinators, and limited legal advice and assistance at Family Law Information 
Centers.327 Bala notes that the UFC’s specialized judges are better able to assist self-represented 
litigants,328 and that UFCs are the best option for limiting delay and managing continuing 
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conflict cases.329 The newly created UFCs will be specialized, although the extent to which the 
UFCs incorporate related family services seems unclear as yet, and will depend upon funding.330  
 
The Integrated Domestic Violence Court (IDVC) was established in Toronto in 2011 as part of 
the Ontario Court of Justice (Provincial Court) and is reportedly an effective problem-solving 
court. Its mandate is to facilitate consistent decision-making informed by knowledge of domestic 
violence, and to increase efficiency by dealing with family and related criminal law matters in 
one forum, in sequence, before a single judge.331 The goal of domestic violence courts is to 
increase accountability of offenders, provide a better connection to social services, encourage 
treatment, and improve safety for victims and children.332 The IDVC is a branch of the Ontario 
Court of Justice, and therefore its jurisdiction over family law is limited to custody and support 
issues.333 Its goals are to increase expertise and facilitate informed decision-making, consistently 
handle multiple cases involving the same parties, eliminate conflicting orders, decrease delay, 
and reduce cost.334 The court is relatively well-resourced: it has a dedicated Crown attorney, 
criminal and family duty counsel, a community resource worker, a “victim witness services court 
worker,” a “family support worker” to provide community referrals for victims of violence, and a 
Family Law Information Centre staff member available for consultation.335 
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A 2014 qualitative study of the IDVC examined the experiences of twenty-one “stakeholders,” a 
group comprised of seventeen professionals (including judges, crown attorneys, court support 
workers, and criminal and family lawyers), one male offender, one female offender, and two 
female victims.336 The reported findings include: judges regard information sharing as valuable, 
Crown prosecutors had generally positive views, lawyers representing parents were generally 
optimistic about the potential for the court, although less satisfied than Crown attorneys, and 
(surprisingly) too many services are provided in “an uncoordinated way.” The authors report that 
the majority of stakeholders were “on the whole positive” about the potential of the court and 
their experiences to date but conclude that to be successful the court will require more 
specialized support services and greater administrative support. The authors note the need for 
further research in which the experiences of victims, offenders and children are explored. The 
two abuse victims and two offenders interviewed reported positively both on their own 
experience with the court, and its impact upon their children.337 
 
With the exception of the IDVC, Ontario courts that routinely deal with family law cases 
(Provincial Courts, and Superior Court-Family Division) do not appear to be problem-solving 
courts, and with the exception of UFCs, they are not highly specialized. Generalist judges still 
deal with family law matters in many Ontario courts, and specialized expertise within UFCs does 
not generally extend beyond a thorough knowledge of the law. It does not necessarily include an 
informed understanding domestic violence, power dynamics, mental health and high conflict, as 
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recommended by the Ontario Law Reform Commission Report referred to above.338 As one 
author notes: 
[T]he reality is that our Rules were meant to have both specialized judges running a 
specialized court, clearly something we do not have. Instead, we have a patchwork of 
courts, nominally united under the rubric of the Family Court of the Superior Court of 
Justice, but without any consistency of approach or practice.”339  
 
Increasing the family-related expertise of judges and expanding access to family services may 
well be a goal under the planned UFC expansion.  
 
 (c)  Specialized Family Courts in the UK and Australia 
 
In England and Wales, specialized family courts with “an integrated social welfare function” 
were first established in 1975,340 and as of 2001, the Children and Family Court Advisory and 
Support Service (Cafcass) has carried out this social welfare function through a staff of social 
workers known as Family Court Advisers.341  The Final Report of the UK Family Justice 
Review, known as the “Norgrove Report,” was released in 2011; it describes the family court 
system in England and Wales as “facing immense stress and difficulties” and “failing children 
and families through its disorganised, fragmented structure, and experiencing chronic delay.”342  
These problems are attributed in part to a three-tiered court process, the reform of which was 
uncontroversial, and in part to problems related to coordinating family services. It had been 
noted in commentary that judges in family courts were increasingly cast in the role of case 
managers and "team leaders” for a range of court related support services, including Cafcass, all 
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of which were accountable to the judge.343 Moreover, it was noted that “individuals and 
organisations across different parts of the system often did not trust each other and there was “no 
set of shared objectives to bind agencies and professionals to a common goal.”344 
 
The Norgrove Report recommended an increased focus on mediation, with court proceedings as 
a last resort, and in 2011, a new mediation information and assessment program (MIAMs) was 
introduced as part of the family court system; it did not attract large numbers, but the following 
year became mandatory for cases involving children.345 Julie Doughty observes that the practice 
of directing cases away from formal hearings and into a less formal mediation process has not 
been accepted by lawyers or the public, and has raised questions about legitimacy.346 She notes 
an ongoing tension between the social welfare and legal functions of family justice systems:  
Within both the English and Australian family justice systems, a relationship between the 
judicial system and a social welfare or behavioral science service is seen as vital in 
resolving parenting disputes, but the expectations of such a service are inherently 
contradictory…both systems have been seen by policymakers and the public as unduly 
delaying and obstructing parental agreement.347 
 
The UK government has reportedly accepted almost all of the Norgrove Report’s 
recommendations and responded with a “radical reorganization” of UK family courts, including 
the creation of a new multi-disciplinary “Family Justice Service” with responsibility for court 
social work services, mediation (with a stronger triage component), information services, and 
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continuing professional development.348  The reforms have led to concern about the effects of an 
“interdisciplinary teamwork” approach upon judicial independence.349  
 
Significant reform of Australia’s family law system began with the opening of its first Family 
Court in 1976; policy objectives included creating a specialist court with an informal process, 
and “one-stop shop” for legal and counseling services to help resolve family law disputes.350  
Doughty writes that “helping courts” in Australia did not, for decades, prove more satisfactory 
than the English system, but through the Less Adversarial Trial, the Australian family justice 
system appeared to have achieved a better balance between social welfare and legal functions, 
and greater public acceptance of diverting cases away from the courts.  
 
The Less Adversarial Trial (“LAT”), emerged out of the Children’s Cases Program (“CCP”) 
which was inspired by a 2002 court-based study undertaken to learn more about European 
inquisitorial-based approaches to children’s cases.351 By 2004 the court had developed a pilot 
model (the CCP), the goals of which were: minimizing delay, early identification of the issues, 
judicial authority to limit evidence to these issues, reduced focus on past parental grievances, 
emphasizing the best interests of the child, minimizing adversarialism, and developing strategies 
to assist parents in future cooperation.352 An empirical research study on parental experiences of 
the CCP reported that a majority of parents described better management of conflict, less damage 
to relationships, greater satisfaction with living arrangements, and improved children’s 
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adjustment. A control group that experienced a traditional adversarial court process reported 
further antagonism and significantly higher levels of strain on children.353  
 
Legislative amendments known as “Part VII Division 12A”354 created the successor to the CCP, 
the Less Adversarial Trial. The LAT is a strong judicial case management system, not a single-
event trial, and is based upon inquisitorial processes.355 It is self-described as more flexible and 
informal, and less costly than ordinary court systems.356 Except in family violence cases, 
applications to the court involving children must be preceded by attendance at a Family 
Relationships Centre (FRC) or similar service for informal dispute resolution. Family 
Relationship Centres are government run and provide information and referral services aimed at 
developing a parenting plan. Mediation, known as “Family Dispute Resolution” is provided free 
of charge regardless of income for one hour; an additional two hours is charged at the rate of $30 
per hour for clients with an annual income of $50,000 or more. These centres also offer 
information sessions and referrals to outside services such as “family law counselling” and 
“programs about parenting after separation.”357 
 
In the event that settlement is not reached, a first trial day is scheduled, also known as an 
assessment conference. Parties are required to complete and file a Parenting Questionnaire 
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twenty-eight days in advance of the first day.358 A Financial Questionnaire and Balance Sheet 
must be filed later, within nine weeks of the initial assessment conference.359 
 
A Family Consultant attends the assessment conference and remains involved throughout the 
LAT process. The role of a family consultant can include providing parenting plan advice, 
conducting a child or family assessment, holding child-inclusive mediation, and acting as an 
expert adviser to the court by presenting research-based recommendations.360 Julie Doughy 
observes that Family Consultants have come to be seen as esteemed experts, whereas the 
reputation of Cafcass’ Family Court Advisers has bureaucratic overtones, in part because they 
work in both public and private family law cases and are regarded as “operatives of the welfare 
state.”361  
 
In the assessment conference, parties are encouraged to explain what they are seeking directly to 
the judge or, if they wish, may have a lawyer speak for them. The judge identifies the evidence 
required (in conjunction with lawyers, if present) and is meant to restrict it to that which is 
required to decide the issues. The judge decides what expert reports are required and what they 
will address, and may make referrals to community-based services, such as counseling or 
parenting education programs, or make interim orders with respect to child care. The judge is 
empowered to control the order in which witnesses are called, what evidence is to be given orally 
or in documentary form, and the extent of cross examination.362 Between the first and final days, 
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the hearing may be continued by telephone: affidavits and expert reports may be discussed, 
further evidence may be identified, and interim and procedural orders may be made.363  It has 
been noted that among judges, the LAT “is not everyone’s cup of tea.” 364   
 
The Australian Law Reform Commission recently reviewed the operation of Australian family 
courts,365 as noted above. Its mandate was to consider “redevelopment “of the family law system 
“as a whole, in an integrated and holistic, rather than piecemeal, way.”366 The first document to 
emerge from this Inquiry, the Issues Paper, was released in 2018. It asserts that current problems 
in the family law system include increasing delays in the courts, increasing cost of legal services 
and expert reports, limited support for children’s participation in proceedings, difficulty 
achieving safe outcomes for victims of family violence and their children, and “concerns about 
the adversarial nature of legal processes and the impact on parental and child well-being.”367 
The report observes growing debate in Australia over the affordability of services and processes 
related to family dispute resolution, the proportionality of costs incurred in family law cases, the 
continued conceptualization of family dispute resolution as a “single event process,” and, once 
again, “the appropriateness of adversarial processes, and the ethics of adversarial practices, in 
any system concerned with the well-being of children.”368 [emphasis added] 
 
The mandate assigned to the Australian Law Reform Commission has familiar ring; it speaks of 
the need “for reform to the culture, structure and governance of the family law system” and “to 
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encourage the resolution of family disputes as quickly and affordably as possible, and in a way 
that is the least harmful, and most protective, of the safety and well-being of all involved, 
particularly children.” The Commission notes further needs: to identify the objectives of a  
contemporary family law system and the principles that should guide it, as well as barriers that 
might affect access to the system; to develop integrated services for families with complex 
needs; to support the involvement of children in the family law system; and to identify the 
competencies and skills required of family law system professionals.369  
 
The second document to emerge from the Australian Law Reform Commission review is the 
Discussion Paper, released in October 2018.370 It, too, solicits further public and stakeholder 
input. The  Discussion Paper makes proposals for change similar to those suggested in Canadian 
literature and reports371 including clearer legislation,372 and the establishment of multi-
disciplinary community-based “Families Hubs” to provide separating families and children with 
visible entry points for access to a wide range of legal and support services in areas including 
family violence, legal assistance services, informal dispute resolution, family counseling, 
housing, and health services.373  
 
The LAT is reportedly the process used in most cases that require adjudication in Australia.374 
The Issues Report says little that expressly relates to the LAT, other than to note that the use of 
Part VII Division 12A (the LAT case management approach) has “waned over time,” and that its 
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processes may “consume too much judicial time,” given the persistent problem of hearing 
delays.375 The Discussion Paper notes that some submissions to the Commission have praised the 
LAT initiative, but many stakeholders described a need for less adversarial processes “for 
children’s matters more generally,” and movement toward a more “solution-based” process.376 It 
approvingly refers to problem-solving courts “such as those that are increasingly used in other 
jurisdictions to deal with matters where behavioural problems complicate the resolution of legal 
disputes…where an ongoing relationship between the parties needs to be preserved, as is the case 
in most disputes about the care of children.”377  
 
2.10 Summary    
This chapter has discussed problems associated with family litigation in court systems, 
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3. VULNERABILITY THEORY AND ANALYSIS 
 
3.1  Theory 
 
 
Martha Fineman’s vulnerability theory advocates for “a more responsive state and a more 
egalitarian society.”378 The term “vulnerability,” often associated with stigma, victimhood, 
dependency, deprivation and even pathology,379 is claimed by Fineman to designate a constant 
and universal aspect of the human condition, indeed, the “primal human condition.”380 The 
theory holds that while vulnerability is constant and universal, it is manifested and experienced 
episodically, and levels of vulnerability vary in degree throughout a lifetime.   
 
Vulnerability theory suggests the “vulnerable subject” replace the “universal liberal subject” 
constructs,381 which valorize autonomy, self-sufficiency and personal responsibility and are, in 
their general application, oblivious to vulnerability. She writes that the liberal subject, when 
these concepts were formed, envisioned a white, property-owning, tax-paying adult male,382 and 
while legal subjectivity has grown to encompass formerly excluded groups, the modern legal 
subject still centres on the needs and political sensibilities of a narrow and privileged minority.383 
In contrast, the vulnerable subject is subject to constant change, fragile in embodiment and life 
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circumstance, and socially interdependent.384 The theory suggests the vulnerable subject is a 
more accurate and complete figure than the “liberal subject” to place at the heart of social policy 
and state responsibility.385   
 
A vulnerability theory analysis does not disregard the importance of typical group identifiers 
such as race and gender, although it argues that they may obscure institutional forces that 
distribute privilege and disadvantage in ways that do not correlate to traditional identity 
categories, and justify limited government responsibility by implying that state processes are fair, 
except for rare and discoverable instances of discrimination.386 Vulnerability theory is intended 
to supplement and complement identity-based analyses, by considering the effects of law and 
social institutions upon segments of the population that do not have common characteristics 
other than vulnerability.387  
 
The “vulnerability paradigm” recognizes the sameness of individuals (their common 
vulnerability) as well as their individual differences.388 Vulnerability obviously manifests itself 
in various ways on the individual level simply due to the vicissitudes of life; it is also manifested 
variously because personal characteristics, such as infancy, old age, race, gender, and sexual 
orientation contribute to different types and fluctuating levels of vulnerability,389 and because 
humans are differently “embedded” in social relationships and within social institutions.390 The 
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“vulnerability paradox” lies in the simultaneous recognition of vulnerability as both universal 
and particular.391 
 
The consequences of manifested vulnerability are obviously greatly influenced by the resources 
one can command to deal with them; in vulnerability theory this is framed in terms of levels of 
resilience.392 No one is born with resilience; it is society-generated.393 It is accumulated over a 
lifetime through individual interaction with social constructs such as the family, and public and 
private institutions, including education and justice systems, which confer support, privilege and 
power.394 The role of the state and its institutions is to foster resilience: to enhance individual 
capacity to withstand harm by ensuring equal access to resource-generating social institutions395 
and actively structure institutions to ensure they do not privilege any group of citizens over 
another. Vulnerability theory is premised upon the vulnerable subject having been ignored in 
favor of a “neoliberal fixation on personal responsibility, buoyed by an insistence that only a 
severely restrained state can be a responsible one.”396 In case this should strike the reader as a 
radical and outsider perspective, I note that Justice Cromwell has written of justice system 
reform that it tends to improve the system for the benefit of those who already benefit from it, 
with little fundamental change.397 
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The vulnerable subject is not limited to the individual. Vulnerability theory argues that 
institutions are also vulnerable: they can be captured, corrupted, damaged, outgrown, and 
compromised by legacies of practices, patterns of behavior and “entrenched interests that were 
formed during periods of exclusion and discrimination, but are now invisible in a haze of lost 
history.”398 According to vulnerability theory, it is typical for the state to minimally monitor 
whether its institutions confer assets that foster resilience.399 
 
A vulnerability theory analysis examines whether social institutions enable individuals to behave 
in ways that perpetuate resource imbalances, such that those already privileged are benefited, and 
those already less privileged are further disadvantaged.400 The theory holds that the valorization 
of autonomy and individual responsibility has permitted profound institutionally embedded 
inequality to be tolerated. Fineman advocates for a legal culture in which the state is obliged to 
either justify inequality or remedy it by reforming institutional arrangements.401 
 
Vulnerability theory is often discussed in terms of a formal and substantive equality. In a recent 
article, Fineman argues that vulnerability theory goes beyond equality, which she characterizes 
as a “limiting aspiration” for social justice.402 She notes that “inevitable inequality” (not always a 
bad thing, for example, in such parent-child and employer-employee relationships), is typically 
addressed in law and policy by declaring that an equality mandate does not apply because the 
individuals to be compared are positioned differently, or by imposing a “fabricated equivalence” 
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between individuals, despite that they occupy obviously unequal bargaining positions.403 It is the 
latter that is troubling, as it suggests ignoring power imbalances for which there is no justifying 
rationale, for example, by way of a compensatory benefit to the weaker party. 
 
Fineman acknowledges that vulnerability theory was crafted for an American audience, and 
indeed, the theory clearly challenges the Lockean foundations of American liberalism and the 
bootstraps underpinnings of the American dream. Its application, however, has not been 
restricted to American law and society. Fineman herself locates the liberal subject in “liberal 
Western democracies”404 and notes that vulnerability theory “allows for the adaptation of 
solutions appropriate to differing legal structures and political cultures.”405 She states that the 
theory has potential to extend even beyond the Anglo-American context, because neoliberalism 
informs social relations within European and Latin American countries as well.406  
 
While neoliberalism ebbs and flows at the provincial and federal government levels in Canada, it 
is an enduring political current, plainly visible in present-day Ontario. I argue that vulnerability 
theory’s challenge to neoliberalism’s focus on personal responsibility has relevance here. Despite 
that Canadian and American culture and society obviously differ in fundamental ways, it does 
not, of course, follow that Canadian laws and social institutions are fully responsive to the 
vulnerable subject. 
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A vulnerability theory analysis is not merely critical, it is also “generative;” it is intended to be 
useful for constructing a critical perspective on political and social institutions.407 Vulnerability 
theory has been applied in contexts as varied as assisted reproductive technology and housing 
policy,408 disability law,409 climate change,410 legal history411 and colonial capitalism.412 For 
example, Anna Grear has argued that capitalism has progressed by rendering human subjectivity 
either partial or nonexistent, and law must now face up to an emerging ethical demand.413 She 
cites examples of instances in which human subjectivity is, or has been, ignored or trampled 
upon, including the disposition of indigenous people by colonialism, corporate neocolonialism in 
the developing world, the effects of global industry on the environment, and predictable patterns 
of advantage and disadvantage in the developed world. Atieno Mboya has conducted a 
vulnerability theory analysis of climate change in which individual states are cast as the 
vulnerable subject under international law, and their levels of vulnerability are connected to 
geographic location and positioning within the global political economy.414 The argument there 
is that a legal subject built upon ideology that prioritizes liberal values over equality distorts 
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concepts such as “choice” and “consent,” and justifies the ongoing exploitation of weaker 
states.415  
  
Vulnerability theory’s momentum as an analytical tool for the justification of policy change has 
drawn criticism. It has been asserted that the theory tends to promote unduly paternalistic 
policies and has limited prescriptive value,416 fails to appreciate that autonomy and independence 
are deeply held social values, particularly in the United States;417 and that in its application it has 
adopted the identity-based approach that the theory is considered (by some) to oppose.418 
 
In my view, what for some are “unduly paternalistic polices” may be entirely consistent with 
Fineman’s concept of the “more responsive state.”419 Similarly, the use of identity categories in a 
vulnerability analysis is consistent with Fineman’s articulation of the theory, in which identity-
based characteristics may be a complementary, rather than competing, analytical tool. As to the 
theory’s prescriptive value, the argument is that vulnerability theory provides little guidance as to 
how to prioritize among vulnerable subjects (and makes this decision more problematic by 
emphasizing the universality of vulnerability), and should be refined by defining vulnerability in 
relation to a particular problem – the result of a relationship between an individual and a context, 
environment or situation.420 In my view vulnerability theory analysis does just that – through its 
analysis of relationships between vulnerable individuals and social institutions. 
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3.2  Analysis 
I argue that legal institutions responsible for custody and access dispute resolution should be 
designed for the vulnerable subject. Vulnerability theory holds that the universal “liberal subject” 
envisions a competent, fully functioning adult, whereas the “vulnerable subject” may have 
social, economic, or biological limitations421 that must inform the operation of law state 
institutions. Indeed, research regarding self-represented litigants in family law court systems 
suggests that for a significant number, the emotional effects of family upheaval may be similar to 
manifested physical disability, that is “a simultaneous experience of threat and the weakening of 
coping mechanisms.”422 And then there are the children.  
 
Fineman has described children as “the paradigmatic vulnerable subjects.”423 She describes 
“derivative dependence” as a form of dependence that attaches to a social role or position, and is 
manifested as a consequence of the vulnerability of someone else.424 Fineman cites the example 
of a male family member who suffers emotionally and financially as a consequence of adopting a 
caretaking role; the burden and resulting dependence are unrelated to his own identity. In my 
view, the same may be said of children whose parents are dependent upon family law systems in 
custody cases. The literature suggests the effects of parental engagement in family litigation are 
often passed on to their children, who, moreover, may suffer long-term adverse consequences, as 
noted in Chapter Two. Vulnerability theory suggests the state has an obligation to build 
structures from which every person will benefit, and to enhance resilience in the face of 
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manifested vulnerability.425 This obligation is, with respect to children, further supported by the 
argument that the societal obligation to protect children does not end at the boundary between 
public and private law, and surely must include effectively shielding children from the damaging 
effects of the state’s own institutions. The United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child, 
provides, among other things, that all children are entitled to protection.426 
 
I argue that vulnerability to family upheaval is universal and constant and may become manifest 
in a myriad of ways within the broad context of separation and divorce. Once manifested it is 
managed through family law systems: that is, legislation and social institutions such as state-
sponsored courts and their adjunct services. On the level of individual experience, I argue that 
the following are examples of those for whom this common vulnerability has become manifest:  
- self-represented parties who face a represented party; 
- self-represented parties who face an opposing party with more resilience; that is, one 
who can more easily bear the financial and/or emotional costs of family litigation, or 
who has more social capital to apply to self-informing and navigating family law 
systems;  
- parties who have been or continue to be victims of domestic violence; 
- parties who are drawn into family law processes through manipulative claims, such as 
custody applications filed to further a pattern of dominance and control, or motivated 
primarily to reduce child support; 
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- parties who are drawn into family law processes through false claims of child abuse 
or parental alienation;  
- parties who avoid legal systems out of fear and thereby further risk their own safety, 
and possibly that of their children; 
- parties involved in cases cannot and should not settle and for whom the only 
affordable alternative to negotiation is a state-sponsored dispute resolution system 
that is damaging to families; and  
- children whose who are placed in a position of derivative dependency because their 
parents are dependent upon family court systems.  
 
Consistent with vulnerability theory, the non-exclusive list of vulnerable subjects set out above is 
not based upon identity categories such as gender, race, or social class. It must be understood 
that vulnerability theory does not suggest that all individuals within a vulnerable population are 
identically or equally disadvantaged as a result of manifested vulnerability. To the extent that 
some vulnerable subjects are more resilient than others, vulnerability theory suggests other social 
systems and institutions, such as the family and educational institutions, have provided them 
with more resources, and hence more resilience. At the level of individual experience, a 
vulnerability theory analysis engages the persistent family law theme of power imbalance.  
 
Fineman notes that the universal subject is given “modified legal subjectivity” based only upon 
certain kinds of deviation from the legal subject.427 Examples in family law would include the 
doctrines of mistake, unconscionability, and duress, which may be used to challenge marriage 
                                               





contracts and separation agreements, and which allow the law to respond, in some cases, to 
exceptional peculiarities and sensitivities. Vulnerability theory argues that this sort of targeted 
approach to some manifestations of power imbalance implies that power imbalances are, on the 
whole, exceptional, and that everyday power imbalances (or, as vulnerability theory would put it, 
uneven “levels of resilience”) are not worthy of redress. 
 
Vulnerability theory argues that the ideologies of autonomy, self-sufficiency and personal 
responsibility have so idealized individual “choice” that the ways in which social institutions 
perpetuate and sometimes exacerbate inequality are taken for granted; they are tolerated as the 
inevitable effects of free choice and individual responsibility. Vulnerability theory acknowledges 
that autonomy is a desirable aspiration but asserts that it cannot be attained without societal 
support through social institutions, which provide the resources needed to “create options and 
make choices.” 428 It points to the need to question the autonomy-based choices which law and 
legal institutions appear to offer, and, in my view, supports the argument made in this thesis that 
the “choice” to negotiate or settle is illusory in the absence of accessible adjudication.429 
 
Several authoritative sources are cited in Chapter Two in support of the general proposition that, 
as the Canadian Judicial Counsel put it,  
[s]elf-represented persons…may find court procedures complex, confusing and 
intimidating; and they may not have the knowledge or skills to participate actively and 
effectively in their own litigation...[and] the average person may be overwhelmed by the 
simplest of court procedures.430  
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Family court systems have, of course, been modified in numerous ways to adapt to self-
represented litigants, as discussed above. Nonetheless, as I have argued above, court-based 
reforms do not yet appear to have significantly ameliorated the effects of family litigation. 
Moreover, a vulnerability theory analysis suggests, based upon the reported experiences of self-
represented litigants in family court systems, that existing Ontario court systems do not yet 
adequately compensate for the embedded advantages and disadvantages they confer upon 
represented and self-represented litigants. I argue that to the extent that court systems provide 
constrained assistance to self-represented litigants in the face of obviously unequal bargaining 
positions, they silently endorse what Fineman has termed “fictitious equality.”431 
 
A vulnerability analysis is distinct in that it is focused upon whether existing institutional 
arrangements are responsive across groups with shared vulnerability (or whether, conversely, 
they perpetuate existing advantages and disadvantages), and it avoids blaming the individual for 
his or her manifested vulnerability432 or treating it as a mere side-effect. To the extent that the 
vulnerable subjects described in the list set out above are disadvantaged by the operation of the 
family court system – for example, due to limited assistance available to self-represented litigants 
in a fundamentally adversarial institution, judicial discomfort with custody decisions, 
institutionalized settlement pressure, family dynamics which require something other than 
judicial expertise to unwind and redress, or simply childhood status – a vulnerability theory 
analysis suggests that the court system perpetuates existing patterns of advantage and 
disadvantage.  
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Vulnerability theory suggests that true equal access to justice requires the state to “take existing 
structural differences into account and work toward their neutralization, so that those who have 
been historically disadvantaged are uplifted to a more level playing field.”433 Despite that this is 
an existing goal of some access to justice initiatives, it is not, in my view, surprising that it has 
proven difficult to achieve, given that “levelling the playing field” is a vague and contested 
vison. How level? What about unfairness to represented parties? What about bias? In a 
vulnerability theory framework, which seeks substantive equality for all persons served by state 
institutions, “levelling the playing field” is not a controversial or counter-intuitive goal. As 
noted, vulnerability theory aims to redefine the parameters of social justice434 through a 
responsive state. I argue here that shifting the focus of policy from the autonomous subject to the 
vulnerable subject could help to empower access to justice reform initiatives, including the 
Family Justice Working Group Report recommendation for “a more dramatic shift to non-
adversarial approaches,” through “drastic change,” “fundamental overhaul” and a “paradigm 
shift.”435  
 
Vulnerability theory’s focus on institutional change is at odds with reform proposals which rely 
upon individuals to independently choose to adopt new work habits. For instance, in a 
vulnerability theory analysis of disability law it was argued that it is “both a Sisyphean effort and 
an unjust request” to expect employers to change their practices in disadvantageous ways, as it 
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amounts to asking them to dilute their own privilege. The study concludes that only a “top 
down” approach to can result in uniform practice reform.436  
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the best-interests-of-the-child test has evolved along with 
changing social constructions of gender roles, has been the subject of “gender wars,”437 and as a 
result, best-interests-of-the-child presumptions are widely considered to be politically 
unfeasible.438 A vulnerability theory analysis recognizes identity characteristics as factors that 
contribute to levels of resilience, but not as a basis for competing entitlements. It avoids allowing 
identity arguments to obscure the institutional forces that distribute privilege and disadvantage in 
ways that do not correlate to traditional categories of identity. I argue that in family law systems 
these forces include an uncertain and litigation-inducing best-interests-of-the-child test.  
 
As noted, vulnerability theory is fundamentally entwined with the concept of substantive 
equality. According to Fineman, a “cramped notion of equality”439 has evolved in American law, 
which merely requires formal equal treatment based upon non-discrimination. She writes that 
generalized harm or deprivation are not considered forms of inequality that the law can 
address,440 and a formal equality perspective isolates state accountability to cases of 
impermissible bias and provides no framework for challenging existing allocations of power and 
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resources.441 Vulnerability theory is intended to push back against this “impoverished sense of 
equality.”442  
 
The Supreme Court of Canada, in contrast, has been clear that the equality rights guaranteed 
under section 15 of the Charter are not limited to formal equality but extend to substantive 
equality. The Supreme Court has rejected of a formal equality paradigm by acknowledging that 
discrimination may stem from group-based differential treatment, but also from the inequitable 
effects of similar treatment, that is, from failure to consider underlying differences between 
individuals “in a world of real social and economic group-based differences.”443 Supreme Court 
jurisprudence has described “substantive equality” as requiring the acknowledgment of, and 
response to, differences in the experiences of members of a particular group in order that they 
may be treated equally, and to “take into account patterns of disadvantage that may require 
proactive responses to address.”444  
 
It is easy to discern parallels between the concept of equality in Canadian law and vulnerability 
theory. Notwithstanding this apparent resonance, constitutional scholars have reported 
widespread disappointment and frustration with the Supreme Court’s inconsistent 
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interpretation445 and application of the substantive equality standard.446 This response suggests 
that vulnerability theory has not been rendered redundant in Canada by judicial acceptance of a 
broad concept of equality. Most importantly, perhaps, the reportedly robust concept of equality 
under Canadian law (despite uneven judicial treatment) has legitimized substantive equality as a 
policy objective;447 I argue that this bodes well for the potential to effectively “level the playing 
field” through polices supported by the “vulnerability paradigm.” 
 
I do not argue that self-represented litigants are a vulnerable population only within family court 
systems. As the empirical research component of this project described in detail below suggests, 
self-represented litigants are also vulnerable subjects in the tribunals studied. In particular, a 
highly uneven approach to the use of processes such as active adjudication, designed and 
adopted to assist self-represented litigants, suggests a random distribution of resources that 
privileges and protects those self-represented litigants who happen to be assigned to an active 
adjudicator, while tolerating the disadvantage of those who do not.  Similarly, self-represented 
litigants who are given constrained levels of assistance by adjudicators who, but for the 
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unresolved tension between adversarial norms and institutionally endorsed inquisitorial 
processes, would willingly adopt an enabling approach, are subjected to a system of fabricated 
equality despite the good intentions of the adjudicator.  
 
Vulnerability theory regards the relationship between the state and its institutions as mutually 
dependent. Fineman suggests there is a state interest in taking corrective action if institutions fail 
to operate effectively, as the result will be to better ensure that each individual has the resources 
needed to withstand manifested vulnerability and function as a productive and participating 
citizen.448 This argument is deeply relevant to our common vulnerability to family upheaval, as it 
is especially likely to manifest in ways that interfere with optimum functioning, not only for the 
parties themselves, but for their children. I adopt Fineman’s argument that the state ought not to 
be cowed by the “autonomy myth”449 in responding to the present and potential future harm its 
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4. TRIBUNAL CULTURE AND DECISION-MAKING  
 
 
This chapter reviews prior research and writing regarding access to justice in administrative 
systems, the reported experiences of tribunal users, the use in tribunal systems of structured 
decision-making and the ways in which tribunals deal with self-represented parties. The essential 
components of adversarial and inquisitorial models are identified and discussed. 
 
4.1 Access to Justice 
 
 
Access to justice is a relatively new concern in administrative law systems,450 and one of its 
themes is that tribunal reform has been known to complicate tribunal processes by making them 
more court-like. The risk of tribunals becoming “over-judicialized” has been attributed to the 
“due process explosion” 451 that began with the adoption of the Statutory Powers Procedure 
Act452 (“SPPA”) in 1966 and is thought to have intensified as a result of efforts to keep up with 
“progressive developments” in court systems, such as multiple layers of case management. It has 
been observed that tribunals tend to defensively overreact to criticism by adopting more court-
like processes.453 In striking parallel with what has occurred in court systems, there is now a 
concern that some tribunal processes may become so expensive and alienating as to result in 
settlements primarily motivated by a desire to avoid the dispute resolution process.454  
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It has been suggested that administrative law systems may counter over-judicialization by 
offering a variety of hearing models, “ranging from the formal process characterized by close 
proximity to criminal and civil trials…through conference hearings, summary adjudicative 
hearings, and emergency hearings,”455as there may be points between mediation and full 
adjudication at which innovative processes can be developed.456 The empirical research for this 
project indicates that in some of the tribunals studied, this is, in fact, what has occurred.   
 
The accessibility of a justice system is, of course, ultimately a question for its users. Within the 
limits of this project, accessibility is gauged through the reported experiences of adjudicators in 
dealing with self-represented litigants. As noted above, the experience of tribunal users is a vital 
topic for further research.  
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It is December, close to the holidays. The tenant is behind in her rent payments 
and the landlord’s representative is seeking an eviction. 
 
The tenant, a woman seemingly in her thirties, talks about her three children and 
needing to buy them Christmas presents. She has no representative and appears to 
have no legal argument and no plan other than appealing to the sympathy of the 
adjudicator.  
 
The adjudicator explains that he cannot order a landlord to become a tenant’s 
creditor and issues an eviction order. The tenant leaves the hearing room in tears.  
 
A man dressed in a suit, who appears to be a lawyer seated with his clients, 
follows the just-evicted tenant out of the hearing room. From a distance I hear 
him assure her that there is a service to which she can apply for immediate 






The National Survey of Tribunal Responsiveness to Self-Represented Parties– Measuring Access 
to Justice for Canadian Administrative Tribunals457 reports upon the results of a quantitative 
study of Canadian adjudicative tribunals in which service to self-represented parties was 
assessed. The study calculates national and regional “baselines” and provides various 
“comparative indices,” including a national average score (or “national index”) that gauges 
responsiveness to self-represented litigants. The national index is reported as 62%, which was 
interpreted as suggesting room for improvement. Identified areas of weakness include hearing 
planning and preparation, mid-range capability was reported with respect to information-related 
services, public education and case management, and reported strengths include dealing with 
language issues, timeliness, and hearings. The study concludes that tribunals with a higher 
prevalence of self-represented parties had a lower focus on the needs of self-represented parties; 
this unlikely result was attributed to several possible factors, including high volumes of work in 
tribunals with large numbers of self-represented parties which may have hindered the 
implementation of systemic access to justice measures, or conversely, to these tribunals having 
developed a culture so well-adapted to working with self-represented parties that strategies for 
dealing with them are less obvious and were therefore under-reported.458 Survey criteria will be 
refined in follow-up studies; the current recommendation is that strategies for improvement be 
developed on a tribunal-specific basis due to the variable needs of self-represented parties across 
different tribunal systems. 
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The 2006 Genn Report,459 which is the product of a study of select tribunals in the United 
Kingdom, reports upon a survey of tribunal users, and includes a statistical analysis of tribunal 
decisions, as well as findings on access to tribunal justice, public perception of tribunals, and 
reported user experiences of tribunal proceedings. This study found that approximately half of 
tribunal participants were self-represented and had generally positive assessments of their 
experiences. Nonetheless, the study found that self-represented parties were less likely to 
succeed, and representation was generally regarded as valuable. Despite the positive reports of 
tribunal users, the study concluded that in some cases representation maybe crucial to procedural 
and substantive fairness. The study examined tribunal users’ perceptions of fairness, such as how 
comfortable parties felt during hearings, how well they understood procedures and questioning, 
the extent to which they believed they were given an opportunity to participate, whether they felt 
understood and whether adjudicators listened equally to what they and others had to say.460 The 
study reported positive findings in the range of seventy to ninety percent in all of these areas. 
With respect to representation by counsel, it states: 
 Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, representation appeared to have little effect and users 
said that they had felt comfortable in the tribunal. Some 69% of represented users and 
72% of unrepresented users when questioned after the end of the hearing said that they 
had felt comfortable during the hearing.461 
 
The demand for tribunal services, and their popularity among policy-makers has reportedly 
grown in step with the burgeoning self-represented litigant population and its increasing 
diversity:  
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Individuals are looking to these tribunals as simpler and more economical avenues to 
review administrative decision making and to resolve their disputes, free from the many 
formal trappings of the law courts – a trend which is likely to continue as the cost of 
access grows as a concern, not only for socially and economically disadvantaged 
individuals but also for the politically significant middle class.462 
 
As noted above, the user experience is a critical aspect of tribunal functioning that is 
recommended as a subject of further study.  
 
 
4.3 Soft Law and Structured Decision-Making  
 
Fairness and predictability are woven into the idea of the rule of law in the context of 
 administrative discretion and its aversion to arbitrary decision-making.463   
 
 
In interviews conducted for this project it was frequently remarked that decision-making 
guidelines for an adjudicative tribunal would be an illegitimate fetter upon discretion. Given that 
guidelines are most controversial in the context of administrative adjudicative tribunals, the 
category into which a custody and access tribunal would fall, the rationale for guidelines, their 
potential uses, and their sources of legitimacy are discussed in some detail. 
 
A legislature may articulate binding decision-making guidelines in a tribunal’s enabling statute, 
or it may give a tribunal authority to issue binding guidelines. In the absence of this authority a 
tribunal may still generate non-binding guidelines, a form of “soft law.”464 Houle and Sossin 
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identify three ways in which tribunal-generated guidelines may be utilized: to complete the legal 
order, develop the legal order, or remodel the legal order. Developing the legal order means to 
adopt specific interpretations of the law a tribunal it is charged with applying, tied to certain 
circumstances, with or without a specific mandate. 465 Guidelines of this sort can clarify, expound 
upon and communicate the framework for tribunal decision-making,466 and enhance consistency, 
accountability, transparency and fairness.467 In my view, this is the guideline function that would 
be most useful for a family law tribunal. 
  
The legitimacy of guidelines is dependent upon several factors, including: the scope of a 
tribunal’s policy-making function, the extent to which it is appropriate for consistency to be 
encouraged, independence and accountability concerns, and Charter compliance.  
 
 
 (a) Policy-Making  
Policymaking - the reconciliation and elaboration of lofty values into operational 
guidelines for the daily conduct of society's business.468 
All tribunals studied for this project are administrative adjudicative tribunals. According to first 
principles, administrative regulatory tribunals have a policymaking role (suggesting they may 
develop soft law) whereas adjudicative tribunals have a policy implementing role (suggesting 
they may not).469 The extent of a tribunal’s involvement in “crafting policy” is one way of 
distinguishing “quasi-executive” (more regulatory) and “quasi-judicial” (more adjudicative) 
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tribunals.470 The principle at stake is that governments cannot both make law and judge its 
application; an independent forum is needed in which the government perspective on its laws can 
be challenged, except where law is merely applied in a regulatory way.471  
 
In Consolidated Bathurst,472 the Supreme Court of Canada held that within the broad discretion 
conferred upon the Ontario Labour Relations Board (an adjudicative tribunal) decision-making is 
inevitably entwined with policy considerations. The Board successfully argued that, “law and 
policy are to a large degree inseparable…and come to be promulgated through the form of case 
by case decisions.”473 In the same decision the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of 
consistency in administrative adjudication, noting, “it is obvious that coherence in administrative 
decision making must be fostered.”474 The implication is that discretionary decision-making 
itself is a form of policy-making, and the further step of consolidating these policy choices in the 
form of guidelines is a legitimate exercise for administrative adjudicative tribunals; nonetheless,  




Administrative adjudicative decision-making is subject to contradictory imperatives: it is not 
bound by precedent, but cannot disregard past tribunal decisions; it may be subject to guidance, 
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but discretion must not be fettered.476 While the nature of a tribunal is relevant to the need for 
consistency, categorization alone does not resolve the problem of degree.477 For example, the 
tribunals studied for this project are “administrative adjudicative” in nature, yet as discussed in 
detail below, a significant number of tribunal members interviewed appeared to strongly identify 
with judges in court systems and reported that any decision-making guidelines would be an 
inappropriate fetter upon discretion, although it was almost universally reported that consistency 
with prior decisions is an important tribunal value.  
 
 
(b) Independence and Accountability 
 
Judicial independence has traditionally been defined as follows: 
Historically, the generally accepted core of the principle of judicial independence has 
been the complete liberty of individual judges to hear and decide the cases that come 
before them: no outsider - be it government, pressure group, individual or even another 
judge, should interfere, in fact, with the way in which a judge conducts his or her case 
makes his or her decision.478 [emphasis added] 
 
 
Interference in tribunal decision-making by “outsiders” such as government is only problematic 
in a “back-channel” sense;479 given that a tribunal exercises a statutory power of decision, 
legislation adopted in the ordinary course may constrain administrative adjudication without 
triggering independence concerns. “Outsider” interference may, however, also include guidelines 
generated by the tribunal itself, but only if they constrain the discretion of decision-makers to the 
extent of compromising independence and impartiality.480 Therefore, non-binding guidelines 
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may not contain language that suggests they are binding, or otherwise interfere with an 
adjudicator’s consideration of the facts in individual cases, or freedom to exercise judgment.481  
 
The legal legitimacy of guidelines is assessed in the course of judicial review cases in which they 
have been applied, and subsequently challenged through the ultra vires doctrine.482 If guidelines 
tread beyond the scope of delegated authority they are outside a tribunal’s jurisdiction, as is any 
individual decision that exceeds the scope of delegated authority, due, for example, to an 
adjudicator considering irrelevant evidence, acting for an improper purpose, or deciding on an 
unprincipled basis or in bad faith. In this framework, guidelines unduly fetter discretion if they 
go beyond indicating the appropriate scope for tribunal decisions or providing a framework for 
decision making; they may illustrate reasonable interpretations of the tribunal’s powers but may 
not provide mandatory answers or solutions. 
 
Finally, guidelines may be problematic in that granting a tribunal authority to develop guidelines 
may inadvertently give significant power to officials who are not subject to any meaningful 
measure of political accountability.483 It has been suggested that political accountability can be 
addressed through transparency, achieved by making guidelines publicly available and seeking 
input from members of the constituent community as part of an open policy development 
process.484 Broad-based input in the development of guidelines reflects a “bottom-up” approach 
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to norm production,485 which similarly occurs when tribunals communicate input on policy 
matters to the executive branch.486 The technology-driven demand for greater transparency in 
many fields has intensified the potential for this form of policy-making, and a “collaborative 
governance” model, which is consistent with New Governance Theory, has been suggested as a 
replacement for the traditional “command and control” approach to policy-making. In a 
collaborative governance model, the “policy process” is informed by broad-based community 
participation in identifying approaches to issues and expanding the range of options for dealing 
with them, utilizing an array of methods of public engagement, both in-person and online.487 
 
 
 (c) Charter Compliance 
 
The constitutionality of guidelines can only be assessed in individual cases in which the Charter 
is invoked upon review.488 It has been suggested that the caselaw offers lessons for the 
development of guidelines: first, a guideline that is constitutional on its face may, in its 
application, offend the equality rights contained in section 15 of the Charter and second, a grant 
of broad discretion with little guidance as to its application may fail to protect against “arbitrary 
conduct” as required by section 7 of the Charter.489 In short, guidelines intended to be non-
binding must be non-binding on their face and in their application, and in their application they 
must not deny equal treatment or enable arbitrary conduct. 
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It is one of the many complexities of administrative law that guidelines may be variously 
interpreted as enhancing or detracting from the legitimate exercise of a tribunal mandate. In the 
result, a range of considerations must inform the development and implementation of guidelines, 
but the administrative adjudicative nature of a tribunal does not, contrary to the views expressed 
in interviews for this project, indicate that guidelines per se are an inappropriate fetter upon 
adjudicator discretion.  
 

































The landlord has obtained an order evicting a tenant for marijuana use. The 
tenant has applied for leave to review an eviction order. Leave is granted by the 
Vice-Chair and the review hearing commences immediately thereafter.  
 
It is a comfortable and well-appointed hearing room, and the lighting is soft. 
The parties testify from counsel tables, rather than “taking the stand.” Both 
parties are represented. The tenant, a soft-spoken man seemingly in early middle 
age, is guided through his testimony, which discloses that he waited almost 9 
years for his subsidized apartment, is on ODSP with an income of $777 per 
month, suffers from schizophrenia, and has a 16-year-old daughter. He further 
testifies that at an earlier time he was homeless and lived in a bus terminal, and 
he has nowhere to go if his tenancy is terminated; his mental health has 
improved since moving into the subsidized apartment, which has allowed him to 
spend more time with his daughter.  His evidence is given in a straightforward 
manner, without self-pity. He makes concessions against interest without 
hedging.  
 
During cross-examination the tenant answers more slowly and takes on a dazed 
look, becoming confused over details of dates and locations. The adjudicator 
takes notes throughout his testimony. Landlord’s counsel is attempting to 
establish that the tenant could find another place to live. The adjudicator 
interjects to ask whether the landlord concedes that the tenant would lose his 
rent subsidy if the tenancy is terminated, and landlord’s counsel indicates he 
does not know. The adjudicator says she thinks this is so. Tenant’s counsel says 
he believes the subsidy will be lost. The adjudicator asks the tenant if he believes 
he can find another place without losing his subsidy, whether it would be 





























While tribunal process design is highly varied, unless the enabling legislation provides 
otherwise, all Ontario tribunals that hold hearings must follow procedures mandated by the 
SPPA, 490 which are meant to protect certain rights: to notice of proceedings, to know the case to 
be met, to representation, to conduct cross-examination of witnesses, and to be provided with 
reasons for decisions. Within this framework, section 25.0.1 of the SPPA provides that tribunals 
are free to develop detailed procedural rules to allow for flexibility, innovation and informality, 
provided that the appropriate standard for fairness is met.491 Therefore, within the limits of the 
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adjudicator, in which each side speaks to alternative remedies. The 
adjudicator’s manner is matter-of-fact, without a hint of condescension. She is 
both supportive of the landlord’s zero tolerance drug policy and sensitive to the 
tenant’s obvious vulnerability. 
 
The adjudicator states, as if it is a proven fact, that the tenant will be devastated 
if, after a nine-year wait, he loses the apartment over a single incident. She 
indicates that the member who made the eviction order considered (but did not 
make) a conditional order based upon the tenant’s ability to transfer the rent 
subsidy. She suggests another option: a conditional order reinstating the tenancy 
on the condition that there is no further marijuana use on the premises and 
providing for automatic termination of the tenancy if the order is breached.  
 
The atmosphere in the room is almost intimate. The tenant’s difficult 
circumstances have been discussed quietly and respectfully. Although extremely 
soft-spoken, the tenant is not asked to speak up. Questioning by landlord's 
counsel was purposeful but not harsh. The adjudicator’s approach was a 
problem solving one, in which all of the participants seemed comfortable and 
invested.  
 
The adjudicator reserves her final decision to consider a procedural matter, 
saying that if it is not a fatal flaw she will write a conditional order allowing the 
tenant to stay provided there are no further incidents of drug use. The appeal 







natural justice requirement of fairness, a tribunal is empowered to tailor its decision-making 
processes to its mandate and clientele. This power is echoed in the Social Justice Tribunals 
Ontario Common Rules,492 applicable to all of the tribunals studied here, in which it is stated that 
the rules and procedures of a tribunal shall be “liberally and purposively interpreted and applied 
to promote the fair, just and expeditious resolution of disputes” and to “allow parties to 
participate effectively in the process whether or not they have a representative.”493[emphasis 
added] The Rules further provide that “a tribunal may vary or waive the application of any rule 
or procedure, on its own initiative or on the request of a party, except where to do so is 
prohibited by legislation or a specific rule.”494 
 
 
(a)  Hybrid Models 
 
Hybrid systems have been described as the “new normal” in administrative justice,495 and in 
family justice systems they have been defined as “those that combine efforts to bring about 
consensual dispute resolution with efforts to identify and impose a just resolution.”496 Hybrid 
adjudication systems can be considered as points on a continuum between adversarial and 
inquisitorial models497 or as existing on a continuum between adversarial and non-adversarial 
processes.498 This is important to keep in mind, as “inquisitorial” and “non-adversarial” do not 
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mean the same thing. This chapter discusses hybrid systems in terms of blending adversarial and 
inquisitorial elements.  
 
As noted above, “pure” adversarial and inquisitorial paradigms are poor reflections of current 
reality.499 It has been suggested that contrasts between adversarial and inquisitorial systems have 
been grossly exaggerated,500 as European inquisitorial systems often utilize elements of 
adversarial procedure 501 and only certain French administrative tribunals can accurately be 
described as purely inquisitorial.502 Despite this, as noted above, the characteristics associated 
with these paradigms remain useful for distinguishing between the fundamental orientation of 
different justice systems, that is, understanding their ideological starting point. It is therefore 
worthwhile to consider the archetypal features of each paradigm, the strengths and weaknesses 
attributed to them, and how they have endured or eroded. 
 
As noted, the components of proceedings with inquisitorial elements vary greatly in different 
forums and jurisdictions, but may include any or all of the following:503 
- claims, documents and other written materials produced by a party are 
addressed to the court or tribunal, and forwarded to the responding party;  
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- the judge or adjudicator is empowered to determine the facts that must be 
established, and the evidence required, including witnesses and documentary 
evidence; 
- the tribunal may engage in independent fact-finding by requesting additional 
information from the parties, calling witnesses, and/or requesting 
documentary evidence; 
- the decision-maker determines when the case is ready to be heard and sets the 
date for hearing; 
- the decision-maker is permitted to consider arguments concerning essential 
aspects of the law, regardless of whether invoked by the parties; 
- the judge or adjudicator is not bound by formal rules of evidence, and is 
permitted to modulate the burden of proof; 
- the decision-maker may help a party to prove the necessary facts, provided the 
exercise is worthwhile;   
- there is no cross-examination of witnesses by the parties;  
- most of the evidence is in written form; 
- all documentary evidence is collected in a file assembled by the decision-
maker;  
- the decision-maker may be empowered to conduct or supervise an 
investigation;  





- witnesses may be restricted to answering questions only from tribunal 
members, with parties having no right to question the other party or 
independently address the tribunal. 
 
The reported strengths of inquisitorial systems include: 1) ability to compensate for differences 
between the parties as to resources, ability and knowledge, by allowing the decision-maker to 
assist the weaker party; 2) ability to better ensure the accuracy of fact-finding or “truth-finding;” 
and 3) greater efficiency and less susceptibility to strategic delay. 
 
The foregoing list illustrates that in inquisitorial systems responsibility for important aspects of 
the decision-making process is shifted from the individual to the state; it further suggests that the 
extent to which many hybrid systems have been endowed with inquisitorial elements is quite 
limited. Indeed, in the UK tribunals are often described as “user-friendly,” but may not assist a 
party to prepare a case or to gather evidence.504 Similarly, despite that it is a foundational 
principle of administrative law in Australia that tribunals are not bound to follow adversarial 
procedures, no Australian court has given unconditional support for the use of inquisitorial 
processes, and among Australian tribunals expressly empowered to conduct investigations these 
powers have reportedly seldom been used, although in some tribunals this is reportedly 
changing.505  
 
Tribunals that tend to attract inquisitorial powers have some common features. First, the work of 
these tribunals tends to suggest an underlying public interest, coupled with specific 
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vulnerabilities that trigger concerns about the use of adversarial processes.506 For example, in 
Australia family courts have developed the Less Adversarial Trial, and inquisitorial elements are 
permitted in refugee hearings; the latter has been attributed to the perceived public interest in 
proper and consistent implementation of immigration policies, the vulnerable populations 
involved, and related efficiency concerns.507 Similarly, in UK tribunals an “enabling approach” 
(in which every possible assistance is provided to self-represented parties, including bringing out 
relevant facts) has generally been advanced, but has been most consistently adopted where self-
represented parties face a repeat-player institutional litigant, for example, in social security 
cases.508 Lastly, in the United States, some inquisitorial methods are used in problem-solving 
family courts, and for claims related to entitlement programs such as Veterans’ Benefits and 
Social Security, where the perceived public interest lies in assisting highly “deserving” 
claimants, and efficiency concerns are engaged by vulnerability, large caseloads and backlogs.509  
 
In the context of public law, Shelley Kierstead has noted that “few would argue against the 
proposition that emotionally and physically healthy children are essential to a thriving 
society;”510 indeed, the documented consequences for children of high conflict separation and 
divorce, and the common knowledge that these consequences can be made worse by the court 
system, support a public interest in the private law sphere as well. What is more, the growing 
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population of self-represented litigants in family law disputes has clearly triggered efficiency 
concerns which, paired with a public interest, further justify inquisitorial dispute resolution 
processes. I argue that a system for custody and access dispute resolution (and perhaps for 
“ordinary” family law cases) should fully empower adjudicators to use all available means to 
assist self-represented litigants and obtain all relevant information as expeditiously as possible. 
 
A comparison between hybrid processes and a “Star Chamber” is clearly extreme, and so too is a 
stereotypical portrayal of adversarial systems, given the drift away from dogmatism on both ends 
of the continuum. With this in mind, the essential components of a traditional adversarial model 
include:511  
- a passive adjudicator who makes rulings as requested by counsel and rarely, if 
ever, interacts directly with parties or witnesses; 
- party control of the evidence (including figuring out what is needed to build a 
case, how to obtain it and in what form it should be presented (that is, in 
bound form, with indices and tabs) and providing this material to the opposite 
party and to the court in accordance with deadlines; 
- no “independent fact-finding” on the part of the decision-making body (all 
findings must be based upon the parties’ evidence); 
- complex rules of evidence;  
- party responsibility for presenting all evidence to the court in a manner 
consistent with procedural norms, including opening statements, giving 
testimony, examining and cross-examining witnesses, making appropriate 
                                               





objections, responding to the opposing party’s objections, properly filing 
documentary evidence in the form of exhibits, qualifying expert witnesses and 
challenging the qualification of the opposing party’s expert witnesses, and 
making closing statements; 
- party responsibility for pretrial processes, including case conferences, 
settlement conferences, and trial management conferences, all of which 
involve preparation and filing of documents with the court and the opposing 
party, and the same with respect to any interim motions; and 
- an emphasis on “winning” such that a favourable outcome is typically valued 
more than a decision considered correct by reference to some external 
standard.  
 
The endurance of the adversarial model has been attributed to a tendency to regard existing law 
and legal systems as “inevitable,” otherwise known as “path dependence” or, more harshly, as a 
“paralysis inducing” mind-set.512 An alternative (or compounding) explanation is ignorance on 
the part of the public as to the real alternatives presented by inquisitorial-based approaches to 
justice. 
 
It is trite, but worth noting, that traditional adversarial processes have been glamourized in 
American popular culture (Inherit the Wind, To Kill a Mockingbird…more recently, The People 
v. O.J. Simpson) and in the United Kingdom the archaic symbolism of adversarial justice is 
famously rich and remains largely in place. As “path dependence” suggests, adversarial systems 
                                               





tend to be equated to “fairness” in cultures in which they are the traditional form of justice. 
Indeed, it seems likely that even those with no substantial knowledge of legal systems are able to 
articulate the symbolic meaning of the blindfolded maiden grasping the scales of justice. The 
result is a perception, even in the minds of self-represented litigants who are disadvantaged by 
adversarial systems, is that justice depends upon combative and performative process.   
 
The public perception of the relative “fairness” of adversarial processes is, in my view, 
confounding; indeed, a recent study indicates only fourteen percent of the American public have 
extreme confidence in lawyers, whereas thirty-two percent have extreme confidence in judges.513 
The study notes that it is difficult to reconcile a finding of more public confidence in judges than 
lawyers with public faith in adversarial systems, in which lawyers have more control than 
judges.514 In my view, the fact that parties, through their lawyers, control adversarial processes is 
likely not well understood by most people, who may well assume that judges are in charge of 
everything. 
 
It is a question for further research whether, to the extent that there is a public preference for 
adversarial systems, it stems from cultural conditioning and ignorance of alternatives, discussed 
earlier, obliviousness to the fact that adversarial systems only work well when there is some 
semblance of equality between the skills and resources on either side, a combination of these 
factors, or something else altogether. Perhaps research subjects, particularly self-represented 
litigants, who are informed of the potential for modified inquisitorial processes to “level the 
playing field” would express different preferences. Finally, the strength of the adversarial model 
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has been attributed to the use of an adversarial court process in judicial review of administrative 
proceedings – encouraging the view that adversarial procedures are more authoritative, or even 
“more correct.”515  
 
Encouragement for the use of inquisitorial elements in some types of adjudication can be seen in 
the “Pinto Report,” discussed below with reference to the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, 
and the Family Justice Working Group Report, which recommends exploring the use of 
inquisitorial or “modified inquisitorial models” for family law and suggests a pilot project to 
evaluate the use of such models in Canada.516 Many hybrid inquisitorial-based systems use 
elements of adversarial civil procedure; for example it has been observed that the German justice 
system (which reportedly inspired the Australian LAT) was designed to avoid “the worst 
excesses” of the adversarial model; toward that end it has eliminated strictly partisan fact-
finding, partisan experts, and coached witnesses.517 Others have noted that “suppressing facts,” 
using “tricks and surprises,” and “manipulating fact-finders”518 also require elimination.519 The 
point is that reportedly effective reforms have been aimed at cabining (but not eliminating) 
adversarial processes. 
 
Working examples of the convergence of adversarial and inquisitorial models include the 
tribunals studied for project, and more prominently perhaps, the Canadian Immigration and 
Refugee Board (“IRB”). The IRB adopted an inquisitorial element by issuing “Guideline 7” 
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pursuant to Board authority under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to “issue 
guidelines…to assist members in carrying out their duties.”520 Guideline 7 allows adjudicators to 
question claimants in advance of counsel; the Board claimed that Guideline 7 was needed to 
curtail rambling examinations in chief,521 (an efficiency concern). Although the Federal Court of 
Appeal in Thamotharem v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration522 found that 
Guideline 7 fettered discretion by being, in effect, mandatory, the Court otherwise supported a 
“pseudo-inquisitorial role” for IRB members, specifically noting it did not imply less fairness.  
 
Thamotharem illustrates that inquisitorial innovations extend beyond active adjudication and 
other hearing room strategies, and include hearing, pre-hearing and intake processes designed to 
make tribunals more manageable (consistent with the most pressing needs of self-represented 
litigants identified in the White Paper),523which include assistance with forms, and plain 
language information and education.524 Hybrid processes may include simplified application 
processes, clear tribunal rules, and tribunal suggestions as to available claims and potential 
witnesses or other evidence. Finally, in administrative law systems hybrid processes are 
generally authorized under the principle that tribunals are “masters in their own house;” 525 as 
noted earlier, they are empowered to design their own processes within the bounds of their 
enabling statute and regulations, the SPPA, if applicable, and rules of fairness and natural justice. 
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(b)  Active Adjudication  
 
I’d like to thank you for losing this case for me.  
Any other questions, your Honour? 
 
Active adjudication is controversial, despite that it is not newly invented, nor exclusive to 
tribunals. Indeed, before a deluge of self-represented litigants expanded the rationale for active 
adjudication processes, Owen Fiss described the role of judges in court processes as follows:  
Of course, imbalances of power can distort judgment as well: Resources influence the 
quality of presentation, which in turn has an important bearing on who wins and the terms 
of victory. We count, however, “on the guiding presence of the judge, who can employ a 
number of measures to lessen the impact of distributional inequalities.” He can, for 
example, supplement the parties' presentations by asking questions, calling his own 
witnesses, and inviting other persons and institutions to participate as amici.526 
 
The decision-making environment described by Fiss is not an uncontested vision; the level of 
assistance considered appropriate to assist self-represented (or under-represented) parties varies 
from merely providing information about basic procedure to substantial assistance to “lessen the 
impact of distributional inequalities” as Fiss suggests, that is, levelling the playing field. 
 
Michelle Flaherty defines active adjudication as a component of adversarial proceedings 
whereby the adjudicator may provide guidance and direction as to how the hearing will be 
conducted , and may assist the parties by explaining procedural steps, raising jurisdictional issues 
adopting a flexible approach to the rules of evidence and procedure, but may not provide legal 
advice or take on the role of representative.527 The issue in active adjudication is how active, and 
the obvious concern is apprehension of bias, which as noted above, appears to require re-
examination in the self-represented litigant era. 
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According to administrative law scholars, administrative proceedings are generally more 
flexible, expeditious and informal than court proceedings, and relatively intense engagement 
with the parties is generally more acceptable in tribunals than in non-inquisitorial courts; indeed, 
it has been asserted that the flexibility of administrative law under a Baker analysis supports 
“adjudicator activism” in some contexts.528 Conference materials prepared by the Society of 
Ontario Adjudicators (SOAR)529 list the benefits of active adjudication processes as including: 
shortening hearings, improving understanding of the issues, improving decision-making, 
enhancing efficiency by allowing adjudicators to exercise greater control over proceedings, 
improving access to justice; improving proportionality by enabling processes to be tailored to the 
nature of the parties and the dispute, and facilitating decision writing. These materials further cite 
the need to balance these benefits with “fairness and avoiding any appearance of bias, pre-
judgment, or descent into the arena and… the dust of conflict.”530 Indeed, the most controversial 
active adjudication technique is direct questioning of witnesses, or interfering in questioning, 
especially on cross-examination. The SOAR conference materials assert that it is permissible for 
an adjudicator to put questions to a witness that should have been asked by counsel, in order to 
bring out some relevant matter, or to explore an area that a witness’ answers have left vague, or 
to clear up ambiguities; they also assert that cross-examination, usurping the role of counsel, 
“excessive questioning,” and “not believing witnesses” must be avoided.531 The space for 
                                               
528 Freya Kristjanson and Sharon Naipul, “Active Adjudication or Entering the Arena – How Much is Too 
Much?” (2011), 24 Can. J. Admin. L. & Prac. 201 at page 5. (Westlaw)  
529 Jeff Cowan and Jill Doherty, “Active Adjudication and Civility” (November 7, 2013), Society of Ontario 
Adjudicators Annual Conference Materials online: https://soar.on.ca/node/262 
530 Ibid. [Cowan and Doherty] 





confusion is vast, given that the permitted scope of questioning could serve as a partial definition 
of cross-examination.  
 
 
(c)  Apprehension of Bias 
 
The natural tension between active adjudication and traditional notions of impartiality illustrates 
the obvious fact that active adjudication techniques are incompatible with adversarial norms, 
upon which court-system conceptions of bias are naturally based.532 As noted above, increased 
use of active adjudication has occurred in step with burgeoning numbers of self-represented 
litigants, who also do not have a natural place in the adversarial paradigm. Indeed, active 
adjudication is seemingly the essence of a moderate inquisitorial model, and according to 
inquisitorial ideology and norms it enhances fairness and natural justice.533  
 
The adoption of active adjudication as an element of otherwise adversarial systems engenders 
debate as to how this authority can be utilized so as not to breach adversarial norms – a difficult 
line to draw because, as noted, active adjudication by definition contradicts adversarial norms. 
Suggested limitations on the use of active adjudication, to reconcile it with an adversarial 
framework, include: a general principle that judges and adjudicators are permitted to intervene 
by clarifying evidence, curtailing the evidence on matters at issue, avoiding irrelevant or 
repetitive evidence, dispensing with proof of obvious or agreed matters, and ensuring that 
witnesses answer questions in a way that does not unduly hamper progress of the matter;534 and 
defining “over-intervention” as undue interference in the presentation of a case, particularly in 
                                               
532 See: Supra, footnote 608. [Children’s Aid Society of the United Counties of Stormont, Dundas and 
Glengarry v. S.V.D.]   
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questioning witnesses, commenting on evidence, or appearing to have pre-judged issues of fact 
and credibility,535 including, more specifically: “sarcasm, discourtesy, disparaging remarks, 
being confrontational, making procedural or other rulings without receiving submissions or 
evidence from one of the parties, and making findings credibility (or making comments that 
suggest a finding of credibility has been made) mid-hearing.”536 In administrative adjudication 
that is built on an adversarial foundation, these limitations apply to ensure that proceedings are 
not conducted in a manner that suggests impartiality, gauged in accordance with the same test 
applied to judges in court systems, and derived from the same jurisprudence,537 but with the 
proviso that the interpretation of bias depends upon a Baker analysis of the requirements of 
procedural fairness in the context of each case.  
 
The connection between adversarial norms and the interpretation of bias can be seen in the 
following passage, recently quoted in a judicial review case in which it was successfully argued 
that the limits upon active adjudication had been exceeded:  
A judge who observes the demeanor of the witnesses while they are being examined by 
counsel has from his detached position a much more favorable opportunity of forming a 
just appreciation than a judge who himself conducts the examination. If he takes the latter 
course he, so to speak, descends into the arena and is liable to have his vision clouded by 
the dust of the conflict. Unconsciously he deprives himself of the advantage of calm and 
dispassionate observation.538 
 
The struggle to reconcile adversarial norms and adjudicator activism is also occurring in courts, 
and is demonstrated by the following passage from a recent Supreme Court of Canada decision:  
Judges are no longer required to be as passive as they once were; to be what I call sphinx 
judges. We now not only accept that a judge may intervene in the adversarial debate, but 
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also believe that it is sometimes essential for him to do so for justice in fact to be 
done…539 
 
The need to re-consider the boundaries of impartiality in administrative decision-making has 
attracted discussion in the literature, including a recent suggestion that a standard of “substantive 
impartiality” is emerging.540 As I have argued in another paper,541 there are a number of 
foundations upon which the development of a more nuanced standard for impartiality in tribunal 
proceedings might rest.  
 
First, the existing test for reasonable apprehension of bias, derived from the dissenting opinion of 
de Grandpre, J. in Committee for Justice and Liberty v. Canada (National Energy Board,542 is 
contextual, and therefore adaptable to hybrid models of adjudication. The apprehension of bias 
test was articulated in Liberty as follows:  
…the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right 
minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the required 
information. In the words of the Court of Appeal the test is “what would and informed 
person, viewing the matter realistically and practically – and having thought the matter 
through – conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the decision 
maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly.”543  
 
 
Second, the case law, beginning with Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration),544 has reinforced that the Liberty test for apprehension of bias it is flexible, 
variable and contextual. What is more, the court in Baker held that the duty of fairness requires 
                                               
539 Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area Number 23 v. Yukon Attorney General [2015] 2 S.C.R. 
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540 Michelle Flaherty, “Self-Represented Litigants: A Sea Change in Adjudication” (2013) Ottawa Faculty of 
Law Working Paper No. 2013-07 online: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2348708 
541 Patricia L. Robinson, “Uneven Treatment of Fairness: Children's Aid Society of the United Counties of 
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administrative decisions to be made “using a fair, impartial, and open process, appropriate to the 
statutory, institutional and social context of the decision,”545 and the content of the duty of 
fairness is to be determined “in the specific context of each case.”546 [my emphasis] The 
Supreme Court of Canada in Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada547 again emphasized the 
importance of context, writing: “[t]his is a corner of the law in which the context, and the 
particular circumstances, are of supreme importance …There are no shortcuts,”548 and the same 
point was literally underlined by the Court in Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area 
Number 23 v. Yukon Attorney General:549 
…allegations of perceived judicial bias will generally not succeed unless the impugned 
conduct, taken in context, truly demonstrates a sound basis for perceiving that a particular 
determination has been made on the basis of prejudice or generalizations. One overriding 
principle that arises from these cases is that the impugned comments or other conduct 
must not be looked at in isolation. Rather, it must be considered in the context of the 
circumstances, and in light of the whole proceeding.550 [underlining in the original] 
 
The connection between the context of decision-making and the requirements of procedural 
fairness is evidenced by yet another continuum, in this instance between the different types of 
tribunal and their attendant procedural requirements. In broad terms, “quasi-judicial” decision-
                                               
545 Ibid., at para. 28. [Baker] 
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makers must more “court-like” procedural protections,551 whereas investigative552 and 
Ministerial553decisions are subject to a relatively low standard of impartiality, as are policy or 
polycentric decisions.554 As the Supreme Court put it in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi,555 
fairness is not a “one-size-fits-all” doctrine.556 To mix metaphors, “fairness” is also not a blunt 
instrument. There are nuances and refinements within decision-making categories, so that mere 
categorization of a decision-making function as “quasi-judicial” or a decision-making body as 
“adjudicative” does not, in itself, give practical meaning to the requirements of procedural 
fairness in the specific context of each case. Indeed, a nuanced contextual analysis of bias has 
been applied upon judicial review of administrative “quasi-judicial” decision-making. For 
example, in DeMaria v. Law Society of Saskatchewan557 allegations of bias stemmed from the 
apparently friendly relationship between Law Society counsel and certain Benchers. The court 
considered a number of social and institutional factors (such as the projected mental/emotional 
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2013 ABCA 6 at para 22, in which the court stated: “a Minister of the Crown authorized to exercise a 
discretion is not necessarily bound to proceed “like a member of the judiciary” without the interest in the case 
that “would make [a judge] apparently biased in the eyes of an objective and properly informed third party.”  
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Kowalczyk v. Peel Access to Housing, 2005 CanLII 1082 (ON SCDC) at para. 7. 
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capabilities of Benchers) and held there was no “reasonable apprehension of bias.”558 [italics in 
the original]  
 
Third, the apprehension of bias test is objective: not only must the perception of bias be 
“reasonable” in the circumstances, it must be interpreted through a “reasonable person” 
construct, and this construct has often been interpreted by appellate courts in nuanced ways that 
effectively expand the boundaries of impartiality. Examples include: Wewaykum Indian Band v. 
Canada,559 in which the Court imputed to the reasonable person knowledge of such social and 
institutional factors as the dynamics of judicial decision-making and the nature of legal practice 
in the Department of Justice, and found no reasonable perception of bias; and, R. v. S.(R.D.)560 in 
which Justices McLaughlin and L’Heureux Dube imputed to the reasonable person an 
understanding of such social “realities” as the local relationship between police and racialized 
communities, and again found no reasonable apprehension of bias.  
 
Finally, as a matter of doctrine, the essence of bias is prejudgement, although there is often no 
discussion in the case law as to whether the conduct in question has created an appearance of 
pre-judgment. Rather, the appearance of bias appears to be treated as equivalent to the 
appearance of pre-judgment. In my view, there is a meaningful distinction between these 
concepts: an adjudicator who questions witnesses closely or aggressively elicits evidence may be 
perceived in some contexts (and by some observers) as assisting a favoured party. In a different 
context (for example, in a tribunal in which there are consistent power imbalances) another, 
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differently informed observer may regard the same conduct as simply a skilled attempt at 
obtaining information.  
 
In sum, the argument here is that the assessment of allegations of reasonable apprehension of 
bias in the context of modified adversarial proceedings invites an analysis of the nature of the 
proceedings and the roles and characteristics of participants in each case, which itself can result 
in a nuanced approach to impartiality, that is, the enabling of active adjudication, although such 
an analysis is not always undertaken.561 As discussed in detail below, the assessment of bias 
allegations in modified inquisitorial proceedings is unrelated to the appearance neutrality, and 
rests upon the more quantifiable notion of thoroughness. Moreover, active adjudication processes 
are consistent with inquisitorial norms. 
 
 
4.5 Multi-Disciplinary Decision-Making 
 
 
The 2001 Leggatt Report, 562 which emerged out of a series of tribunal studies conducted in the 
United Kingdom, noted an important advantage of tribunals is that decisions are often made 
jointly by panels comprising lawyers and experts able to bring a broad range of skills to bear on 
decision-making, and in Canadian administrative law a multi-disciplinary, consultative decision-
making process is considered appropriate for adjudicative tribunals.563  
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Recent research suggests “collegial decision-making” (defined as a common interest in getting 
the law right, and a willingness to listen, to persuade, and to be persuaded) generally leads to 
“more principled” decisions,564 and multiple perspectives have been demonstrated to improve 
decision-making in some contexts, particularly where panel members have more diverse 
backgrounds. These general conclusions reportedly depend upon a number of variables,  
including: how deeply information is shared, the extent to which group members elaborate upon 
shared information, whether different perspectives are integrated into a final decision, leadership 
styles that may affect interpretation of the group task,565 and “panel effects,” which refer to the 
positive and negative potential for the ideologies or personal characteristics of some panel 
members to influence others.566 It has been noted in other jurisdictions that decision-making in 
child welfare is increasingly seen as benefitting from a collaborative process, and the 
effectiveness of team decision-making in this context depends upon “shared mental models” and 
the absence of over-deference to more “senior” panel members.567 In the context of Ontario 
labour arbitration, one panel member represents workers, the other represents management and 
the third is “neutral,” allowing the representative members to adjudicate from the informed 
perspective of each side and act as a “sounding board.”568 This, in my view, is suggestive of the  
potential role of clinicians in the application of the best-interests-of-the-child test (in cases where 
they are consulted, not empaneled); their perspective could be focussed upon the parties’ 
“derivative dependents,” and would be informed by knowledge of child development, best-
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interests-of-the-child studies and literature, and their (assumed) ability “thin-slice” family 
dynamics.569 Finally, it has been reported that panel decisions may be seen as more “accurate,” 
that is, “correct” in the view of the affected community.570   
 
It is not suggested here that judicial decision-making in the court system is not collegial, only 
that it is not based on collegiality, that is, upon a common interest in getting the law right in each 
case. Having said this, I note that while the research here cannot be generalized to the tribunals 
as a whole, among the members interviewed, the extent of permissible informal collaboration 
with other members appeared, for some, members interviewed, to be unclear. Despite that 
Consolidated Bathurst571 signalled support for plenary meetings,572 other recent studies and 
commentary confirm uneven use of multi-disciplinary expertise in tribunal adjudication, noting 
that despite the legitimizing function of expertise at the creation stage of tribunals, expertise is 
sometimes isolated from decision-making in order to avoid over-stepping the limits of 






Depending upon the issue in dispute, the standard for admissibility of evidence in a tribunal may 
simply be relevance, although other rules of evidence may be applied to determine weight.574 
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This approach obviously simplifies hearings as it takes a highly technical aspect of the law out of 
the scope of the parties’ concern. Again, depending upon the issue, relevant studies and reports 
may be used as evidence in tribunal proceedings without the support of an expert witness, and 
accepted facts within a tribunal’s specialized knowledge may be used to inform decision-making 
without the restrictions associated with “judicial notice.”575 For administrative bodies with 
specialized expertise, the concept of judicial notice has been expanded to a concept of “official 
notice,” which permits reliance upon opinions and assumptions generated by the administrative 
body that have not been introduced in evidence, as long as they are not inconsistent with the 
evidence presented.576 
 
The potential in tribunals for innovative approaches to the problem of competing experts is 
illustrated by the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“AAT”), which hears expert 
evidence presented by panels comprised of more than one expert. Instead of using cross-
examination to challenge the credibility of conflicting opinions, experts for each side testify 
together and discuss their different approaches and conclusions, and the tribunal asks questions 
of both experts with the goal of obtaining the best possible evidence.577 
 
4.7 Appointment Process and Term Limits 
 
 
The reforms introduced by the Adjudicative Tribunals Accountability, Governance and 
Appointments Act578 (“Accountability Act”) have not silenced critics of tribunal appointment and 
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retention practices. Term limits, discretionary re-appointments, lingering concerns about 
patronage despite a merit-based appointment process, and large numbers of part-time members 






Informality is sometimes equated to a “less adversarial” process, but as discussed above, 
informality relates to the physical decision-making environment and its atmosphere as well as 
the decision-making process. Despite that tribunals are generally considered to be less formal 
than courts, tribunals are neither inherently nor uniformly informal, but they can be designed to 
be informal. Among the tribunals in which I observed hearings, some hearing rooms felt very 
informal while others resembled courtrooms. The most consistently informal aspects of 
administrative adjudication appear to be the ordinary business attire of adjudicators, the modesty 
(even shabbiness) of some hearing rooms, and the absence of court-like customs, such as bowing 
before the decision-maker.  
 
4.9 Electronic Hearings  
  
A number of alternatives to in-person proceedings are commonly available in administrative 
adjudication. Among the tribunals studied here, the HRTO is currently conducting a pilot project 
for telephone mediation in cases where both parties are represented by a lawyer or paralegal 
(representation was reportedly considered essential to ensure “easy access to fax machine and/or 
email and scanner”); the benefits of telephone mediation cited in the most recently published 
HRTO Annual Report include “reduced travel time, convenience and potentially lower legal 
                                               





costs, because of time saved.”580 It was noted in interviews for this project that both the LTB and 
SBT conduct telephone or videoconference hearings, and the CFSRB conducts some pre-
hearings by telephone.   
 
The availability of e-hearings is subject to a tribunal’s determination that unfairness to a party 
will not ensue.581 Some fairness concerns are technology-based, and may fade over time as 
technology improves,582 but the problems identified in a 2006 study remains noteworthy, and 
include: inability to maintain eye contact or talk privately; camera angles that make it difficult to 
read facial expressions and body language; audio that muffles nuances of speech and emotion; 
and the extreme informality of remote settings (such as public school classrooms) which may 
undermine tribunal authority and credibility.583 On the positive side, some judges have reported 
that viewing an electronically transmitted full-face close-up view of witnesses, rather than seeing 
them at an angle from the bench, enhances the ability to assess credibility, and  e-hearings 
reportedly can save twenty-five to forty percent of hearing time, and further contribute to 
efficiency by eliminating travel expenses and security costs. 584  
 
Finally, “virtual tribunals” operate primarily or entirely on online.585 In 2012, British Columbia 
enacted the Civil Resolution Tribunal Act,586 under which it has established a “Civil Resolution 
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Tribunal” for specified small claims587 and cases governed by the Strata Property Act.588 The 
Tribunal website describes it as Canada’s first online tribunal,589 and its process begins with 
individual online information gathering and problem diagnosis, moves to online monitored 
negotiation, followed by two stages of case management; first, facilitative mediation and second, 
preparation for adjudication. The final stage is adjudication, either online, by telephone, mail or 






This chapter reviews common aspects of tribunal adjudication systems which, in my view, are 
relevant to decision-making needs in custody and access cases. The discussion of the 
components of adversarial and inquisitorial models illustrates that neither model in its pure form 
is as desirable as a blend of both; I argue that inquisitorial processes seem more responsive to  
unmet needs in family law dispute resolution than adversarial processes.  
 
Active adjudication is a common feature of hybrid adversarial models with inquisitorial 
elements. Despite that the “battle of wits and wiles”590 premise adversarial systems is undone 
when one or both parties is self-represented, the apprehension of bias standard has not yet been 
modified to fully enable the use of active processes. Some may regard this as a healthy tension 
that keeps adjudicators in check; that is, appropriately conscious of the potential for judicial 
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review. I later argue, based upon my empirical research, that the effects can be more far-ranging, 
and include unpredictable hearing styles and a corresponding lack of tribunal process identity.  
 
Finally, the appropriate role of guidelines and internal informal consultation are discussed, 









































5. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
 
 
The tribunals studied, the Child and Family Services Review Board (“CFSRB”), Landlord and 
Tenant Board (“LTB”), Social Benefits Tribunal (“SBT”) and Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario 




5.1  Research Strategy and Method 
 
 
(a) Case Study Strategy    
A case study is not a research method; it is a qualitative research strategy in which a range of 
methods may be utilized to accumulate data and investigate phenomena in the particular context 
of the case.591  
 
Case studies are especially well-suited to the study of social, organizational and institutional 
processes and they often examine groups and individuals within, or affected by, organizations. 592 
They are useful for understanding how processes are influenced by their context and identifying 
the meaning for institutional actors of key concepts and everyday institutional practices; they can 
help to explain behavior which can only be fully understood by probing the broader forces that 
operate within and upon an institutional entity.593 
 
                                               
591 Jean Hartley, “Case Study Research” in Catherine Cassell and Gillian Symon, eds. Essential Guide to 
Qualitative Methods in Organizational Research (2004) (Sage Publications Limited: London) at page 323. 
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The “case” in a case study refers to the system or phenomenon under study; case study research 
may be based upon a single case or multiple cases, and it may focus upon an entire organization, 
cases which exist within the organization, or some combination of both.594 The empirical 
research conducted for this project consists of a single case study in which the “case” is 
adjudication within carefully selected tribunals.  
 
The purpose of a case study does not typically include generalization of study findings.595 The 
central goal is to gain an in-depth understanding of the specific system or phenomenon under 
study through the gathering of rich and detailed information.596 The methods adopted here 
(participant observation, ethnography and semi-structured interviews) are commonly used in 
case studies,597 and can be described as “information-oriented sampling,” a case study research 
method that maximizes extensive and detailed information from a small group of subjects.598 The 
methods used in this study are based upon “sympathetic engagement”599and are inherently 
subjective. This quality, considered problematic in quantitative research, is an essential source of 
depth in qualitative research.600 
 
Case studies can be descriptive, explorative and/or explanatory,601 and research methods utilized 
in a case study may be qualitative or quantitative, but are typically qualitative. The research 
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methods adopted for this project are qualitative. The debate over the relative merits of these 
approaches is not re-visited here; I simply note that while quantitative methods may be more 
acceptable to academics,602 there is a level of nuance in qualitative research that has been said to 
inspire more complex solutions, and is unquestionably suitable for exploratory purposes, 603 that 
is, to enhance understanding as a preliminary step toward prescribing solutions. 
 
Methods used for qualitative research may be deductive or inductive.604 The method used here is 
inductive. Deductive methods more closely resemble quantitative research; previous research is 
used to develop a specific theory or set of hypotheses which are then tested. In inductive case 
studies, theory and hypotheses may be rudimentary at the start and developed as the researcher 
makes sense of fine-grained data and identifies what is of more general relevance and interest.605  
 
The initial theoretical framework for inductive research often simply consists of a research 
question (for this project: whether there is positive potential for the use of tribunal processes in 
family law), interview questions and definitions of key concepts.606 Inductive methods are not 
constrained by fixed methodological rules or a particular analytic approach; they allow 
researchers to “follow their phenomena.”607 For example, in this project I did not initially expect  
                                               
602 Catherine Cassell and Gillian Symon, “Assessing Good Quality Research in the Work Psychology Field: A 
Response to the Commentaries” (2011) 84 Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology 666 at page 
667.  
603 Ibid., at page 667. [Cassell and Symon] 
604 Supra, footnote 594 at page 684. [Lee et al] 
605 Supra, footnote 591 at page 324. [Hartley] 
606 Ibid., at page 324. [Hartley] 
607 Karen Locke, “Narratives of quality in qualitative research: putting them in context” (2011) 84 Journal of 





that active adjudication would be a central theme; it became so because its use was contested in a  
hearing I observed, and later became the subject of a judicial review decision.608  
 
“Sampling” refers to the selection of subjects or units of study.609 Qualitative sampling is not 
based upon principles associated with statistical methods, and selection criteria for units or 
samples are not usually pre-specified and may be both planned and “opportunistic,”610 that is, 
expanded on a “rolling basis” through referrals or the requirements of evolving theories derived 
from the data.611 This was the process used for this project, as detailed below.  
 
The essential task of the methodology type adopted for this study is “to make sense of and 
recognize patterns among words in order to build up a meaningful picture without compromising 
its richness and dimensionality.”612 More prosaically, this sort of analysis has been compared to 
detective work: it involves piecing together collected data to generate or support theories of 
broader interest.613 The narrative portion of a such analysis is unlikely to be compelling reading 
among those outside the organization studied, although the broader implications of the analysis 
may be of wider interest.614  
 
                                               
608 Children’s Aid Society of the United Counties of Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry v. S.V.D., 2016 ONSC 
350 (Div. Ct.).  
609 Sarah Curtis, Wil Gesler, Glen Smith, and Sarah Washburn, “Approaches to Sampling and Case Selection 
in Qualitative Research: Examples in the Geography of Health” (2000) Social Sciences and Medicine 1001 at 
page 1002. 
610 Supra, footnote 591 at page 324. [Hartley] 
611 Supra, footnote 609 at page 1002. [Curtis] 
612 Supra, footnote 595. [Leung]. 
613 Supra, footnote 591 at page 324. [Hartley] 





Standard experimental or survey design criteria are not relevant to assessing the validity of the 
kinds of qualitative research methods used in this case study; validity and credibility remain 
essential but are assessed differently. 
 
The “internal validity” of a qualitative case study depends upon the research question and the 
suitability of the methodology for exploring the research question.615 “External validity” depends 
upon whether the study provides sufficient in-depth “thick description” to enable the reader to 
sense that its findings are likely to be consistent in a similar context;616 otherwise expressed as 
whether the research provides “a really convincing account of what is observed.”617  
 
There are several sources of credibility for qualitative case study research, including: rich and 
meaningful description (also relevant to validity),618 a rigorous approach to data collection, the 
use of multiple sources of data; development of a transparent “case study database,” using charts 
and coding systems to organize raw data;619 internal coherence in the data analysis, pointing out 
similarities and contrasts in the data,620and a ratio between evidence and argument that suggests 
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620 Supra, footnote 591 at page 324. [Hartley] 
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 (b)  Parallels Between Family Law and the Tribunals Studied   
As noted earlier, in my view, the tribunals selected for study have similarities to family law 
courts. This claim is based upon several factors, beginning with the very high proportion of self-
represented parties in these tribunals, comparable or exceeding that which is reported the 
Canadian family court systems.  
 
I note that Noel Semple has used the term  “personal plight sector” to describe a category of legal 
needs that arise out disputes (rather than transactions) between individuals (rather than legally 
created entities) which are caused by “an underlying life crisis.”622 Semple notes that areas of 
law in which personal plight needs arise include family, criminal defense, employment and 
personal injury.623  
 
While it may be argued that family law problems are more complicated and entail higher levels 
of conflict than the subject matter of the tribunals studied, or that substantive family law is more 
complex and less clear than the law applied in the studied tribunals, I point out that the CFSRB is 
charged with applying the best-interests-of-the-child test, and it deals with families engaged with 
child protection services, one of the most discretionary and emotionally fraught areas of the law. 
The HRTO deals with employment law and is charged with applying the discretionary “duty to 
accommodate” test. Its caseload includes disputes between individuals, which may have high 
emotional stakes due to loss of income and/or allegations of sexual assault, racism and other 
forms abuse. The LTB adjudicates eviction orders, sometimes for tenants who are highly 
marginalized and occupy subsidized housing. Lastly, SBT hearings concern claims for income 
                                               
622 Supra, footnote 306 at page 146. [Semple, Third Revolution] 





support arising out of disability, which require adjudicators to independently assess medical 
evidence.  
 
(c)  Methodology 
The research question for this project was addressed by exploring tribunal decision-making. I 
began this process with participant observation; I sat in on multiple LTB, CFRSB and HRTO 
hearings, but have not observed SBT hearings. Participant observation is the main research 
method used in ethnography. It requires close observation of events and/or behavior in a specific 
context, and recording observations and experiences in extreme detail, usually in the form of 
meticulous notes. The collected data is reviewed and summarized, again in great detail, 
preferably immediately following the observation phase. Hypotheses may emerge from the data 
which determine the direction of future data collection. It is a reflexive process that does not rely 
upon standard protocols. Its credibility is assessed in the same way as described above with 
respect to the external validity of case studies in general: through the reader’s sense of deep 
engagement with the observed events or behavior and sense of the reality of what has been 
described.624 
 
I have had informal discussions with court-adjunct mediation personnel in Toronto, employees 
of The Human Rights Legal Support Centre, and Provincial Court duty counsel and advice 
counsel. I have conducted twenty-one interviews with members and Vice-Chairs of the tribunals 
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studied, some of whom are cross-appointed to more than one tribunal and described their 
experiences accordingly.  
 
I sought and received permission from the CFSRB to observe proceedings, as they are closed, 
and to interview its members. I later sought permission from the SJTO to interview members of 
the other tribunals studied and was provided with a list of recommended interview subjects. I 
drew from this list as well as my own list of potential interviewees, compiled based upon online 
member biographies, and added more interview subjects on a rolling basis, through 
recommendations of other interviewees based upon fellow members’ areas of expertise. The 
members interviewed have a wide variety of backgrounds and levels of experience.  
 
The depth of the reporting on each tribunal studied varies in accordance with the number of 
interview requests accepted in each tribunal. Eight interviews were conducted with members of 
the CFSRB; six with members of the HRTO, three with members of the LTB and four with 
members of the SBT.  As noted above, some members were cross-appointed and commented 
upon more than one tribunal. 
 
The same topics were canvassed in all interviews, although in some instances time constraints 
and/or an adjudicator’s personal areas of interest or expertise led to more discussion of some 
topics and less of others. Broadly stated, interviews covered perceptions of tribunal mandate, the 
effects of self-representation on tribunal functioning, techniques adopted by adjudicators to deal 
with self-represented parties, attitudes toward active adjudication and common active 





informality, availability of mediation and other settlement strategies, settlement pressure, the 
development and utilization of institutional expertise, internal consultation and communication, 
and current policy issues. While the research was focussed upon the actual experiences of 
tribunal members, not their future policy or practice preferences, the latter were sometimes 
solicited or volunteered, and are included in this report to the extent they provide insight as to 
potential tribunal processes. 
 
Interviews were semi-structured and conversational; a chart of questions was used to guide 
discussions but was not treated as a questionnaire, and notes were taken almost constantly. 
Following each interview, these notes were immediately reviewed and summarized, and as 
common and contrasting themes emerged, they were separately noted. Once all interviews were 
completed, the notes and summaries were again analysed to separate out common responses, 
responses supportive or contrary to common responses, outlier responses, and areas in which 
there was no common response. This data was compiled in the chart attached as Appendix B. In 
keeping with the research methodology, the results are also reported in narrative form in Chapter 
Six, and no statistical analysis has been attempted.  
 
 
5.2 Tribunals Studied  
 
(a)  Child and Family Services Review Board  
 
The CFSRB is of particular interest for this project because of its mandate to apply the best-






The Board was constituted under the Child and Family Services Act,625 (“CFSA”), the stated 
purpose of which is “to promote the best interests, protection and well-being of children.”626 Its 
review powers cover a wide range of children's aid society decisions.627 It is also an appeal 
forum under the Education Act628 for school board expulsions of students. 
 
The Board adjudicates disputes between individuals and institutions, such as school boards and 
children’s aid societies, not between private parties. In Ontario, children’s aid societies are 
independent non-government bodies, which are created under the authority of the Ministry of 
Children and Youth Services but have considerable autonomy.629 Applications to the CFSRB are 
not eligible for legal aid.  
 
The strength of the CFSRB’s remedial power varies. Under sections 68 and 68.1 of the CFSA the 
Board was granted an apparent oversight role with respect to complaints regarding children’s aid 
society services and decisions, after they have been through an internal children's aid society 
review process. The role of the Board is in these cases is to ensure that society decisions have 
                                               
625 Child and Family Services Act, RSO 1990, c. C.11, recently replaced with the Child, Youth and Family 
Services Act, Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1. The new legislation 
greatly expands the cultural background and personal characteristics of the child to be considered in the 
application of the best-interests-of-the-child test.  
626 Ibid., s.1(1). [Child, Youth and Family Services Act]  
627 Supra, footnote 580. [SJTO Annual Report]  
The CFSRB reviews, under the CFSA, supra. footnote 363: children's aid society decisions to remove a Crown 
ward from a foster home under section 61; complaints about children's aid society services under sections 68 
and 68.1; residential placements of children under section 36; emergency admissions to secure treatment 
programs under section 124; decisions to refuse an adoption, remove a child from an adoption placement, or 
place conditions on adoption under sections 141, 142.3 and 144. 
628 Education Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.2, section 311.7. 
629 Children’s aid societies are not, strictly speaking, “government actors;” they are non-government 
organizations funded by government. In addition to acting pursuant to the CFSA, supra note 8, the Board 






been accompanied by adequate reasons and it may require a society to further explain its 
decisions. Its role in these hearings is to ensure that complainants “feel heard,” and in 
appropriate cases, to work toward improving the ongoing relationship between a society and the 
complainant. This work forms the bulk of the CFSRB’s caseload. By way of contrast, the Board 
has much greater remedial authority under sections 61 and 144 of the CFSA, pursuant to which it 
is required to make best-interests-of-the-child determinations and confirm or rescind children’s 
aid society decisions.630 This project focuses upon the self-represented population in all CRSRB 
cases, and in dispute resolution in section 61 and section 144 cases, despite that the latter 
constitute a small fraction of the Board’s caseload, as they involve the application of the best-
interests-of-the-child test. 
 
The SJTO Annual Report for 2015-2016631 indicates that Regulation 70 under the CFSA has 
recently been amended to reduce the minimum number of members required to hear an 
application for review from three to one. It reports that the new practice is for one member to 
hear section 68 applications and two-member panels to hear “other application types.” The 
Annual Report describes the motivation for this change as “more effective use of resources and a 
significant reduction in part-time member per diem costs and travel expenses.” The research for 
this project was conducted prior to this change, and all discussion of panel decision-making is 
based upon three-member panels. 
 
                                               
630 Ibid., s.144(11); s. 136(2) specifies the potentially relevant criteria.  





CFSRB membership currently includes two senior SJTO executives, one Associate Chair, one 
Vice-Chair, and nineteen part-time members.632 The CFSRB completed 196 section 68 
applications in the 2016-2017 reporting period, of which 123 were resolved by settlement and 
twenty-two by adjudication;633 it completed eight section 61 applications, of which seven were 
resolved by settlement and none by adjudication, and ten section 144 applications, of which four 




(b)  Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario  
 
The HRTO exercises statutory powers of decision over claims of discrimination and harassment 
made under the Ontario Human Rights Code.634 The HRTO adjudicates disputes between private 
individuals or between individuals and corporate or government entities.  
 
The HRTO is the only tribunal within the SJTO authorized to use a mediation/adjudication 
model known as “med/adj,” an optional process added to the HRTO Rules in 2010.635  
 
The HRTO is the also the only tribunal within the SJTO to have express statutory authority to 
employ active adjudication techniques, although members of all SJTO tribunals reportedly 
receive training in active adjudication. In 2008, the HRTO shifted from a commission model to a 
                                               
632 Public Appointments Secretarial website: 
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634 Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c.H.19. 
635 David E. Wright, “Implementing the New Ontario Human Rights Code: A Tribunal Perspective” (2014), 18 





“direct access” model.636 It was correctly anticipated that the new model would attract a large 
number of self-represented parties and create a significant backlog of cases. For these reasons, 
inquisitorial powers were granted to the new Tribunal under the Human Rights Code, including 
authority to: 
... provide for and require the use of hearings or of practices and procedures that are 
provided for under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act or that are alternatives to 
traditional adjudicative or adversarial procedures; define or narrow the issues required 
to dispose of an application and limit the evidence and submissions of the parties on such 
issues; determine the order in which the issues and evidence in a proceeding will be 
presented; authorize the Tribunal to conduct examinations in chief or cross-examinations 
of a witness; prescribe the stages of its processes at which preliminary, procedural or 
interlocutory matters will be determined; authorize the Tribunal to make or cause to be 
made such examinations of records and such other inquiries as it considers necessary in 
the circumstances; authorize the Tribunal to require a party to a proceeding or another 
person to, produce any document, information or thing and provide such assistance as is 
reasonably necessary, including using any data storage, processing or retrieval device or 
system, to produce the information in any form, provide a statement or oral or affidavit 
evidence, or in the case of a party to the proceeding, adduce evidence or produce 
witnesses who are reasonably within the party’s control.637[emphasis added] 
 
These powers were initially mirrored in the Tribunal Rules; however, authority on the part of 
adjudicators to cross-examine witnesses has since been deleted from the Rules.638 The HRTO’s 
direct access model was the subject of Andrew Pinto’s 2012 Report of the Human Rights Review 
(“Pinto Report”) which recommended more robust use of active adjudication.639 Finally, a 
further innovation that occurred as a result of the concern over large numbers of self-represented 
parties in the direct access model was the establishment of the Human Rights Legal Support 
Centre (“HRLSC”), a specialized adjunct legal advice service. It reportedly provides full 
                                               
636 The Ontario Human Rights Commission still exists, and functions to promote research, education, policy 
development and “targeted legal action” with respect to human rights issues. See online: ohrc.on.ca 
637 Ontario Human Rights Code, 2006, c. 30, s. 5, section 43(3). 
638 Rules of Procedure for Applications under the Human Rights Code, Part IV, R.S.O. 1990, c.H.19, as 
amended, Rule 1.7 m. 






representation in about twenty percent of cases for which representation is sought, although it 
performs a “coaching” role in many others.640 
 
HRTO membership currently includes two senior SJTO executives, one Associate Chair, twenty-
one full-time Vice-Chairs and thirty-three part-time members.641 The HRTO “closed” 3,234 
cases the 2016-2017 reporting period, and held mediation in 1,584 cases, of which fifty-eight 
percent settled.642  
 
 
 (c)  Landlord and Tenant Board 
 
The Landlord and Tenant Board has the largest caseload of any tribunal in Ontario. It adjudicates 
disputes under the Residential Tenancies Act,643 between private individuals, or between 
individuals and corporate or government entities. The focus of the LTB was described in some 
interviews for this project as “high-volume, repetitive work.” Its powers of decision appear to be 
less discretionary than those of the other tribunals studied, although members interviewed noted 
sites of discretion within their mandate.  
 
The LTB has undertaken a Case Management Hearings Pilot Project (“CMH Pilot Project”) in 
some locations, pursuant to which a Case Management Hearing (“CMH”) is mandatory for all 
tenant applications, reportedly because tenants tend to be the least organized Board participants, 
and their applications are the easiest to settle. A CMH may be conducted in person or by 
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telephone and is presided over by a dispute resolution officer (“DRO”) who may be either a 
mediator or a case administrator, depending upon location. It was reported that mediation at the 
Board was previously unstructured, with mediators “wandering around” encouraging parties to 
mediate; the CMH Pilot Project was described as an attempt to improve upon this approach. 
There are various consequences for failure to attend, and CMH hearings may only be adjourned 
in narrowly defined “exceptional circumstances.”  
 
Member estimates as to settlement rates for CMH mediation varied; some reported them as 
higher than ordinary mediation, and some as lower on the basis that CMH is involuntary and 
engages parties who are not necessarily committed to a settlement solution. Despite these 
differing perceptions the program was consistently described as successful.  
 
LTB membership currently includes two senior SJTO executives, one Associate Chair, seven 
full-time Vice-Chairs, thirty-six full-time members, and ten part-time members.644 The LTB 
resolved 78,135 cases the 2016-2017 reporting period, of which 11,541 were settled in mediation 
and 48,533 were resolved through adjudication.  
 
 
(d)  Social Benefits Tribunal 
 
The Social Benefits Tribunal was established under the Ontario Works Act, 645 and adjudicates 
appeals from government decisions made under this statute and the Ontario Disability Support 
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Program Act.646 It was reported in interviews that the vast majority of cases concern claims for 
income support which have been refused, or in which the quantum of benefits is disputed.  
 
SBT appellants face a government respondent in the form of a Case Presenting Officer (“CPO”), 
who may or may not be a lawyer, or through written submissions. The SBT operates an Early 
Resolution Opportunity program (“ERO”), that consists of a telephone mediation session 
presided over by an Appeal Resolution Officer. SBT proceedings are eligible for legal aid.  
 
SBT membership currently includes two senior SJTO executives, one Associate Chair, four full-
time Vice-Chairs, seventeen full-time members, and sixteen part-time members.647 The SBT 
completed 13,038 cases the 2016-2017 reporting period, of which 8,087 were resolved through 
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I'm seated in a worn hotel conference room just large enough to accommodate 
its furnishings. Faux-traditional wallpaper and cornice mouldings are at odds 
with black office chairs and fluorescent lights.  I’m here to observe a hearing to 
determine which of two families will be permitted to adopt a child. Both families 
have cared for him for long, almost equal periods of time, and both claim deep 
attachments.   
 
I have been directed to an upholstered armchair near the room’s entrance, next 
to a small round table. I’m self-conscious about taking the most comfortable 
chair in the room. I avoid eye contact for the most part, making notes and 
striving to be inconspicuous.  
 
The children’s aid society is represented by a lawyer. He sits a couple of chairs 
away from one of the foster parents. Between them sits the instructing member 
of the CAS, who occasionally glances at the other foster parents, not supported 
by the society, who are seated at the opposite branch of a U-shaped table 
covered in white tablecloths. They are self-represented. 
 
The middle section of the U-shaped table is occupied by the adjudicators, a 
panel of three members of the Child and Family Services Review Board, 
selected for this hearing. The Chair of the panel, seated at the centre, is a 
lawyer. She is flanked by professionals with mental-health credentials, on her 
right a psychiatrist and on her left a PhD in psychology. All three are women.   
 
It is the morning of day one, and the room holds a sense of fresh anticipation. 
Polite nods are exchanged as materials are unpacked and organized.  One of 
the self-represented foster parents sets out, among piles of papers and files, a 
small tea set, a basket of healthy looking snacks and a large framed photograph 
of the child who is the subject of the hearing. She gently asks the panel if she 
may display the photo, so everyone can be reminded of “why we are here.” The 
Chair replies with a smile that the photos in the file are sufficient. The foster 
mother nods and adjusts the angle of the photo so it is visible only to her. 
 
The Chair explains rudimentary procedural rules to the self-represented foster 
parents, the witness list is reviewed, and a few witnesses are eliminated. The 
Chair pauses briefly and begins to speak in a quiet and concerned tone about 
the importance of “civility.” Acknowledging the emotional nature of the 
proceedings, she urges all participants to focus on the best interests of the child, 
stressing that the Board is not interested in assigning blame. She concludes by 
saying, “it doesn’t get any harder than this.” 
 





















































The Chair asks CAS counsel to call his first witness. The self-represented foster 
mother raises her hand and quietly asks to make an opening statement. The 
Chair asks CAS counsel and the foster parent seated beside him if they have 
prepared openings; they have not. CAS counsel offers to improvise, and the 
foster father gestures toward CAS counsel, shrugging and smiling. I realize that 
he and his wife, who is absent, are indirectly represented by the Society. 
 
The self-represented foster mother, who will turn out to be the primary 
spokesperson for she and her husband, begins to give evidence; she recites a 
detailed account of the ways in which she has been misrepresented by the 
society. She sounds unconsciously self-righteous and defensive. CAS counsel 
counters with a chronology of incidents of conflict between the CAS and this 
foster mother, characterizing her as lofty and uncooperative. 
 
The first witness, a society worker, enters the room and sits at a small square 
table also draped in hotel white, at the mouth of the U.  She is asked by the 
Chair to swear a plain oath, simply promising to tell the truth. CAS counsel 
remains seated as he delivers his questions to the witness, and as he addresses 
the panel.   
 
Throughout the first witness’ testimony the Chair occasionally interjects to 
request that the witness testify only to facts, not what others may have been 
thinking or feeling, and a few times she restrains CAS counsel from excessively 
leading the witness. The psychiatrist interjects, asking the witness a question 
about her testimony. The witness says she needs access to her case note. It 
emerges that the CAS has not brought its entire file as requested by the Board. 
The Chair states that the Board requires the missing note. In what will become a 
recurring source of frustration for all concerned, the proceedings are 
interrupted to search for missing material.  
 
A second witness is called, who is also a CAS worker. Her testimony suggests 
she dislikes the self-represented foster mother and regards her as grandiose. She 
bristles as she recounts the self-represented foster mother’s assertions of her 
own competence. She speaks with stubborn-sounding insistence as she describes 
the inadequate care the child received in care of the self-represented foster 
parents, and in glowing terms of the care provided by the foster family 
represented by society counsel.  
 
As CAS counsel takes the second witness through examination in chief, there are 
several long delays as she, too, shuffles through her file looking for case notes. 

















This chapter summarizes research interview responses in narrative form. Common responses are 
identified, as are responses that contradict them; where there was no common response, this too 
is indicated. Many responses include short quotes to give a sense of their tone, but there is no 
lengthy direct quotation. The format of this chapter is intended to illustrate the variations and 
similarities among the responses of the tribunal members interviewed, with respect to the 
subjects explored, and is not intended to draw a portrait of each tribunal. While the views of 
individual members interviewed suggest common and contrary responses among the members 
interviewed, they are not presented as representative of the tribunal as a whole. Ethnographic 
reports are interspersed, and findings are summarized at the end of the chapter. 
 
6.1 Self-Represented Parties  
 
CFSRB adjudicators interviewed commonly reported that applicants are almost always self-
represented, with the percentage generally estimated at ninety-five to ninety-eight percent in 
proceedings involving children’s aid societies, whereas children’s aid societies are invariably 
represented, usually by in-house counsel. Several adjudicators mentioned that applicants are 
repeatedly leave the room to make copies. The foster father seated with the CAS 
is animated, exchanging papers with counsel, whispering to the CAS 
representative and writing notes.  
 
Throughout all testimony the Chair almost incessantly takes notes. The 
psychologist is a slightly less dedicated note-taker and has yet to ask any
questions or offer any comments. The psychiatrist watches the witnesses 
carefully, seldom writing anything.   
 





more likely to be represented in school expulsion proceedings than in children’s aid society 
cases, although this is not the norm.  
 
As noted, the bulk of the CFSRB caseload consists of section 68 applications. Among members 
interviewed, parties in section 68 proceedings were frequently described as having low levels of 
income and education, being “needy” and unsophisticated, and sometimes having mental health 
problems. One member described them as “victimized groups over-exposed to the judicial 
system.” Another member remarked with some admiration that these applicants are often single 
mothers who may be poorly educated but are “street smart and gutsy.”  
 
In section 144 proceedings, which engage the foster parent community, and in school expulsion 
proceedings under section 311.7 of the Education Act, self-represented parties were portrayed as 
a diverse group, more likely to include seeming members of the middle-class. One member 
observed, “the Board sees a whole range of human experience,” and another described self-
represented parties in section 144 proceedings as ranging from low-functioning to relatively 
sophisticated, noting that adjudicators must adjust their process and approach depending upon 
the individual characteristics and needs. It was commonly observed that despite Board efforts to 
assist self-represented parties in managing Board processes, they remain a “vulnerable 
population” that is “hugely disadvantaged.” Most adjudicators interviewed attributed self-
representation to the cost of legal services; as one member remarked, “Even people with good 






With respect to the apparent effects of Board processes on self-represented parties, it was 
commonly reported that they are very often visibly stressed and overwhelmed in all types of 
proceedings. One member described “a wall” between society professionals and self-represented 
applicants, created not just by the nature of the proceedings but also by the contrast between self-
represented parties and the experience, confidence and competence of society representatives and 
their counsel. 
 
Among CFSRB adjudicators interviewed, typical responses to the question, “Is the tribunal 
comfortable dealing with self-represented parties?” included: “Of course, it’s all we do”; “It’s 
just our reality”; and, “Any adjudicator who is not comfortable with self-represented parties 
should not work at this Board.” One member described the Board as having developed a culture 
of “respect, support, and patience” with respect to self-represented parties, and said they are not 
“brushed off” at the Board.   
 
Consistent with this, participating CFSRB adjudicators overwhelmingly reported that 
representation, or the lack of it, is a neutral factor in performing their roles; that is, while 
adjudication is different in the absence of a lawyer performing certain tasks, it is not more 
difficult. A very small minority reported that self-represented parties with mental health issues 
require constant accommodation, making these cases feel “risky and taxing.” While almost all 
interviewees claimed to experience no additional sense of pressure due to self-representation, 
this response varied by type of proceeding. In section 68 proceedings members reported no 
disadvantages in terms of their experience of adjudication, but for best-interests-of-the-child 





relatively “high stakes” and systemic power imbalances. One member reported that self-
represented parties initially believe the Board is accessible without a lawyer, but once they see 
that children’s aid society representatives are accompanied by counsel, they are sometimes taken 
aback, saying some version of “I didn’t know I had to have a lawyer.”  
 
Unsurprisingly, participating CFSRB adjudicators reported the greatest specific challenge for 
self-represented parties as “the acting like a lawyer stuff.” Uncertainty about how to question 
witnesses, especially on cross-examination, what to say and when to say it, and trying to speak, 
but being stopped or interrupted by the adjudicator or opposing counsel, were all mentioned.  
 
As noted above, applications to the CFSRB are not eligible for legal aid. It was reported that as a 
result, not many lawyers do “applicant work” and no onsite legal advice services, such as duty 
counsel, are available. Although this was reported as problematic by several adjudicators, there 
was no common thread about the value of legal advice services. Some considered legal advice 
irrelevant to 68 applications because of the Board’s limited remedial authority. Others remarked 
that duty counsel would be appropriate for some section 68 cases, but best-interests-of-the-child 
cases are too complex and “high stakes” for legal advice alone to be meaningful; only full legal 
representation would make a difference. A significant number responded that applicant lawyers, 
when they do appear, tend to unnecessarily complicate Board proceedings. 
 
It was consistently reported that a great deal of effort is made by the Board to assist self-
represented parties in advance of hearings. It is apparently not uncommon for applicants, at the 





remedies or Board procedures, all of which is addressed in Board pre-hearing processes. The 
Board’s “institutional competence” in making its processes manageable was often noted; the role 
of case coordinators, described by one interviewee as “hand holders,” reportedly includes 
informing applicants that the Board will determine whether they have a claim that falls within 
the Board mandate. In other words, the Board does not leave it to self-represented parties to 
define their problem in legal terms. It was reported that people who approach the Board are often 
“in crisis,” and the role of case coordinators is to make them aware of their options, and once an 
application is filed, to become a contact person at the Board for the purpose of scheduling 
appearances and answering questions. It was noted by one adjudicator that self-represented 
litigants sometimes rely too heavily upon case coordinators, expecting them to give legal advice 
and actively prepare a case. 
 
After an application has been filed, the next step is a pre-hearing. It was reported that the Board 
has developed a document that explains pre-hearings, and self-represented parties have since 
tended to be better prepared. If the parties consent, a pre-hearing can be converted to a mediation 
session. If it remains a pre-hearing, or if settlement is attempted but not achieved, disclosure 
orders are often made. It was reported that whether or not pre-hearings have been converted to 
mediation, members interviewed “put remedies on the table” and inform self-represented parties 
of available claims of which they seem unaware. It was remarked that a lot of “heavy lifting” is 
done by adjudicators in pre-hearings; as one member put it, the adjudicator must figure out what 
a self-represented litigant could claim but is “at sea about,” explain disclosure and filing 
requirements, and generally assist parties onto a path toward a productive hearing. It was 





than they do about how to prepare a case; while they have a story to tell, translating it into 
evidence does not often come naturally, and some are initially unaware that evidence is even 
required. One member remarked that pre-hearings would be more effective if there were a more 
intense focus on the evidence needed and how it might be obtained.  
 
It was generally considered among CFSRB adjudicators interviewed that self-represented parties 
are becoming better informed at the hearing stage. This was mostly attributed to improved Board 
strategies to educate and prepare parties at the intake and pre-hearing stages, as noted and, less 
often, to the use of online information. A few members reported that it is no longer surprising for 
self-represented parties to attend hearings with printed materials in hand, such as case law 
obtained through CanLII, or information obtained from the SJTO website or other online 
sources, but others reported, “Web-based information is not especially helpful to Board 
clientele.” 
 
The HRTO is similar to the CFSRB in that the percentage of self-represented litigants is much 
higher for applicants than for respondents; it was commonly estimated among participating 
members that sixty to seventy percent of applicants are self-represented in Tribunal hearings, 
whereas the percentage of respondents who are represented was pegged at eighty to ninety 
percent. These estimates are consistent with SJTO Annual Report649 statistics as to rates of 
representation.  
 
                                               






Applicants are reportedly a diverse group at the HRTO, sometimes including people who exhibit 
obvious stress or emotional problems or “what one would expect to see in a vulnerable 
population.” One member described the high rate of self-representation as surprising in view of 
the “complexity of the legal issues and the formality of proceedings.”  
 
The “flexibility and relationship-building skills” of case processing officers was cited among 
members interviewed as helpful in allowing the tribunal deal effectively with self-represented 
parties. The use of “case management directives” in advance of the hearing stage was reported as 
uneven, although some adjudicators reported using directives to convey pre-hearing 
determinations (such as direct a case to summary hearing), give instructions (for example, to 
reduce a lengthy and non-comprehensible claim to a limited number of pages), or provide 
information (such as a pending or missed deadline). 
  
Reports on the extent to which self-represented parties seem able to manage Tribunal 
proceedings were highly varied. For example, responses included: the ability to function well 
depends upon the level of analysis required in each case; some applicants do not get the basic 
idea that there are legal tests and evidence is needed; some self-represented parties do an 
“amazing job, as well or better than a lawyer would;” and, “lots of people do just fine.”  
 
HRTO members interviewed commonly reported being comfortable dealing with self-
represented parties although, unlike their CFSRB counterparts, many reported a sense of relief 
when both parties appear with counsel. It was remarked that some self-represented parties need 





needed. Several reported that hearings involving self-represented litigants are more strenuous 
because it becomes the adjudicator’s job to ensure that every aspect of a claim has been 
considered, in part to position for potential judicial review.  
 
Several participating adjudicators remarked that the HRTO was designed to facilitate self-
representation, but a small minority disagreed, noting instead that the public perception of the 
tribunal as “applicant-friendly” is inaccurate because the Tribunal is very much based upon a 
traditional litigation model. There was no common thread in responses as to whether there has 
been a change in the level of sophistication of self-represented parties through self-informing. 
Some reported no change, others saw a “big change.” A member in the latter group remarked 
that while self-represented parties may obtain case law from CanLII they often do not understand 
that one case is not enough. Another member remarked that the availability of these resources 
may further marginalize those who do not have the ability or means to utilize them.  
 
It was often reported by HRTO interview subjects that respondent lawyers tend to be highly 
competent, often from specialized firms. The typical quality of applicant lawyers was described 
variously: they were often characterized as ill-informed, having not “bothered to” learn about the 
Tribunal process or even the relevant substantive law (on the apparent assumption that tribunals 
processes are “easy”) or having wholly unrelated skills and training (a criminal law background 
was mentioned most often) and being a “net negative,” that is, worse than no lawyer. Several 
adjudicators were unflattering in their assessments of paralegals, as well. The term “under-
represented” was used to describe the effect of representation by paralegals (and lawyers) who 





framework. One member noted that some paralegals (like some lawyers) are unaware of entire 
sections of legislation that might assist their clients; another reported that the “vast majority” of 
paralegals are a hindrance. Conversely, a minority of members interviewed described “some 
paralegals” as “very, very good,” and as a group, getting better over time. Power imbalances 
were commented upon by some, due to the quality differential in representation as between 
applicants and respondents, or the lack of applicant representation, but concern was muted 
among HRTO interviewees in comparison to CFSRB interview subjects.   
 
The most consistent description of the HRLSC among interviewed members was some variant of 
“hugely oversubscribed.” Instead of an income test, the HRLSC reportedly uses a two-pronged 
triage approach in which the level of representation provided depends upon both the nature of the 
claim and the applicant’s ability to self-represent. In my discussion with a HRLSC staff member 
it was indicated that full representation is provided in approximately twenty percent of cases for 
which representation is sought, and a “coaching” role is performed in many others. Some 
adjudicators remarked that they can often tell from the quality of materials that the HRLSC has 
provided assistance, but others reported the opposite.  
 
As to whether the HRTO is accessible without representation, HRTO members interviewed 
commonly responded that it is part of the job of an adjudicator to make it possible to appear 
without counsel. It was said that the tribunal is manageable at the mediation and hearing stages 
due to the skill of members, but the preparation stage (drafting and filing witness statements, 
seeking appropriate remedies) remains challenging for self-represented parties. Nonetheless, it 





they need to make, and the evidence required. One member considered that accessibility varies 
with subject matter, saying “anyone can argue sexual harassment,” but legal tests such as “the 
duty to accommodate” are far more nuanced and challenging for self-represented parties.  
 
In LTB proceedings, it was commonly reported that tenants are “almost always” self-
represented, whereas a majority of landlords have some form of representation. Among the 
members interviewed, it was estimated that about seventy-five percent of landlords are 
represented by lawyers, paralegals or “landlord representatives,” the latter of which may be 
specialized paralegals or property managers with no legal accreditation.  
 
In keeping with CFRRB responses, LTB interviewees consistently reported that the Board is 
very comfortable dealing with self-represented parties. They described the self-represented 
community as varied, but overall tending to be disadvantaged, economically or otherwise, and 
sometimes displaying obvious mental health issues. LTB hearings were described as often 
emotional. Several members remarked that frustration with personal problems can be manifested 
in the hearing room through behaviours such as interrupting other side, arguing with the 
adjudicator or otherwise failing to observe the expectations of a hearing process.  
 
Among LTB members interviewed, it was reported that LTB onsite duty counsel services are 
underutilized. It was reported as a recurring problem for self-represented parties to decline to 
meet with duty counsel, then appear before the Board with no argument, evidence or proposal in 
support of their position. It was reported by some that duty counsel services are simply not very 





advice and little or no assistance with written submissions; advice may not be well understood 
and therefore not applied; it is reportedly rare for duty counsel lawyers to attend hearings, 
although some will reportedly sit in and become involved if the need is perceived; tenants who 
go to duty counsel often do not take notes, rendering the advice received ephemeral: a self-
represented party may return from duty counsel and ask for adjournment without being able to 
articulate the basis for the request, leaving it to the adjudicator to “unpack that.” 
 
In addition to duty counsel tenants may turn to outside community legal clinics. It was explained 
that clinics focus on “saving tenancies” and therefore mostly appear on behalf of tenants who 
face eviction or have been illegally locked out, and even in these cases full representation is 
provided only for those who exhibit a disability which limits the ability to self-represent, or in 
cases that present a legal issue in which the clinic is interested.  
 
LTB member reports of paralegal representation were very mixed, but somewhat more positive 
than those of HRTO members interviewed. It was commonly noted that specialist paralegals 
sometimes do a good job but are a minority. The quality of paralegal representation was 
generally described as “poor” on the tenant side, but some “top notch” paralegals were reported 
on the landlord side. As in HRTO interviews, some LTB members interviewed described some 
parties as “under-represented” because, as one member said, “it is better to be uninformed than 
wrongly-informed.” A very small minority expressed a contrary view, remarking that paralegals 
who appear before the Board often have more expertise than tenant lawyers, and regulation of 






Among interview subjects, LTB members echoed CFSRB members in very often reporting that 
the Board is accessible without lawyers, essentially “because it has to be.” These members 
commonly linked accessibility to the simplicity of Board processes relative to the court system. 
As with HRTO members interviewed, some connected accessibility to the specific characteristics 
of parties and their disputes, remarking that the Board is accessible for self-represented parties 
who are able to communicate clearly and to fully understand their disputes, but where there are 
comprehension or communication problems, or complex legal issues such as bankruptcy, 
representation is obviously helpful.  
 
Similar to reports among HRTO members interviewed, concern was expressed by LTB interview 
subjects that the public perception of Board accessibility is overblown, leading some applicants 
to have unrealistic expectations as to the level of help they will receive from intake staff and 
adjudicators. One LTB member reported that tenants sometimes expect members to tell them 
how to “get the most out of the landlord.” Another perceived problem was that tenants 
sometimes refuse to consult with duty counsel based upon an apparent assumption that enough 
advice, assistance (or even just sympathy) can be elicited from the adjudicator to render legal 
assistance unnecessary. Participating LTB members generally reported no significant changes in 
the way parties self-represent as a result of online resources.  
 
In reports that echo the dynamics of some family law disputes, it was reported that some parties 
appear to crave the formal disapprobation an adjudicated outcome can convey. Indeed, one 
member noted that both landlords and tenants use the Board to punish one another. Another 





family law cases they start off in a mutually beneficial relationship, things go wrong, and they 
end up in a destructive and interdependent relationship which they may nonetheless want or need 
to continue. 
 
More than participating members of any other tribunal, SBT members emphasized the fragility 
of the Tribunal clientele. Hearings were described as often stressful and emotional due to the 
subject-matter of income support due to physical or mental disability, and related depression or 
other emotional problems. It was reported that members generally strive to ease the emotional 
impact of hearings, although much depends upon individual adjudicators.  
 
The percentage of self-represented parties in SBT hearings who have not received some form of 
legal assistance was estimated among interview subjects at only five to ten percent. Although full 
representation is not reportedly the norm, in contrast with the other tribunals studied, SBT 
interviewees emphasized the availability of legal assistance for Tribunal applicants. At the outset 
of SBT proceedings, appellants are reportedly informed by letter from the Tribunal that legal 
assistance is available, and if the appellant is an Ontario Works (“OW”) recipient, the same 
information is provided by an OW worker. If an appellant arrives at a hearing without a 
representative, or without having received advance legal assistance, eligibility for free legal 
assistance is reportedly discussed at the hearing stage, and proceedings are adjourned upon 
request to allow time to obtain it; an estimated fifty percent of cases in which self-represented 






There are no onsite duty counsel services at the SBT; and as with LTB and HRTO proceedings, 
the level of assistance provided by legal clinics varies. It was reported that the SBT has worked 
with clinics to determine the best triage practices for SBT claims, and similar to the HRLSC and 
the LTB clinics, full representation depends upon individual needs, such as language or other 
communication barriers that affect the ability to self-represent, and the complexity of each case. 
Although one member remarked, “Low income is a proxy for complex needs,” another asserted 
that impoverished people with simple cases do not get full representation solely based upon low 
income. 
 
Similar to participating HRTO and LTB members, SBT interview subjects characterized partial 
representation, or the “self-help” stream, as “lawyers adopting a coaching role.” Unlike duty 
counsel, in this model lawyers are able to meet with parties repeatedly and assist in compiling 
evidence. The extent of the assistance given within the self-help stream varies depending upon 
the policies and practices of each legal clinic; some supply written submissions for every case, 
but others do not. The coaching approach was consistently described as very helpful for 
adjudicators, not only because of the improved quality of materials, but also because appellants 
are made aware of weaknesses in the case before the hearing stage, are less likely to see the 
adjudicator as the “bad guy,” and more accepting of the hearing process and result. 
 
Full representation was reported as divided between specialist clinic lawyers and paralegals and, 
in both categories, was described as “very, very good.” It was reported that among the small 





competent, but it is rare for them to appear with case law or other indicia of having self-informed 
through online resources, consistent with the reported characteristics of tribunal clientele. 
 
As for the respondent government, submissions are made in writing through Case Processing 
Officers (“CPOs”), and a CPO will attend in person in an estimated thirty percent of hearings, 
although this percentage was reported as increasing. 
 
In common with participating members of the other tribunals studied, SBT adjudicators 
generally reported being comfortable dealing with self-represented parties, although one member 
added that self-represented parties are not a problem because “there aren’t that many.” Echoing 
some HRTO members’ comments with respect to active adjudication, one SBT member 
remarked that self-represented parties require more preparation and are “more work.”  
 
In response to the question of how the Tribunal prepares self-represented parties for hearings, the 
focus among SBT members interviewed was less upon Tribunal processes designed to assist 
(such as “hand-holding” at the intake stage) and more upon urging self-represented parties to 
seek full or partial representation. Nonetheless, the ability of self-represented parties to navigate 
SBT processes without a lawyer was reported as a goal that has been met through the skill of 
adjudicators in dealing with a vulnerable population, and alternatively, as a phenomenon that 











facilities to temporary forums – often hotel conference rooms, but reportedly, on at least one 
occasion, a room located in a hockey arena complex. Needless to say, the level of formality 
conveyed by the hearing setting is variable. 
 
There were a range of responses in all tribunals studied as to the formality of the tribunal itself, 
and the value of informality as a component of tribunal identity. Participating HRTO 
adjudicators gave the most diverse range of responses as to the questions of both whether their 
processes are formal, and whether informality is a positive value. 
 
The CFSRB has hearing and mediation rooms at its Toronto offices, but it also uses HRTO 
hearing rooms, located nearby, which have a slightly more formal air.  The proceedings I 
observed in Hamilton, Kitchener and Cornwall were held in hotel conference rooms, at U-shaped 
or square conference tables with no architecture to suggest rank or territory. Several CFSRB 
adjudicators interviewed remarked that it is beneficial for the decision-maker to be on the same 
physical level as the parties, to facilitate eye contact and encourage interaction. In the course of 
interviews, CFSRB members often remarked that it is a goal of the Board to be a “comfortable 
place for self-represented parties.” 
 
Informality was generally described by CFSRB members interviewed in terms of enhancing the 
ability of self-represented applicants to function in a hearing environment. This was especially 
emphasized by participating clinically trained members, who remarked that: anxiety significantly 
affects the ability to relate to questions and formulate answers; people with mental health issues 





accommodations to be made, such as slowing proceedings down; and, many applicants lack 
“social capital,” often find themselves in situations where they feel unheard or overlooked, and 
informality is vital to creating the sense of inclusion needed for effective communication.  It was 
commonly noted that Board processes are informal relative to courts; one CFSRB adjudicator 
with litigation experience remarked that in courtrooms “we are still bowing to judges,” whereas 
tribunal members sometimes debate whether it is appropriate for parties to arrive at hearings with 
coffee and snacks (as they reportedly often do). 
 
Participating CFSRB members commonly reported that the formality of hearings varies 
depending upon the style of individual adjudicators and panel members. Several adjudicators 
identified it as a personal goal not to intimidate self-represented parties, to be perceived as 
“approachable” or “relatable;” several reports characterized Board hearings as “appropriately 
informal;” and, one member characterized Board processes as “flexible within boundaries.” A 
single member described Board hearings as necessarily formal (to establish authority) and 
suggested that more formality would enhance Board credibility.  
 
Perceptions of informality were most highly varied among participating HRTO members. On 
one end of the spectrum, some characterized the Tribunal as “court-like” compared to other 
SJTO tribunals, with adjudicators having a “traditional judicial role” within a “traditional 
adversarial process,” and described the tribunal “essentially adversarial” and having “a certain 
gravitas.” At the other end of the spectrum, HRTO proceedings were characterized as “unique” 
in that members deeply engage with the parties through “trust-building” and extensive use of 





from adversarial processes, whereas for others it meant the freedom of adjudicators to run 
hearings in any manner they choose, and for still others it was associated it with adjudicator 
willingness to perform menial tasks such as making copies of documents and setting up 
conference calls. Among members who saw the tribunal as informal, the reported benefits of 
informality included efficiency as well as those reported by CFSRB members: self-represented 
parties feel more comfortable and less defensive, and proceedings flow more easily. Among 
those who perceived the Tribunal as formal, some expressed awareness of less formal 
approaches within the Tribunal but considered them inappropriate for the Tribunal. 
 
HRTO hearings were described as sometimes “unpleasant, grueling, charged, or draining,” 
depending upon the parties and subject-matter, but not as “damaging” or an experience to be 
avoided at all costs. Th stress of hearings was generally attributed to applicants having to re-tell 
their stories and listen to the other side, often in the context of an ongoing relationship such as 
employment, and applicants being subject to a system in which “others seem to be speaking a 
different language.”  
 
LTB hearing rooms visited for this project varied in tone; some were very similar to courtrooms, 
with wood paneling and conspicuous territorial demarcations, while others had roughly court-
like architecture but were comparatively simple, even bleak, with heavily worn carpets and 
furnishings.  
 
There was relatively little diversity among interviewed LTB members as to perceptions of Board 





was noted, and hearing processes were described as traditional and adversarial. It was remarked 
that: it is not a priority at the Board to put self-represented parties at ease; hearings follow a 
direct/cross, direct/cross format with little departure except in accordance with personal 
adjudication styles; adjudicators do not have any contact with parties prior to hearings through 
case management or mediation, which was said to contribute to the formality of hearings. It was 
noted that formality is required to prevent a “free-for-all” atmosphere; indeed, the LTB members 
interviewed differed from members of other tribunals studied in that they did not report an 
institutional ethic in favour of informality (whether observed or not) in the sense of adjudicators 
being “approachable.” The personal style of adjudicators was cited as the only reason for this 
kind of informality – it was reported that some members are “naturally informal” whereas others 
are “diva-like.” It was remarked that a uniform style would not be desirable because people 
“think differently” and process control is “empowering” as it contributes the sense of authority 
needed to be an effective adjudicator. 
 
Despite reporting relatively high rates of representation at some level, interviewed SBT 
adjudicators commonly described hearings as informal relative to courts. The Tribunal’s process 
was described as simpler and more relaxed than a court process, and manageable for people with 
physical and/or emotional challenges. However, similar to responses in other tribunals it was 
remarked that levels of informality vary depending upon the choices of individual adjudicators. 
The atmosphere of SBT hearings was described by one member as “collaborative,” which was 
attributed in part to CPOs not having a personal stake in proceedings, and rarely approaching 










































(a)  Attitudes and Source of Authority  
 
A range of adjudication styles was observed in the hearings attended for this project, and 
interview subjects differed widely in their reports as to the purpose of active adjudication, how it 
should be used, and under what authority it is permitted.   
 
It is the beginning of day two. As seats are taken, coffee obtained and materials 
organized, there is friendly banter between the foster father supported by the 
children’s aid society, society legal counsel, and the CAS representative.  The 
empaneled Board members huddle and exchange materials. Across the table 
from the CAS group the self-represented foster parents fidget, seemingly 
conscious of their relative isolation.  
 
The second witness is re-seated at the small witness table at the mouth of the U-
shaped table for cross-examination by the self-represented foster parents. The 
foster mother begins her cross-examination by giving evidence, telling her own 
story to contradict the witness’ testimony in chief. The Chair listens patiently for 
a while, then finally interrupts, saying, “okay, you have to ask a question.”  
 
The foster mother continuously struggles to elicit information rather than 
provide it. She seemingly intends to review the details of every contact she has 
had with the society, including with previous foster children. The Chair 
indicates several times that she is having difficulty understanding the point of a 
line of questioning or a series of assertions, and often suggests the phrasing and 
content of questions. The foster mother’s lack of focus and apparent need for 
vindication dovetail badly with the witness’ sometimes superior-sounding and 
off-the mark answers. The Chair advises the foster-mother to break questions 
into little pieces to make it easier to elicit a clear and specific answer and 
repeatedly admonishes the witness to “answer the question, just answer the 
question.” The Chair often interjects to ask the witness if she has a case note to 
support her testimony, and the witness is often sure she does, but is unable to 
locate it.  
 
As the cross-examination stumbles along, the Chair increasingly takes control. 
As the Chair asks more and more questions, CAS counsel begins to furiously 






Participating CFSRB members frequently described active adjudication as essential to addressing 
the vulnerability of applicants in the face of power imbalances. As one member put it, “one side 
knows it all and the other is totally disadvantaged,” and several adjudicators noted that a blend of 
inquisitorial and adversarial approaches is needed to enable self-represented parties to effectively 
participate in Board proceedings. It was almost universally reported by CFSRB the interviewed 
members that the role of an adjudicator is to attempt to “level the playing field.” 
 
The purpose of active adjudication was also frequently described among CFSRB interview 
subjects as obtaining information needed to make a decision, which some referred to as “truth-
finding” (although others were dismissive of this term). Some CFSRB adjudicators characterized 
active adjudication as a natural component of a “less formal” process, and it was 
overwhelmingly reported as an essential tool for the application of the best-interests-of-the-child 
test.  
 
A majority of the CFSRB adjudicators who participated in this project reported that tribunals 
have more authority than courts to engage in active adjudication, but there was no consensus as 
to the basis for this authority. It was sometimes expressed as an assumption flowing from SJTO 
training in active adjudication techniques, or as a general characteristic of administrative 
adjudication. Some remarked that the authority of the Board relative to courts is unclear, given 
that the “entering the fray” test “is identical” for courts and tribunals. One member reported that 
engaging in active adjudication “makes you vulnerable” especially where respondent’s counsel is 
aggressive, and there is a need to “think defensively” in terms of the potential for complaint or 





tribunals may be eroding as judges in some courts are becoming very active; the Board’s clinical 
expertise lends itself to active engagement with the parties and the evidence; and, unlike the 
HRTO, the Board has no specific legislated mandate to engage in active adjudication processes.  
 
There was a consensus among CFSRB interview subjects that active adjudication is very 
important to the work of the tribunal. Members with backgrounds in mental health and other 
non-legal fields, referred to collectively here as “clinicians,” were particularly supportive of 
active techniques, but generally described “entering the fray” is a legal concept upon which they 
defer to fellow members with legal training. 
 
Despite the HRTO’s express mandate to adopt active adjudication processes, not all HRTO 
members interviewed reported using active adjudication techniques. Indeed, the most diverse 
range of attitudes toward active adjudication was expressed by HRTO participants. 
 
Among interviewed HRTO members who reported engaging in active adjudication, the purposes 
for doing so, apart from the express mandate, included: efficient hearings, ensuring a fair process 
for self-represented litigants, sympathetic concern over the cost of lawyers, obtaining necessary 
information, and, “getting to the truth.” One member noted that unlike the court system where 
“lawyers put on plays,” the job of adjudicators is to “get the facts needed to make a decision.” 
Some of these members cited the specific mandate as a “safety net.” Some also remarked that 
apart from the express mandate, tribunals have more latitude than courts to engage in active 
adjudication because of administrative law norms. Indeed, it was remarked that in the absence of 





prohibition against asking leading questions is sufficient to allow adjudicators to cross-examine. 
Some members described having had both applicants and respondents request an active process. 
 
The minority of HRTO members interviewed who did not support the use of active adjudication 
generally indicated they lacked the mix of litigation skills and strong personality needed to use 
these techniques effectively or reported that active adjudication is inconsistent with their 
perception of the Tribunal as formal and adversarial. At the extreme end of the spectrum, active 
adjudication was described as “a confusing concept;” unfair to respondents who have hired a 
lawyer and “spent thousands” and, “the flavour of the month.” The essence of the division 
between active adjudication critics and enthusiasts is illustrated by one member describing a 
traditional court process as “useless” for dealing with self-represented litigants, and another 
describing HRTO proceedings as “just another kind of lawsuit.” Further explanations for 
avoiding the use of active adjudication included: HRTO disputes involve private parties (rather 
than government department or agency as respondent) and the Tribunal is therefore more like a 
court than other SJTO tribunals; respondents’ counsel are often senior and specialized lawyers, 
well capable of pushing back against active processes; and, as one adjudicator observed, “No one 
wants to write a decision that is overturned by the Divisional Court.” The fact that tribunal 
members may run hearings in a manner of their own choosing was seen as positive by many, on 
the basis that members should only use processes with which they are comfortable. Others, 
although a minority, expressed the view that Tribunal clientele should not have a completely 






HRTO interview subjects widely acknowledged the uneven use of active techniques at the 
Tribunal; indeed, it was repeatedly remarked that the Tribunal does not have a “character” apart 
from the personal adjudication styles of individual members. The most commonly cited reason 
for this variance was, as noted, that active adjudication is “not something everyone can do,” but 
overall pattern of interview responses suggests that experience and assertiveness are not 
determinative – attitudes toward active adjudication were divided among both seasoned and 
assertive adjudicators and newer, more tentative-seeming tribunal members. 
 
In response to the question of whether active adjudication is important to the work of the 
tribunal, the most common answer was (not surprising at this point): “It depends on the 
adjudicator.” The minority of members who reported that active techniques are inappropriate in 
the tribunal’s adversarial setting also reported that active techniques are not important to the 
work of the tribunal. One member noted there is no “truth at all costs imperative” at the Tribunal; 
another stated that the goal of respondents’ counsel is to win and factored into this goal the 
expectation that self-represented (or less well-represented) applicants will be inadequately 
prepared. At the other end of the spectrum, the importance of active adjudication to effective 
tribunal functioning was described in highly enthusiastic and committed terms.  
 
When asked whether tribunals have more authority than courts to engage in active adjudication 
the common response among study participants was “yes,” based largely upon the Tribunal 
mandate. Some differed, however, noting that the same test for apprehension of bias is applied to 
both courts and tribunals, and active adjudication is therefore no more appropriate in tribunals 






There was no common thread in responses as to whether it is difficult to draw the line between 
acceptable and inappropriate active adjudication strategies. Some members supportive of active 
adjudication made it sound easy, saying “you just don’t descend into the arena,” whereas others 
emphasized the need to “bring people along,” “tread softly,” and avoid any opportunity for 
comparison between the Tribunal and a “Star Chamber.” Despite that the potential for judicial 
review was frequently noted, formal complaints about the use of active adjudication were 
consistently reported as infrequent. 
  
Among LTB members interviewed, attitudes toward active adjudication were moderate and 
supportive; I encountered neither enthusiastic advocates nor strong opponents. Some members 
emphasized the limits of active adjudication, stressing that it is solely up to the applicant to 
“make a case,” or remarking that the balance of probabilities should not tilt because of anything 
said or done by an adjudicator. Others took a more expansive view, echoing the rationales 
described by members of the other tribunals studied: clarifying information, addressing power 
imbalances, moving things along, and, “Nobody who isn't a lawyer is comfortable with cross-
examination.” 
 
Participating LTB members generally reported that active adjudication is important to the work 
of the Board, despite that most of those interviewed characterized the Board as formal and 
described hearing processes as traditional and adversarial. It was commonly considered that 
adjudicators have more latitude than judges to engage in active adjudication, but as in other 






As noted, SBT interview subjects reported a relatively small percentage of self-represented 
parties; nonetheless, hearings were described as informal and active adjudication was 
characterized as “natural” in the context of the Tribunal’s mandate to deal with a “vulnerable 
population,” and necessary to ensure that parties “feel heard.”  
 
There was no common thread among the responses of SBT participants as to the source and 
extent of tribunal authority to engage in active processes. It was remarked that tribunals do not 
have more latitude than courts, but may, in general, “take active adjudication more seriously” 
because of an orientation toward self-represented parties, but it was conversely maintained that 
there is no difference between courts and tribunals in this regard.  
 
 






















Mid-afternoon, day two, the self-represented foster mother’s cross-examination of 
the second CAS witness is suspended to allow the child’s pediatrician, who has 
limited availability, to testify. She is a witness for the self-represented foster 
family. The self-represented foster mother begins her examination in chief by 
asking the doctor some general questions. CAS counsel objects – the doctor has 
not been qualified as an expert witness and therefore can only speak to her direct 
experience with the child. The Chair assists the foster mother by suggesting more 
specific questions. With the help of the Chair, testimony is elicited to the effect that 
the doctor recommended feeding techniques for which the foster mother was 
reprimanded by the Society. The doctor completes her testimony at the end of day 
two. I leave the hearing room impressed with the Chair’s skill.  
 
 
The following morning the self-represented foster mother is scheduled to resume 
her cross-examination of the second CAS witness. Before she begins, the Chair 
requests that she try to be more direct in asking questions “or we’ll be here in 
September.” Questioning begins, and soon the witness is, once again, unable to 
confirm her testimony in a case note.  The Chair immediately intervenes, saying, 















The Chair begins looking through her own notes from the previous day, which 
have been highlighted and marked with tabs and red arrows. She asks a long 
series of questions, frequently cutting off the witness and insisting “it’s a yes or 
no answer.” The Chair questions the witness’ use of the term “report,” asking 
“do you agree that “report” has a technical meaning?” She refers to the 
doctor’s testimony, asking “what would you say to the fact that the doctor 
says...?” “where are the doctor’s concerns reflected in your notes?” and “did 
you talk to the doctor about food logs? I would suggest to you that you didn’t.” 
 
The proceedings no longer feel informal or business-like, and nor do they 
resemble an adversarial process.  
  
After the Chair has completed her questioning a ten-minute break is called, after 
which the Chair indicates she has a few more questions for the witness. She 
looks through her notes for several minutes. The room is silent except for the 
sound of turning pages. The Chair again quotes the doctor’s testimony and asks 
the witness to comment. CAS counsel objects, saying he’s not sure the doctor 
actually said that. The Chair moves on, directing the witness to a case note 
which contradicts her oral evidence; when the witness suggests there must be 
another relevant case note, the Chair replies, “I suggest to you there was no 
other note.”  
 
In addition to taking notes throughout the Chair’s questioning, CAS counsel has 
been throwing incredulous glances at others in the room, including me. I avoid 
meeting his eyes and aim for a blank expression. Upon the Chair’s suggestion to 
the witness that “there was no other note,” he stands, saying, “with all due 
respect,” he is increasingly concerned that the Chair has gone from being an 
impartial adjudicator to an advocate conducting a cross-examination. He claims 
she is displaying a “highly adversarial attitude” toward the witness, and that 
there is a “distinct air of lack of impartiality.” He concludes by saying he 
“doesn’t make these submissions lightly” and wishes to advise the Board that a 
motion to recuse is being considered.  
 
The Chair, visibly unsettled, replies that administrative tribunals have evolved 
into the age of active adjudication, which is a legitimate exercise in the pursuit 
of administrative justice, particularly when a self-represented litigant lacks the 
skills needed to ask questions to which the Board needs answers. She notes that 
the Board is faced with the profound question of the best interest of a child and 
must be satisfied that it has the information required to assess the special needs 
of this child. Without pausing, the Chair requests that the self-represented foster 









The self-represented foster mother again delves into the minutiae of the child’s 
treatment in her care. The witness begins looking at the CAS representative as she 
answers, seemingly seeking affirmation and reassurance. The self-represented 
family notices this and asks the Chair to exclude the CAS representative from the 
hearing room.  The panel leaves the room to deliberate, returning shortly to rule 
that the CAS representative may remain, but the Board takes seriously any attempt 
by a witness to communicate with others in the hearing room. Eye contact between 
the witness and the CAS representative is to be avoided. 
 
The self-represented foster mother again resumes her cross-examination, now 
attempting to discredit the witness’ testimony about her own personality and 
demeanor, and soon is in tears. A break is called. When the cross-examination 
resumes the self-represented foster mother puts more direct questions to the 
witness, such as “did I ever cut a conversation short or refuse to talk to you?” and 
“if I disagreed did I explain?” CAS counsel objects that the questions should be 
yet more specific. The foster mother starts to defend her questioning, and CAS 
counsel abruptly cuts her off. The Chair tells CAS counsel, “I am the Chair,” and 
indicates that she will hear the foster mother’s submissions.  
 
The Chair responds to the foster mother’s submissions by reminding the self-
represented foster mother to rephrase her questions to refer to specific occasions; 
questioning again resumes. The Chair, seemingly finding the witness’ answers 
vague, impatiently and repeatedly tells the witness to “just answer the question.” 
Counsel again objects and is abruptly cut off by the Chair, who says, insistently, 
that she is getting close to asking him to instruct his witness not to be evasive. 
 
A ten-minute recess is called. The awkwardness that now enfolds the room can be 
seen in the faces of all, save the apparently unflappable witness, as participants 
file out of the hearing room in clusters.   
 
Immediately after the break, CAS counsel addresses the panel. He stands, 
presumably to underline the seriousness of the situation, and says he has 
consulted with his client and wishes to put on the record the apparent bias of the 
Chair against the current witness. His tone is exceedingly formal.  He claims the 
witness has been treated with condescension by the Chair; her answers have been 
repeatedly cut off, and the Chair has exhibited “exasperated facial expressions.” 
He asserts that the Chair has trespassed the limits of active adjudication by 
conducting an aggressive cross-examination. Finally, he warns he may move for 
adjournment, followed by a motion for recusal.  
 

















































not. CAS counsel responds that he is not making the motion “at this time,” but is 
“reserving the right to do so.” He is informed by the Chair that the right to
make any motion he wants is always available, and there is no need to “reserve” 
it.  She shuffles through the briefs and other materials on the table and in her 
briefcase and locates a copy of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act. She riffles 
through the Act for a few moments, then reads aloud section 13, which provides 
that where any person, without lawful excuse, acting as a witness, refuses to 
answer any question to which a Tribunal may legally require an answer, the 
Tribunal may request by way of the Divisional Court that the person be found 
guilty of contempt. The Chair reiterates that she told CAS Counsel this morning 
to instruct his witness to answer the questions. She explains that in the event of a 
motion to recuse, the panel will make its own ruling. Without inviting a 
response, she announces that the hearing will now resume.  
 
The self-represented foster mother, now looking worried and confused, perhaps 
unsure if the foregoing exchange was helpful to her, or not, continues her cross- 
examination. She asks the witness whether she has ever been dismissive in her 
tone when dealing with her. After the witness has briefly answered this non-
specific question, the witness asks the Chair, “can I add to that?” The Chair 
replies “No.” CAS counsel raises his eyebrows and shakes his head, keeps his 
eyes averted from the panel, and again begins to take notes. 
 
The foster mother concludes her cross-examination and indicates that her 
husband would now like to ask a few questions of the witness. He holds up and 
refers to a medical report. CAS counsel immediately raises two objections: the 
witness is not the author of the report and it contains medical opinion evidence 
provided by a doctor who is not in attendance. The Chair rules that the report 
can be used for the purpose of questioning the witness; it will be decided later 
whether it will be admitted as evidence. 
 
The self-represented foster father commences his cross-examination, and the 
Chair occasionally intervenes but is more restrained.  CAS counsel appears to 
be lost in thought. The witness now frequently asks the Chair, “am I allowed to 
say this?” and “is it okay to say more?” After the self-represented foster father 
has concluded his cross-examination, the self-represented foster mother 
indicates she has a few more questions, which turn out to retread previously 
covered territory. The Chair points this out, saying that any further questions 
must be restricted to new matters. The foster mother refers to yet another e-mail, 
requiring yet another search to locate it. When cross-examination is finally over, 
the Chair remarks that the proceedings are taking longer than expected, and 
several more days should be scheduled. CAS counsel replies that he has court 







A wide variety of adjudication styles and active techniques was displayed in the hearings 
observed, including within the same tribunal, consistent with reports of many interview subjects 
that there is no typical style of tribunal adjudication. Despite the reported and observed 
differences, some common techniques emerged. In several hearings, adjudicators adopted a style 
I would characterize as “managerial.” Irrelevant evidence was swiftly cut off, parties, whether 
represented or not, were questioned by the adjudicator, and when parties were represented, 
counsel had less control over questioning and the flow of evidence than did the adjudicator. 
Similarly, a common method for clarifying evidence was observed: following cross-examination 
by counsel, detailed and probing questions were asked by the adjudicator, covering the same 
material but allowing the witness to elaborate and give additional context to the evidence. 
 
In a highly active hearing I observed, the adjudicator’s approach was obviously problematic in 
terms of the opportunity for judicial review, yet also refreshingly transparent. It seemed to 
convey to the parties: The Board needs to understand this, what you have to say about it? Can 
you be completely clear? Do you have any documentation? What about what you said earlier? 
What about what someone else said yesterday? It was bold, and it contained no trace of the 
mystery and gamesmanship that can hover over traditional courtroom litigation. 
 
Among participating CFSRB members, active adjudication techniques were generally reported 
upon differently by clinician-members and those with legal training. 
 
Lawyer-members interviewed tended to emphasize using active adjudication to directly question 





relative disadvantage of self-represented parties and the need to ensure they “felt heard,” the 
emphasis among lawyer-members was commonly upon “truth-finding” and efficiency. As one 
such member said, “The goal is to obtain information needed to make a decision; the reality is 
that you find yourself asking the questions.” Others reported using active adjudication to 
“question and instruct, but not to cross-examine;” or compared active adjudication to a client 
interview in which questions are asked in a casual manner to elicit the salient facts, further 
remarking that judges in family law cases are “not even close” to using a similar approach. 
Specific active adjudication techniques described by lawyer-members included: taking more 
control over the evidence than would occur in court, for example, asking if there is an email or 
any other document to support an assertion, and if there is, allowing time to get it rather than 
insisting on adherence to filing timelines; requesting updated evidence; insisting on written 
statements from all witnesses in advance of hearings; and, conducting med/adj where it seems 
appropriate and parties agree, despite that the Board has no express mandate to engage in 
med/adj.  
 
Clinician-members interviewed generally reported their role in hearings in therapeutic terms, 
including: being aware of an applicant’s disadvantage and helping to ensure that hearings are 
sufficiently accommodating;  taking notice of body language and other cues that indicate a lack 
of understanding; recognizing apparent mental or emotional problems and discussing them with 
other panel members; noticing “wandering thinking” and trying to assist with focus and any 
necessary clarification; encouraging patience among panel members if learning difficulties, 
extreme stress or depression are observed; taking an active part in reducing unproductive levels 





in proceedings. As one member put it, the role is not to do a “clinical assessment,” but rather to 
have “clinical perspective.”  
 
It was common for participating clinicians to comment upon power imbalances and express 
empathy for self-represented parties. Most reported feeling comfortable asking questions of 
witnesses in the course of hearings, including in new areas that a self-represented party “has 
failed to explore,” as well as questioning a witness about his or her background or qualifications. 
One such member commented that an adjudicator must ask questions of witnesses or is “failing 
to do the job.” A very small minority remarked that frequent interruption from any panel member 
in the course of testimony is problematic for self-represented parties, who, it was said, function 
best if allowed to tell their story with any necessary clarification sought at the end. It was 
remarked that clinicians tend to engage more with the parties, to “stretch out” the story, ask more 
personal questions, and do so in a “less legalistic” tone. 
 
With respect to evidence, one clinician recounted requesting drug testing in one instance, and 
requiring an applicant to consult with a neurologist in another. While one member stated that the 
Board may order its own assessment of a child, another reported that the Board has this power, 
but it is not used.  
 
Some participating CFSRB members mentioned the need to get both sides to “buy-in” to active 
adjudication at the outset, although this was not a common response. CFSRB members 
interviewed most commonly reported clarifying the issues at the start of hearings, telling parties, 






Despite the Board’s express mandate to utilize active adjudication techniques, many HRTO 
members interviewed stressed the need to work toward a “buy-in” from both sides at the 
beginning of proceedings or spoke of the need to gain the trust of the respondent community 
with respect to the use of active processes by nurturing an understanding that they do not suggest 
a preference for the applicant side. Some members described consciously adopting a non-
threatening tone and striving to establish a cooperative environment.  
 
It was reported that self represented parties consistently give more information than is necessary 
or relevant, sometimes to the point of making it difficult to discern the Code violation claimed, 
and making it useful to ask questions such as: “Are you alleging X is a discrimination against 
you because of Y? OK so that's the issue;” “I don’t see anything about X, will you tell me about 
this later?” and “What box are you claiming to fit in?” The initial stages of a hearing were 
compared to a lawyer/client interview with the applicant (a comparison also made by a CFSRB 
member) at the end of which there is a clear list of issues, and after which submissions are 
invited from the respondent. If new issues are raised by either side in the course of this process, 
rulings are made as to whether they are relevant, and if so, consent is sought to include them.  
Some HRTO members reported dispensing with opening statements, described as unhelpful 
because self-represented litigants will “always start to give evidence.” Similarly, it was very 
frequently remarked by members of all tribunals studied that self-represented parties are almost 
universally incapable of effectively conducting a cross-examination, and instead tend to give 
evidence. Some participating HRTO members reported having occasionally cross-examined 





acceptable, include leading questions, such as: “Am I correct in saying you said X?”; 
“Something you said doesn't make sense to me, how do you respond to that?” (instead of, “I put 
it to you that you are lying”); and, in the face of conflicting evidence saying, “I want you to 
know that when X was here he said Y, what do you have to say about that?” The rationale for 
strategies such as these was described as ensuring that “the questions that need to be asked are 
asked.” It was reported among HRTO members supportive of active adjudication that its 
effective use requires a firm and complete understanding of all available information about the 
case before the hearing or med/adj begins; all documents must have been filed, and all 
prehearing materials, case direction notes, witness statements, and other materials must be read 
in advance. Others simply described active adjudication as “more work.” 
 
A more moderate approach to questioning witnesses was described by some members 
interviewed, who reported assisting self-represented parties to conduct a cross-examination by 
asking, “What are you driving at?” and then providing an appropriate question for the self-
represented party to ask. Members who reported a lack of enthusiasm for active adjudication, 
unsurprisingly reported avoiding questioning witnesses, particularly during cross-examination, 
and posing “neutral questions” at the conclusion of testimony. Among this group it was noted 
that an adjudicator might “plug some holes” after cross-examination by a self-represented party, 
but that this can be done “within the traditional adversarial model of adjudication,” and there is 







Several participating members reported requiring written witness statements to enhance hearing 
efficiency. Further evidence-related strategies included: suggesting a certain order of witnesses; 
reducing the number of witnesses (for example, where a witness is being called to establish an 
element of the case that has already been established); dispensing with disputes over 
admissibility by accepting virtually all evidence and applying the rules of evidence to weight; 
and, requiring a missing witness statement to be written “on the spot” by calling a hearing break. 
In contrast to these assertions, other members reported that adjudicator control over evidence is 
exercised “tentatively,” departures from the rules of evidence are predominately made on 
consent, and restraining repetitive evidence risks judicial review.  
 
It was commonly reported as unusual or inappropriate for HRTO adjudicators to request 
evidence. Members reportedly cannot summon witnesses on their own motion but may suggest 
to parties that certain witnesses would be of assistance, and may compel document production, 
although there is no obligation to do so. One member remarked that if applicants claim damages 
but provide no proof of loss, they are “out of luck.” Another remarked that many applicants fail 
in their claims because of insufficient evidence, not because their claims are not conducive to 
proof, but because the applicant does not understand how to prove the case or has failed to obtain 
evidence understood to be necessary. As one member put it: it is not the role of the Tribunal to 
“figure out what one side needs to make a case, and then allow time to go and get it.”  
Several participating HRTO members volunteered that there is strong institutional bias against 
adjournment, which some adjudicators strictly enforce. Examples of reported accommodations to 
avoid adjournment or loss “on a technicality” include: allowing an applicant to amend pleadings 





have been filed by a self-represented litigant, forty-five days prior. One member described 
granting an adjournment to allow a self-represented party to obtain missing evidence, explaining 
to the respondent that the evidence was needed for a “solid decision;” whereas another member 
recounted denying an adjournment to a self-represented party who arrived without having filed 
any materials, proceeding with the hearing request, and barring the self-represented party from 
calling witnesses or submitting documents. 
 
LTB members interviewed generally described moderate but assertive use of active adjudication 
techniques. It was reported that members “try not to cross-examine,” but will directly question 
“and challenge” a witness, if necessary. Some strategies echoed those reported in other tribunals, 
such as asking a self-represented party, “You've claimed X, how do you plan to prove it?” 
Similarly, it was reported as “no problem” to interrupt testimony, not just to clarify the evidence 
given, but to focus the parties and exclude irrelevant material, for example, by asking, “How 
does that fit in here? This is what I need to know.” As in other tribunals, the unproductive 
combination of cross-examination and self-representation was noted; some LTB members 
reported suggesting that cross-examination be skipped altogether. 
 
Similar to the responses of some HRTO members, the interests of represented parties were noted 
by some LTB members interviewed. One member remarked that if a witness is evasive, it is 
enough to notice the behavior and draw an appropriate inference, that is, “there is no need to 
insist upon clear answer.” Another commented that more inquisitorial powers would make 
adjudication easier but would “not be fair.” Another member remarked that if a tenant exhibits 






As in other tribunals studied, LTB members interviews commonly mentioned a strong 
institutional bias against adjournment, and described allowing almost any evidence rather than 
“going through the fuss” of explaining rules of evidence and applying the rules to weight. It was 
reported that adjournments are sometimes granted for the sake of “fairness,” but not with 
comfort, and one member remarked that fairness should be more important than efficiency. If a 
new claim comes to light in in the course of a hearing, the potential claimant is reportedly 
advised to withdraw and file a new application. If a new defense is discovered of which a tenant 
was unaware, the tenant is reportedly referred to duty counsel. It was remarked that an 
adjournment might be granted to allow a self-represented party to obtain missing evidence but 
would never be granted simply because a party “was seeing the case unravel” and regretted not 
being better prepared. Similarly, another member reported that if a self-represented party asks for 
time to obtain important evidence, an adjudicator is as likely to say, “Your hearing is today,” and 
proceed, as to grant an adjournment, depending upon the circumstances and the individual 
adjudicator.  
 
As noted, participating SBT adjudicators discussed active adjudication in terms of assisting self-
represented parties to “feel heard.” SBT members also described the importance of explaining 
the role of a Case Processing Officer (“CPO”), so that self-represented parties “don’t feel 
attacked;” being patient because “people meander;” balancing efficiency with letting people say 
what they need to say (“up to a point”); and being aware of sub-cultural sensitivities, such as 
discomfort with eye contact. SBT members reported curtailing repetitive testimony by 






It was reported that it would be rare for a SBT member to request new evidence of any kind, and 
it would certainly “never happen” with respect to medical evidence, which was described as the 
“sole responsibility of the appellant.” One member gave a contrary account, stating that an 
obvious hole in an appellant’s case would be met with a suggestion that legal counsel be 
obtained, followed by an adjournment. 
 
(c)  Limits of Active Adjudication  
 
Participating CFSRB members consistently reported that complaints about the use of active 
adjudication are infrequent. One CFRSB member recounted society counsel saying in the course 
of a hearing, “If this was a court no judge would allow this;” and another mentioned a society 
lawyer walking out of a hearing, but these were described as rare and isolated incidents. It was 
reported that complaints about Board processes are usually resolved by immediate discussion 
and mutually satisfactory process adjustments, not formal complaint or application for judicial 
review. It was remarked that the Board periodically consults with stakeholders, such as children's 
aid societies, and that this has helped the Board gain acceptance for its processes.  
 
Clinicians more often than lawyers, reported it as difficult to restrain involvement in 
proceedings. One clinically trained member remarked that it is tempting to become an advocate 
for applicants, given that they often present as relatively powerless and isolated. Some Board 
adjudicators emphasized the importance of active processes to the work of the Board; as one 






Similar to CFSRB members interviewed, participating HRTO members consistently reported 
that complaints from parties and counsel about the use of active adjudication are infrequent. The 
HRTO has an internal review process through which it may consider any complaints in advance 
of the opportunity for judicial review. Despite the reported infrequency of complaints, it was 
often remarked that clarity must be achieved with respect the treatment of active adjudication by 
review courts.  
 
Participating LTB adjudicators also reported that bias allegations stemming from the use of 
active adjudication are uncommon, and when they do arise, are dealt with through an internal 
review process that reportedly seldom leads to judicial review.  
 
SBT members interviewed reported it as very rare for CPOs to object to active adjudication 
strategies; one member recalled once being cautioned, but another remarked that there is 
considerable room for the use of active processes because CPOs do not have a personal stake in 
outcomes and are interested in efficiency. Consistent with this, another adjudicator reported “not 
being very concerned about appearing to advocate for other side.”  
 
 
Interviews with tribunal members were conducted shortly after the release of the Divisional 
Court decision in Children’s Aid Society of the United Counties of Stormont, Dundas and 
Glengarry v. S.V.D.650(“S.V.D.”). The decision was highly critical of the conduct of the CFSRB 
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proceedings under review; the court held that the duty of procedural fairness had been breached 
in that the conduct of the Chair established a reasonable apprehension of bias.651  
 
The S.V.D. decision was discussed in most interviews, often raised by interview subjects in 
tribunals other than the CFRRB. Responses to the decision were fairly evenly divided. Some said 
the conduct of the Chair as reported in the decision was far too intrusive; one such member 
remarked, “You cannot ask questions that take up 44 pages of transcript;” another noted that in 
using active adjudication an adjudicator must “tread softly and slowly,” coaxing the parties 
along, rather than “conduct an inquiry.” Conversely, some tribunal members (including non-
CRSRB members) said that the conduct complained of was not extreme, and questions of the 
kind asked by the Chair and set out in the decision were asked “every day of the week” by 
adjudicators in active proceedings. It was emphasized that there is a difference between 
questioning a witness to obtain the witness’ response to apparent conflicts or inconsistencies in 
the evidence or matters that require explanation, and “cross-examination” in a manner that a 
lawyer might adopt – such as suggesting a witness is not telling the truth. Concern was expressed 
that the former style of questioning may be perceived by a review court a form of “uneven 
treatment,” particularly given that an adjudicator must ensure that all the evidence required to 
make a fully informed decision has been obtained and cannot rely upon self-represented parties 
to do so through effective cross-examination. Among those who disagreed with the Divisional 
Court decision, some reported the decision as “shocking” on the basis that the court had 
“ignored” the administrative law context of the decision, and it was remarked (again, among 
                                               





non-CFSRB members) that the Board does not require an express mandate to conduct highly 
active proceedings in an administrative law context.  
 
In terms of future practice, many participating members reported concern about the S.V.D. 
decision. At the extreme end of this concern, one member described feeling “muzzled,” and 
another reported “pretty much giving up on the use active adjudication.” A more moderate 
response was that the CFSRB will have to “regroup in order not to feel too restrained.” 
 
 
(d)  Levelling the Playing Field 
 
It is unsurprising, given the wide scope of active adjudication attitudes and practices reported in 
the tribunals studied, that some adjudicators reported “levelling the playing field” as a vital 
tribunal function, while others swiftly rejected this characterization. The term itself seemed 
charged; indeed, some members who described levelling the playing field as an illegitimate 
tribunal goal nonetheless reported using highly active adjudication strategies.  
 
Among interview subjects in all tribunals studied, CFRSB adjudicators most often reported 
“levelling the playing field” as a legitimate tribunal function, consistent with frequent reports of 
significant power imbalances in CFSRB proceedings. It was reported that self-represented parties 
can be conspicuously “outmaneuvered” by children's aid society counsel, and that within the 
relative informality of Board proceedings, it is appropriate, even essential, for adjudicators to 
address power imbalances by deeply engaging in proceedings. It was further remarked that the 





Provincial Courts, resulting in an adversarial orientation that is at odds with the Board’s 
emphasis upon alternative processes.  
 
There was no commonality among participating HRTO adjudicators as to whether it is the role of 
an adjudicator to level the playing field. Responses included: “We take parties as they come;” it 
is not the role of an adjudicator to educate self-represented litigants or to “help them” because 
“there is a lot of information out there;” “Imagine if you had paid thousands for a lawyer and the 
adjudicator rescues the other side,” and, “We are not going to be rescuing the applicant.” 
Conversely, it was asserted by other members that the Tribunal “manages aggressive lawyers;” 
ensures that core issues are addressed, even if one side is self-represented or under-represented; 
and, “It’s not about who puts on the best show.”  
 
LTB members interviewed did not emphasize power imbalances and, consistent with reports of 
moderate use of active adjudication techniques, did not discuss active adjudication in terms of 
leveling the playing field. SBT members commonly reported that in appropriate cases a 




(e)  Active Adjudication Guidelines 
 
There was generally support among participating HRTO and CFSRB members for active 
adjudication guidelines. Most CFSRB adjudicators interviewed opined that publicly available 
active adjudication guidelines would provide members with clarity and enhance the legitimacy of 





who reported discomfort with active processes nonetheless supported active adjudication 
guidelines on the basis that, as one member put it, “It would be nice to know what you’re 
allowed to do.” Other HRTO adjudicators who described themselves as very comfortable with 
active hearing process also supported guidelines on the basis that less comfortable members 
would “have something to hang onto,” and with which to “push back,” while still others opposed 
guidelines on the basis of not wanting “to be told what we’re not allowed to do.” 
 
Participating members of the LTB were divided on the merits of active adjudication guidelines, 
and SBT members generally reported uncertainty as to whether active adjudication guidelines 
would be appropriate, mentioning the value of existing training in the use of active adjudication. 
 
 
6.4  Multi-Disciplinary Panel Decision-Making  
 
 
The CFRSB is unique among the tribunals studied in that it engages in multi-disciplinary panel 
decision-making. The other tribunals studied recruit adjudicators with a range of background 
training and experience, but reportedly use panel decision-making only in cases which have 
ramifications for the development of the law or are otherwise exceptional. 
 
There was extremely strong support among CFSRB members interviewed for the use of panels in 
best-interests-of-the-child cases, and several members described it as “essential.” It was often 
remarked that panel members complement and balance one another. Lawyer-members in 
particular frequently reported a great deal of reliance upon, and comfort in, the knowledge and 






At the hearing stage, lawyer-members remarked that the knowledge of clinicians is very helpful 
in emotionally charged cases and those affected in some way by mental health problems. It was 
noted that panels make it easier to avoid pitfalls like “reacting to personalities” and provide a 
good “reality check.” It was remarked by one lawyer-member that panel decision-making 
provides the Board with a more informed approach to best-interests-of-the-child determinations 
than is available to courts. Clinician-members, on the other hand, reported deferring to legally 
trained panel members with respect to process issues and the overall management of 
proceedings, but were less emphatic than lawyer members about the need for panels in best-
interests-of-the-child decision-making. One clinician member, while noting there is “comfort in 
panels,” expressed no “absolute preference” for the panel model, and another remarked that if a 
single member were required to adjudicate a best-interests-of-the-child case, a clinician would be 
preferable to a lawyer.  
 
In the CFSRB proceedings I observed, it was clear that panel members were performing distinct 
roles. The behavior of the lawyer-member was generally managerial and, in some instances 
dominant, while the conduct of other panel members varied from almost complete passivity to 
active engagement in questioning witnesses. In general, panel members gave the impression of 
being part of a fact-finding mission not directed by parties or counsel.  
 
At the deliberation stage, participating CFSRB members of all backgrounds reported multi-
disciplinary perspectives as valuable. Legally trained members generally reported deference 
toward clinicians regarding behavioural, mental health, and child-centred issues; some said they 





clinician-members reported deference to lawyer-members as to the limits of active adjudication. 
Despite reported areas of deference, the deliberation process was described as active, respectful 
and collaborative, with panel members having “equal voices” and typically engaging in 
extensive discussion. Both legally-trained members and clinicians reported “constructively 
challenging” one another and cultivating an atmosphere of “respectful trusting” in order to 
maximize the participation of all panel members. It was remarked that disagreements about 
outcomes are dealt with by efforts to persuade, and dissenting views are never dismissed out of 
hand.  
 
The existence of “panel effects” which might undermine multi-disciplinary decision-making was 
explored, and there no reports of "over-deference” to other panel members, or “strong” members 
seeking to dominate deliberations, or more taciturn members too readily seeking consensus at the 
expense of thorough deliberations.  Just one member reported having experienced a panel 
deliberation that was unpleasantly “conflictual,” and just one area of disagreement emerged: 
some members reported that if no consensus is reached following deliberations, majority rules, 
while others insisted that panels never operate on a majority-rule basis. Written dissents were 
reported as rare, but nonetheless an option.  
 
 
6.5 Best Interests of the Child  
 
 
All CFSRB members interviewed reported that the Board is very comfortable applying the best-
interests-of –the-child test. It was specifically remarked that “the field is well understood” by the 





and youth work, some members have taught and/or applied the best-interests-of-the-child 
concept in other institutional settings. 
 
When asked what an ideally constituted panel for best-interests-of-the-child determinations 
would look like, the common thread in responses of participating CFSRB members echoed the 
format currently in place at the Board: one lawyer to give the panel legal process credibility and 
authority, and two members with clinical backgrounds suited to the case. Preferences for the 
training of clinical members included training in social work or psychology, with expertise in 
special needs, parenting plans and mental health. One member remarked that social workers may 
have the best qualifications for panel adjudication and are often under-rated as professionals.  
 
6.6  Expertise and Internal Consultation 
 
As the foregoing indicates, CFSRB members interviewed reported a high regard for the 
knowledge and experience of fellow Board members. I was informed that members include, or 
have included, psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, teachers, and lawyers familiar with 
court systems and/or child welfare systems, including the institutional dynamics of children’s aid 
societies.  
 
Although I did not set out to explore the effects of term limits on expertise, several CFSRB 
adjudicators volunteered that term limits are problematic for the development and retention of 
expertise, although one clinician, expressed the contrary view that term limits provide a good 






Participating CFRSB members commonly reported that, on an informal level, expertise is 
primarily built and shared simply by panels working together over a period of years. On a formal 
level it is enhanced by regular conference calls and cluster-wide “Institutes,” in which members 
of all SJTO tribunals receive professional development training. It was commonly remarked that 
Institutes are not sufficiently targeted to Board issues, and while some members considered 
conference calls a useful component of professional development, it was more often remarked 
that they fail to foster either expertise or collegiality. One member remarked that conference 
calls do not encourage the kind of dialogue that allows knowledge to be reinforced and 
broadened, stressing, “This is a really important piece.” 
 
Reports of informal communication among CFSRB members outside the panel context were 
varied. Some members reported very frequent informal communications about problems and 
perspectives, saying that members regularly reach out to members with different strengths in the 
course of private deliberations, whereas others reported very little internal consultation, saying it 
would be inappropriate to “poke into other member’s files,” or that they “don’t want to make 
decisions for someone else,” and will only discuss “situations and experiences” in general terms, 
without discussing case details.  
 
HRTO membership is largely made up of lawyers, with training and experience in a variety of 
areas of the law; however, as noted above, the Tribunal does not normally utilize panel 
adjudication and is not “multidisciplinary” in the same sense as the CFSRB. Expertise is founded 
more upon familiarity with Tribunal subject-matter than the contributions to decision-making of 






It was commonly reported by participating HRTO members that formal consultation in the form 
of quarterly mini-training sessions led by vice chairs are important and effective for building 
Tribunal expertise, and bi-weekly meetings/conference calls where draft decisions can be 
voluntarily shared were also described as helpful. In common with CFSRB members, it was 
frequently noted by HRTO members that Institutes are too general and wide-ranging to be 
effective, and that term limits inhibit the retention of institutional expertise; indeed, the very fact 
of term limits was described as inconsistent with the concept of an expert Tribunal with a merit-
based appointments process. HRTO members generally described extensive informal 
consultation; members referred to an “open door” atmosphere and “tons of” interaction and 
exchange of ideas. 
 
As with HRTO members, most LTB members are reportedly lawyers, and the Board is not built 
upon multi-disciplinary expertise.  
 
LTB members interviewed reported a high level of internal consultation both in a general sense 
and regarding specific cases under consideration. Legal department circulations and quarterly 
half-day training sessions were described as useful for allowing members to drill down on their 
own legislation and discuss new issues, and Institutes were described as an effective “umbrella 
approach” to professional development. The background training and experience of SBT 
members seems especially diverse; membership reportedly includes many lawyers, but also 
teachers, police officers, paralegals, social workers, administrators, and business people. Term 






It was reported by SBT members interviewed that expertise is built by monthly teleconferences 
and periodic circulation of Divisional Court decisions. The value of mentoring was noted, as well 
as performance monitoring and random internal review of member decisions by Vice-Chairs. 
Like LTB members, SBT members reported more positively upon Institutes as a professional 
development tool. Descriptions of internal consultation were varied; SBT members generally 
reported frequent internal consultation, but a minority maintained that internal consultation is 
restrained by a need to ensure that members do not offload responsibility for the central task of 
assessing the implications of medical evidence.   
 
 
6.7 Soft Law and Structured Decision-Making 
 
 
The tribunal members interviewed varied in the extent to which they described decision-making 
as discretionary. Participating LTB members were the least consistent in this regard; although 
several members noted specific and meaningful sites of discretion within their mandate, such as 
imposing a payment plan upon a landlord based on a tenant’s circumstances, others described 
their role as straightforward application of a statutory code. This discrepancy perhaps is 
unsurprising, as an element of discretion is an inevitable part of decision-making652 and may not 
be reported as a distinct power. HRTO members more consistently described their decision-
making authority as discretionary, sometimes citing the need to interpret the “duty to 
accommodate.” CFSRB and SBT members very consistently reported their decision-making as 
discretionary, consistent with commentary which suggests that in settings involving 
                                               





conspicuously vulnerable populations, discretion is usually broad and the manner in which it is 
exercised is enormously significant.653  
 
One of the questions for this project is whether a more structured “guidelines approach” to the 
best-interests-of-the-child test is desirable or feasible in the context of an adjudicative family law 
tribunal. For this reason, two potential sources of soft law were discussed with CFSRB members: 
1) a publicly available digest-like record of significant tribunal decisions, appellate court 
decisions, and frequently updated clinical research on the application of the best-interests-of-the-
child test, as a way of memorializing tribunal expertise and creating a tangible foundation upon 
which to build further expertise; and 2) publicly available, non-binding guidelines for the 
application of the best-interests-of-the-child test. Members of the other tribunals studied were 
similarly asked to comment upon the potential for a digest or guidelines approach to decision-
making, but not in the context of a particular legal test. 
 
A digest approach was met with approval by most CFSRB members interviewed. It was 
remarked that while relevant Divisional Court decisions and some Board decisions are 
summarized and distributed by the Board legal department, these cases often relate to process 
rather than substantive law, and obviously do not reflect the blend of law and other disciplines 
that is at the heart of the Board’s concept of its own expertise. Approving responses included: 
“there is not enough downloading of experience and perspective” to allow Board expertise to 
become “generalized to the Board;” a digest would be useful in non-panel adjudication; 
“excellent members come and go” and it would be worthwhile to preserve their contributions; a 
                                               





digest would demonstrate to outsiders the Board’s commitment to informed and consistent 
decision-making, and would enhance the Board’s public profile; and, it would be helpful for 
training new members. The minority of participating CFSRB members who were opposed to the 
concept of a Board digest indicated that it would fetter discretion. In the view of one such 
member, any development that could be interpreted as a “best practices” approach would be a 
problem, because “best practices are not best in every situation,” and may too readily used to 
override the importance of, for example, cultural factors. 
 
The response to best-interests-of-the-child guidelines was mixed; some felt they would be 
helpful and appropriate, provided they were clearly non-binding, and others strongly emphasized 
the importance of unfettered discretion. Positive responses (some of which echo reactions to a 
Board digest), include: “Low-key guidance would be good, but it could never be a “ticks-in-
boxes” approach; “I would be happy to see it, possibly to the point of non-binding 
presumptions;” guidelines would help to “even out” panels by extending the knowledge of more 
experienced members; greater transparency would improve Board credibility; the criteria in the 
CFSA are a “good list” but guidelines “could flesh them out from a conceptual and practical 
perspective;” guidelines informed by social science and psychological perspectives as to the 
impact upon child development of “surface conditions” such as cleanliness of the home, would 
be very useful; and, an express focus upon the best-interests-of-the-child test would allow it to be 
more thoroughly understood and consistently applied. Among those opposed to guidelines, again 
upon the basis of fettering discretion, one member asserted that all development of Board 
expertise regarding the best-interests-of-the-child test must occur as a consequence of the Board 






Although one member volunteered that non-binding presumptions would be useful, there was 
little common ground among members as to the merit of non-binding presumptions. Some 
indicated support for attachment as the default primary factor, even to point of a presumption, 
absent risk of harm, whereas others remarked that while guidelines would be helpful they should 
not include presumptions.  
 
Finally, participating members were asked whether unwritten “guidelines” currently exist in the 
form of shared understandings about best practices in the application of the best-interests test. 
Some legally trained members reported that such understandings exist with respect to “broad 
principles,” for example, emotional bonds and status quo parenting are always “front and 
centre,” and if this factor is very strong it will almost always overwhelm other components of the 
test. Others remarked that certain adjudicators, who have worked together for a period of years, 
have developed common approaches toward more refined aspects of the test, but this is not a 
significant phenomenon on a Board-wide scale. Still others rejected the notion that shared 
understandings exist, adding that any commonality in the approach to applying a discretionary 
legal test would be a fetter on discretion. Among these members it was emphasized that internal 
consultation concerning the best-interests-of-the-child test does not extend to discussion of how 
it should be applied in specific cases.  
 
 
Participating HRTO members’ responses to an internal digest were fairly evenly divided. At the 





conversely, as “unwieldy” if not impossible to produce because there are “too many divergent 
views at the Tribunal.”  
 
HRTO members interviewed also responded unevenly to the potential for guidelines. 
Enthusiastic members remarked that CanLII is a limited tool for searching procedural points; 
guidelines on substantive law would be especially helpful with respect to nuanced concepts such 
as the “duty to accommodate;” and, guidelines would help to compensate for the loss of key 
people due to expired term limits. On the skeptical side, the concern was again fettering 
discretion. Incidentally, the Ontario Human Rights Commission website, which contains 
information that elaborates upon the Code was not mentioned by members and seems intended 
only for public education purposes.654 
  
Despite the mixed responses to a digest or guidelines approach, shared understandings or 
“institutional perspectives” on frequently encountered legal issues were reported to exist, and to 
be nurtured by Vice-Chairs in quarterly mini-training sessions, and through bi-weekly 
meetings/conference calls in which draft decisions can be voluntarily discussed, as described 
above.  
 
Neither a digest nor a guidelines approach was generally well received by LTB members 
interviewed; just one member considered that an institutional memory or greater decision-
making guidance would be useful.  
 
                                               





Some participating LTB members remarked that the “Practice Directions” posted on the Board 
website, which elaborate upon both process issues and substantive law, do not function as 
guidelines; they are meant to inform the public, not to guide decision-making. Adjudicators are 
reportedly expected to rely upon CanLII and legal department memoranda summarizing relevant 
appellate and review court decisions. Some members described shared understandings as to the 
circumstances in which members may depart from a strict application of the legislation; for 
example, a payment plan is reportedly more likely to be extended, or an eviction delayed, in 
cases where there is a long-standing tenancy or where children are affected.  
 
Among SBT members interviewed there was no common thread in responses to a digest or 
guidelines approach to decision-making. It was remarked that a digest would be useful but 
impractical to maintain, as it would require frequent updating and refinement. It was further 
noted that the existing “Hearing Handbook” effectively canvasses all recurring issues, and that 
the Tribunal’s internal legal department effectively performs a guideline function. 
 
 
6.8 Pre-Hearings and Mediation 
 
 
The tribunals studied incorporate different mediation systems, and participating members 
reported various styles. The responses of members interviewed in all tribunals studied suggested 
that extending initial mediation to a further date was generally considered a negative outcome, an 
indicator that settlement had not been swiftly achieved, rather than a positive indicator of the 







Almost all CFSRB members interviewed reported acting as both adjudicators and mediators. 
Participating members described mediation as “built into” the Board process, in that pre-hearings 
may be converted to mediation if the parties agree. Mediation, or “settlement facilitation,” is 
reportedly strongly encouraged for section 68 claims, as there is often an ongoing relationship to 
preserve between a children's aid society and a complainant and the Board has limited remedial 
authority in any event. A very small minority described mediation as ineffective for section 68 
applications because children’s aid societies are aware of the Board’s limited remedial authority 
and have little incentive to meaningfully engage in mediation. The use of mediation to resolve 
best-interests-of-the-child cases was reportedly strongly encouraged only for those in which 
common ground is apparent at the pre-hearing stage. 
 
CFSRB pre-hearings/mediation are scheduled for a day-long session, and may, in appropriate 
cases, be conducted by telephone. It is reportedly possible to extend mediation by scheduling an 
additional pre-hearing, although one-day sessions were generally described as sufficient. One 
member remarked that the HRTO’s half-day approach would not be suited to the sensitive and 
personal issues dealt with by the Board, saying, “It takes half a day just to get parties settled, the 
issues agreed upon and understood, and productive discussions underway.” If settlement is not 
reached, a mediation report is generated, which serves as an agenda for the subsequent hearing, 
although new issues can be added even at the hearing stage.   
 
CFSRB members who conduct a pre-hearing/mediation may preside over the hearing of the same 
matter, provided the parties consent. This differs from the med/adj format utilized by the HRTO, 





adjudicator if settlement is not reached. It was reported by participating CFSRB members that 
applicants “very rarely, if ever” obtain legal advice in advance of pre-hearings or mediation, and 
respondent children's aid societies are generally accompanied by counsel both in mediation and 
in hearings. One member remarked that Board mediation would be more successful at reaching 
settlement if children's aid societies “did not bring their lawyers.” 
 
The Board reportedly uses the pre-hearing/mediation stage to “educate” self-represented parties 
as to the position of the party opposite, the applicant’s potential claims, information the Board 
will need to make a decision, and the hearing process.  It was commonly remarked that self-
represented litigants are increasingly well-informed at the hearing stage, which was attributed to 
pre-hearing practices, as well as to increasing use of the SJTO website, CanLII and other online 
resources.  
 
Most CFSRB members interviewed described Board mediation as evaluative. Although one 
member maintained there is no typical style of mediation at the Board, it was generally reported 
that mediators do not hesitate to discuss options, remedies, likely outcomes of adjudication, and 
“things parties haven’t thought of,” despite recognition voiced by some members that children's 
aid society lawyers may see this as “giving advice.” One member stressed that mediators do not 
suggest arguments or strategies to self-represented parties, but rather, inform them of what the 
society needs to prove and what information the Board needs to make a decision. Another 
member described the Board approach to mediation as “getting to the centre of the dispute.” In 
section 68 matters, where, as noted, there is often an ongoing relationship to protect, the goal of 





aid society perspective, “bringing civility” to the relationship and working with both sides to 
reach an agreement that will benefit their long-term relationship. Some members remarked that 
evaluative mediation would not be appropriate for a med/adj process, and those who reported the 
occasional use of med/adj at the Board noted that a less evaluative, more facilitative approach 
was adopted in these cases to preserve the adjudication role.  
 
Most participating CFSRB members reported that mediation is generally preferable to 
adjudication. Some members cited the standard virtues of settlement: mutual buy-in, win-win 
result, and better compliance. Others reported that a broader range of issues can be dealt with in 
more depth, and self-represented parties are more likely to “feel heard,” particularly if emotional 
problems suggest they will have difficulty “tolerating a hearing.” One member expressed the 
contrary view that Board mediation is unsatisfying because applicants tend to concede too much, 
leading the member to feel “complicit.”  
 
In common with most CFSRB members, HRTO members reportedly act as both mediators and 
adjudicators. HRTO applicants are asked to consider mediation at the application stage, either 
independent of the hearing process or through a combined mediation and adjudication process 
known as “med/adj.” Mediation is scheduled for a single half-day and may be conducted in 
person or by telephone, pursuant to the telephone mediation pilot project referred to above. Some 
members reported that a half-day session is often not enough. If settlement is not reached at the 
conclusion of independent (non-med/adj) mediation, a hearing is scheduled before a different 
tribunal member; in a med/adj process a hearing is immediately scheduled before the same 





The med/adj program was overwhelmingly described in positive and enthusiastic terms by 
participating HRTO members. It was said that med/adj is offered in virtually all cases, is strongly 
encouraged, and a hearing without med/adj is now unusual. One member’s characterization of 
the program as “massively successful” was not atypical; indeed, settlement rates were reported to 
be as high as ninety-five percent, compared to about eighty percent for independent mediation. It 
was remarked that some parties agree to med/adj to favourably impress the adjudicator and are 
surprised to find themselves in a productive mediation process. 
 
The high settlement rate for med-adj was attributed to mediators being more fully informed in 
the med-adj context. Others cited the greater impact of mediator comments to the parties in 
med/adj, due to the potential for a hearing before the same member. The most recently available 
SJTO Annual Report sets out statistics on rates of representation in mediation and adjudication. 
Although the Report does not separate med/adj and independent mediation, it indicates a higher 
rate of representation in mediation overall than in adjudication and a much higher rate of 
assistance from the HRLSC in mediation than in adjudication. No significant difference in rates 
of representation based upon process was reported for respondents.655  
No institutional style of mediation was identified by HRTO members; as with active 
adjudication, mediation style was described as a matter of the individual preferences of 
                                               
655 Supra, footnote 580. [SJTO Annual Report] The Report indicates: 
For mediation: 36% of applicants were represented by a lawyer or paralegal, 22% received assistance from the 
Human Rights Legal Support Centre, and 40% were self-represented. Among respondents in mediation, 85% 
were represented by a lawyer or paralegal, and 13% were self-represented; 
For adjudication: 28% of applicants were represented by a lawyer or paralegal, 7% received assistance from 
the Human Rights Legal Support Centre, and 53% were self-represented. Among respondents in adjudication, 






members. The range of reported styles was broad; some described a “folksy” or conversational 
approach, others saw themselves as “swiftly evaluative.”  
 
Adjudication and mediation are separate functions at the LTB; mediators are reportedly 
unionized, and it was noted that adjudicators must be careful not to adopt mediation-like 
methods in the course of adjudication. As noted above, the LTB has undertaken the CMH Pilot 
Project in some locations, under which attendance at a case management hearing, presided over 
by a dispute resolution officer who may be either a mediator or a case administrator, is 
mandatory for all tenant applications. An applicant’s failure to attend a CMH may result in the 
application being dismissed. A respondent’s failure to attend may result in deemed admission of 
all facts and allegations pled, and a hearing conducted in the respondent’s absence. A CMH may 
only be adjourned in “exceptional circumstances,” such as the need for accommodation under the 
Human Rights Code, or a family illness or death, and this standard applies even to adjournment 
requests made on consent. In cases where adjournment is allowed, the case may be rescheduled 
to a new CMH or proceed directly to a hearing, at the discretion of the DRO or mediator 
assigned to the hearing. Costs may awarded for failure to participate in a CMH if the result is a 
delay in the resolution of the application. 
 
A CMH may be conducted in person or by telephone; one hour is scheduled, and if no agreement 
has been reached but settlement seems likely, a further CMH or “special mediation” may be 
scheduled. If settlement neither occurs nor seems imminent within the first hour, the mediator 
adopts the role of “case manager” and discusses the need to obtain evidence, file materials and 





“if asked.” One member stressed that once it becomes clear that a CMH will not result in 
settlement, strenuous efforts are made to ensure a “tangible take-away” in the form of an interim 
order (usually for disclosure), a statement of agreed facts, and/or a list of next steps.  
 
Participating LTB members reported that parties are very often directed to duty counsel in 
advance of mediation, or alternatively, mediation may be interrupted to allow time to meet with 
duty counsel.  
 
There was no common thread among LTB members interviewed as to the style of LTB 
mediation. Some reported that LTB mediators typically conduct “interest-based” (facilitative) 
mediation, the goal of which is “getting people talking,” and that mediators are generally not 
sufficiently familiar with cases to adopt a “rights-based” approach. In contrast, one member 
described interest-based mediation as, “a beautiful concept that mediators do not have time for,” 
and maintained that a “legalistic approach” is more efficient, better suited to addressing power 
imbalances, and appropriate for landlord/tenant disputes which at bottom involve “business 
relationships;” the role of mediator was said to include “educating self-represented about legal 
tests,” what to expect in a hearing, and how the Board has handled similar cases. Specific 
practices described for accomplishing this reportedly include using a paper copy of online 
practice directions as a manual for discussing rights and obligations, that is, to manage power 
imbalances through equal access to information and tread the line between providing information 






It was further reported by some participating LTB members that mediation is encouraged at the 
Board for the sake of efficiency, not because it is a superior process or leads to better outcomes. 
One member reported that tenants may well “get less” through mediation than they would 
through adjudication; conversely, another maintained that most mediators would recommend a 
hearing rather than encourage agreement on terms too far removed from legal entitlements.  
 
Discussions with SBT members were focussed more upon adjudication and the availability of 
legal advice and/or representation, than on mediation and settlement, although, as noted, the SBT 
reportedly offers an early resolution opportunity presided over by an appeal resolution officer, 
who is not an adjudicator, but rather an administrator trained in mediation. These sessions were 
said to function like case conferences in the court system: as an opportunity to clarify the issues 
and potentially settle. In the event that settlement does not ensue, the appeal resolution officer 
becomes the appellant’s contact person at Tribunal. 
 



















It is 9:10 a.m. as I enter a Landlord and Tenant Board hearing room, and 
someone is speaking. I make my way along a sidewall and across the back of the 
room and sit at the edge of a row of chairs in the least populated part of the 
room.  
 
The speaker is a woman who stands at the front of the room behind one of two 
rectangular tables. She is talking about the role of Duty Counsel. It soon 
becomes apparent that she is referring to herself. Her voice is authoritative, but 
without edge. She gives the impression she has given this talk many times 
before.  
 
Duty Counsel moves on from explaining her role and begins to talk about the 
Board’s mediation services. She emphasizes that parties “Do Not, Not, Not,” 




















































She says parties can “come right back” to the hearing room if mediation “is not 
working.” She uses a persuasive tone to inform the twenty-odd people assembled 
in the room that there are “lots of upsides” to mediation; specifically, mediators 
are not bound by the pleadings and parties can explore any issues they want in 
any manner, and “Mediation is a win–win.” 
 
Duty Counsel then outlines the shortcomings of the hearing process: the 
Adjudicator will take a narrow view of the issues; parties can only talk about 
what is in the pleadings; there will be no opportunity for negotiation. Duty 
Counsel ends it there and leaves the room.  
 
People clustered around the room in little groups begin to talk quietly. The 
chairs, of which there are about eighty, are arranged in rows facing the front, 
with an aisle down the centre. In the back row on the left side sit a couple with 
two children who look to be between seven and ten years of age. A bald man 
dressed in a suit sits in the front row near the door, flipping through a newspaper 
spread out on the chair beside him. A woman with her hair in a tidy series of 
long, thin black and blond braids sits behind him; next to her is a man wearing a 
Greek fisherman’s hat, holding in his lap a large metal briefcase. A tiny middle-
aged woman with sharp features sits at the opposite end of my row looking tense 
and impatient, as if she is anxious for the day to be over. Another woman of a 
similar age sits a few rows ahead, wearing a lacy knit brown shawl that re-
arranges itself as she shuffles through papers on her lap. Some people fidget 
restlessly, others look bored. Several people stare intently at their cell phones. 
One man paces up and down the centre aisle. He is short in stature and his 
clothing is stained and drooping. He wears a smudged safari-style hat, out of 
which trails thin brownish hair. As he walks his fingers comb his thin goatee. 
 
It is now 9:35 and the Adjudicator has not yet arrived. People continue to talk 
quietly in little groups, read, look at their phones or do nothing. The Security 
Guard, a reedy man who appears to be in his fifties, leaves his chair in the glass 
anteroom and begins to pace up and down the left side of the room. 
 
A woman wearing a tailored suit and a badge with the word “Mediator” on it 
enters through the anteroom carrying a folded laptop and sheaf of papers. She 
approaches a small group in the front row, asking if they want to try mediation. 
They do not. She suggests they might want to just “give it five minutes.” They say 
they are “past that.” The Mediator moves on to approach others in the room with 
the same question. No one accepts her offer. 
 
At 9:39 a.m. a woman enters the room through a secure door behind a long, 























































the dais, without looking up, and begins to look through the files she has brought 
with her. After a minute or two, she looks up and says she will explain a few 
things before hearings start.  
 
The first topic is mediation. The Adjudicator repeats much of Duty Counsel’s 
remarks on the availability of legal advice, and the Mediator’s talk about the 
benefits of mediation, saying parties often find mediation more satisfying than a 
hearing. She describes the hearing process as adversarial and adds that it looks 
like it will be a long morning; many people on the list have shown up and 
several have brought witnesses. She again suggests that while people wait to be 
heard they investigate the other services offered by the Board. 
Hearings commence with the Adjudicator calling an address. The Adjudicator 
indicates that the landlord is to sit at a table on the right immediately in front of 
the dais, and the tenant at an identical table on the left. The man wearing a 
Greek fisherman’s hat moves to the tenant’s table, alone, and gruffly states he 
wants advice from Duty Counsel. The Adjudicator asks if he has signed up for 
Duty Counsel yet; he says yes. She nods, makes a note, and says she will “hold 
the matter down a bit.” He leaves the hearing room. 
 
The Adjudicator calls another address. The woman with black and blond braids 
comes forward and sits at the tenant table. The woman in the lacy shawl sits at 
the landlord’s table. Neither looks at the other.  
 
The Adjudicator asks the tenant if she wants advice from Duty Counsel; she 
indicates she does not. The Adjudicator asks if the parties wants to try 
mediation, again saying it is a useful process; they both decline. The hearing 
begins with the Adjudicator asking questions of the tenant. She recites events 
apparently referred to in the pleadings and asks, “Could you tell me about 
that?” She asks for information about the premises: How many bedrooms? 
Furnished? How much is the rent?  
 
As the Adjudicator is inviting testimony from the landlord, the Mediator re-
enters the hearing room. The Adjudicator notices her presence and interrupts 
herself to announce that the Mediator is available “and willing” to review the 
issues with anyone waiting to be heard. No one responds. 
 
The Adjudicator goes back to looking through the file in front of her, as the 
landlord begins to talk about being a cancer survivor. The Adjudicator 
interrupts her to ask for copies of the lease and certain emails. “You have three 
copies, right?” the Adjudicator asks. She does not. The Mediator, still standing 



















































Adjudicator’s manner abruptly changes; she turns to the landlord and says, 
emphatically, “Listen to what I'm saying. I’m not interested in wasting your time 
or my time. I'm not sending people out to make copies. We'll have a short recess. 
There is a copy place downstairs. Go get prepared.”  
 
The Adjudicator calls another address. This time only the landlord is present, 
through a “landlord's representative,” a middle-aged woman who has just 
entered the room wearing a green leather jacket and large gold hoop earrings. 
She takes her place at the landlord’s table and confidently recites the absent 
tenant’s spotty payment history. The Adjudicator’s demeanor is calm and 
business-like. She makes slow and deliberate notes, seemingly unaffected by the 
silence of a roomful of people watching and waiting. As the landlord’s 
representative speaks the Adjudicator occasionally asks her to stop as she 
locates a document in her file or makes further notes. She nods every so often 
without looking up. She occasionally says “okay.” She issues an order for 
payment of arrears in the form requested by the landlord’s representative. 
 
A new address is called. The tiny middle-aged woman who had seemed so 
impatient moves to the landlord’s table. She indicates that she has a witness in 
attendance, who sits beside her. Again, the tenant is not present. The 
Adjudicator notes this is the second appearance. The Adjudicator asks the 
landlord if she wants to give evidence first or start with her witnesses. The 
landlord elects to testify first and is asked to swear to tell the truth, and she 
does.  
 
The Adjudicator riffles through the file as the landlord talks about the difficulties 
created by the absent tenant: loud swearing, unprovoked outbursts of anger and 
bizarre behaviour. The Adjudicator interrupts to ask which unit is occupied by 
the absent tenant. The landlord answers that it is the basement.  The Adjudicator 
says this information does not appear in the Notice. She says the Notice is 
defective, she cannot proceed under a defective Notice, and the absent tenant 
will have to be re-served and the process re-started. She explains that if she 
orders an eviction on the basis of the defective Notice the whole address will 
need to be evicted because the Sheriff will not know which unit is affected. The 
Adjudicator says it is a shame that this was not noticed at the first appearance, 
and she understands it is frustrating. The matter is adjourned. As the landlord 
and her witness prepare to leave the Adjudicator says: “I know it doesn’t seem 
fair.” No one replies. 
 
The landlord and her witness walk toward the door, passing a man who recently 
entered the room and has been observing the proceedings. She shakes her head 























































The Adjudicator scans the room and asks if anyone is back from seeing Duty 
Counsel. No one speaks or steps forward. The Adjudicator says she’ll take a 
short recess. It is 10:15. 
 
Most people stay in the hearing room during the recess. The Security Guard sits 
at the end of a row and looks through the Toronto Star. The children in the back 
row begin playing a clapping game. A man in a blue-black suit and oxfords, with 
wavy graying hair and the air of a lawyer enters the hearing room and sits in an 
empty row near the front.  
 
At 10:25 the Adjudicator returns. She calls several matters. The parties are 
absent or not ready. She quietly sighs and declares another recess.  
 
People resume talking. I hear murmurs about wasted time coming from the front 
row. There is quiet laughter between the man in the oxfords and a middle-aged 
couple, who have just entered the room. The landlord in the lacy shawl returns 
from making copies. She asks someone in the front row where the “judge” is.  
 
At 10:37 the Adjudicator re-enters the hearing room. As she sits down, the man 
in the Greek fisherman’s hat returns from Duty Counsel. The Adjudicator calls 
his address, and he again sits at the tenant’s table. The man in the safari-style 
hat resumes his place at the landlord’s table, removing his hat to reveal a long 
Mohawk that falls from side to side as he moves his head. A younger man 
dressed in a suit sits beside him.  
 
The tenant is invited to begin. He explains he is “looking for” an adjournment. 
He says he just received the landlord’s Notice and has a lot of paperwork to 
review; he wants to raise an issue of his own; he is running out of money making 
three copies of everything; he spent nearly $150 on the last hearing he attended; 
his witnesses couldn’t come today. He asks, “I don't know if you recall my last 
visit?” The Adjudicator nods and ever so slightly raises her eyebrows. The 
tenant says the landlord has a “big force” representing him and has “unlimited  
money.” 
 
The Adjudicator asks why his witnesses could not attend; in reply he begins 
talking about photocopies. The Adjudicator says “We are talking about 























































The Adjudicator then looks beyond the parties and addresses the room. She says, 
“This matter will take a while” and again suggests mediation is “a good 
alternative.” She says she would hate to run out of time and be unable to hear 
everyone. She says, “the hearing room closes at 12:30 and if I run out of time I 
run out of time.” 
 
The Adjudicator turns to the man with the long Mohawk and says, “It’s your 
turn.” He explains that the tenant will not give him access to the premises for 
any purpose, even maintenance. He holds up a copy of a sign with the 
handwritten words “NO ENTRY,” which he claims the tenant has posted on the 
door. The tenant starts to speak, but the Adjudicator immediately turns to him 
and says, “No. It’s not your turn.”  
 
The landlord resumes talking. His testimony meanders. The Adjudicator says, 
“Please answer the question I'm asking” and, looking at the man in the suit, 
“I’m asking your representative to keep you on track.” The Adjudicator asks the 
landlord to clarify when the NO ENTRY sign went up on the tenant’s door. The 
landlord’s response is vague and rambling. The Adjudicator tells him he must 
answer the question, or he will lose credibility. She tells him he isn’t making 
sense. A woman seated among the spectators, several rows behind the landlord, 
starts to answer the question. The Adjudicator raises her voice and says “Excuse  
me, stop talking. You cannot speak when the witness is on the witness stand.”  
She then addresses the landlord and his representative: “I'm going to give you a 
few minutes to get yourselves together. I’m going to deal with a matter on 
consent and come back to you later.” 
 
The Adjudicator calls a new address. A group of people who have just entered 
the hearing room approach the bench.  
 
The man with the long Mohawk continues to talk to his representative at the 
landlord’s table while the tenant in the fisherman’s hat gets up, takes his metal 
briefcase and moves back to the first row of chairs. The Adjudicator talks to the 
group seeking a consent order, who stand in front of the dais, and smiles as the 
parties chuckle. The group leaves after a few minutes looking satisfied. The 
Adjudicator looks down at the landlord with the Mohawk and his representative, 
still at the landlord’s table, and tells them they have to move so she can deal 
with another application. 
 
The Adjudicator asks the landlord in the lacy shawl whether she has her copies. 
She says she does, and she and the woman with black and blond braids take 
















































Adjudicator notices that only one side of the lease has been copied. The 
landlord explains that she asked the photocopy service downstairs to copy both 
sides. The tenant with the braids exclaims “She’s had two and a half weeks to 
prepare! She ought to have copies!” The Adjudicator, now more patient, 
replies, “These things happen. I'm not going to wait another half hour.” She 
hands the document to the security guard, who leaves the room, apparently to 
make copies of the back of the lease.  
 
The Adjudicator asks the landlord to talk about the emails she has filed. She 
tells the parties she has to decide on a balance of probabilities whether a 
tenancy has been created. She asks questions of both parties. The landlord talks 
a great deal more about being a cancer patient. The Adjudicator nods 
sympathetically whenever the landlord mentions her illness and says that what 
she needs to understand is her living arrangements. The landlord is vague.  
 
The Adjudicator reiterates that the first issue is whether or not the Act applies. 
She says she finds it “more likely than not” that it applies, and therefore she 
will hear the tenant’s application. The tenant with the braids lowers her head, 
says a theatrical “thank you,” and begins to testify. She says the landlord has 
repeatedly entered the rental premises without notice, and has on various 
occasions removed the thermostat, cut off the cable and internet, turned off the 
water, changed the locks and called the police to complain of noise in the 
apartment. She is articulate, soft-spoken and organized. The Adjudicator seems 
to appreciate the quality of the tenant’s presentation; she frequently nods and 
indicates her understanding by saying “okay.” She often looks up from her 
notes and watches the tenant closely. 
 
The Adjudicator asks the tenant what remedies she is looking for. The tenant 
says she wants to be reimbursed for sixty dollars she spent on a new internet 
connection and requests a one-month rent rebate as compensation for the 
difficulty she has suffered. 
 
The Adjudicator asks the landlord in the lacy shawl if she is ready to respond to 
any of the things the tenant has said. The landlord responds by talking about a 
broken towel rack, exorbitant internet bills, smoking in the unit, garbage 
everywhere and dirty dishes in the sink. When he has finished speaking, the 
Adjudicator looks hard at the landlord as she tells the parties they will have a 
decision within thirty days. 
 









Settlement pressure was generally not reported as problematic by participating CFSRB members. 
It was said that pressure to mediate is applied in section 68 cases but is justified by the strong 
advantages of mediation in these cases. One member reported that settlement pressure is not a 
concern in any type of case, because even parties who have been pressured to mediate are often 
pleased with the process once they are in it (echoing an HRTO member, as noted above) and 
further because of the general superiority of consensual outcomes. Another member remarked 
that settlement pressure is not a problem because “people are often disappointed at the end of 
hearings.” It was stressed by some that although mediation is encouraged, members clearly 
signal that it is voluntary. It was reported that “shuttle mediation” is used to check in with parties 
during mediation to ensure comfort with the process and that any proposed settlement accurately 
reflects “where they are at.”  
 
In HRTO interviews, a significant minority of members expressed concern over settlement 
pressure. Some of these concerns were related to its effects on members – it is reportedly seen as 
a “failure” if mediation does not result in settlement. Participating members of both the HRTO 
and LTB mentioned an institutional emphasis upon settlement statistics, some remarking that 
members are under “unfair pressure” to maintain or improve their “stats,” a pressure which is 
passed on to parties. One member characterized a practice whereby members are required to 
contact parties who have not checked the “mediation box” to persuade them to mediate as an 
awkward exercise in “pushing people.” Apart from the effects upon members, it was said that too 
much emphasis upon settlement may detract from the important message that the Tribunal, at its 





emphasis upon settlement were also noted; that is, the law does not evolve, and human rights 
become “privatized.” 
 
As noted above, it was reported among LTB members interviewed that the Board is focused 
upon high-volume, repetitive work. One member explained that adjudicators typically start a 
hearing day with approximately sixty files; in about half of these cases a party does not show up 
(often because the parties have settled privately); in the remaining thirty or so cases, some parties 
are diverted to duty counsel, which can result in adjournment, and some take up the repeated 
offers of mediation, which is reportedly essential for getting through the docket. Participating 
SBT members reported no concern over settlement pressure. Hearings were described as highly 
accessible, with more emphasis placed upon obtaining representation than upon settlement.  
 
 
6.10 Access to Justice 
 
 
Among tribunals members interviewed, accessibility was defined in various ways centred upon 
providing assistance to self-represented parties, including: the relative ease with which processes 
can be invoked; assistance provided at the intake stage; ready availability of mediation services; 
for some members, active hearing processes; and, for a smaller number of members, the ability 
to level the playing field. While a very small minority expressed concern that tribunal 
accessibility may be over-estimated by the public, a strong majority of members across all 
tribunals studied reported that accessibility, in the sense of the ability of self-represented parties 







6.11 Summary  
 
 
This chapter recounts the reported responses of interview subjects, broken down by subject 
matter and tribunal.  Significant findings which suggest promising tribunal approaches to 
problems identified in family law court systems include: 1) consistent reports among all tribunal 
members interviewed of a high level of individual and institutional comfort in dealing with large 
numbers of self-represented parties, often characterized as a vulnerable population;  2) emphasis 
among participating CFSRB and HRTO members upon the value of work done by the tribunal in 
advance of the hearing stage, including defining legal problems and identifying the evidence 
needed; 3) the success reported among members interviewed of mediation processes  “built in” at 
the start of tribunal processes, with an adjudication fallback; 4) the reported use of information-
intensive mediation; that is, redressing power imbalances by ensuring equal access to 
information using published best practices as a guide; 5) the use of blended mediation and 
adjudication through med/adj; 6) the availability in some tribunals of specialized legal clinics 
that provide different levels of assistance and/or representation based upon complexity and 
ability to represent, often through a “coaching” role; 7) reports of the value of multi-disciplinary 
decision-making, particularly by participating lawyer-members of the CFSRB; 8) common 
support among participating clinician-members of the CFSRB for best-interests-of-the-child test 
guidelines; 9) consistent reports among both lawyer and clinician CFSRB members interviewed 
that active adjudication is an essential tool in the application of the best-interests-of-the-child 
test; 10) common responses among participating members of all tribunals that the main purposes 
of active adjudication are “getting the facts needed to make a decision” and assisting self-





“institutional perspectives” on frequently encountered legal issues; and 12) no reports that 
suggest hearing processes are “damaging” or to be avoided at all costs. 
 
Further significant findings which suggest problematic aspects of tribunal decision-making that 
could be useful in the conception of a family law tribunal include: 1) lack of consensus among 
some participating tribunal members as to the fundamental character of the tribunal, whether it is 
hybrid or adversarial, formal or informal; 2) uneven attitudes among members interviewed in the 
same tribunal toward active adjudication, that is, uneven hearing styles – some members 
interviewed reported using traditional adversarial litigation format, while participating members 
invested in active adjudication reported dispensing with aspects of the adversarial model 
including opening statements, closing statements, rules of evidence, cross-examination and direct 
examination of witnesses; 3) lack of consensus among tribunal members interviewed as to the 
basis for their authority to engage in active adjudication and what strategies are appropriate; 4) 
reports of some participating HRTO members of a need to coax respondent lawyers to accept an 
active hearing process despite the Board’s express mandate; 5) emphasis by some members 
interviewed upon independence in the sense of adjudicators’ freedom to adopt processes with 
which they are most comfortable, and the related acceptance of highly varied hearing practices; 
6) limited use of voluntary onsite mediation services offered at the start of hearing processes; 7) 
reports that self-informing is not particularly useful for vulnerable populations at the initial stage 
of a dispute when the nature of a claim and the evidence needed must be assessed; 8) 
acknowledgement of settlement pressure as potentially problematic due to pressure to maintain 





legitimate triggers for review; and, 10) the reported use of mediation styles based upon member 
preferences rather than client needs.  
 
Finally, a significant finding regarding potential tribunal processes relevant to problems 
identified in family law court systems is that among participating members in all tribunals 
studied, there was generally a divided response as to both a digest and a guidelines approach to 



































7. A TRIBUNAL FOR CUSTODY AND ACCESS?  
 
The Family Justice Working Group Report begs the question: if the recommended reforms were 
fully implemented, would there be any reason to explore the potential for alternative institutional 
approaches to family law dispute resolution? American problem-solving courts, the LAT and the 
Toronto IDVC suggest the same question: why consider a tribunal model given that family 
courts already have been, in some jurisdictions and for some purposes, extensively reformed? 
Indeed, from a vulnerability theory perspective, the institution is immaterial; it is the institutional 
effects that count.  
 
This chapter considers the potential for a tribunal system to meet assumed family law policy 
goals, and within the limits of this project, noted above, reports and commentary with respect to 
family court systems are interlaced with the discussion of tribunal potential.  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, on the basis of the literature reviews and research reported above 
the assumed goals of a tribunal-based family justice system include: the creation of an 
administrative multi-disciplinary settlement system based upon a teamwork approach; a 
secondary adjudication component that operates as a secondary, ancillary function, and is 
identified as a modified inquisitorial model; the development and nurturing of institutional 
expertise in the assessment of children’s interests and the application of the best-interests-of-the-
child test; the development and nurturing of institutional expertise with respect to domestic 
violence; development of decision-making guidelines; and, exercising a policymaking role 
through the principles of collaborative governance. Implicit in all of these goals are the broader 





holistic dispute resolution system that does not inspire dread and does the utmost to protect 
children. 
 
As others have suggested, tribunal design itself must be “a holistic enterprise, involving the 
expertise of policy-makers and lawyers, administrators and information-technology 
professionals, organizational and behavioral specialists, and communication experts.”656 This 
chapter makes no such attempt; it is the culmination of a thought experiment and the discussion 
is broad-brushed and hypothetical.   
 
 
7.1  The Potential for Multi-Disciplinary Teamwork 
  
 
It is noted in administrative law literature that an ideal tribunal design creates opportunities for 
teamwork, division of labour and a “spirit of collegiality and co-operation.”657 The rationale for a 
multi-disciplinary teamwork approach to custody decision-making is perhaps best illustrated by 
the knowledge and skills suggested as essential for family law judges, in addition to adjudication 
skills and comprehensive knowledge of family law:  
Judges must understand the complexities of family dynamics, including: the causes and 
implications of family violence; other power imbalances within the family; and the 
causes of alienating parental conduct. They need to also know about the effects of these 
behaviors and attitudes on children and parents, and their ability to parent effectively. As 
we have noted, multiple causes can underlie continuing conflict families, including 
personality disorders, other mental health issues, substance-abuse, and patterns of 
controlling behavior, and judges should be familiar with these underlying causes and 
their implications. 
 
Judges need to be familiar with child development theory and must understand how a 
child can be adversely affected by conflict between the parents. They need to know about 
the significance of hearing from children, as well as the short and long-term 
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consequences of not hearing from them. Judges need to apply this knowledge to the 
particular family that the judges dealing with to determine what is happening within this 
family, and what is required in the future to make the best interests of the children; this 
identification of the real issues at stake is critical 
 
Judges should have effective communication and management skills as well as other 
dispute resolution skills. While attempting to facilitate settlement is always important, the 
judge needs also needs to know when the decision is required and must be able to provide 
a decision in a timely way. The decision must be understood by the parents and children 
and rendered anyway that will facilitate compliance with the decision. Being able to 
identify the continuing conflict cases, determine the nature of the problems and devise the 
necessary solutions is not intuitive. Nor is the knowledge and expertise required learned 
from ordinary family living experience. Making wrong choices can be harmful to 
children. Judicial education, training, and experience in dealing with family cases are 
essential if these cases are to be dealt with effectively and efficiently.658 
 
 
The foregoing is arguably too much to ask. Moreover, the overall approach is inconsistent with 
the realization in many fields, as noted above, that the complexity of modern decision-making 
benefits from an interdisciplinary approach.659  
 
An alternative to expanding judicial qualifications to include other fields is to locate adjudicators 
within an interdisciplinary team. This approach is consistent with studies noted above that 
suggest: “collegial decision-making” leads to “more principled” decisions660 and panel members 
with diverse backgrounds improve decision-making when information is deeply shared.661 
Moreover, the benefits of collaborative decision-making are increasingly recognized in the child 
protection sphere.662  
 
                                               
658 Supra. footnote 206 at page 445. [Bala, Birnbaum, and Martinson] 
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Although England and Wales reportedly have a long history of attaching social welfare services 
to family law systems,663 the Norgrove Report describes a lack of trust and shared objectives 
among component parts of the family justice system.664 Perhaps in a similar vein, the Australian 
Law Reform Commission Issues Report refers to submissions in which it is remarked that 
available family services are “siloed” and navigating among them can be frustrating and 
overwhelming.665 While the OCL is recommended as a model for “an independent body tasked 
with representing children’s interests” in the Australian Law Reform Commission Discussion 
Paper,666 it accepts less than fifty percent of the cases referred to it, and despite the 
acknowledged value of its services, there is a tension, discussed in detail above, between reliance 
upon outside assessments and judicial independence. In the same vein, the proposed creation of a 
Family Justice Service within UK family courts “rang some judicial alarm bells;” the President 
of the Family Division reportedly remarked that it raised significant issues of constitutional 
validity.667 It has been suggested in related commentary that by characterizing the Family Justice 
Service as a “support for the judiciary” which can be “shaped” by senior family judges, the 
Norgrove Report understates the extent to which decision-making may become shared with non-
judges in the new model, and glosses over the serious implications for judicial independence of 
close multi-disciplinary teamwork within a court setting.668  
 
It has been remarked in the literature that a tribunal model offers the opportunity to utilize non-
judicial decision-makers “with the specific skills needed to deal with modern family 
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problems.”669 The extent to which tribunal adjudication has potential to improve upon family 
court systems may depend upon the value to policymakers of collaborative, multi-disciplinary 
non-hierarchical decision-making in best-interests-of-the-child cases, and the capacity of tribunal 
systems to provide it.  
 
The natural justice requirement of judicial independence in a tribunal model is a factor in both 
courts and tribunals; however, tribunals such as the CFSRB in Ontario and the PMH pilot project 
in Australia, appear capable of integrating decision-making and multi-disciplinary expertise 
through a skill-based division of labour and equal status among professionals. Although the data 
generated here cannot be generalized to other contexts, for the limited purpose of recommending 
further study I note that participating CFSRB members reported enthusiastically on panel 
decision-making in best-interests-of-the-child cases, and both legally trained and clinically 
trained members specifically remarked upon an atmosphere of mutual respect and appreciation 
for the expertise of others. Having said this, a significant minority of members interviewed in 
both the CFRRB and HRTO reported that informal internal consultation among tribunal 
members is approached cautiously, out of a concern for fettering discretion. Recent commentary 
also suggests that expertise is not always fully utilized in tribunals; while it serves a legitimizing 
function at the creation stage of tribunals, it can be isolated from decision-making for fear of 
compromising adjudicator independence.670 In the result, a firm tribunal mandate could articulate 
the difference between internal consultation and abdication of the decision-making role, and 
validate the sharing of expertise among equals as a legitimate component of tribunal decision-
making, that is, teamwork. 
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Australia’s proposed PMH pilot project is described as an administrative tribunal “designed to 
provide a multi-disciplinary alternative to court proceedings for less complex children’s matters 
where parents are not legally represented.”671 The Australian Law Reform Commission 
Discussion Paper reports a “mixed response” to the PMH concept among stakeholders; concerns 
include a proposal to require leave in order to attend hearings with legal counsel, and a need to 
ensure that at least one panel member has expertise in all forms of family violence and related 
trauma, that adequate processes exist to help children and young people participate in the hearing 
process and strong risk assessment processes are in place.672 There is no apparent concern over 
integrated multi-disciplinary decision-making; indeed, the Discussion Paper notes that in light of 
the concerns noted above, stakeholder input is needed regarding ways of strengthening the 
capacity of the PMH process, or otherwise developing a less adversarial decision-making 




7.2 The Potential for a Settlement System  
 
 
(a) Integrated Specialized Mediation  
The HRTO med/adj process and the CMH Pilot Project suggest movement toward settlement 
systems in which adjudication is a secondary, but accessible component of the dispute resolution 
process. The CMH Pilot Project, as noted, requires mediation in the form of an information-
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intensive case management hearing run by a dispute resolution officer (who may be either a 
mediator or a case administrator) for all tenant applications, and if settlement is not achieved a 
report is filed; a similar approach is taken in the CFSRB; both mediation and pre-hearings are 
followed by reports that inform subsequent adjudication. 
 
A custody and access tribunal conceived of as a settlement system could experiment with any 
number of variations on these programs. Their reported strengths, noted above, include: more 
informed mediation; a tendency toward facilitative mediation, high settlement rates; and the 
obvious efficiency of not starting over at the adjudication stage. Moreover, 
“mediation/arbitration” is effectively used in private family law dispute resolution,674 generally 
toward the high end of family law practice.  
 
Family courts have adopted blended settlement and adjudication processes, such as the “one 
judge” approach in which a single judge mediates a pretrial settlement conference and also 
presides over any subsequent trial.675 The case conference process similarly provides multiple 
opportunities for judges to encourage and assist with settlement, but it is up to individual judges 
to determine the extent to which settlement is encouraged and how it is pursued, and what is 
more, these sessions are not necessarily equivalent to mediation as not all judges undertake 
mediation training. Others have noted that judges tend to be evaluative mediators and are not 
generally highly suited for the facilitative style of mediation thought to be effective for family 
law disputes involving children.676 
                                               
674 Supra, footnote 339. [Grant] 
675 Supra, footnote 150 at page 318. [Semple, Judicial Settlement Seeking] 






A family court system could experiment with single-judge med/adj, provided it is presided over 
by a judge (and not, for instance, a mental health professional with mediation training) regardless 
of the requirements of the case. There is no constitutional barrier to judicial mediation in Canada 
but the qualifications for appointment to the bench are based upon legal training and experience 
according to statute, to say nothing of centuries of tradition. Again, it seems too much to ask of 
judges that they must have knowledge and skill in family law, the art of judging, child 
development and family dynamics (and particularly family violence) and also mediation.  
 
As noted, in some Ontario courts, two hours of free onsite mediation is available to parties in 
family law cases who are referred by a judge or Dispute Resolution Officer, as well as eight 
hours of offsite subsidized private mediation. While these services are of course a positive 
development, they are time-limited and not integrated with the judicial function.677 Similarly, in 
Australia, England and Wales and British Columbia, while mediation is required in advance of 
filing a court application involving children (except in cases of family violence) the mediation 
and adjudication functions remain, in different ways and to varying degrees, separate from the 
adjudication process.  
 
With respect to the potential for tribunal processes in family violence cases, I note that the 
Australian Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper reports stakeholder submissions which 
describe adversarial litigation in family courts as particularly inappropriate for people who have 
experienced family violence, with some noting that it can “reinforce the destructive and 
                                               





traumatic experience of family violence and enable perpetrators of violence to continue their 
abuse of the other party,” which, the paper notes, are consistent with findings of the Parliament 
of Australia’s Standing on Social Policy and Legal Affairs Committee that “the existing 
adversarial system for family law disputes is not appropriate to address matters involving family 
violence” and “must be restructured and redesigned so that safety and accessibility are 
central.”678  
 
It has been noted in the literature that in mediation of any kind, whether or not it is connected to 
the courts, unrepresented parties may seek levels of advice or support that are inconsistent with 
mediator neutrality, and self-represented parties may feel the process is unfair if mediators do not 
assist them sufficiently, while represented parties may feel the process is unfair if they do. 
However, in court-adjunct mediation in particular, parties may assume, rightly or not, that a 
mediator will provide sufficient legal information and guidance to protect against an improvident 
settlement.679 Further, court adjunct mediation which offers short mediation times and focuses 
upon disposing of cases quickly has been characterized as a “coercive” form of mediation that 
ought not to be court-sponsored.680 
 
In a tribunal setting, mental health professionals and legally trained members could work 
independently, collaboratively or in formal panels, and in both mediation and adjudication, 
depending upon the needs of each case. The opportunities for process flexibility could allow for 
targeted use of expertise, enable the effective use of elaborate forms of triage, potentially 
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decrease delay and stretch resources, both as a consequence of time-saving and through the use 
of a less expensively credentialed workforce.  
 
 
 (b)  Interactive Information Services 
 
While the parallel to family law is not exact, as noted above, among members interviewed in all 
tribunals studied, a portion of tribunal clientele was described as obviously stressed, sometimes 
with apparent mental health issues. It was reported that applicants in CFSRB processes are often 
“in crisis” and have little or no understanding of potential claims, remedies or Board procedures, 
all of which come to be understood through interaction with the Board. Within the HRTO 
med/adj process and the CMH Pilot Project, an interactive information exchange process was 
reported at the intake, pre-mediation and pre-hearing stages, and the manageability of tribunal 
processes for self-represented litigants was often attributed to “institutional competence,” 
including the “relationship-building skills” of intake workers. As pointed out in the literature, the 
most active intervention, in terms of assisting self-represented parties, appears to occur in the 
“subterranean elements” of tribunal processes.681 
 
While an interactive approach to distributing and gathering information contrasts with a 
traditional court process, it may not differ substantially from the innovative court systems briefly 




                                               





(c)  Legal Advice 
The line between legal advice and legal information is easier to state than it is to apply,682 and 
along with this recognition, some distinctions have been suggested. For example: legal 
information can answer questions such as “can I?” or “how do I?” whereas advice can answer 
questions such as “should I?” Another formulation: legal information “outlines options and what 
often happens,” whereas legal advice lays out “what will likely happen.”683 It seems self-evident 
that legal advice is preferable to legal information, to say nothing of full representation.  
 
Family law scholars have described numerous potential ways of making legal services more 
affordable, including appointing state-funded counsel, expanding legal aid, creating legal fee 
insurance plans and encouraging “unbundling,” whereby legal services are retained for only 
some aspects of a case.684  Noel Semple has recently suggested the need for a “third revolution” 
in family law (the first two being the development of comprehensive substantive law and the 
widespread use of alternative dispute resolution), in which family law firms utilize innovative fee 
structures, labour-division strategies and new service delivery models to make legal services 
more affordable.685 He writes that the progress made in substantive family law reform and the 
expansion of alternative dispute resolution processes will not fully benefit all Canadians until 
legal services become more accessible, as “most separating people will continue to want and 
need partisan legal professionals to at least advise and often to represent them.”686  
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Accepting that legal advice is a necessary component of access to justice,687 vulnerability theory 
(the lens chosen here) would suggest that responsibility for its provision lies with a “responsive 
state,” and not with private industry (although changes in legal fee structures would be 
enormously helpful in any event). The relationship between legal advice and access to justice, 
and the boundary between private and state responsibility for legal services, has been addressed 
by others in various contexts,688 including in recent research that suggests “re-thinking what non-
lawyers can do.”689  
  
As noted above, duty counsel and advice counsel are available for twenty-minute sessions in the 
Ontario family courts, and it is arguable that duty counsel services in particular are too last-
minute and perfunctory. A tribunal which has developed publicly available decision-making 
guidelines, discussed in detail below, could use these materials as a foundation for interactive 
explanation of the legal framework for decision-making, both at the intake stage and in 
mediation. This work could be done by non-lawyers, as reported in the research here with respect 
to the use of published practice directions in some CMH mediation. I suggest there may be 
greater potential to expand the depth of legal information in a tribunal system, by virtue of its 
greater distance, relative to courts, from traditional legal power structures. The information 
provided could not, of course, answer the question, “should I?” but with the help of guidelines it 
could effectively communicate “what often happens,” from which parties may be capable of 
deducing “what will likely happen.” 
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 (d) Legal Representation 
 
Others have argued with respect to mediation that legal representation limits the parties' direct 
participation and makes the process more contentious, thereby reducing opportunities for 
problem-solving and relationship repair; and conversely, that lawyers ensure parties understand 
how mediation operates and are properly informed of facts, through appropriate disclosure, and 
legal entitlements, and protect against unfair agreements, improve the tone of mediation, and 
assist parties to effectively communicate and keep emotions in check. Finally, it has been argued 
that the effect of representation on mediation outcomes is actually fairly neutral.690  
 
There is research which suggests that legal representation is advantageous in tribunal 
adjudication, but the use of active adjudication reduces the “added value" of representation.691  
The various ways in which legal advice and complete or partial representation could be made 
available in a custody and access tribunal is a complex problem outside the scope of this thesis.  
Again, the data reported here cannot be generalized; I simply note that: providing different levels 
of advice and representation based upon the combined factors of complexity and ability to self-
represent was reported upon with approval among tribunal members interviewed, consistent with 
an enabling approach to self-representation; and, moreover, legal coaching was reported upon 
more positively by HRTO and SBT members interviewed than was duty counsel by LTB 
members interviewed, which is perhaps unsurprising given that even minimal assistance in the 
form of “coaching” allows, in at least some cases, for more than a single meeting, as well as  
assistance in compiling evidence and drafting written submissions. In interviews for this project, 
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mixed reports of paralegal representation were given, as described above, but it should be noted 
that permitting paralegal practice in family law cases was urged in a recent study which 




7.3 The Potential for Fallback Inquisitorial Adjudication  
 
 
(a)  Inquisitorial Processes  
 
It seems likely that an inquisitorial adjudicator could effectively and legitimately level the 
playing field by exposing improper motivations, obtaining hidden evidence, interviewing 
witnesses and restricting the number of expert witnesses. As noted above, I find it credible that 
“truth-finding” is more closely associated with inquisitorial models, and that inquisitorial 
processes practiced in a tribunal format do not equate to less fairness. Moreover, as noted 
throughout this paper, the Family Justice Working Group Report recommends experimenting 
with a modified inquisitorial model,693 although this suggestion was presumably made with 
reference to the family court system. 
 
The relative capacities of courts and tribunals to carry out a mandate based upon inquisitorial 
adjudication would likely depend, in part, upon the extent to which individual judges and 
adjudicators enthusiastically adopt a new and seemingly more demanding judicial role. As noted 
above, recent research has described judicial attitudes toward assisting self-represented litigants 
in Canadian family court systems as variable,694 and Canadian scholars have observed that 
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“inquisitorial justice is not necessarily embraced by the judiciary.”695 Despite that tribunals are 
often designed with the needs of self-represented parties in mind, the research reported in this 
project contains a similar finding; that is, some participating adjudicators described active 
adjudication as something not everyone is capable of doing, or even wants to do, and others 
simply stated that it is “more work.” In other jurisdictions, the Norgrove Report states that some 
judges have expressed concern that a new Family Justice Service (which, as noted, places judges 
at the head of interdisciplinary teams) would put “undue pressure on the judiciary”696 Perhaps in 
the same vein, as noted above, the Issues Report of the Australian Law Reform Commission 
states that use of the LAT case management approach has “waned over time,” and further notes 
that these processes may “consume too much judicial time,” given the persistent problem of  
hearing delays.697 In short, whether located in a court or tribunal system, inquisitorial-based 
adjudication would have implications for training and recruitment, as discussed above with 
respect to active adjudication. The advantage in a tribunal model may be that targeted 
recruitment opportunities present themselves when institutions are re-built “from the ground up.”  
 
Determining the ideal blend of new and existing processes for an optimally designed family law 
tribunal is not attempted here; it may, however, be instructive in a general sense that, as noted 
above, the LAT model was inspired by the German family court system, an inquisitorial system 
that was designed to only dispense with “the worst aspects of adversarialism,”698 and the recent 
                                               
695 Supra, footnote 40 at page 15. [Semple and Bala, Reforming the Family Justice System] The authors report 
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or OCL services instead. 
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Australian Law Reform Commission, charged with redeveloping the Australian family court 
system, repeatedly questions the continued use of adversarial processes in proceedings involving 
children. 
 
(b)  Inquisitorial Identity 
 
Within the context of the research reported here, an ambiguous institutional identity appeared to 
affect the confidence with which inquisitorial processes, such as active adjudication and 
managerial judging, are utilized, even among tribunal members who support them, and to create 
a diffuse fear of judicial review. I reiterate that some HRTO members interviewed for this 
project reported that the tribunal has no process identity apart from the preferences of individual 
adjudicators, and despite that only a minority of members considered consistent hearing styles a 
worthwhile goal,699 lack of consensus as to fundamental tribunal identity seems sub-optimal. 
Fairness is primarily a procedural value in administrative law, and often associated with the 
predictability of legal systems.700 Indeed, the tendency of hybrid systems to fail to live up to the 
expectations of either adversarial or inquisitorial models has been noted,701 and has been 
attributed, at least in part, to the lack of an articulated, principled vision of tribunal identity, as a 
foundation for hybrid systems.702 
 
A firm mandate to conduct inquisitorial proceedings seems to be an obvious starting point for the 
credible use of inquisitorial processes, both to enable active hearing processes and signal a clear 
departure from adversarial norms, that is, the natural tendency in non-Continental hybrid systems 
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for the adversarial paradigm to operate as a default framework against which the legitimacy of 




(c)  Impartiality  
 
Judicial neutrality is important in inquisitorial systems, but it is not assessed through party 
control or judicial passivity; that is, by the appearance of judicial neutrality. Instead, allegations 
of bias are assessed in terms of whether or not the decision-maker has complied with a “duty of 
care,” or “duty to inquire,” pursuant to which adjudicators must obtain and scrutinize the 
evidence “with all due care” at every stage of a proceeding, and failure to do so is a ground for 
review.703 The duty of care standard exists, in part, to convey the professionalism and integrity of 
the decision-making body. Its emphasis upon thorough review of the evidence is not unique to 
inquisitorial systems (although obtaining evidence is); it is similarly a ground of review to 
overlook important evidence provided to the court in adversarial systems.704 While the duty of 
care is relatively straightforward in that it does not entail the projection of perceptions of fairness 
upon a notional “reasonable person” and it does not equate a high level of engagement with 
parties and evidence to impartiality, it is complicated by the need for the applicable duty of care 
to be proportionate to the depth of inquiry.705 For example, in some tribunals the duty of care 
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requires that decisions be “taken in the light of the best scientific information available and based 
on the most recent results of international research,”706 which clearly requires a high level of 
commitment to tribunal funding, that is, state responsibility. For the purpose of discussion, 
contrast this with the family court system, in which it is up to parties, the majority of whom are 
self-represented, to provide all relevant information to the court; disclosure may be deliberately 
incomplete or tactically delayed; the availability of assessments, their integrity and the ability of 
judges to critique them are all potentially problematic, depending upon the circumstances of each 
case; and, the constraints of “judicial notice” limit the literature a judge may consider apart from 
what the parties (again, often self-represented) provide to the court.  
 
It is a legitimate question whether judges, with their greater status, could exercise an inquisitorial 
mandate more confidently than tribunal members, and attract less resistance based upon 
perceptions of bias. Indeed, it has been noted that the effective use by administrative decision-
makers of active adjudication processes is hampered by a lack of conviction on the part of the 
courts that active adjudication processes do not compromise the role of adjudicator as neutral 
arbiter.707 To the extent that courts may have more latitude to use active adjudication processes, 
it does not, in my view, result from the application of legal principles. According to 
administrative law scholars, intense engagement with the parties is considered, in general, to be 
more acceptable in tribunals than in courts, due to the relatively flexible, expeditious and 
informal nature of administrative adjudication; indeed, it has been credibly asserted that the 
flexibility of administrative law under a Baker analysis supports “adjudicator activism” in some 
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contexts.708 The foregoing assumes an adversarial foundation; that is, a need to reconcile active 
adjudication with adversarial norms. In an inquisitorial model, the assessment of bias allegations 
would not depend upon a review court’s determination as to the apparent mindset of the 
decision-maker, for which the greater status of judges may be an advantage. A test for bias based 
upon inquisitorial norms, that is, thoroughness of the evidence and analysis, seems less likely to 
confer an advantage.  
 
The optimal duty of care in inquisitorial systems varies with the depth of a tribunal’s 
investigative function, which in turn depends upon social, political and economic considerations 
as to how much of the dispute resolution process should become the responsibility of the state, 
and in precisely which ways this shift should occur. These are fundamental questions which 
require broad-based consultation, political engagement, and further study.  
 
7.4 The Potential for Institutional Expertise 
 
 
Adjudicators are relatively free from the restrictions associated with “judicial notice.”709 Tribunal 
members may deepen their expertise on matters before the tribunal through relevant literature, on 
their own initiative, without the support of an expert witness.710  
 
Identifying the precise ways in which the expertise of mental health professionals could be 
integrated in a tribunal model would require extensive consultation with the mental health and 
family law communities. In general terms, there may be potential to reduce the need for outside 
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assessments by applying the expertise of non-lawyer members to the evaluation of the parties’ 
evidence, enabling the “voice of the child” to be heard and, in appropriate cases, conducting 
investigations. In cases for which outside assessment is required, in an inquisitorial system an 
expert may be chosen and retained by the tribunal or court.711 As noted above, the Family Law 
Rules712 have been amended to allow judges to appoint a single expert,713 but in an adversarial 
system this power cannot  prevent a “battle of the experts” as parties may still hire their own 
expert witnesses.  
 
The potential for a multi-disciplinary tribunal to apply expertise to the best-interests-of-the-child 
test has been discussed in this thesis in general terms, without analysis of this potential with 
respect to specific factors, such as domestic violence. Janet Mosher has argued that a nuanced 
understanding of domestic violence is required to improve access for justice for women.714 She 
writes that a pervasive “incident-based” approach does not consider patterns of coercive and 
controlling behavior,715 and results in a limited concept of “safety,” and failure to recognize that 
abusers may strategically manipulate legal systems as part of a pattern of dominance and control, 
through meritless applications for sole or joint custody, or tactics that engage criminal or 
immigration law.716 The need for decision-makers to grasp the full dimensions of domestic 
violence is reflected in the proposed Bill C-78, referred to above; there may be more potential in 
                                               
711 Supra, footnote 178 at page page 835. [Langbein] 
712  Supra, footnote 28. [Family Law Rules] 
713 Ibid., Rule 20.1(3) [Family Law Rules] See also Nicholas Bala, “Single Court-Appointed Experts for 
Family Cases” Lawyers Weekly, January 21, 2012, Seventh Annual FL Summit Materials, Osgoode Library. 
714 Janet E. Mosher, “Grounding Access to Justice Theory and Practice in the Experiences of Women Abused 
by Their Intimate Partners” (2015) 32 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 149 at pages 150-151. 
715 Infra, footnote 722. [Bill C-78]  





an expert multi-disciplinary tribunal model to achieve a deep and clinically informed perspective 
and to apply it consistently. 
 
 
7.5 The Potential for Guidelines  
 
 
(a) Structure and Best-Interests-of-the-Child Test 
The insights of Fiss, Mnookin and Kornhauser discussed earlier suggest a fair settlement 
environment requires that parties be uniformly aware of legal entitlements, which must be 
specific enough to predict likely outcomes, and parties must not be deterred from pursuing these 
entitlements by institutional factors. In other words, clear law and minimal risk associated with 
not settling. 
 
Criteria for the application of the best-interests-of-the-child test are currently contained in the 
Divorce Act,717 the Children’s Law Reform Act,718 the Child, Youth and Family Services Act,719 
and in a limited manner in the matrimonial home provisions of the Ontario Family Law Act,720 
but it has been widely observed that these criteria lend little certainty to the application of the 
test; they are neither prioritized, exhaustive, nor annotated, and as others have observed, they 
create almost as much uncertainty as a simple statement of principle. Until the recent passage of 
the revised British Columbia Family Law Act,721 and the very recent proposed amendments to 
the Divorce Act contained in Bill C-78,722 which create presumptions only in mobility cases, 
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there have been no legislated or informal guidelines or presumptions in Canadian custody and 
access decision-making.723 
 
The theoretical potential for a multi-disciplinary tribunal to coalesce available data into decision-
making guidelines is suggested here but given that “reality has a surprising amount of detail,”724 
whether this potential could actually be realized in a tribunal system is a question for further 
research as to their social, political and legal feasibility. Having said this, I note that the 
Australian Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper contains the following proposal for 
“improved guidelines material:” 
The Attorney-General’s Department (Cth) should commission a body with relevant 
expertise, including in psychology, social science and family violence, to develop, in 
consultation with key stakeholders, evidence-based information resources to assist 
families in formulating care arrangements for children after separation that support 
children’s wellbeing. This resource should be publicly available and easily accessible, 
and regularly updated.725 
 
The best-interests-of-the-child test has always been treated as a special aspect of family law for 
which structure is inappropriate, and it would be reckless to extend increasing calls for more 
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prior history of parental childcare. It requires parents to exercise parenting time and responsibility in a manner 
consistent with the child’s best interests, extending the best-interests concept to a behavioral requirement on 
the part of parents (section 7.1) and specifically requires that parents protect any child of the marriage from 
conflict arising from divorce proceedings. It places a duty upon legal advisors to encourage the use of 
alternative dispute resolution processes (section 7.7(2)) and provides that parties shall attempt to resolve any 
matter that could be the subject of a court order through a “family dispute resolution process” (section 7.3). It 
defines “family justice services” as public or private services intended to help persons deal with issues arising 
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and “parenting time;” “custody and access order” is replaced with “parenting order.” 
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structure in family law to this tangled area of the law, but for the Family Justice Working Group 
Report recommendation that substantive family law be simplified, with “more guidance by way 
of rules and presumptions, where appropriate.”726 Given that legislated presumptions are 
politically fraught, and the Supreme Court of Canada has a record of repeatedly declining to 
engage with presumptions by refusing relevant applications for appeal,727 the routine 
development of decision-making guidelines as part of ordinary tribunal functioning suggests a 
potentially practical avenue for providing “more guidance by way of rules and presumptions.”  
 
In view of the long history of debate as to the relative merits of presumptions and relative 
importance of various aspects of the best-interests-of-the-child test,728 the suggestion to develop 
guidelines and presumptions is not meant to imply they are an easy answer, or that any of the 
presumptions discussed earlier is ideal, or that a collective orientation among mental health 
professionals would naturally emerge. It is acknowledged that there is insufficient social science 
data on many aspects the best-interests test, and controversy about the data which does exist. For 
example, concepts such as “attachment,” “psychological parent” and “primary caregiver” are not 
consistently defined of or understood, and perceptions as to their respective significance differs 
within the clinical community.729 As noted above, no consistent approach seems to have 
developed among family service providers in UK family courts.730  
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I note that tribunal members who participated in this project were asked to gauge the potential 
for more structured decision-making in their own fields, and while responses were mixed, the 
most consistent support for guidelines was located among clinically trained CFSRB members, 
expressed with regard to the best-interests-of-the-child test. I do not suggest that this finding can 
be generalized to all of family law; further study is needed to determine whether there is broad-
based support in the mental health professional community for a more structured approach to the 
best-interests-of-the-child test.  
 
The need for guidance in “mobility cases” was urgently argued long before presumptions were 
included in British Columbia’s family law legislation and the proposed amendments to the 
Divorce Act,731 as was the difficulty of legislating in this area.732It was pointed out in support of 
guidelines and presumptions that decision-making patterns could be deciphered in the case 
law,733 and indeed they were.734 Decision-making patterns obviously exist in other areas of best-
interests decision-making; for example, the literature reports some consensus among mental 
health professionals as to certain aspects of the best-interests-of-the-child test, such as the age at 
which overnight stays with an access parent are likely to be seen as appropriate, depending upon 
certain variables. Locating this sort of information in guidelines does not detract from 
individualized justice; that is, clearly communicating “what often happens” does not prevent 
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parties and decision-makers from recognizing situations in which the usual outcome is not 
appropriate. 
 
In a court system rules and presumptions arrive by way of legislation or regulation, generated in 
the legislative and executive branches. Tribunal-generated guidelines could function as a less 
“blunt instrument” than legislation or regulation for refining and improving understanding of the 
best-interests-of-the-child test, and a multi-disciplinary expert tribunal may have more potential 
than the legislative branch or the ministerial level of the executive branch, to credibly and 
apolitically develop a comprehensible framework for reasoning about custody and access.  
 
 (b)  Guidelines and Discretion  
It has been observed that the injection of “more rules” into discretionary areas of the law is often 
intended to increase “individualized justice”735 by decreasing the potential for arbitrary decision-
making. As noted above, this thinking has traditionally been reversed with respect to the best-
interests-of-the-child test, for which more structure in the form of presumptions or prioritized 
criteria has been resisted, in part on the basis that it would detract from the “individualized 
justice” enabled by broad discretion. Guidelines are not suggested here as a “more law” strategy 
for limiting discretion with more rules;736 in other words, it is not suggested that guidelines 
should displace discretion, but rather, that clear law should accompany the exercise of discretion.  
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The values reflected in the demand for rule-based law are consistency and coherence;737 the 
resulting predictability is thought to enhance fairness, promote settlement and reduce costs and 
conflict. As noted, Consolidated Bathurst738 reinforced the importance of coherence in 
administrative adjudication and has been interpreted as endorsing tribunal-generated guidelines 
and other means if enhancing consistency of decision making.739 It is disturbing that best-
interests-of-the-child should defy prediction, as the implications exceed mere consistency, as 
discussed above.  If the goal of family dispute resolution systems is not merely to press for 
settlement, but, rather, to facilitate fair settlement, enabling public understanding of the central 
test for decision-making seems essential.   
 
From a vulnerability theory perspective, a guidelines approach could address the needs of the 
“vulnerable subject;” to the extent that guidelines could effectively communicate “what often 
happens,” the more risk averse party would be empowered in negotiations and mediation. In 
cases that “cannot or should not settle,” the suggestion is not that discretion be constrained, only 
that it be relocated. It seems obviously sub-optimal, if not irrational, to entrust a discretionary 
power to determine outcomes for children to any professional reluctant or ill-equipped to 
exercise it. Indeed, it seems uncontested that: 
Being able to identify the continuing conflict cases, determine the nature of the problems 
and devise the necessary solutions is not intuitive. Nor is the knowledge and expertise 
required learned from ordinary family living experience. Making wrong choices can be 
harmful to children.740 
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The question of whether guidelines should be binding, or non-binding, requires expert input. For 
the purpose of this paper, the potential for non-binding guidelines is considered. At the 
adjudication stage, even non-binding guidelines could curtail the potential for discretion to be 
used improperly, for example, as a vehicle for the external ideologies and class-based 
assumptions of individual decision-makers,741 as is claimed to occur with respect to the 
idealization of the traditional nuclear family.742  
 
I urge further research as to the feasibility of a guidelines approach to the best-interests-of-the-
child test as they may have potential to clarify general expectations as to the application of the 
test at the negotiation and mediation stages while retaining the discretion necessary to tailor the 
application of the test to individual needs at the adjudication stage.  
 
It must be acknowledged that not all family law scholars support placing custody decision-
making in the hands of mental-health professionals. It has been argued that neither judges nor 
“mental health experts” are better able than presumptions to predict the future best interests of a 
child,743 that training in psychology is not simply not helpful in most cases, and that the best-
interests-of-the-child standard is based upon a misplaced faith in the ability of mental health 
professionals to evaluate families and advise courts.744 Martha Fineman has argued that divorce 
has been redefined from a “legal problem” to an “emotional crisis,” which has allowed mental 
health professionals to “hijack” custody decision-making.745 As noted, these arguments are 
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paired with recommendations for presumptions, on the basis that they obviate the need for 
psychological evidence, are a verifiable proxy for best interests, and can be applied by judges 
without training in other fields.  
 
7.6  The Potential for Collaborative Governance  
 
 
A family law tribunal could be granted a policy-making role based upon “collaborative 
governance,” pursuant to which the tribunal absorbs input on an ongoing basis, not only from 
tribunal members, but also from the public, family law and mental health professional 
communities and interested organizations, such as feminist and fathers’ rights groups. 
Collaborative governance entails a multi-level policy process in which norms and practices are 
continually reconsidered and revised in the light of broad-based knowledge and experience.746 
 
Opportunities have obviously expanded for diverse input through blogs and other tech-driven 
formats. A broader base of policy input may have the potential to dilute the divisions between 
identity-based groups by giving voice to wider range of perspectives, and in turn render 
guidelines and presumptions more politically neutral. Moreover, transparency at this level could 
provide a credible foundation for norm identification, norm reproduction, political 









                                               





7.7 The Potential for Informality  
 
 
Again, without suggesting broad application of the research reported here, I note there was more 
consistency among tribunal members interviewed as to the value of informal processes 
(compared to informal settings), and the value of informality in hearings was most emphasized 
by clinically trained members of the CFSRB, who consistently noted a connection between 
informality and the ability of a vulnerable population to function. With respect to the value of 
informal settings, there was no common thread among interview subjects. Some participating 
CFSRB remarked that being on the same physical level as the parties is useful for encouraging 
interaction, whereas others preferred a more formal setting. It is perhaps instructive that the 
initial, 1975, version of Australia’s “helping court” stressed informality; lawyers did not wear 
formal robes, and “court registries” were set up to resemble storefronts. 747 The reported result 
was disrespect for the court, including incidents of violence, which led to abandonment of this 
approach and a return to formality, described as “proper court syndrome.”748 
 
I have argued above that consistent hearing style is an access to justice component and have 
noted the potential for a settlement system, would naturally be relatively informal up to the point 
of adjudication. The extent to which the adjudication component of a settlement system could or 
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7.8 Potential Jurisdiction  
 
 
The number of self-represented litigants in family law cases and their range of complexity749 
suggests, in my view, that an administrative settlement system might have benefits for a 
significant proportion of cases. Its jurisdiction could begin with custody and access disputes; 
however, once established, a tribunal could prove to be a preferable forum for the resolution of 
a broader range of “ordinary cases;” that is, those which do not involve complex, non-child-
related facts.  
 
Administrative processes seem well-suited to areas of family law other than custody and access. 
To cite a few examples, child support could be dealt with administratively, indeed, movement in 
this direction can be seen in the proposed Bill C-78, which provides that a provincial agency may 
be established to calculate child support and require that it be paid, with disagreements resolved 
by the courts. In a tribunal, a similar agency could operate as a department, and an inquisitorial 
adjudication component could resolve disagreements. Support cases, both child and spousal, 
often involve problems of income determination and financial disclosure that may be better dealt 
with in a forum with an inquisitorial adjudication mechanism.  
 
The threshold issue of entitlement to spousal support seems a suitable subject for information-
intensive mediation; calculations under the SSAG could be run at the intake and mediation 
stages, based upon different assumptions if facts are in dispute. Simple property issues, involving 
a matrimonial home and ordinary assets, could be dealt with by legally trained adjudicators up to 
                                               





a designated maximum amount. Uncontested divorce applications, often processed by law clerks, 
could be managed through an administrative arm and the perfunctory court process of reviewing 
separation agreements could easily be accomplished in an administrative setting. 
 
Barbara Babb, a long-time advocate of therapeutic family law processes, has written that family 
functioning is of such critical importance to society that family law must be dealt with “at the 
same level as courts of general jurisdiction.”750 I would counter that the critical importance to 
society of family functioning supports an alternative to courts, and that the Ontario Securities 
Commission alone is sufficient evidence that complex cases can be decided in a tribunal 
format. Having said this, intricate financial claims, for example, involving multiple properties 
and investments, family-owned businesses, pre-nuptial agreements, diverse sources of income, 
offshore assets, family trusts, bankruptcy claims, and so on, are far more suited to court 
jurisdiction than the best-interests-of-the-child test. One possibility is to permit parties to elect 
a tribunal process or a court process, except for custody and access disputes, for which a 
tribunal would have exclusive jurisdiction; another is to set a limit on tribunal jurisdiction for 
non-custody disputes based upon the value or complexity of claims. A third option is to equip a 
tribunal to deal with intricate high-value claims; the potential drawback to this approach is that 
the burden of these cases might overwhelm the essential mandate to provide swift and 
therapeutic dispute resolution to a largely self-represented client population. In any event, the 
only parties subjected to the prospect of dual proceedings would be those with significant 
assets, and they would be inconvenienced only to the extent that custody and access issues 
must be dealt with first through a multi-disciplinary tribunal process.  
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7.8 The Need for Further Research 
 
 
The need for further research has been suggested throughout this paper; on a modest scale this 
would include empirical research as to the experiences of Ontario tribunal users and family court 
litigants, and the views of Ontario family court judges, lawyers and mental health professionals 
as to the potential for tribunal system.  
 
On a larger scale, a full comparative institutional analysis of the relative potential for courts and 
tribunals to implement a therapeutic and holistic family law policy agenda could engage a wide 
range of further research initiatives, including, but not limited to:  
- analysis of resources that may be saved that might be realized in a tribunal system, 
including a behavioural law and economics analysis;  
- therapeutic justice analysis of the merits of panel decision making and non-judicial 
single-member decision-making in best-interests-of-the-child cases;  
- empirical research as to the level of support among mental health professionals for a 
more structured approach to the best-interests-of-the-child test, up to and including 
the development of guidelines and presumptions;  
- empirical research as to the potential for a tribunal process to effectively deal with 
domestic violence cases;  
- analysis of whether and to what extent family services, such as counselling, can or 
should be integrated or, conversely, located in a network of “hubs” as suggested in 
the Australian Law Reform Commission reports and in the literature;751  
                                               





- analysis of family dispute resolution as a state responsibility, including the ways in 
which governments in various jurisdictions deal with this responsibility, the extent to 
which greater use of private mediation and arbitration save public resources and how 
these are or could be reallocated;  
- empirical research as to public attitudes toward inquisitorial adjudication in family 
law, among research subjects informed of the how a modified inquisitorial 
adjudication system could function; 
- empirical research as to the views of family law lawyers and judges as to the optimal 
blend of blend of adversarial and inquisitorial processes; 
- feasibility study as to the ways in which legal advice and complete or partial 
representation could be made available; 
- feasibility study as to the development of best-interests-of-the-child decision-making 
guidelines; 
- study of the substantive law changes that might accompany a tribunal transition; 
- expert analysis of the constitutional implications of tribunal jurisdiction in some or all 
areas of family law; 
- further analysis of the extent to which tribunals can issue contempt orders and swiftly 
enforce tribunal orders;  
- study of recent existing family court reforms in Ontario which have not yet generated 
research findings; 
- study of the benefits of the planned expansion of UFCs in Ontario; and 
- study of the potential for electronic intake, mediation and hearing processes in remote 








The potential for multi-disciplinary teamwork in a settlement system with interactive information 
services, in which the legitimate boundary between legal information and advice is explored, has 
been discussed in this chapter, and the potential for integrated specialized mediation services 
with fallback inquisitorial adjudication has been explored. The potential to develop institutional 
expertise in a tribunal format, and to develop decision making guidelines with respect to the best-
interests-of-the-child test have been considered. The potential jurisdiction of a family tribunal 
































8.  FORCES AND OBSTACLES  
 
There may be more room in family law than in other areas of litigation for the use of the 
legal process to harm others, to serve less rational, more emotional, more conflictual 
ends.752 
 
This chapter addresses some of the social forces and legal and political obstacles relevant to the 
potential for a family law tribunal for custody and access. It reviews factors that informed the 
transfer of jurisdiction over residential disputes from courts to the Landlord and Tenant Board, 
and the progress of “therapeutic justice” as a goal of decision-making processes. Potential 
obstacles in the form of a constitutional challenge and tribunal capacity to exercise authority are 
considered.   
 
8.1  Legal Thought and Paradigm Shifts  
 
 
American legal philosopher Roscoe Pound long ago observed the “the inevitable difference in 
the rate of progress between law and public opinion,”753 which he described as a cause of 
dissatisfaction with legal systems. A gap between law and public opinion is inevitable, of course, 
given that changes in law require social consensus, the existence of which is not always obvious 
and often contested.754 Nonetheless, a durable gap invites analysis. 
 
At the outset of this thesis a number of social and legal developments are noted which appear to 
be indicative of a paradigm shift away from adversarialism. According to principles articulated 
by Thomas Kuhn, a paradigm shift begins when too many anomalies occur within the dominant 
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paradigm. The result is a “paradigm crisis” in which the familiar tools associated with the 
paradigm no longer work (such as cross-examination, rules of evidence, and opening and closing 
statements in proceedings with one or more self-represented litigant). During a paradigm crisis 
there is a sense of casting about for new answers (such as alternative dispute resolution) and the 
fundamental principles and ideology of the paradigm are questioned (for example, through 
multiple studies on the experiences of self-represented litigants in adversarial court systems). 
Despite that a paradigm shift signals change, it does not, as noted earlier, presumptively toss out 
the old or, more poetically, reject “the cumulative disciplinary matrix.”755 
 
Many of the phenomena discussed in this thesis are suggestive of a “paradigm crisis” in Anglo-
American dispute resolution, particularly in family law. As cited in the introduction to this thesis, 
these arguably include the large population of self-represented litigants, an institutional emphasis 
on alternative dispute resolution, information programs that educate parents as to the benefits of 
alternative dispute resolution, the American “problem-solving court movement,” the Australian 
LAT, the reform recommendations in the Norgrove Report, the Ontario IDVC and further 
Ontario initiatives such as Family Law Information Centres and court-adjunct mediation, 
substantive law reforms contained in British Columbia’s new Family Law Act and similar 
changes in proposed amendments to the Divorce Act, the relatively recent inclusion of multi-
professional and therapeutic approaches in law school curricula, and the rapidly expanding 
application of vulnerability theory.  
 
                                               





According to Kuhn’s principles, paradigm shifts do not occur quickly, and they strongly depend 
upon changes in ideology, the commentary of authoritative academics (some of which is reported 
here) and a professional cohort trained in the new paradigm.756 A paradigm reportedly moves 
from crisis to “revolution” when a viable alternative is found to unite the threads that have arisen 
in response to the crisis.757  
 
It has been observed that in family law, an abundance of practical and imaginative ideas for 
reform have long existed.758 The Family Justice Working Group Report attributes the 
“implementation gap” in family law reform, in part to the “culture of the justice system.”759 The 
Canadian Bar Association’s Future of Legal Services Report more bluntly notes that the legal 
industry is conservative and resistant to change,760 and indeed, ideas for reform have co-existed 
with adversarial decision-making systems and enmeshed, even unconscious notions about 
adversarial justice. It is easy to imagine, for example, that family judges may be seen as 
authoritarian, approval-granting (or denying) parent-figures, particularly given that a traditional 
symbolic function of courts has been to moralize divorce. The unconscious acceptance of such 
symbolism makes it difficult to depart from the ideology it supports, despite broad recognition of 
ample reason to do so.761   
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It would be disingenuous not to note that it serves lawyers and justice systems for the best-
interests-of-the-child test to remain amorphous, or, as one author put it, as specific as the 
expression “long as a rope.”762 I do not suggest that professional protectionism entirely explains 
resistance to reforms that go to the heart of existing legal structures, but it must be acknowledged 
that the legitimate interests of the legal profession as producers of legal services can “block 
consumer welfare reform.”763 Regardless of the reason for the apparent hold of court systems 
upon family law in spite of avalanches of criticism and decades of unsatisfactory reform, the 
power of information technology to change the way almost everything is done may, ultimately, 
sufficiently loosen the bonds between adversarial ideology and the collective unconscious to 
make way for a different path.  
 
In The End of Lawyers?764 it is argued that fundamental change to legal structures is an 
inevitable consequence of new values centred on “efficiency,” which it defines as the ability of 
individuals to break through knowledge barriers in order to better understand and control their 
own circumstances.765 The author observes that speed and efficiency have replaced formality as 
the primary value in both communication and information gathering, and argues that traditional 
approaches to legal services which benefit from a monopoly on information increasingly seem 
antiquated, as do systems that fail to empower those who have informed themselves. Indeed, the 
Canadian Bar Association’s Future of Legal Services Report notes that client empowerment is 
the most important recent change affecting the practice of law, although it must be noted that it 
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describes a possible exception for criminal and family law.766 I do not suggest that the need for 
lawyers in family law has been or could be eliminated, on the contrary, lawyers are clearly 
essential in complex family law cases.  There is, however, no inconsistency in recognizing this 
fact and also suggesting the emergence of ethical demand for legal systems built upon 
recognition of the “vulnerable subject.”  
 
In law, easy access to information occurred shortly after the emergence of new norms that no 
longer moralize the fact of family dissolution,767 and roughly in step with even newer norms 
that communicate disapproval of family dissolution that fails to adequately safeguard the 
“separated family,”768 rendering the moralizing function of the court system not only irrelevant, 
but self-satirizing. Further, as Mnookin and Kornhauser maintain, the ritual and ceremonial 
aspects of court systems can hardly be meaningful in the context of uncontested divorce, which 
is to say, most divorces, as the parties rarely attend proceedings and courts only conduct a 
cursory review of private agreements. The authors liken the process to “a civil fine imposed on 
a divorcing couple – a fine payable not to the treasury but to the divorce bar.”769 Finally, Julien 
and Marilyn Payne predict, “the uncontested divorce under the auspices of the judiciary is on 
its last legs.” The authors suggest that administrative divorce will replace desk order divorces 
currently processed on affidavit evidence, “provided that section 96 of the Constitution Act can 
be overcome.”770 I suggest that all of this may at some point add up to ethical demand for 
administrative processes in family law areas other than custody and access.  
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The primary policy rationale for creating the LTB was to relieve the problem of self-
represented litigants “clogging the courts,” and to address the perceived need for a system 
capable of efficiently dealing with large numbers of similar claims.771 The policy rationale for 
the Ontario Labour Relations Board was reportedly quite different; the Board arose out of a 
socio-economic phenomenon whereby labour strife was increasingly anticipated and its causes 
eradicated, making strikes less inevitable and creating new expectations as to how labour and 
management should behave. The underlying “socio-economic phenomenon” has been 
attributed to the “trite” cause of rapidly changing technology, social complexity and 
interdependence, and the not-so-trite cause of the ensuing revolution of expectations. 772 In my 
view, rapid change in these categories has created new expectations as to the way in which 
family law “is done” and will ultimately limit social tolerance for solutions tied too closely to 
the status quo. Systemic change often originates within existing systems, in the form of 
recommendations of stakeholders who envision ways of improving efficiency and outcomes 
within existing power structures. This approach is, in my view, useful only up to the point at 
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8.2 Therapeutic Justice 
 
  
The concept of therapeutic jurisprudence, which began as a method of studying and evaluating 
law and legal systems in terms of their therapeutic or non-therapeutic effects,774 has evolved 
beyond a method of study.775 The term “therapeutic justice” has come to refer to practical 
attempts to enhance the capacity of law and legal systems to function as a “healing agent,”776 and 
is controversial. It has been argued that therapeutic perspectives inappropriately muddle civil 
justice systems with state health and welfare services, detract from the fundamental principle that 
judicial institutions, rather than striving to “do good as well as to do right” must focus upon 
“justice according to law” and must not “systematise the welfare function.”777 It has been 
maintained that therapeutic approaches fuel unrealistic notions that law can “make people good 
and happy,” detract from understanding the “art of the possible;”778and inappropriately cast 
individuals as objects of assistance, rather than subjects of rights.  These sentiments resonate 
with the traditional view that “judges should be judges,” that is, not stray from the classical 
ideal.779 
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Barbara Babb has advocated for a therapeutic orientation in specialist family courts in the United 
States, whereby “specially trained and interested judges address not only the legal issues, such as 
divorce, custody, child support, and domestic violence, but also…consider the family’s nonlegal 
needs, such as substance abuse, mental health issues, or domestic abuse.”780 She describes the 
Maryland family justice system as a suitable “national model” for a therapeutic family court: the 
services available in this system reportedly include: “mediation, custody investigations, 
emergency response personnel, mental health and substance abuse evaluations, information 
services for the assistance of unrepresented litigants, lawyer referral services, and parenting 
seminars,”781 as well as a court-appointed “family support services coordinator” to compile 
information about offsite community support services, coordinate these services with the family 
court, and report on the need for additional services.782  
 
This paper does not suggest the Ontario family court system has failed to respond to changing 
norms and expectations, indeed, a number of proposals and reforms aimed at increasing the 
therapeutic effects of court processes have been discussed above. However, the question here 
concerns the potential for a tribunal approach to bridge the “implementation gap” as it relates to 
holistic family law dispute resolution. I suggest that the therapeutic potential of court systems is 
limited, at least in part because in Anglo-American jurisdictions the adversarial courts system 
has “been at the core of our legal institutions for centuries;” therefore, reforms to legal practice 
and procedure do not tend to “go to the heart of the legal system.”783  
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It must be noted that a “holistic” family justice system is not universally regarded among family 
law scholars as a realistic goal; for example, Semple and Bala write that arguments in favour of 
holistic systems imply a state responsibility that extends beyond protecting “adult rights” and 
“children’s interests” to encompass protecting the “needs and interests of adults.”784 The authors 
maintain that ample demand is placed upon state resources just to attend to adult rights and 
children’s needs and interests, without added responsibility for the “welfare of adults” and the 
post-separation “family unit.”785 They further note, “to the extent that the family justice system is 
seen as a battle ground for angry and vindictive former spouses, there is little political support 
for increased funding in this area.”786 I do not challenge these assertions, but rather, suggest that  
the limited capacity of family court systems to operate holistically supports the exploration of 
alternative institutional models designed not to attract comparisons to a battle ground, which may 
have the potential to save adjudication resources and apply them to family services that address 





Adversarial systems have an insatiable appetite for resources.787 
 
 
There is, of course, an inevitable tension between always-constrained resources and proposals for 
change. I have repeatedly referred to “efficiency” in this paper but, as noted, the real-world cost-
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effectiveness of courts and various hybrid tribunal dispute resolution systems is beyond the 
scope of this project.  
 
For the purpose of this paper it is simply noted that tribunals seem generally to be considered 
more cost efficient than courts, based upon their proliferation in response to efficiency concerns, 
noted above.788 This is unsurprising given reports that annual judicial salaries are upward of 
$250,000, whereas mediator compensation is typically in the $53,000 to $80,000 range.789  The 
relative efficiency of tribunal processes might also be assumed because they can be designed to 
facilitate self-representation;790 indeed, the ability to self-represent is a recognized value in 
administrative justice.791 Moreover, access to justice concerns specific to family law (such as the 
damaging potential of court processes and the potential for interim parenting arrangements to be 
converted into status quo hurdles) may be ameliorated to the extent that a multi-disciplinary 
tribunal would allow members with practical, clinical knowledge and experience to swiftly 
gauge the interests of children from the outset, that is, to make relatively accurate early 
deductions based upon expertise and available information.  
 
Lastly, a family law tribunal may be more efficient than the court system simply because 
efficiency is a dominant value in administrative law, as illustrated in the seemingly constant 
growth and re-organization of tribunal systems in Ontario and other jurisdictions.792 Moreover, it 
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seems a common-sense proposition that the cost of any justice system is increased when it 
functions sub-optimally, as court systems surely do in the face of large numbers of self-
represented parties.  
 
8.4 Authority: Contempt and Restraining Orders 
 
 
There appear to be ways in which tribunals can be granted a full range of contempt powers, 
although the extent to which there may be corresponding disadvantages, such as limiting the 
force of any privative clause, or creating delay, are important concerns outside the scope of this 
paper.  
 
For the purpose of discussion here, it is noted that of the two branches of the common-law 
contempt power, contempt in the face of the court and contempt outside the presence of the 
court, and the two types of contempt power – civil contempt, which is the power to issue an 
order for compliance, and criminal contempt, which is power to issue an order for punishment 
such as fine or imprisonment – inferior courts and tribunals have jurisdiction only over contempt 
in the face of the court (or tribunal) and have only civil contempt power.793 Superior courts have 
jurisdiction over both branches of contempt and have both civil and criminal contempt powers.  
 
The contempt powers of an inferior court or tribunal can be expanded by legislation to include 
jurisdiction over contempt outside the presence of the court and to include the criminal contempt 
power; however, there is a common law presumption against expanding the jurisdiction of 
                                               






inferior courts and tribunals, and therefore clear statutory language is needed.794 It has been 
suggested that this presumption is narrowly construed only in circumstances where the criminal 
contempt power is granted, or where the grant of jurisdiction over contempt outside the tribunal 
correspondingly deprives the Superior Courts of jurisdiction.795 Two examples taken from a 
discussion of the relevant case law illustrate these principles; in Chrysler v. Canada 
(Competition Tribunal)796 the Supreme Court of Canada considered the authority of the 
Competition Tribunal to issue a contempt order for failure to comply with one of its orders. The 
enabling legislation granted to the tribunal jurisdiction to “hear and determine all applications 
made under Part VIII of the Competition Act and any matters related thereto,” as well as “all 
such powers, rights and privileges as are vested in a superior court of record” with respect to “the 
enforcement of its orders and other matters necessary or proper for the due exercise of its 
jurisdiction.”797 The court interpreted the express grant of “enforcement” power as conferring 
jurisdiction over contempt outside the tribunal, in part on the basis of tribunal expertise and in 
part because there was no privative clause by which the supervisory role of the Superior Courts 
was entirely usurped.798 With respect to the exercise by a tribunal of the criminal contempt 
power, pursuant to United Nurses of Alberta v. Alberta (Attorney General)799 if enabling 
legislation provides that an order of a tribunal may be filed with the Superior Court and enforced 
as such, the criminal contempt power is engaged such that disobedience of the order is likely to 
constitute criminal contempt.800   
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The capacity of a tribunal to exercise strong powers in domestic violence cases is acknowledged 
as a further potential limiting force; it is merely noted here that, with the exception of the IDVC, 
family cases in which there is a criminal component are currently divided in the court system and 
would remain so if family law cases were decided in a tribunal system. For cases which do not 
involve criminal charges, tribunal capacity to issue restraining orders does not seem problematic, 
as such orders are currently issued by the inferior provincial courts. Finally, without diminishing 
the need for strong authority in domestic violence cases, in high conflict cases that do not have a 
criminal law component, a holistic tribunal could combine authority to issue restraining orders 
with services aimed at achieving the goal recommended for high conflict family law cases in the 
CCMP report, that is, a more integrated and collaborative approach to dispute resolution.801  
 
8.5 From Courts to Tribunal: Landlord and Tenant Board Policy Trail 
 
 
The Landlord and Tenant Board was not created through a straightforward legislative exercise, 
and the story of its emergence illustrates policy and constitutional issues relevant to the potential 
to establish a family law tribunal. Almost all controversy surrounding the transfer from the 
courts to a tribunal system for residential tenancy disputes was constitutional (that is, legalistic) 
or related to the substantive changes to landlord and tenant law that accompanied the transition. 
The process aspect of the change seems to have attracted much less debate. 
 
The policy deliberations surrounding the adoption of a tribunal model for residential tenancy 
disputes are located primarily in the Bill Davis era. The 1968 Law Reform Commission Report: 
                                               





Interim Report on Landlord and Tenant Law Applicable to Residential Tenancies asserts that the 
court system was inundated with landlord and tenant matters. This is echoed in the 1978 Ministry 
of Consumer and Commercial Relations Green Paper, Policy Options for Continuing Tenant 
Protection. When the later Harris government enacted the Tenant Protection Act,802 
contemporaneous materials including the New Directions discussion paper, which was publicly 
distributed, and Standing Committee transcripts reveal much debate over “common sense 
revolution” issues such as rental housing market stimulation and rent control,803 but little 
controversy over the merits of a tribunal model for dispute resolution.  
 
Once enacted, numerous complaints, both among landlord groups and tenant associations, were 
voiced about the Tenant Protection Act, which was repealed and replaced by the Residential 
Tenancies Act804 in 2006. Dissatisfaction did not apparently concern tribunal structure or 
functioning, but again centred on substantive law. Standing Committee hearing transcripts and 
concurrent media reports reveal intense bargaining of interests among corporate landlords, small 
landlord groups and tenant associations, primarily over “vacancy decontrol,” the ability of 
landlords to raise rents for vacant units without regulation, and some criticism on each side that 
the tribunal tended to favour the other, but no demands to abandon or substantially revise the 
tribunal process. 
 
                                               
802 Tenant Protection Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 24. 
803 The 1968 Law Reform Commission Report: Interim Report on Landlord and Tenant Law Applicable to 
Residential Tenancies gives some indication of the policy rationale underlying the change to a tribunal system, 
as does the 1978 Green Paper: Policy Options for Continuing Tenant Protection, issued by the Ministry of 
Consumer and Commercial Relations. 





There are parallels between the problems identified in landlord and tenant law prior to the 
transition from courts to the LTB, and the problems currently reported in family law, as 
illustrated in the chart attached as Appendix A. To summarize: the transition began with policy 
recommendations that landlord and tenant legal processes be made more accessible; as noted, it 
was reported that courts were inundated with landlord and tenant matters, especially in large 
population centres; an early initiative for dealing with the problem was adopted in the form of a 
court-adjunct service to distribute information, oversee the preparation of applications, and 
mediate disputes (comparable, perhaps, to Family Law Information Centres); and, in the 
successful Nova Scotia constitutional case, the Attorney General of the province argued that 
court procedures were too formal and fragmented, whereas the proposed administrative system 
would not only ease the burden on courts, it would also provide a more appropriate setting for 
dispute resolution.  
 
 
8.6 Constitutional Arguments   
 
 
Some of the constitutional issues raised with respect to the potential to create a provincial family 
law tribunal were addressed in the course of the creation of the Ontario Landlord and Tenant 
Board, and some are unique to the prospect of tribunal jurisdiction over family law.  
 
(a) Constitution Act, 1867 
 
The establishment of an administrative family law system is complicated by the combination of 
federal and provincial authority over aspects of family dissolution, and by the status of section 96 
courts. This section outlines potential arguments with respect to the constitutionality of a family 





as the constitutional implications of tribunal jurisdiction in some or all areas of family law is 
recommended as a subject of further study. 
 
Under section 91(26) of the British North America Act, 1867 (now cited as the Constitution Act, 
1967,805 but referred to here as the “BNA Act”) the federal government has exclusive authority to 
legislate with respect to “marriage and divorce.”  The provinces have exclusive legislative 
authority under section 92(13) of the BNA Act with respect to “property and civil rights” in the 
province, under section 92(16) with respect to “matters of a merely local or private nature,” 
under section 92(14) in regard to “the administration of justice in the province” and under 
section 92(12) regarding “solemnization of marriage”. The provincial authority over property 
and civil rights has been interpreted to mean that the provinces govern the “day to day life of 
citizens,”806 which together with authority over matters of a “private nature” gives the provinces 
complete legislative jurisdiction over family law (other than divorce), including with respect to 
custody, support and division of matrimonial property.  
 
Despite that federal constitutional authority over “marriage and divorce” is more technical than 
substantive, the federal Divorce Act807 contains provisions related to custody and support,808 
which will be expanded if the proposed new legislation is enacted.809 Overlapping federal and 
provincial legislation in these areas has caused considerable debate and litigation, which is not 
discussed here; it is merely noted that sections of the Divorce Act which appear to tread upon 
                                               
805 The Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Victoria, c 3.  
806 S. Ian Bushnell, “Family Law and the Constitution” (1978) 1 Can. J. Fam. L. 202 at page 203. 
807 Supra, footnote 14. [Divorce Act] 
808 Sections 15-18, ibid. [Divorce Act] 





provincial jurisdiction over “property and civil rights,” that is, substantive family law, have been 
upheld.810 
 
At confederation, the jurisdiction of the High Courts of England vested in the Superior Courts of 
each province under section 129 of the BNA Act, as part of their “plenary jurisdiction,” that is, 
jurisdiction over everything that is not validly assigned to different court.811 The Superior 
Court’s inherent plenary jurisdiction means that the court’s existence is rooted in constitutional 
law, not merely legislation. 
 
Section 96 of the BNA Act provides that judges of the Superior Courts, sometimes referred to as 
“section 96 courts,”812 must be appointed by the federal executive branch. Therefore, provincial 
powers over the “organization of the provincial courts” and the “administration of justice” under 
section 92(14) are qualified by section 96.  Although not obvious on the face it, section 96 of the 
BNA Act has been interpreted to “render unconstitutional any provincial legislation which vests 
in provincial officers the jurisdiction exercised by, or analogous to that exercised by, those 
judges at Confederation.”813  
 
Given the comprehensive provincial jurisdiction over substantive family law, a family law 
tribunal would seemingly be a matter of provincial initiative. As the foregoing suggests, the BNA 
Act presents obstacles to a provincially constituted family law tribunal with jurisdiction over all 
                                               
810 Supra, footnote 806 at page 216. [Bushnell] 
811 F.J.E. Jordan, “Federal Divorce Act (1968) and the Constitution” (1968) 14(2) McGill L.J. 209 at page 213. 
811 Ibid., at pages 216. [Jordan] 
812 Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v. British Columbia (Attorney General) [2014] 3 SCR 31 at 
paragraphs 29-30.  





aspects of family dissolution, including: 1) the prohibition against granting a power to adjudicate 
that was exercised by section 96 courts in 1867 to a lower provincial court or other inferior entity 
(that is, one with non-federally appointed judges or adjudicators); and 2) the principle that 
legislative power cannot be delegated from one level of government to another, derived from the 
division of powers in sections 91 and 92 of the BNA Act. 
 
The first obstacle – how to allow provincially appointed judges to exercise powers previously 
within the exclusive domain of federally appointed judges in section 96 courts – has been 
overcome in UFCs by judicial appointments made by concurrent action of federal and provincial 
governments.814 With respect to the transfer of judicial authority to a non-judge within a non-
court entity, such as a tribunal, the “residential tendencies cases” apply,815 as discussed in detail 
below. 
 
The second obstacle – the prohibition against delegating legislative functions to a different level 
of government – can be overcome through a cooperative scheme of interlocking federal and 
provincial legislation, using techniques such as “administrative delegation.”816 For example, the 
“Potato Marketing Board case”817 concerned the validity of Prince Edward Island legislation 
delegating to the provincial cabinet authority to market agricultural products and to create boards 
                                               
814 Steven P Sibold, “The Unified Family Court and Section 96 of The British North America Act” 
(1976) 3(2) Queen's Law Journal 71 at page 78. 
815 Supra, footnote 656 at page 101. [Sossin, Designing Administrative Justice] 
816 Bruce Ryder, “Equal Autonomy Canadian Federalism: The Continuing Search for Balance in the 
Interpretation of the Division of Powers” (2011) The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual 
Constitutional Cases Conference 565 at page 597. 
817 Prince Edward Island (Potato Marketing Board) v. H.B. Willis Inc., [1952] 2 S.C.R. 392. The other 
foundational cases are Valin v. Langlois (1879), 3 S.C.R. 1 re: federal delegation; Hodge v. R. (1883-84), L.R. 
9 App. Cas. 117 re: provincial delegation; and Constitutional Validity of Bill No. 136 (Nova Scotia), [1951] 





to administer these marketing plans, and Parliamentary legislation which authorized the federal 
cabinet to delegate federal power to regulate “inter-provincial and export trade” with respect to 
the same agricultural products to the same provincial board. This “interlocking legislation” was 
determined to be constitutionally legitimate, despite that Parliament could not have given power 
to enact the same regulations to a provincial legislature, on the basis that a provincial board is an 
autonomous creature from the legislature under which it is created. This “devious logic” is 
referred to as “cooperative federalism.”818  
 
Through these mechanisms, a provincial family law tribunal could be established to administer 
both federal and provincial laws.819 As noted above, the authority of tribunal adjudicators to 
assume the same jurisdiction as family law judges would remain to be determined under the 
residential tenancies cases.  
 
 
 (b)  Residential Tenancies Cases 
 
The Ontario government under Premier Bill Davis enacted The Residential Tenancies Act, 
1979,820 (“RTA”) which contained a “legislative code” governing the rights and obligations of 
landlords and tenants and established the Residential Tenancy Commission, mandated to take 
over jurisdiction from the Superior Courts with respect to residential tenancy disputes. From the 
outset there was some doubt as to the constitutional legitimacy of the new system, which was 
entirely a project of the provincial government. The Provincial Cabinet therefore referred two 
questions to the Ontario Court of Appeal: could a provincial tribunal exercise eviction powers, 
                                               
818 Peter H. Russell, Rainer Knopff, F.L. Morton, Federalism and the Charter: Leading Constitutional 
Decisions (Carleton University Press, 1989) at page 686. 
819 The Prince Edward Island Potato Marketing Board v. H.B. Willis Incorporated (1952) 2 S.C.R. 392. 





and could it be empowered to compel tenants to comply with obligations imposed under the 
Residential Tenancies Act? The Court of Appeal held that these powers were within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts under section 96 at the time of confederation and could 
not be transferred to a provincial tribunal, and in Reference re: Residential Tenancies Act 
(Ontario)821 the Supreme Court of Canada reached the same conclusion, through a three-part 
analysis: 
1. does the power conferred “broadly conform” to a power or jurisdiction exercised by a 
superior, district or county court at confederation; 
2. if so, is it a judicial power; 
3. if yes, is the transferred power of decision subsidiary or necessarily ancillary to 
predominately administrative function? 822 
 
The analysis is based upon the principle noted above that neither Parliament nor the provincial 
legislatures may impair the status or jurisdiction of Superior Courts; therefore, the Court held 
that only judicial powers that are subsidiary or necessarily ancillary to a valid administrative 
scheme may legitimately be transferred. At step one, the Court held that the powers conferred 
upon the Residential Tenancy Commission broadly conformed to powers of s. 96 courts 
exercised both before and after Confederation. At step two, the Court held that the power to 
order eviction or compliance remained a judicial power exercised “in the context of a lis between 
parties” requiring findings of fact, an analysis of law, and the application of law to the facts. At 
the third step, the Court held that the central function of the Commission was dispute resolution 
in a judicial form, and the judicial powers conferred were not part of a “broad legislative 
scheme” in which judicial functions were “subsumed.”823  
 
                                               
821 See: Reference re: Residential Tenancies Act (Ontario), [1981] 1 SCR. 714 (SCC). 
822 Ibid., at pages 729-734. 





Fifteen years later, in Reference re: Amendments to the Residential Tenancies Act (N.S.),824 the 
Supreme Court of Canada considered the constitutional validity of Nova Scotia’s planned 
tribunal system for residential tenancy disputes. The Court distinguished its earlier decision In 
the Ontario Reference on the basis that only a narrow issue had been presented to the court in 
that case: the legitimacy of the proposed Commission’s specific adjudication powers over 
eviction and enforcement of tenant obligations.825 
 
Justice McLachlin, for the majority in the Nova Scotia case, found residential landlord and tenant 
disputes were resolved “co-extensively” by inferior and Superior Courts in 1867, and therefore 
the creation of a provincial landlord and tenant tribunal did not violate section 96 of BNA Act.826 
The majority went on to consider the remaining parts of the analysis: whether, if the power had 
been a judicial power exclusive to Superior Courts in 1876, it could be delegated to a provincial 
tribunal as a “novel jurisdiction,” that is, as a judicial power subsumed within a new overall 
institutional arrangement. In the opinion of the majority the “novel jurisdiction” test was not 
met, essentially because the tribunal’s function and powers were purely analogous to those of the 
courts. As McLachlin, J. put it, the new system amounted to “covering an existing body of law 
with a new statutory wrapper.”827  
 
Most interesting here, the minority concurring decision of Lamer, C.J., Cory and Sopinka, J.J., 
found the tribunal would constitute a novel jurisdiction. First, the enabling legislation granted 
powers to the Director of Residential Tenancies to investigate and mediate, as well as to make 
                                               
824 Reference re: Residential Tenancies Act (Nova Scotia), [1996] 1 SCR 186 (SCC). 
825 Ibid., at para. 73. 
826 Ibid., at para. 69. [Reference (Nova Scotia)] 





decisions and issue orders.828 Second, the minority concluded that “residential tenancies” was a 
“novel jurisdiction” in the sense of being a phenomenon of modern urban society. The minority  
articulated a test for such determinations in future cases:   
1. is the legislation an attempt to respond to a new societal interest and approach 
regarding a subject matter of the legislation; 
2. is the legislation based on principles of law that make it distinct from similar 
legislation; 





 (c)  Jurisdiction in Family Law 
 
At the time of confederation, divorce was religiously controversial and socially distasteful,830 
which resulted in there being no federal legislation in this area for more than one hundred years 
after confederation. The initial role adopted by the federal government was to ensure that 
marriage in one province was valid in another province and  by asserting federal jurisdiction, 
distancing the issue of divorce from local interests, and thereby ensuring that consensus around 
divorce legislation was difficult to achieve.831 In Newfoundland and Québec there was no federal 
or provincial divorce legislation, but in most other provinces, including Ontario, the English 
Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857 was incorporated by reference,832 and established narrowly 
specified grounds for divorce.833  Provincial divorce acts remained in effect until 1968,834 when 
                                               
828 Ibid., at para. 5. [Reference (Nova Scotia)] 
829 Ibid., at para. 37. [Reference (Nova Scotia)] 
830 Supra, footnote 811 at page 213. [Jordan] 
830 Ibid., at pages 211-213. [Jordan] 
831 Ibid., at page 213. [Jordan] 
832 Ibid., at page 211. [Jordan]  
833 Kristin Douglas, “Divorce Law in Canada, Library of Parliament, Law and Government Division” (March 
27, 2001) online: https://lop.parl.ca/content/lop/ResearchPublications/963-e.htm#ahistory 
Supra, footnote 538. [Douglas] 





the first federal legislation was passed835 and Parliament granted to Superior Courts exclusive 
authority to grant divorce decrees and make corollary relief orders in divorce applications, now 
reflected in section 2(1) of the Divorce Act.836  
 
It was not until 1930 that the Supreme Court of Ontario (now the Superior Court) began to issue 
divorce decrees; until then, a marriage could only be dissolved by private act of Parliament,837 
that is, a political, rather than judicial process. Therefore, Superior Court jurisdiction over 
divorce was not exercised by Superior Courts in 1876. Under the first branch of the test in 
Reference re: Residential Tenancies Act (Ontario)838 it can be argued that the power to grant a 
divorce decree does not conform to “a power or jurisdiction exercised by a superior, district or 
county court at confederation.”  
 
The Superior Courts did exercise jurisdiction over property disputes in 1867, through their 
plenary jurisdiction; therefore, on the face of it only Superior Courts may make property orders 
in family law disputes, as reflected in section 4(1) of the Family Law Act.839 It should be noted, 
however, that the Supreme Court of Canada has held that the question of whether a power or 
                                               
835 Ibid. [Douglas] 
836 Supra, footnote 14. [Divorce Act] In the result, parties seeking a divorce may apply to the Superior Court 
under the Divorce Act for divorce and custody, access, child support and spousal support (as corollary relief, 
despite provincial jurisdiction over family law, noted above), and may advance a claim in the same application 
for property division under the Ontario Family Law Act. Parties not seeking divorce, may apply to either the 
Superior Court or the inferior provincial courts for child support and spousal support under the Ontario Family 
Law and for custody and access under the Children’s Law Reform Act,836 but property claims (which outside of 
marriage are governed by common law) may only be advanced in the Superior Court. With the exception of 
UFCs, which exercise jurisdiction over all aspects of family law jurisdiction, family law will remain divided 
between Superior Courts and Provincial Courts until the new plan to expand the Unified Court system is fully 
implemented. 
837 Archives of Ontario 210 Research Guide (updates 2018) online: www.archives.gov.on.ca/en/accesArchives 
of Ontario Research Guide s/documents/research_guide_210_divorce_files_in_ontario.pdf 
838 Reference re: Residential Tenancies Act (Ontario), [1981] 1 SCR. 714 (SCC). 





jurisdiction was exercised by a section 96 court at the time of confederation depends upon the 
type of dispute, not the remedy sought, and should be narrowly construed.840 With this in mind,  
it can be argued that property claims between spouses were not a type of dispute resolved by 
Superior Courts at confederation because women had no virtually no property rights at that time, 
and certainly none that are analogous to current family law property rights. It can be argued that 
a completely different societal interest is at stake in matrimonial property disputes, and that 
while the remedy sought is a judicial decision over property rights, the type of dispute is the 
settlement of all rights and obligations that flow from family dissolution (of which property is 
only one component) and is quite different from anything that was before section 96 courts at 
confederation.841 Similar arguments have prevailed; for example, in jurisprudence regarding the 
validity of tribunal jurisdiction with respect to worker’s compensation, it was decided that the 
new board, “although dealing with the subject matter previously entrusted to the Superior 
Court,” was dealing with it from a wholly different point of view.842  
 
It could be further argued that decision-making authority over property and all other aspects of 
family law in the context of a holistic and therapeutic approach to family law dispute resolution 
is part of a novel jurisdiction, based upon the minority opinion and analysis set out in Reference 
re: Amendments to the Residential Tenancies Act (N.S.). 843 The argument is not difficult to 
conceive: the delegated decision-making powers would be subsidiary and ancillary to the central 
                                               
840 Supra, footnote 656, at page 101. [Sossin, Designing Administrative Justice] The author refers to Sobey’s 
Stores Ltd. v. Yeoman’s [1989] 1 SCR 238. See also supra, footnote 813 at page 525. [Willis] The author 
writes: “It is intra vires a provincial legislature to remove from one of the courts within sec. 96 a subject matter 
which was being dealt with by it at Confederation and transfer it to a provincial tribunal, so long as it does not 
empower that tribunal to decide with respect to it the same type of question that that court was deciding.” 
841 Constance B. Backhouse, “Married Women’s Property Law in Nineteenth Century Canada” (1988) 6 Law 
& Hist. Rev. 201. See also: supra, footnote 813. [Willis] 
842 Supra, footnote 813 at page 540. [Willis] 





tribunal function of facilitating settlement through a holistic and therapeutic settlement system, a 
policy agenda distinct from any existing Ontario legislation; the enabling legislation would be a 
clear response to a newly recognized social problem and societal interest, revealed by new social 
norms as to family dissolution, in particular, the unacceptable process effects of family dispute 
resolution through adversarial processes. 844  
 
There could be no worker’s compensation tribunal system if it were impossible for a tribunal to 
assume jurisdiction previously exercised by Superior Courts.845 In A.G. Quebec v. Slanec & 
Grimstead et al.846 the Quebec Court of Kings Bench, Appeal Side, remarked with respect to the 
novel jurisdiction of the commission: 
The commission has without doubt, in a certain measure, to settle legal disputes; but it 
has nothing of the nature of the ordinary tribunals, above all of Superior, District, or 
County courts. Thus, it is not necessarily composed of lawyers; it is not bound by any 
rules of procedure; it sits wherever it pleases; it cannot award costs, which practically 
deprives the interested parties of legal or attorney assistance; it revises its own decisions 
at will, and, sometimes even, without being requested to do so…847  
 
As noted, the creation of the LTB coincided with substantive changes in landlord and tenant law; 
as the discussion above suggests, substantive law changes are essential to a novel jurisdiction 
argument. The substantive law changes that might accompany a tribunal transition are outside 
the scope of this paper. 
 
 
                                               
844 Carol Rogerson, “From Murdoch to Leatherdale: The Uneven Course of Bora Laskin’s Family Law 
Decisions” (1985) 35 U. Toronto L.J. 481 at page 536. The author’s remarks suggest that a tribunal approach 
may signal a “serious new social problem requiring innovative solutions.”  
845 Supra, footnote 813 at page 521. [Willis] 
846 A.G. Quebec v. Slanec & Grimstead et al., [1933] 2 D.L.R. 289. 





8.7  Summary 
 
 
I argue in this chapter that while there are obstacles to the transition from courts to tribunal for 
family law, they are largely symbolic and ideological, and moreover, to the extent that they rest 
upon ideology, they are rapidly becoming eclipsed by changes in technology, social norms, 
perceptions of human interdependence in the context of separating families, the relative power of 
social institutions and the populations they serve (and the related unmasking of illusions about 
autonomy and “choice”), and the evolution in law, however halting, from formal to substantive 
equality. Finally, it seems highly fortuitous that the “novel jurisdiction” argument which supports 
a transition from courts to tribunal for family law is entirely consistent with a modern family law 


































I have argued that a paradigm shift away from adversarialism and toward a more collaborative, 
interdisciplinary and problem-solving approach to dispute resolution may enable 
experimentation with alternative institutional approaches to family law dispute resolution, 
specifically in the form of a holistic tribunal-based settlement system, at least in cases involving 
children’s interests. The rationale for such a transition has been discussed largely in terms of 
longstanding (but intensifying) recognition that family litigation is damaging to children and 
separated families, which I argue has become so incompatible with modern social norms as to 
constitute a new and serious social problem which requires an innovative solution. I have 
suggested that a holistic tribunal “settlement system” in which multi-disciplinary mediators and 
adjudicators function as equals, tribunal expertise is nurtured, transparent decision-making 
guidelines are developed (and adjudication is a secondary, accessible, and inquisitorial 
component) could address the needs of the “vulnerable subject” in multiple ways, and in general 
improve the negotiation and settlement environment, whether or not the system is directly 
engaged.  
 
This thesis reports upon new empirical research regarding day-to-day mediation and adjudication 
in selected tribunals. While this research may not be generalized to any tribunal as a whole, my 
claim is that the reported experiences of tribunal members with tribunal processes and self-
represented litigants is relevant to the potential for an alternative institutional approach to family 





conclusion, within the limited remit of this project, is that there is positive potential for a tribunal 
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Chronology of Policy Considerations and Decisions re: Establishment of 1) Ontario Rental 
Housing Tribunal and 2) Ontario Landlord and Tenant Board 
 
Date and Event, Document or Source Details and Importance 
1968 
Law Reform Commission Report: Interim 
Report on Landlord and Tenant Law 




Recommends landlord and tenant legal 
processes be made more accessible; finds 
courts are inundated with landlord and tenant 
matters, especially in large population centres. 
 
March 1, 1971 
Davis Conservative government to succeed 
Robarts Conservative government [followed 
by Miller as inter-election appointee: 
February 8, 1985 – June 26, 1985] 
 
Beginning of 14 consecutive years of 
Conservative provincial government. 
1972 
Law Reform Commission, Part IV of The 




Cited by SCC in Reference re Residential 
Tenancies Act (Ontario); addresses substantive 
changes, not process change. 
1976 
Law Reform Commission, Report on 




Cited by SCC in Reference re Residential 
Tenancies Act (Ontario); recommends county 
court judges continue to have jurisdiction over 
summary landlord and tenant matters; removal 
to Supreme Court of complex matters. 
 
February 10, 1978 
Green Paper: Policy Options for Continuing 
Tenant Protection, Ministry of Consumer and 
Commercial Relations 
[Robarts Library, Government Publications, 
CAONXC 16 G23 ENG]  
 
Cited by SCC in Reference re Residential 
Tenancies Act (Ontario); first indication of 
support for a tribunal approach. (See 
Assignment 11 – Comparative Discourse for 
detailed summary)  
 
 
April 4, 1978 
Green Paper referred to “Standing General 
Government Committee”  









May 25, 1978 
Globe and Mail 
Single tribunal for housing disputes urged 
Tories, Liberals defeat NDP bid to extend 
rent review  
 
NDP motion called for creation of a residential 
tenancies commission and tribunal. Commission 
would be a public information arm of the 
tribunal, oversee the preparation of 
applications and mediate disputes. One-stop 
service, taking over from County Court (for 
evictions), the rent review tribunal (for 
applications for rent increases and claims for 
rental arrears) and municipal housing standards 
branches (for neglected repairs).  
 
October 30, 1978 
Globe and Mail 
New tenants' bill passes second reading 
(source for date) 
 
Consumer and Commercial Relations Minister 
Frank Drea introduced Residential Tenancies 
Act in the legislature. 
November 15, 1978 
Globe and Mail 




Residential Tenancies Act passed second 
reading; sent to a “Standing General 
Government Committee” for public hearings. 
The Act provided for Residential Tenancies 
Commission to take over from courts as tribunal 
for dispute resolution. 
April 19 – May 31, 1978 
Committee Transcripts: “Standing General 
Government Committee” 
Ontario Legislative Assembly Debates, 
Standing Cttee. On General Government 
Debates, 31st Parl. 2nd Sess., 1978 at pages 
G17 to G634 
(Robarts Government Publications 
CA2ONXC 16 – G23) 
 
“Standing General Government Committee” 
holds public hearings April 19, April 26, May 1, 
10, 24, 31,1978. 
 
June 21, 1979 
Globe and Mail 
Opposition stands ground on rent bill  
Richard Furness 
 
Committee engaged in “five months of 
committee debate and amendment.”  
 
June 21, 1979 
Globe and Mail 
Opposition stands ground on rent bill  
Richard Furness  
 
Ontario New Democrats and Liberals make last-
ditch efforts to have changes included before the 
Government's long-awaited landlord and tenant 
legislation becomes law.  
June 22, 1979 
Globe and Mail 
Bill passes third reading 6% ceiling on rents 
stays in new landlord-tenant law  
The Residential Tenancies Act, 1979 passed into 
law. Residential Tenancies Commission replaces 
the courts as forum for landlord-tenant disputes. 





Richard Furness  
 




From: Reference re Residential Tenancies 
Act (Ontario) 
Cabinet referred to the Court of Appeal two 
questions: whether a tribunal could exercise 
eviction powers and whether it could compel 
tenants to comply with obligations imposed 




Court of Appeal decision 
Reference re Residential Tenancies Act 
(Ontario) 
AG argued courts were clogged with tenant 
disputes, procedures were too formal and 
fragmented, proposed commission would ease 
the burden on the courts and provide a more 
appropriate setting for dispute resolution.  
COA held that Commission powers were in the 
exclusive purview of section 96 courts and could 
not be transferred to a tribunal.  
 
May 5, 1981 




May 29, 1981 
Globe and Mail 





SCC declared Residential Tenancies 
Commission unconstitutional.  
Nova Scotia, Quebec, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, 
Alberta and B.C. supported Ontario's position 
before the court. Among those arguing against 
the law were the federal Attorney-General, 
property management associations, community-
based legal service clinics and Toronto's 
Federation of Metro Tenants Associations, an 
umbrella organization composed of some 100 
tenants' groups, ie. both landlord and tenant 
groups 
February 13, 1981 
Globe and Mail 
U of T wants tenants out of rooming house  
MARINA STRAUSS  
 
Residential Tenancies Commission remained in 
place and functioned as a provincial agency 
which had power to roll back rent increases of 
more than 6 per cent. 
 
 
October 6, 1982 
Globe and Mail  
Landlords, tenants to boycott rent control 
probe  
DUNCAN McMONAGLE  
 
Residential Tenancies Commission functioned 
as inquiry and conducted hearings re: rent-
control. 
October 6, 1984 
Globe and Mail  
Residential Tenancies Commission began 
second phase of hearings re: rent-control system.  





Landlords, tenants to boycott rent control 
probe  
DUNCAN McMONAGLE  
 
 
June 26, 1985 
Peterson Liberal government elected 
 
No movement on tribunal: Reference. 
October 1, 1990 
Rae NDP government elected 
Strengthened rent control; no movement on 
tribunal: Reference. 
 
September 9, 1994 
Supreme Court of Canada Docket: 
http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/case-dossier/cms-
sgd/dock-regi-eng.aspx?cas=24276 
Notice of Appeal to SCC filed in An Act to 
Amend Chapter 401 of the Revised Statutes, 
1989, the Residential Tenancies Act, S.N.S. 
1992, c. 31 
 
Political awareness that the issue of transferring 
jurisdiction from courts to a tribunal may be re-
opened. 
June 26, 1995 
Harris Conservative government elected 
[Eves named inter-election: April 15, 2002 – 
October 22, 2003] 
 
 “Common sense revolution” 
 
November 1995  
Pre-legislation public hearings 
 
(Canada Newswire 
Tenant Protection Act Takes Effect in 
Ontario  
June 17, 1998) 
 
“The government consulted for one year with 
tenants, tenant organizations, landlords, landlord 
associations, developers, builders, and others 
interested in rental housing issues before 
introducing the Tenant Protection Act in the 
legislature in November 1996.” 
 
February 22, 1996 
Decision in Nova Scotia Reference 
 
Canada Newswire 
Supreme Court of Canada Renders Judgment 
On Appeals  
 
Nova Scotia constitutional case: SCC finds An 
Act to Amend Chapter 401 of the Revised 
Statutes, 1989, the Residential Tenancies Act, 
S.N.S. 1992, c. 31, within the jurisdiction of the 
Nova Scotia legislature. Confers authority for 
residential tenancy dispute resolution upon a 
tribunal. Appears to contradict earlier decision in 
Reference re Residential Tenancies Act 
(Ontario). 
AG Ontario was an intervenor. 
  




Contains summary of Al Leach policy 
announcement and notice that written 





Public Consultation Launched On New 
Tenant-Protection Act  
 
Municipal Affairs and Housing by August 30, 
1996.  
 
Note: Summary emphasizes “tenant protection;” 
consistent with New Directions consultation 
paper; later widely criticized as disingenuous. 
 
9 August 1996 
Canadian Press 
Hamilton Spectator 
Tories cap rent hikes at 22-year low  
 
A discussion paper detailing the proposed 
Tenant Protection Package will be considered 
by a government standing committee for three 
weeks beginning Aug. 19 in Toronto and 
continuing in eight other cities: Thunder Bay, 
Sault Ste. Marie, Ottawa, Peterborough, 
Hamilton, Windsor, London and Kitchener.  
 
1996 (day/month unspecified) 
Discussion Paper, New Directions for 
discussion, Tenant Protection Legislation, 
Ministry of Consumer and Commercial 
Relations 
 
Emphasizes tenant protection, conspicuously 
targeted at landlords and developers. 
June 26, 1996 
Globe and Mail 
Ontario proposes rent-control reforms 
Landlords and tenants say changes could 
poison relations between the two groups  
BY MURRAY CAMPBELL  
 
Newspaper reports that both landlords and 
tenants unhappy with proposed Tenant 
Protection Act. Howard Tessler, Federation of 
Metro Tenants Associations: “back door to the 
death of rent control;” “association representing 
landlords and property managers”: “not the 
“fundamental change” promised during the 1995 
election campaign.” 
 
August 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, September 3, 
4, 5, 9 (part day hearing, part writing report), 
11 and 12, 1996 
Transcripts: Standing Committee on General 
Government 
Legislative Assembly Standing Cttee on 
General Govt. Debates, 36th Parl. 1st Sess. 22- 
33, 1996 at pages G1483 – 1704; and  
Legislative Assembly Standing Cttee on 
General Govt. Debates, 36th Parl. 1st Sess. 34 
– 46, 1996 at pages G1705-2164. 
(Robarts: CA2ONXC16 – G23) 
 
Pre-legislation Standing Committee on General 
Government public hearings on Tenant 
Protection Package  
 
Composition 6 – PC; 2 – NDP; 2 – Lib. 
 
September 9 and 13, 1996 Sept. 9: Mandate to report back to Minister on 
public reaction to discussion paper; opposition 





Transcripts of Standing Committee on 
General Government meeting on writing 
report 
Legislative Assembly Standing Cttee on 
General Govt. Debates, 36th Parl. 1st Sess. 34 
– 46, 1996 at pages G2167-2224, and G2265 
to 2268. 
(Robarts: CA2ONXC16 – G23) 
 
effects of package on people living in poverty; 
Chair (Carroll) argues delay and outside 
mandate; motion made and defeated 6/4, party 
lines; (page G2182); complaints from opposition 
MPP that the constant narrative throughout 
hearings was this is only a discussion paper, yet 
at report-writing stage it is clear that not only 
was Minister’s mind made up, but also all of 
those he “sent forth on the committee;” 
opposition MPP (Curling, Liberal) refers to 
government MPPs as “trained seals” (page 
2194) 
Sept 13: Report of the Committee is a summary 
of the submissions received prepared by 
research dept of government; by Sept. 13 was 
released to the press before it was approved by 
all committee members; opposition MPP 
(Curling, NDP) calls cttee a farce and process 
insulting; govt MPP moves to adopt report as 
written; opposition MPP (Marchese, NDP) says 
report makes the cttee “useless;” should just 
have witnesses make submissions to research 
staff ; expect that govt has already drafted 




Report of Standing Committee on General 
Government - Bill 96, Tenant Protection Act 
Robarts Government Publications:  
CA2ONXC 16 G23 ENG 
 
Mandate to provide guidance to govt in drafting 
TPA 
Research summary referred to in transcript; 
Very brief “discussion” of submissions; one or 
two paragraphs per issue; liberal and NDP 
dissenting reports; lists supporters of various 
components of proposal; 168 pages; one 
sentence to one short paragraph and initials of 
submitter, eg., “We believe that a truly active 
duty counsel program that is designed to fit 
needs of local community is an efficient way to 
assist tenants, the courts and landlords.” 
WELSCO (West End Legal Services of Ottawa). 
Paltry document. 
 
Exhibit List of written submissions Standing 
Committee on General Government - Bill 96, 
Tenant Protection Act 
 





June 19, 26, August 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14 
and 28 
Transcripts of Standing Committee on 
General Government writing report 
Legislative Assembly Standing Cttee on 
General Govt. Debates, 36th Parl. 1st Sess. 83 
- 94, 1997, at pages G3887 – 4113. 
(Robarts: CA2ONXC16 – G23) 
 
Second Round of public hearings: Tenant 
Protection Act 
 
Aug 28 and Sept 4 
 
p. G4347 – 4413 debates book 
 
Clause by clause; opposition MPP make motions 
for specific amendments to the legislation; on 
August 28 approx. 35 opposition motions 
defeated, one carried - changed “reasons” to 
“reasons and details respecting” on eviction 






Tenant Protection Act Takes Effect in 
Ontario  
June 17, 1998) 
 
Tenant Protection Act received third reading and 
royal assent. 
 
June 17, 1998 
Canada Newswire 
Tenant Protection Act Takes Effect in 
Ontario  
 
Tenant Protection Act proclaimed and came into 
effect – established Ontario Rental Housing 
Tribunal. 
December 23, 1998 
Toronto Star 
Renters score pay victory in ruling: Human 
Rights Commission agrees landlords can't 
discriminate based on income  
By Patricia Orwen  
 
Tenants awarded damages from landlords who 
refused to rent based on income. Tenant 
Protection Act allowed income to be a 
consideration. Issue: whether the HRC takes 
precedence over the Tenant Protection Act; 100 




May 5, 1999 
Toronto Star 
City fights `loophole' in tenant legislation  
Bruce DeMara  
 
Landlords claimed series of renovations was 
demolition in order to evict tenants and raise 
rents; seen as loophole in legislation. City 
intervenes for tenants; new report says Toronto 






 February 24, 1999 
Toronto S tar 
Wanted: Real solutions to blight of 
homelessness --- Thousands waiting for 
affordable housing across GTA  
David Lewis Stein  
 
Government says no significant increase in 
evictions under Tenant Protection Act, legal 




Greg Lampert, The Challenge of 
Encouraging Investment in New Rental 
Housing in Ontario, Min of Mun Aff and H 
 
Report commissioned by government asks why 
if Tenant Protection Act “very positive initiative 
from the perspective of new rental investment. . . 
.” then “why has no one built to date”? 
Concludes developers want government 
financial support. 
 
June 2002  
Ombudsman Clare Lewis begins 
Investigation into TPA 
 
 
June 15, 2002 
Hamilton Spectator 
Tenant Protection Act needs revisiting  
 
Reports “cleverly misnamed Tenant Protection 
Act has “hammered seniors” and “desperately 
needs revision.” Says legislation has many 
problems; cites substantive only. 
Note: accords with submissions in May 31, 2006 
Committee Transcripts, Standing Committee on 
General Government hearings on Bill 109 - 
Residential Tenancies Act  
 
June 19, 2003 




Expresses concern about substantive law issues. 
June 19, 2003 
Canada Newswire 
Ombudsman concerned about services 
provided to vulnerable individuals.  
 
Reports on substantive problems with Tenant 
Protection Act.  
October 23, 2003 McGuinty Liberal government elected 
 
Spring 2004  
Ontario Government Consultation Paper, 
Residential Tenancy Reform, John Gerretson, 
Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing 
http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/Asset1767.aspx 
 
(Robarts: CA2ONHO 2004 R27) 
Govt goal is to repeal Tenant Protection Act; 
clear about balancing “real protection for 
tenants” and “ensuring an adequate stock of 
rental housing.” 
 
“Questions for consideration” format; sets out 








contains questionnaire asking for choices among 
options outlined; Appendix A is Lampert 
Report. 
 
Focus on “real” rent control ie. eliminating 
vacancy de-control. Re tribunal: restructure 
procedural rules to make them “more fair and 
equitable to tenants.”  
 
September 26, 2005 
The Canadian Press  
Tenant act ruled discriminatory in case of 
working single mom forced out  
 
Human Rights Commission set aside an Aug. 10 
eviction order on basis that requirement for 
tenants to file a written dispute to the Rental 
Housing Tribunal within five days “results in 
constructive discrimination.” 
Five day period removed in amendments to 
legislation. 
 
February 21, 2006 
Toronto Star 
Ontario pledges new tenant act; Number of 
evictions at record high Current law favours 
landlords: Critics  
Richard Brennan and Christian Cotroneo  
Reports that in 2005 in Ontario, landlords filed 
64,864 eviction applications. Quotes 
adjudicator: “the quasi-judicial body is too 
focused on saving time and money to give 
tenants a fair hearing.” 
 Note: Number reported consistent with 
Standing Committee Transcript of June 5, 2006. 
  
March 1, 2006 
Toronto Star 
Tenant group alleges bias; Rental tribunal 
'aligned inappropriately' with landlords 
Document in eviction ruling used to bolster 
argument  
Naomi Carniol  
Toronto Star 
 
Reports that tenant groups allege Ontario Rental 
Housing Tribunal has “aligned itself 
inappropriately” with landlords, “finding a 
shared financial benefit in reducing the number 
of eviction hearings,” said Reid's lawyer, Kathy 
Laird, legal director for the centre, which tries to 
improve housing conditions of Ontarians with 
low incomes.  
Note: Number of hearings increased under 
amendments to legislation. 
 
Housing Minister John Gerretsen announced 
a new landlord and tenant act will be tabled 
during the spring session of the Legislature 
that begins March 21. 
The current grievance process under the Ontario 
Rental Housing Tribunal has been criticized as 
an “eviction factory.” An adjudicator said the 
process discriminated against many tenants by 
requiring those facing eviction to file a written 
response within five days of getting a notice. 
 







May 17, 2006 Residential Tenancies Act passed second 
reading; sent to Standing Committee on General 
Government for public hearings.  
 
May 26, 2006 
Toronto Star 
Why lack of full public hearings?  
 
Reported “With less than 4 weeks since the 
surprise introduction of Bill 109, they are 
holding public hearings starting Monday May 
29, to total only 8 hours and only in Toronto, 
which historically is quite unusual.” 
Note: Similar complaint re: tight timeframe 
made by opposition MPP in June 7, 2006 
Committee Transcripts, Standing Committee on 
General Government hearings on Bill 109 - 
Residential Tenancies Act  
 
May 31, 2006 
Committee Transcripts, Standing Committee 
on General Government hearings on Bill 109 









Toronto; heard submissions 
Submissions on hearing process on eviction for 
non-payment of rent. Some say the five days to 
give notice of request for hearing to prevent 
summary eviction should be 20 days; other that 
fair because if rent not paid tenant already aware 
there is a problem. 
June 5, 2006 
Committee Transcripts, Standing Committee 
on General Government hearings on Bill 109 









Toronto; heard submissions 
Dan McIntyre: “It's astonishing that 64,000 
households faced evictions last year. We 
applaud the elimination of default evictions.”. 
Exhibit List of written submissions to 
Standing Committee on General Government 
hearings on Bill 109 - Residential Tenancies 
Act  
 
91 sources of submissions listed 





Committee Transcripts, Standing Committee 
on General Government hearings on Bill 109 









Amendments proposed at Third Reading of 





All substantive, none relate to tribunal structure. 
July 8, 2006 
The Hamilton Spectator 
Neither side thrilled with new rental law  
Bill Dunphy  
 
 
Tenants unhappy legislation does not end 
“vacancy de-control,” landlords unhappy at end 
of “default decisions,” the provision that gave 
tenants just five days to appeal an eviction 
notice before a default eviction order was issued, 
and that tenants given right to introduce 
evidence about other issues during eviction 
hearings.  
 
Note: Accords with submissions made by both 
landlord and tenant groups.  
 
January 31, 2007 
 
 Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 proclaimed and 
came into effect. 















        APPENDIX B 
 
   Empirical Research Data 
 
Colour Key: 
Common Responses  
Responses Consistent with Common Responses 
Responses Inconsistent with Common Responses  
Outlier Responses: Unrelated to Common Responses 








 a) What is the approximate 
balance of SRLs as between 
applicants and respondents?  
b) Is there a typical SRL 
profile or experience? 
a) Are adjudicators 
comfortable dealing with 
SRLs? 
b) What are main sources of 
frustration for applicants? 
Are advice services 
available for tribunal clients 
and are they effective? 
a) How does the tribunal 
prepare SRLs for hearings?  
b) How do SRLs prepare 
themselves; is this 
changing? 
CFSRB a) 
- applicants are 
overwhelmingly self-
represented for children’s 
aid society matters, most of 
which are under s. 68; if 
there is representation most 
commonly for school 
expulsion cases 
a) 
- absolutely comfortable 
- adjudicators are very 
comfortable; there is no 
added sense of pressure with 
SRLs 
 
- “it’s all we do” 
- not a lot of lawyers do 
applicant work; “there 
should be legal aid funding” 
- there should be duty 
counsel for s. 68 
proceedings; s. 144 cases 
are too complex for duty 
counsel to be of much 
assistance 
a)  
- a lot effort is made to 
ensure that SRLs understand 
the process  
 
- intake case coordinators 
are “hand holders;” 
encourage applicants to fill 
out application, then Board 
 
 332 
- for s. 68 complaints low 
income; for s. 144 more of a 
range because includes 
foster parent community 
 
- for s. 68 vast majority of 
SRLs have low income and 
education; “victimized 
groups over-exposed to 
judicial system”; for s, 61 
and 144 more diversity, 
more middle class SRLs 
- for s. 68 overwhelmingly 
self-represented, for s, 61 
and 144 seeing more 
representation but still not 
common 
- the Board sees a whole 
range of human experience; 
many needy people in s.68 
cases 
- SRLs in s. 68 cases are 
very often single mothers, 
poorly educated, “street 
smart and gutsy” (need to be 
to take on system); often 
end up admiring them  
- there are a range of 
characteristics of SRLs, but 
the reason for self-
representation is still 
financial; “even people with 
- yes, “we know that’s our 
reality” 
- if an adjudicator is not 
comfortable with SRLs 
should not work at this 
Board; “it’s what we’re all 
about”  
- experienced adjudicators are 
quite comfortable dealing 
with SRLs 
- yes, not all adjudicators are 
lawyers, some are clinicians 
“used to helping people” 
- SRLs are not particularly 
challenging because of 
“institutional competence” in 
making process manageable 
- it’s a neutral event whether 
represented or not; job is just 
different because no lawyer 
to perform certain tasks, but 
not more difficult 
 
- for SRLs with mental health 
issues members are 
constantly accommodating; 
these cases can feel risky and 
are taxing  
 
b) 
- uncertainty about how to 
question witnesses, what to 
say and when, trying to speak 
- legal assistance would not 
be very helpful in s. 68 
matters because the Board 
has little remedial authority 
- legal advice would not 
improve outcomes in s. 68 
cases; case coordinators are 
very good at answering 
questions 
- in theory prefer applicants 
to be represented, but 
lawyers can unnecessarily 
complicate proceedings; the 
board can deal with power 
imbalances  
- some lawyers need to 
show they are “tough” and 
can impede settlement; 
prefer CAS to appear 
appears without lawyer 
(they occasionally do) 
- would not say advice isn’t 
helpful, but maybe not 
central s. 68 applications, 





can figure out whether 
within Board mandate; do 
not leave it to SRLs to 
define their problem in legal 
terms  
- clients are “in crisis” when 
they approach Board; case 
co-ordinators can make 
them aware of options 
- through pre-hearings; the 
Board has developed a 
document that explains the 
purpose of pre-hearings; 
parties now better prepared; 
often make disclosure 
orders at pre-hearings and 
can become an informal 
settlement conference 
- applicants often arrive at 
tribunal with no 
understanding of process, 
claims or remedies; this 
develops through interaction 
with the tribunal 
- some SRLs rely too 
heavily upon case 
coordinators and expect 
them to give legal advice 
and prepare case  
- intake process includes 
mediation option; if no 
settlement reached a 
“mediator report” is 
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good salaries don’t want to 
pay $400 an hour”  
- majority of Applicants 
have emotional problems or 
“thinking disturbances” 
- some have mental health 
issues  
- some are reasonably 
sophisticated, others not at 
all, must adjust process and 
approach depending upon 
characteristics/needs 
 
- there is no common SRL 




- SRLs are very often 
emotionally stressed for all 
applications 
- SRLs are frequently 
overwhelmed by emotion 
during hearings because 
there is a child involved 
 
- SRLs seem isolated; there 
is “a wall” between CAS 
professionals 
(representatives and CAS 
counsel) and self-
represented applicants; other 
side is very formalized  
and being stopped or 
interrupted  
 
- “acting like a lawyer stuff” 
ie. conducting examination 
and cross-examination of 
witnesses and dealing with 
opposing counsel’s 
interruptions and objections  
- feeling that they have been 
misunderstood by children’s 
aid society, and are unable to 
fix this 
- feeling that claims are not 
believed; cannot convince 
CAS of competence 
- the Board’s limited remedial 
powers re s. 68 applications 
 
generated; serves as a 
hearing agenda but not 
carved in stone; new issues 
can be added 
- pre-hearings are by 
telephone if they follow 
unsuccessful mediation; 
figure out what’s needed for 
hearing 
- pre-hearing member can 
preside at hearing with 
parties’ consent  
- in pre-hearings 
adjudicators can “put 
remedies on the table” and 
inform SRLs of claims of 
which they appear unaware 
- there is a tendency to 
assume that SRLs 
understand more than they 
do about the case and the 
evidence needed; they have 
their story and translating it 
into evidence does not come 
naturally, so tribunal helps 
with that 
- a lot of “heavy lifting” 
done by adjudicators in pre-
hearings; have to think 
about what self-represented 
litigant could say but is “at 
sea about”; must explain 
disclosure, filing and set 
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 parties up so that the 
hearing can proceed more 
fluidly 
- pre-hearings would be 
more effective if more focus 
on the evidence needed, 
how and when to obtain 
(and have case coordinators 
go over pre-hearing report 
in advance of hearing to 
check whether evidence 
obtained 
- prehearing adjudicator will 
always preside at hearing; a 
one-judge approach  
- settlement facilitation 
efforts at pre-hearing stage 
help SRLs understand and 
prepare for hearings; tell 
them: you need to respond 
to X, what do you have? 
 
b) 
- SRLs are generally better 
informed than in past; now 
not unusual to come to 
hearings with case law 
- CanLII has contributed to 
Board accessibility; 
sometimes SRLs get it 
“wildly wrong” but 




- have had people show up 
with material printed  from 
websites such as “Court 
Watch” and fathers’ rights 
groups, or SJTO website 
 
- there has not been much 
change in the level of SRL 
preparedness; occasionally, 
but rarely, receive 
intelligent and well thought-




CFSRB - Self-Representation (…continued) 
 
 Has goal of accessibility 
without representation been 
met?  
Are tribunal proceedings 
approached by SRLs with 
fear and dread? 
CFSRB - to varying degrees, yes, but 
power imbalances remain a 
problem 
 
- for s. 68 applications yes, 
because they are not legally 
complex; for s. 61 and 144 
cases power imbalances are 
a problem; but in terms of 
process the Board is much 
simpler to navigate than a 
court process and the Board 
- not approached with dread 
in same way a court process 
might be, but certainly 




compensates better than 
courts for power imbalances 
- yes, in the sense that the 
Board does a good job of 
assisting SRLs to feel 
comfortable and to manage 
the process, but no, in the 
sense that Applicants are “a 
vulnerable population” and 
“hugely disadvantaged,” 
facts are complex and 
decisions have important 
consequences 
-yes, in terms of the ease 
with which the process can 
be invoked; compared to 
tribunal processes a court 
process is “hugely 
sophisticated and complex” 
- more manageable for s. 68 
applications; for s. 144 
representation would be 
preferable because so much 
is at stake  
- for s. 61 and 144 
sometimes better to have 
applicant represented 
- SRLs have said “I didn’t 
know I had to have a 
lawyer” when they see that 
CAS has counsel; the Board 




- SRLs may initially believe 
the board is accessible 
without a lawyer, “but once 
they see that CAS has a 
lawyer (or more) they are 
often disconcerted”  
- the Board has gotten better 
at explaining processes to 
SRLs at intake stage and 
throughout; pre-hearings 
allow Board to fully explain 
options and prepare SRLs 
for hearings; web-based 




CFSRB - Active Adjudication (AA) 
  
 a) What does AA mean? 
b) Do adjudicators have 
more latitude than judges to 
engage in AA? 
What are common AA 
strategies? 
[Lawyer responses] 
What are common AA 
strategies? 
[Clinician responses] 
If evidence is missing could 
or would you suggest it be 
obtained? 
CFSRB a) 
- recognizing the 
vulnerability of some 
applicants and making 
appropriate adjustments to 
the hearing process 
- efficiently obtaining 
information needed to make 
a decision 
 
- the approach is to efficiently 
obtain information needed to 
make a decision; the reality is 
that you find yourself asking 
the questions  
- tell parties at the outset 
“what I need to hear about” 
- more concerned about use 
of active adjudication since 
S.V.D. decision 
- being aware of applicant’s 
disadvantage and conduct 
hearings with that in mind; ie. 
simple language, look for 
body language that suggests 
lack of understanding 
- recognizing and pointing 
out to other panel members 
the vulnerability of some 
Applicants; being patient and 
- the Board has the authority 
to order independent 
assessments; have talked 
about it but haven’t seen it 
happen [clinician] 
- sometimes evidence is 
outdated (eg. doctor’s 





- yes, but not sure on what 
basis 
 
- tribunals definitely have 
more authority than courts; 
this is the focus of active 
adjudication training, at 
SOAR and elsewhere 
- yes, but must be cautious 
because no specific mandate 
in legislation; this is “ironic 
because CFSRB has more 
subject-matter experts” that 
could engage deeply 
- yes, there is specialized 
training at SJTO 
- yes, had thought so, but 
judges in some courts, eg. 
youth courts are also 
increasingly active  
- yes, Board adjudicators are 
trained in active 
adjudication so must have 
authority, but it would help 
parties to understand if the 
Board had mandate in Rules 
- yes, but the “entering the 
fray” line is in the same 
place for courts and 
tribunals, so it’s hard to say  
- yes, it is confusing that 
investigative authority had 
 
- taking more control over the 
evidence than would occur in 
court 
- Board has developed a 
culture of respect, support for 
and patience with SRLs; they 
are not “brushed off”; these 
people often don’t feel heard 
in society, we make sure they 
are heard at Board 
- telling SRLs that the Board 
is used to dealing with SRLs 
- insisting on written 
statements from all witnesses 
in advance of hearing to 
reduce hearing time 
- the opening of hearing is 
critical; must explain active 
adjudication and get all 
parties to “buy-in” 
- engaging in active 
adjudication makes you 
vulnerable, requires 
confidence especially where 
respondent’s counsel is 
aggressive or belligerent 
- need to think defensively to 
do active adjudication; can't 
conduct inquiry, must tread 
softly and slowly; 
respondents’ counsel are 
conservative 
making allowances for 
learning difficulties/extreme 
stress/ depression which may 
make it difficult to process 
questions and formulate 
answers  
 
- not to do “clinical 
assessment” but to have 
“clinical perspective” and ask 
questions relevant to that 
perspective 
- if there is an area that SRL 
has failed to explore, cover it 
by asking questions after case 
presented by SRL 
- it is not a problem to delve 
into new areas if they have 
been missed 
- questioning a witness’ 
background or qualifications 
(because SRLs never do this) 
- very different than the legal 
member; engages with the 
parties, “stretches out” the 
story, asks more personal 
questions, different tone, less 
legalistic  
- a lot of people with learning 
difficulties and depression; 
frequently overwhelmed; we 
slow things down and give 
them time 
- yes, have requested drug 
test and have required a 
parent to see a neurologist 
[clinician] 
- generally ask CAS to bring 
more information to the 
table; have also asked 
applicants for more 
information and given them 
time to get it on consent of 
CAS  
- cannot order a psych 
assessment of a child or ask 
for other evidence not in 




been given to the Office of 
the Provincial Advocate for 
Children and Youth as more 
authority is needed by 
Board to effectively deal 





- active adjudication is like a 
client interview: ask 
questions in a casual manner 
to elicit salient facts; judges 
in family law matters are “not 
even close” to using similar 
approach and not sure they 
should because in court 
process, notwithstanding 
questioning and disclosure, 
there is a sense of 
manipulating evidence  
- to question and instruct, not 
to cross-examine  
- being aware that the 
applicant’s understanding of 
the case that has to be met 
evolves in the course of a 
hearing, and being flexible 
about evidence; eg. asking if 
there is an email or any other 
document and if so, allowing 
time to get it, rather than 
insisting on adherence to 
filing timelines  
- requiring parties at pre-
hearings to agree to timelines 
for disclosure and filing  
- conducting single session 
med/adj where it feels 
appropriate and parties agree, 
notwithstanding no express 
mandate 
- being aware of wandering 
thinking and trying to assist 
with focus; clarifying for 
SRL panel understanding of 
testimony  
- tell SRLs at outset: I won’t 
tell you what to say or not 
say, but I will make sure you 
get heard” 
- in s. 68 applications probe 
the applicant’s understanding 
of CAS expectations; look for 
practical ways to help 
applicant to meet them and 
deeper implications for 
managing relationship 
- asking questions in hearings 
and accepting guidance from 
lawyer member about what is 
appropriate 
- a question of personal style; 
do not like frequent 
interruptions from other panel 
members; will throw off 
SRLs; let each side make 
case, note any clarifications 
needed and ask later if still 
unclear and important  
- once cross-examination has 
run its course ask “fill in the 
blanks” questions; seek 
elaboration but hesitant to 
challenge testimony; would 
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- extending timelines for the 
compilation of evidence, 
which is challenging for 
SRLs 
 
- have “pretty much 
abandoned” active 
adjudication since S.V.D. 
decision 
 
- adjournment requests are 
not frequently granted; little 
flexibility on part of CAS 
counsel 
 
not say “you said X, now Y”; 
would not ask leading 
questions 
- to ensure witnesses give the 
Board the information it 
needs, must ask questions, 
otherwise “failing to do your 
job” 
- always explain at outset the 
active approach and rationale 
for it 
- adjourning to allow 
applicant to obtain needed 
evidence 
- interviewing older children, 
when appropriate 
- med/adj has been informally 
adopted on consent, ie. 
modifying process to suit the 
parties/circumstances 
- allowing SRL to set up 
printer in hearing room to 
make copies of documents on 
the spot after it becomes clear 











CFSRB - Active Adjudication (…continued)  
 
 How important is AA to the 
work of the tribunal?  
Is it difficult to draw the line 
on appropriate AA; are there 
often complaints?  
Is it the role of an adjudicator 
to level the playing field for 
SRLs? 
Would AA guidelines be 
helpful? 
OR 
 a) Can you comment on 
AA training? 
b) Would AA guidelines be 
helpful? 
CFSRB - it is very important  
 
- it is usually necessary to 
be very active; to guide and 
direct a lot in hearings 
because one side knows it 
all and the other is “totally 
disadvantaged” 
- active adjudication is 
essential from a clinician’s 
perspective; “entering the 
fray” is a legal concept so 
guided by the lawyer on 
panel 
- part of less formal process 
and getting to the point in an 
expeditious manner 
- the point of active 
adjudication is to achieve 
clarity; it is not for 
efficiency, which is 
addressed through pre-
hearing processes 
- complaints from CAS 
counsel are uncommon 
- there is currently anxiety 
and confusion about active 
adjudication  
 
- have had CAS counsel 
attempt to undermine 
tribunal; “if this was a court 
no judge would allow this” 
- have had one lawyer storm 
out because of the hearing 
process, but this is not at all 
typical  
- complaints are uncommon, 
and are usually resolved by 
discussion and adjustments to 
mutual satisfaction, not by 
formal complaint  
- the Board consults with 
stakeholders; this helps to 
overcome resistance to 
process changes 
- yes; children’s aid societies 
have in-house counsel, almost 
always have a lawyer attend 
(sometimes more than one) 
and applicants are almost 
always self-represented in 
children’s aid society cases 
 
- yes, power imbalances are 
extreme; SRLs are often 
“outmaneuvered” by CAS 
counsel 
- yes, an important difference 
between courts and tribunals 
is that the Board is less 
formal and can address power 
imbalances by assisting SRLs 
- Board proceedings are very 
slanted; and isn’t there a 
“conflict of interest” for the 
CAS lawyer to represent both 
CAS and party opposite 
SRL? [clinician] 
- guidelines would be useful 
for clarity and would 
enhance legitimacy 
 
- published guidelines 
would make the Board 
process clearer to the public 
and children’s aid societies 
- guidelines would “of 
course” be helpful, as would 
authority in the Rules that 
would shelter members 
from judicial review  
- guidelines as to when it is 
acceptable to request 
additional evidence would 
be useful 
- the cluster trains in active 
adjudication; the focus is on 
controlling the hearing 
process, dealing with issues 
in an orderly way, but 
overarching goal is fairness, 
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- active adjudication is 
essential because of the 
extreme power imbalances 
in Board proceedings and 
the “extreme vulnerability” 
of Board clientele  
 
 
- the Board is very conscious 
of the line between assistance 
and advocacy, but 
adjudicators should not be 
afraid to do their jobs 
 
- we know we can't be 
advocates, but it is not always 
easy to strike an ideal balance 
- it is very tempting to 
become an advocate for the 
Applicant, who sometimes is 
not even sure what the 
process is or why they are 
involved; when Respondent 
CAS is asked to explain have 
heard it reply to SRL that it is 
the role of Applicant’s lawyer 
to explain; since there isn’t 
one the adjudicator must 
explain the CAS position in 
addition to process [clinician] 
- it is difficult to restrain 
involvement; look to lawyer 
on panel for guidance on 
limits of questioning; have 
been cautioned by other panel 
members not to ask leading 
questions or summarize 
evidence; we comment on 
other panel members’ 
conduct, a lot of trust 
- applicants would prefer to 
have lawyers, of course; the 
Board tries to compensate for 
this; “we overcompensate, if 
anything”; would give SRLs 
more help if it were possible 
- CAS has significant 
resources and CAS counsel 
does a lot of court work; they 
have an adversarial 
orientation, but the simplicity 
of Board processes somewhat 
levels the playing field 
 
must be more active for 
benefit of SRLs 
- training would be more 
effective if the Board had a 
specific mandate in its Rules 
to conduct active 
adjudication; an express 
mandate would also help the 






between panel members 
[clinician] 
- not difficult to draw the line, 
have never had a complaint 
from CAS counsel; just 
clarify the evidence; act as if 
I missed the point, not as if 
the witness was lying 
- the adjudicator’s conduct in 
S.V.D. crossed the line; 
cannot ask questions that take 
up 44 pages of transcript 
- the adjudicator’s conduct in 
S.V.D. was not extreme and 
was justified  
- do not agree with the scope 
of active adjudication 
articulated by the Board post-
S.V.D. 
- the Board will have to re-
group after S.V.D. in order to 
not feel  
too restrained 
- since S.V.D. decision active 
adjudication is very 
restrained; there is a 
philosophical rift between 
adjudicators and the Board’s 
legal department; review goes 
beyond whether test set out 
and extends to re-writing  
- the effect of S.V.D. has been 






CFSRB - Mediation  
 
 How does mediation work 
at the tribunal?  
a) 
Is there an institutional style 
of mediation? 
b) 
Are mediated outcomes 
superior? 
Are there time limits; can 
they be exceeded?  
Are you concerned about 
settlement pressure? 
CFSRB - mediation tends to be 
highly evaluative, and is 
effective and strongly 
encouraged for section 68 
claims 
 
- most members are both 
adjudicators and mediators 
- there is no formal 
mediation training; learn by 
observing others  
- mediation (“settlement 
facilitation”) is built into the 
process for s. 68 
applications in the sense that 
a pre-hearing may be 
converted into a mediation 
session if parties agree; for 
s. 61 and s. 144 applications 
the board only encourages 
mediation when telephone 
a) 
- mediators inform applicants 
of options even though CAS 
lawyers may see this as 
giving advice  
 
- mediators do not hesitate to 
discuss options, remedies, 
things parties haven’t thought 
of 
- a lot of work is done in 
mediation to get to the centre 
of the dispute; don’t suggest 
arguments to SRLs, but tell 
them what CAS needs to 
prove and what Board will 
need to hear from them 
- the Board looks at the real 
underlying issues in the 
dispute and tries to come up 
with a plan for re-organizing 
the relationship 
- there are no formal time 
limits; generally scheduled 
for a day; can be extended 
 
- mediation is part of pre-
hearing process; more than 
one pre-hearing can be 
scheduled for continuation of 
mediation  
- one session is usually 
enough 
- at least a day is needed and 
always give extra time if 
needed 
- it is no problem extend; it 
takes half a day just to get 
parties settled, issues out and 
productive discussions 
underway 
- yes, mediation is generally  
booked for a whole day, 
would not like to see that 
- the Board is not under 
pressure to avoid 
conducting hearings, 
encourages mediation for 
section 68 claims but 
sensitive to the problem of 
settlement pressure 
 
- yes, important to stress 
that it is voluntary; if sense 
discomfort during mediation 
then caucus with parties and 
ensure that Applicant feels 
heard and not pressured to 
settle 
- yes, use caucus to speak to 
SRLs privately to make sure 
that what is being said and 
done accurately reflects 
where they are at 
- there is pressure to 




potential for settlement 
- mediation is strongly 
encouraged for s. 68 
complaints; relatively new 
for s. 61 and 144 matters; it 
has enormous value for 
everyone concerned in both 
instances 
- mediation is strongly 
encouraged, but there is a 
very clear message that it is 
voluntary 
 
- some CAS counsel are 
very collaborative and it 
works well in First Nations 
files through use of talking 
circles 
- sometimes applicants want 
to settle (or withdraw 
application) once the 
hearing process is explained  
 
 
- very evaluative, tell parties 
what result would be in 
adjudication 
- highly evaluative; explain 
likely outcome and options  
- do a lot of shuffle 
mediation; try to get 
applicants to understand CAS 
perspective; to bring civility 
to relationship; “trust-
building” is important; try to 
get to agreements that will 
benefit long-term relationship 
with CAS 
- mediation is highly 
evaluative; delve into claim 
and remedies; parties expose 
vulnerabilities they would not 
reveal in hearing, this style of 
mediation would not be 
appropriate for med/adj   
 
- mediation is ineffective in 
s.68 matters because 
children’s aid societies know 
that the Board cannot impose 
significant remedies in 
adjudication so no incentive 
to avoid adjudication 
- there is no uniform 
approach, probable that 
clinicians do it very 
differently than lawyers 
reduced to half-day as in 
other tribunals; the issues are 
too sensitive and complex; 
time is needed to build trust   
because there is an ongoing 
relationship to preserve and 
because Board has limited 
remedies 
- yes, there is pressure to 
settle, but some people need 
an outcome that feels 
authoritative and they are 
not necessarily more 
invested in (and more likely 
to comply with) a settlement  
- yes, applicants may settle 
out of fear of hearing, 
especially if the CAS 
indicates that hearing will 
be complex and involve 
many witnesses 
 
- no, even if parties appear 
to have been pressured into 
mediation they are often 
really pleased once they are 
in the process, and mediated 
outcomes are superior 
because of satisfaction of 




- a matter of personal style 
 
b) 
- mediation achieves much 
better outcomes; more depth 
and range of issues dealt 
with; family feels heard and 
can be win-win; especially 
true for those with mental 
health issues who cannot 
tolerate hearings 
- mediated outcomes are 
generally better; more of a 
buy-in and more likely to be a 
win-win 
 
- never satisfied with 
mediation; often concerned 
that applicants concede too 
much and feel complicit in 





CFSRB - Multi-Disciplinary Panel Decision-Making 
 
 For what cases is panel 
decision-making important? 
What are the dynamics of 
panel decision-making? 
 
CFSRB - panels are always 
important for best-interests-
of-the-child determinations 
- deliberations are respectful 
and collaborative; members 
given equal voices 
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- a great deal of reliance 
upon, and comfort in 
expertise of other panel 
members 
 
- should always have 3-
member panel to decide 
best-interests-of-the-child 
cases; never needed for s. 68 
cases 
- grateful for panels in best-
interests-of-the-child cases, 
recognize the strength of 
clinicians and welcome their 
knowledge  
- in best-interests-of-the-
child cases panels “feels 
better”  
- panels make it easier to 
avoid pitfalls like reacting to 
personalities; a good reality 
check 
- panel members 
complement and balance 
one another, especially in 
emotionally charged matters  
- panel members allow 
Board to have much more 
specialized support than is 
available to courts; have had 
a judge remark that Board is 
“lucky” to have clinician 
 
- members “constructively 
challenge” one another; 
cultivate an atmosphere of 
“respectful trusting” to 
maximize benefits of 
expertise 
- panels do not work based 
upon a simple “majority rule” 
approach; dissenting views 
are never disregarded; there is 
always a strenuous effort to 
reach common ground; there 
have been dissenting opinions 
written, but this is rare 
- have only had one 
experience in which 
deliberations were conflictual 
- mental health experts share 
informed perspective on 
behaviour issues 
 
- there is a temptation to 
share opinions early on to 
influence others, but its best 
to wait until the end of 
proceedings 
- deliberations are often very 
active; extensive discussion 
to reach consensus 
- some deference to clinicians 
in best-interests-of-the-child 





- in cases where there are 
mental health problems very 
grateful for clinicians on 
panel 
- panel members may weigh 
factors differently; different 
perspectives on best-
interests-of-the-child are 
very valuable and enrich 
decision-making 
 
- no absolute preference for 
panels, but there is comfort 
in panels [clinician] 
 
 
need to convince other panel 
members  
 
- absolutely defer to 
clinicians re: child centred 
issues and lawyers are 
deferred to on legal and 
process issues 
 
- ultimately majority rules, 
but always with a firm 
understanding of points of 





CFSRB - Expertise, Consultation, Informality and Guidelines  
 
 What is the nature of 
institutional expertise? 
a) How is expertise formally 
built and shared? 
b) How is it shared 
informally? 
Would a digest-style record 
of Board decisions and 
perspectives be helpful? 
How informal are tribunal 
proceedings? How does 
informality work? 
CFSRB - the Board has subject-
matter expertise; members 
have high regard for the 
varied knowledge and 
experience of other 
members   
a)  
- expertise is built through 
Institutes, although this 
approach is not ideal; it is less 
effective than Board-level 
meetings because Institutes 
- there is not enough 
“downloading of experience, 
expertise and perspective” to 
allow expertise to become 
institutionalized; there is not 
enough facilitation of the 
interchange of knowledge and 
- it is absolutely the goal of 
the Board to be a 
“comfortable place” 
- the level of formality 
depends on the adjudicator 
or panel members, but the 
institutional ethic is that 
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- term limits are a problem 
because of loss of expertise 
 
- members include or have 
included psychiatrists, 
psychologists, social 
workers, teachers, lawyers 
who are familiar with court 
system and/or child welfare 
system, children’s aid 
societies, and their clientele, 
with insights into mental 
health issues and 
institutional dynamics 
- the tribunal is more expert 
than courts in its subject-
matter 
 
- term limits are fine 
because they allow 
membership to be 
“refreshed”; it is good to 
have up-to-date perspectives 
 
- some children’s aid 
societies are resentful of the 
Board’s authority and do not 
respect Board competence  
- the Board has earned the 
respect of children’s aid 
societies 
- children’s aid societies 
are not sufficiently targeted to 
Board issues 
- expertise is shared 
informally by panels working 
together over a period of 
years 
 
- members educate one 
another in training sessions, 
eg. presentations by clinicians 
at Institutes  
- professional development is 
difficult within the cluster 
format 
- Board expertise is wasted 
because the Board is not in 
control of its own training 
and ongoing learning needs 
- Institutes do not build 
expertise; they are focussed 
on larger volume tribunals; 
only the occasional issue 
crosses over to Board 
- there is not enough 
communication and assertion 
of Board expertise to the 
client community, especially 
children’s aid societies, and 
to courts 
- monthly Board 
teleconferences are “better 
than nothing” but not as 
not enough preservation of 
Board knowledge for training 
and future use 
 
- Divisional Court decisions 
and some Board decisions are 
summarized and distributed; 
this could be expanded and 
deliberately refined to create 
body of knowledge specific 
to board 
- a digest approach to 
recording and preserving 
Board practices and 
approaches could be passed 
on and re-interpreted by new 
waves of members 
- it would be helpful to build 




panel members should be 
approachable 
 
- informality is a positive 
value; it helps self-
represented applicants to 
function 
-  board adjudication is 
much more open and 
friendly than court; in court 
we still bow to judges, in 
tribunal proceedings the 
question is should we allow 
parties to drink coffee 
through proceedings; some 
(but not all) adjudicators 
draw the line at eating 
during a hearing [lawyer] 
- informality is a positive 
value; allows panel 
members to call for a break 
when parties exhibit mental 
health/emotional issues have 
been triggered [clinician] 
- Applicants tend to be 
people who lack financial 
and social power; 
informality is critical to 
making them comfortable 




appreciate the Board’s 
assistance in section 68 
applications  
helpful as face-to-face 
meetings 
- more regular contact among 
Board members would allow 
for better sharing and 
reinforcing of expertise 
- the lesson from review cases 
often relates to how evidence 
should be presented in 
decisions, not substantive 
issues 
- conference calls do not 
encourage the kind of 
dialogue that allows expertise 
to be shared and broadened; 




- very frequent informal 
communication about 
problems and perspectives 
- regularly reach out to others 
with different strengths in 
course of deliberations (even 
if not in empanelled) to seek 
different perspectives 
- “constant discussions” as to 
how Board jurisprudence is 
developing, through monthly 
conference calls and through 
informal discussion and 
- informality and relatively 
simple processes enhance 
accessibility  
- informality is very 
important; “it allows 
Applicants to see 
adjudicators as human 




- people with mental health 
issues cannot live by rigid 
rules and processes; need 
flexibility within 
boundaries; there should be 
more informality in Board 
processes 
- the decision-maker should 
be on same level 
(physically) as the parties to 
facilitate eye contact and 
interaction 
- it’s good to have everyone 
at eye level; feels like a 
meeting, relatively casual 
dress helps SRLs feel more 
comfortable 
- informality is important 
and conveyed deliberately 
through relatively casual 
dress and manner 
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sharing expertise as panel 
members 
- very little consultation 
outside of panel context; 
don’t want to appear to be 
poking into other member’s 
files 
- the level of communication 
is “miserably poor”; 
teleconference calls are not a 
learning experience and 
Institutes are not that helpful, 
too generic 
- don’t want to “make 
decision for someone else,” 
but will discuss in general 
terms “situations and 
experiences” without details 
of the case 
- conference calls and cluster 
“institutes” have replaced 
face-to-face Board meetings; 
with new approach there is 
less familiarity, collegiality, 
Board identity and trust have 
been eroded 
- legal issues may be 
discussed with non-panel 
members, and if a panel is 
lost on a medical or mental 
health issue may reach out, 
but rarely happens because 
cannot fetter discretion 
- informality is essential for 
dealing effectively with 
self-represented parties; 
anxiety negatively affects 
thinking; impairs ability to 
relate to questions and 
formulate answers 
 
- CFSRB hearings are 
relatively formal; this is a 
way of showing authority 
 
- accessibility is impaired by 
CASs that do not inform 
people of their right to 
Board review 
- the Board would be more 
accessible if children’s aid 
societies would consistently 








CFSRB - Best Interests of the Child  
 
 Are adjudicators 
comfortable applying the 
BIC test? 
Do informal institutional 
understandings exist about 
how to apply the BIC test? 
Lawyer responses:  
Would “best-interests-of the 
child” guidelines be helpful 
and feasible?  
Clinician responses: 
Would “best-interests-of the 




- the Board is very 




- a very high degree of 
comfort and have never 
sensed any discomfort from 
other panel members 
- the field is well 
understood; some members 
have deep experience in 
child and youth work; some 
have taught these concepts 
- the Board is comfortable 
with the test and it’s role is 
important; children’s aid 
society case workers are 
often inexperienced “team 
players”; Board can take an 
independent view  
- there are shared 
understandings among some 
adjudicators, but not on a 
Board-wide level 
 
- there are institutional 
understandings, for example, 
emotional bonds and status 
quo are always front and 
centre and at some point 
overwhelm other parts of the 
test 
- shared understandings are 
developed through years of 
working together on panels; 
some combinations of 
members know one another 
very well and have common 
approaches  
- there is internal discussion 
about the elements of the BIC 
test, but not about how it 
should be applied in specific 
cases; not appropriate to seek 
- best-interests-of-the-child 
test guidelines or best 
practices would be 
problematic because of 
fettering discretion 
- could not be done in a rigid, 
formal way; consistency is 
good but there is always a 
concern about fettering 
- conscious internal 
development of best-
interests-of-the-child 
understanding and practices 
would enhance Board 
credibility  
- the Board should build and 
refine institutional expertise 
on best-interests-of-the-child 
test; “one thing Board doesn’t 
do is assert its expertise 
enough” 
- consolidating and 
emphasizing tribunal 
expertise would enhance 
- best-interests-of-the-child 
test guidelines would be 
helpful, but could not be 
binding 
 
- low-key guidance would 
be good; never a “ticks –in-
boxes” approach 
- expertise could absolutely 
be refined and strengthened 
through more discussion 
and training around BIC test 
- it would be great to 
consolidate Board expertise, 
not in a way that is 
restrictive, just informative; 
would help to even out 
panels because some more 
knowledgeable than others 
- the BIC test could become 
a conscious focus of 
expertise; more thoroughly 




input on weight of different 
factors  
 
tribunal functioning and 
credibility 
- a case could be made for 
guidelines; other tribunals 
have them (eg. IRB); as long 
as not binding; would be 
helpful in training new 
members 
 
- any development of Board 
expertise re best-interests-of-
the-child has to be done 
through Board jurisprudence 
or courts, because otherwise 
the Board becomes a policy-
maker 
- very wary of presumptions 
about weight of factors 
because every case is 
different and “best practices” 
are not always best in every 
situation; may be used to 
override cultural issues  
- if a best-interests-of-the-
child digest could be 
articulated in some way 
would be happy to see it; 




- it would be useful to make 
tangible the collective 
experience of board 
members and to further 
develop institutional 
expertise; criteria in the 
CFSA are a “good list” but 
guidelines “could flesh them 
out from a conceptual and 
practical perspective” 
- guidance on the weight to 
be given to race and cultural 
factors, or surface 
conditions such as 
cleanliness of home vs. mild 
abuse at home would be 
useful;  
- Board should consciously 
develop and record Board 
expertise and share it with 
client community and 
especially with children’s 
aid societies  
- excellent members come 
and go; there is no 
mechanism for preserving 
and passing on their 
knowledge and experience 
and guidelines could do that 
 
- there should not be too 
much intervention with 
discretion; but would 
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support attachment as the 
default primary factor, even 
to point of presumption, 
absent risk of harm 
- conscious development of 
depth of understanding of 
each criterion and how to 
apply would be helpful, not 
to the level of presumptions, 
it is very context-specific 
work, but guidance on 






CFSRB - Best Interests of the Child Continued 
 
 What would an ideally 
constituted panel for BIC 
determinations look like? 
CFSRB 
 
- it depends on the case; 
lawyer on panel gives the 
process legal credibility; in 
some cases someone who 
understands child welfare 
system can identify 
problems in children’s aid 
socirty processes; obviously 
mental health professionals 
where there are these issues 
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- an ideal panel would 
possess experience with 
social services, children’s 
mental health, the law with 
respect to children and 
families, making decisions 
with respect to the lives of 
children; could include 
family lawyers, social 
workers, psychologists 
- a panel should be able to 
see problems in the context 
of the “big picture” and 
understand systemic issues 
- social workers may have 
the best qualifications and 
are often under-rated 
- there would be one lawyer, 
one clinical social worker 
and one expert in the area of 
concern eg. special needs, 


















 a) What is the approximate 
balance of SRLs as between 
applicants and respondents?  
b)  
Is there a typical SRL 
profile or experience? 
 
Are adjudicators comfortable 
dealing with SRLs? 
 
What legal advice services are 
available for tribunal clients 
and how effective are they? 
a) How does the tribunal 
prepare SRLs for 
hearings?  
b)  
How do SRLs prepare 
themselves; is this 
changing? 
HRTO a)  
- the percentage of SRLs is 
higher for applicants (75-
85% was the most common 
response; one adjudicator 
estimated it at 60%; the 
percentage of respondents 
that are represented was 
pegged at 85-90%) 
 
- respondents’ counsel tends 
to be specialized and highly 
competent  
- surprisingly high SRL rate 
given the complexity of law 




- the self-represented 
population includes a 
significant [check] number 
- adjudicators are certainly 
comfortable dealing with 
SRLs, but it is a relief when 
both parties are represented 
 
- it’s a relief when both sides 
are represented, but some 
lawyers are not helpful - 
don’t bother to learn about 
tribunal process and 
substantive law because they 
think it will be easy 
- there is a sense of relief 
when both sides are 
represented because self-
represented litigants are more 
work; it is essential to read 
the entire file in advance 
identify issues, evidence 
needed (no lawyer to do that 
for you) and up to adjudicator 
to probe pleadings to ensure 
- HRLSC is a specialized legal 
aid clinic, but it is “hugely 
oversubscribed” so full 
representation is uncommon 
- the HRLSC uses a 
triage/coaching approach 
whereby full representation 
depends upon the nature of the 
claim and the ability to self-
represent 
 
- a triage system, there is no 
income test for HRLSC 
support, rather an “ability to 
self-represent” test  
- when applicants are 
represented through HRLSC it 
obviously makes a big 
difference, but not a large 
percentage obtain 
representation so it’s “better 
than nothing” 
a) 
- feels like a system very 
much geared to SRLs 
-  the flexibility and 
relationship-building skills 
of case processing officers 
helps the tribunal deal 
effectively with vulnerable 
populations 
 
- case management used 
extensively by some 
adjudicators, others not at 
all; up to adjudicators 
whether to hold pre-
hearing case conferences, 
issue case management 
directives 
- summary hearings may 
inadvertently assist SRLs, 
but only occur where little 
chance of success 
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of people who exhibit 
emotional problems, 
obvious stress and mental 
health issues “such as one 
would expect to see in a 
vulnerable population” 
- has had SRLs that did an 
“amazing job”, as well or 
better than a lawyer would; 
and lots of  people are just 
fine 
- it depends on the 
complexity and level of 
analysis required 
- not everyone gets the basic 
ideas that there are legal 





everything is considered or 
the ultimate decision will be 
open to review 
- some SRLs need a lot more 
help than others 
- SRLs are expected, but are 
still difficult to deal with 
when they are not “high 
functioning” 
- most adjudicators can 
handle SRLs because they are 
savvy   enough to get the 
information needed 
- the tribunal can deal with 
self-represented parties 
because administrative law 




- can often tell from quality of 
materials that HRLSC has 
helped  
- not sure what they do for 
people they don’t appear for, it 
is not obvious from materials 
filed or ability of self-represent 
whether the centre has given 
some assistance 
- it's rare, but some self-
represented litigants do a better 
job than lawyers (although 
perhaps because of coaching 
by HRLSC)  
- at HRLSC intake stage 
frontline non-legal staff give 
information and help which 
can be “empowering”, but a 
“reality check” can occur at 
case conference or med/adj 
stage 
 
- some paralegals have a broad 
range of skills and are “very, 
very good”; generally getting 
better over time, but some 
applicants are underrepresented 
by paralegals 
- about 15% of applicants are 
represented by paralegals, at 
least half of these people are 
“under-represented” ie. low 
quality evidence and shallow 
 
- the public perception that 
the tribunal is applicant-
friendly is false; very 




- have not seen a big 
change in the 
sophistication of SRLs or 
in self-informing through 
CanLII 
- there has been a big 
change in self-informing; 
lots of self -represented 
litigants bring in case law 
from CanLII, but they 
often don't understand that 
one case is not enough; to 
some extent this further 
marginalizes those who do 
not have the ability or the 





understanding of the legal 
framework 
- some paralegals, lawyers are 
SRLs are unaware of sections 
of the legislation that may 
assist them  
- broad range of ability among 
paralegals; some are excellent 
but small minority - the vast 
majority of paralegals are a 
hindrance 
- lawyers can be very helpful if 
they are experienced in 
employment and labour law 
and have some familiarity with 
the tribunal, but some lawyers 
who appear at the tribunal have 
unrelated skills and 
background and can be a “net 
negative” 
- general practice litigators are 
often effective; criminal 
lawyers generally not 












HRTO - Self-Represented Parties (…continued) 
 
 Has goal of accessibility 
without representation been 
met?  
 
Are tribunal proceedings 
approached by SRLs with 
fear and dread? 
HRTO - the job of adjudicators is to 
make it possible to appear 
without counsel 
 
- the tribunal is manageable 
at the mediation and hearing 
stage; the problem is getting 
there; the preparation stage 
(drafting and filing material, 
eg. witness statements and 
asking for appropriate 
remedies) is most 
challenging for SRLs  
- people rarely arrive at 
hearings without knowing 
the case they have to make 
and the proof needed 
 
- tribunal culture rewards 
“toughness” (ie. no 
adjournment) when SRLs 
are unprepared 
- it depends on the subject-
matter; anyone can argue 
sexual harassment but 
something like duty to 
accommodate is much more 
- not something to be avoided 
at all costs but still fear-
inducing 
 
- SRLs are fearful because 
they are subject to system in 
which others seem to be 
speaking a different language 
- we try to coax parties into 
mediation, but not because of 
emotional, financial or 
relationship consequences of 
adjudication 
- depends on parties and 
subject-matter; some hearings 
can be “unpleasant, grueling, 
charged, draining”; stressful 
because applicants have to re-
tell their story and listen to 
the other side, often in the 
context of an ongoing 
relationship such as 
employment, but unlikely that 
hearings are seen as 
potentially financially or 









HRTO - Active Adjudication (AA)  
 
 a) What does AA mean? 
b) Do adjudicators have 
more latitude than judges to 
engage in AA? 
What are common AA 
strategies? 
If evidence is missing could 
or would you suggest it be 
obtained? 
How important is AA to the 
work of the tribunal? 
HRTO a) 
- active adjudication is 
about access to justice for 
SRLs and streamlining 
processes 
- case management 
techniques used in med/adj 
and hearings are a form of 
active adjudication and 
access to justice 
enhancement; can identify 
gaps in evidence that can be 
filled  
- the point of active 
adjudication is to assist self-
represented parties, not just 
efficiency (as in other 
tribunals) 
- the tribunal is unlike the 
court system where 
“lawyers put on plays”; here 
the job is to get the facts 
needed to make a decision 
Pre-hearing: 
- issuing case assessment 
directives in advance of the 
hearing to provide direction 
to parties 
- sending out reminders to file 
documents  
- to effectively practice active 
adjudication the adjudicator 
needs to have a firm and 
complete understanding of all 
available information about 
the case, before the hearing 
starts; all documents must 
have been filed and witness 
statements provided, and the 
adjudicator must have read all 
prehearing and case direction 
notes 
- some adjudicators use case 
management directives to 
inform parties in advance of 
hearing of “things they need 
- do not request new evidence 
or suggest that something be 
obtained if it is missing 
- requesting evidence is not 
the role of an adjudicator 
 
- if applicants claim damages 
but provide no proof of loss 
they are “out of luck” 
it is not the role of the 
tribunal to figure out what 
one side needs to make a case 
and then give time to go and 
get it 
- a lot of applicants lose 
because of insufficient 
evidence, not because the 
case is not conducive to 
proof, but because they 
haven't figured out and/or 
obtained necessary evidence 
- it is the responsibility of the 
parties to figure out what's 
- it depends entirely on the 
adjudicator whether active 
approach is seen as 
important  
- “very important” when 
dealing with SRLS, but it 
means different things to 
different people 
 
- the tribunal does not have 
a “character” apart from 
individual adjudicators 
- some adjudicators are very 
active and say things like 
“I’ll be asking all the 
questions”; others run a very 
traditional court-like process 
- active adjudication 
requires an assertive 
personality and litigation 
experience; not something 
everyone can do 
- everyone has a different 
style; some adjudicators are 
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- the point of active 
adjudication is to get at the 
truth, not to enhance 
efficiency; does not 
subscribe to the “potted 
plant theory” of role of 
adjudicator 
- the goal of active 
adjudication is a fair 
process; “we all know how 
expensive lawyers are” 
- the point is efficiency and 
speed but prefer to “let 
people tell their stories”  
 
- not sure what active 
adjudication means; the 
concept is confusing and 
feels like “flavour of the 
month” 
- how would you feel if 
you've hired a lawyer and 
spent thousands and the 
adjudicator “rescues the 
applicant”; would only do 
this where it is essential to 
get to the truth and the 
evidence is opaque 
 
b) 
- yes, “absolutely” a high 
level of comfort with active 
adjudication at HRTO 





Outset of Hearing: 
- the opening explanation is 
critical 
- always get “buy in” from 
both sides at beginning of 
proceedings; explain the 
approach 
- important to gain trust of 
respondent community; 
develop understanding that 
active approach is not 
preference for other side 
- a traditional court process is 
“useless” for SRLs; in 
opening statements they will 
always start to give evidence, 
therefore dispense with them 
and instead frame the issues 
and ask parties to agree very 
specifically that these are the 
things upon which evidence 
is needed 
- take parties through opening 
statements, push and probe, 
explain terms, “what box are 
you claiming to fit in?”; talk 
about process, witness 
statements (adopted or not), 
needed and present it to the 
tribunal 
- the tribunal has 
investigatory powers but 
these are never used 
- tribunal cannot compel 
witnesses on their own 
motion, but can compel 
document production and 
suggest to parties that a 
certain witness would be of 
assistance; discretionary, no 
obligation to do so 
- even if a self-represented 
litigant is highly 
marginalized, not sure that 
such assistance or 
accommodation would be 
appropriate 
- there is a strong emphasis 
on efficiency and a “big bias” 
against adjournment; some 
adjudicators are strict, others 
make exceptions, generally 
have to be on consent 
 
 
more assertive than others; 
also a question of 
experience 
- a matter of personal style; 
some adjudicators use 
“inquisitorial methods” but 
most adopt a “traditional 
model” of adjudication; it 
should be an adversarial 
process because “it’s just 
another kind of lawsuit”, 
and different from other 
tribunals where government 
is respondent 
- the use of active 
adjudication is uneven 
because some adjudicators 
have strong personalities 
and others are tentative; 
respondent counsel can push 
back, some of whom are 
senior lawyers 
- senior adjudicators love 
active adjudication, less 
experienced members are 
not as enthusiastic  
- although it is up to 
individual adjudicators how 
hearing is conducted 
including whether and to 
what extent to adopt active 
adjudication techniques, 
parties should not get a 
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because specific mandate in 
Code and Rules provide a 
“safety net” 
- tribunals have more 
latitude than courts because 
administrative adjudication 
tradition, not because of any 
particular authority, but a lot 
of comfort is taken from 
Rules, legislation and the 
fact that active adjudication 
is encouraged by 
stakeholders; have had both 
applicants and respondents 
ask for an active process 
 
- the tribunal has more 
latitude because 
administrative law norms 
are different 
- “creative management” of 
case and hearings is 
encouraged at HRTO; other 
tribunals such as LTB and 
SBT emphasize efficiency 
- some adjudicators are 
more concerned about 
judicial review than others 
 
- adjudicators do not have 
more latitude because 
HRTO proceedings are 
adversarial; the Divisional 
identify missing pieces and 
ask “do you have supporting 
documents?”  
- giving indirect guidance at 
opening stage: “I don’t see 
anything about X, will you 
tell me about this later?”; talk 
about remedies; work with 
both sides to get cooperation 
 
Questioning Witnesses: 
- if counsel conducts 
examination chief will “jump 
in” whenever clarification is 
needed 
- will interrupt to ask 
questions as needed to 
understand evidence  
- on core issues, no reason not 
to intervene to get answers to 
questions 
- will ask questions, generally 
at the end of testimony 
 
Cross-Examination 
- all self-represented litigants 
are unable to effectively 
conduct a cross-examination; 
it is effective to ask the self-
represented party to tell me 
the point they are driving at, 
and then provide SRL with 
the appropriate question  
completely different 
experience depending upon 
personality of the 
adjudicator 
- nobody wants to write a 
decision that is overturned 
by the Divisional Court 
 
- active adjudication is not 
very important in HRTO 
matters; there is no “truth at 
all costs imperative”; the 
Respondent is almost 
always represented by 
experienced counsel, and 
the goal is to win, in part 
because the other side will 






Court applies the same test 
to all tribunals and courts 
and the standards of the 
court do not support the 
tribunal’s active 
adjudication mandate  
- aware that the Pinto 
Report encouraged active 
adjudication but there needs 





- it is acceptable for an 
adjudicator to ask leading 
questions: for example “Am I 
correct in saying you said 
X?” Adjudicators cannot say 
“I put it to you that you were 
lying”, but can say 
“something you said doesn't 
make sense to me, how do 
you respond to that?” 
- where there is conflicting 
evidence there is a spectrum 
of adjudicative styles: 
extreme end of the spectrum 
is to jump in as witness gives 
contradictory evidence and 
say “I want you to know that 
when X was here he said Y; 
what do you have to say 
about that?” 
- not a former litigator so will 
not cross-examine; just ask 
neutral questions 
- has cross-examined 
witnesses, “sometimes 
aggressively”, but not 
common to do so 
- adjudicators are not 
aggressive in cross-
examination because 
adjudicators are “not trying to 
build a case or “score on” 
 
 364 
anyone; trying to get 
information” 
- might “plug some holes” 
after cross-examination by a 
self-represented party, but 
can be done within the 
traditional adversarial model 
of adjudication 
 
Number/Order of Witnesses: 
- suggest that a certain order 
of witnesses makes sense and 
seek agreement 
- to cut down number of 
witnesses, not to limit 
testimony just to say “we 
already believe that” 
 
Rules of Evidence: 
- accept almost all evidence 
and let rules affect weight 
- very assertive about not 
hearing irrelevant evidence, 
eg. similar fact evidence, 
explain why not admissible, 
but cannot limit repetitive 
evidence because too much 
exposure for judicial review 
- adjudicators do have control 
over the evidence but 
exercise it “tentatively”; 
make rulings about needing 
evidence when both parties 
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see it as legitimate (eg. 
medical evidence is unclear, 




- a lot of case management 
primarily for benefit of self-
represented parties 
- case management is an 
active adjudication tool; some 
adjudicators issue frequent 
case assessment directives; 
others use them only for 
simple matters  
- using case assessment 
directives to move things 
along. eg. direct to a 
summary hearing where Code 
does not appear to be 
engaged; or to instruct that “a 
70-page claim must be 
reduced to 20 pages, with 
page numbers” 
- case assessment directives 
are used mostly as form 
letters re: missed deadlines 
 
Summary Hearings: 
- summary hearings can help 
self-represented litigants by 
giving insight as to how the 
tribunal is likely to see the 
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- if, for example, witness 
statement not provided in 
advance of hearing, take a 
break and require it to be 
prepared on the spot; don’t 
reward failure to prepare with 
adjournment 
- had SRL show up without 
having filed any materials; 
proceedings went ahead, SRL 
was not allowed to call 
witnesses or submit 
documents; adjudicator 
congratulated by colleagues 
for “being tough” 
- granting an adjournment to 
allow SRL to obtain missing 
evidence; explained to 
respondent that needed for a 
“solid decision” 
- the hearing process involves 
rules and deadlines that are 
very difficult for people with 
mental health challenges, and 
accommodation is not always 







- want to get to a just result, 
not to have someone “lose on 
a technicality”; have allowed 
applicants to amend pleadings 
on third day of hearing   
- SRLs show up with 
documents that should have 
been filed 45 days prior; can 
usually get opposing counsel 




HRTO - Active Adjudication (…continued) 
 
 Is it difficult to draw the line 
on appropriate AA; are there 
often complaints?  
Is it the role of an adjudicator 
to level the playing field for 
SRLs? 
Would AA guidelines be 
helpful? 
HRTO - the use of active 
adjudication is not 
controversial and the line is 
not difficult to draw: just do 
not descend into the arena  
- complaints are infrequent, 
it is more common to have 
parties ask for an active 
process 
- must be careful; have to 
explain process at the outset 
and bring people along; do 
not want to be seen as a 
“Star Chamber” 
- yes, the tribunal will 
manage aggressive lawyers 
and ensure that core issues 
are addressed even if other 
side is self-represented or 
under-represented; it’s not 
about who puts on the best 
show 
- the Adjudicator may level 
the playing field. sometimes 
consciously and sometimes 
not 
- it is not the role of an 
adjudicator to educate SRLs 
- would welcome guidelines 
on active adjudication; it 
would be “nice to know what 
you’re allowed to do” 
- supportive of guidelines for 
active adjudication so that 
fearful members have 
something to hang onto and 
something to push back with 
- eventually clarity needs to 
be achieved with respect to 




- more concern about active 
adjudication since S.V.D. 
decision 
- yes, only experienced 
adjudicators are comfortable 
with active adjudication 
- not really an issue; our 
process is not very different 
from a court; the lawyers 
who represent respondents 
tend to be from large firms 
used to appearing in at 
places where both sides are 






or to “help them”; there is a 
lot of available information 
out there 
- there is a perception that the 
tribunal will do more for 
SRLs than we do; we are not 
going to be “rescuing the 
applicant”; must maintain 
impartiality 
- “we take parties as they 
come”; it is not the 
adjudicator’s role to level the 
playing field. 
- power imbalances are not 
always one-sided; sometimes 
respondents bring counsel 
who are not experienced in 
the area of law, such as in-





- active adjudication is a work 
in process; it is evolving, still 
trying different methods  
- general principles in 
guideline form might be 
useful, but essence of role is 
that of an independent 
decision-maker and people 
have their own ways of 
working 
- active adjudication 
guidelines are not needed 
because it is not difficult to 




HRTO - Mediation and Med/Adj 
 
 How does mediation work 
at the tribunal?  
Is med-adj a good system? Are there time limits; can 
they be exceeded?  
Are you concerned about 
settlement pressure? 
HRTO - mediation is offered to 
almost all parties at outset 
and throughout the hearing  
- the med/adj program has 
been “massively successful”; 
95% of cases settle compared 
- usually not more than one 
session, but can be extended  
  
- yes, there is too much 
settlement pressure; 
personal costs may be 
lessened, but the law 
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- mediation style is a matter 
of personality and strengths 
of individual mediators; 
ranges from “folksy” and 
conversational to swiftly 
evaluative; mediators need 
to adopt the style that is 
comfortable for them 
- in med/adj the approach to 
mediation is non-evaluative, 
can suggest range of likely 
outcomes but tread 
carefully; must preserve the 
role of adjudicator if 
settlement not reached 
 
- may suggest to parties 
during hearing that “there is 
a lot of common ground”, 
which may lead to offer and 
acceptance    
- sometimes people agree to 
mediation to please the 
mediator/adjudicator; to 
“play nice”, can still end up 
with productive mediation  
- when mediation is done 
before file is complete the 
mediator doesn’t have 
enough information to be 
evaluative or even comment 
much 
to about 80% in ordinary 
mediation  
 
- med/adj is invariably 
encouraged; a hearing 
without it would be unusual 
(unless a party clearly not a 
suitable mediation candidate) 
- at least 85% of cases settle 
in med/adj; it is offered to 
everyone 
- med-adj is offered to all 
unless obvious unsuitability 
(there is a box to check) and 
almost always used; results in 
75-85% settlement rate 
- high settlement rate for 
med-adj because mediator is 
more fully informed in med-
adj context 
- what the mediator says has 
high impact in med-adj 
because the parties know 
he/she is the decision-maker, 
and without saying so directly 
parties get a sense of who 
would succeed in a hearing  
 
- if mediation is commenced 
and after half day there is no 
settlement may sit longer or 
arrange further discussions by 
phone to keep momentum if 
seems worthwhile 
- half a day is not enough 
time; if possible keep going 
(have gone until 1:00 am) or 
book a new date, but most 
settle on first day or during 
hearing;  
 
doesn’t evolve and human 
rights become “privatized” 
 
- yes; if settlement is not 
reached, seen as a “failure” 
- if the mediation box has 
not been checked then 
parties are contacted by 
tribunal and attempts are 
made to persuade into 
mediation; although a “big 
fan” of mediation but does 
not like to push people 
(but worried about 
settlement stats) 
- “unfair pressure” on 
mediator because of 
“stats”; this pressure is 
passed on to parties 
- cannot put too much 
emphasis on settlement 
without respondents seeing 
the tribunal as an advocate 
for applicants; need 
principled adjudication at 
centre 
- mediation is probably 
“oversold”, but not when it 
is inappropriate  
- mediation is strongly 
encouraged, but must be 
careful not to seem like 
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- a lot of legal information 
(not advice) is provided by 
mediators; eg. legal 
entitlements and range of 
remedies/probable 
outcomes, what seems 
reasonable and what doesn’t  
- in med/adj; adjudicators 
must adopt distinct dual 
roles so that parties don't 
feel railroaded 
- telephone mediation works 
well where both parties are 
represented 
 
- those who don’t settle 
have unrealistic 
expectations, are mentally 
unstable or want the 
approval of a decision-
maker 
you “won’t take no for an 
answer” 
- settlement is better; 
people are often 
disappointed at the end of 
hearings 
 
- would not discourage an 
improvident settlement 
because hearings are 
uncertain, time-consuming 





HRTO - Expertise, Consultation, Informality and Guidelines 
 
 What is the nature of 
institutional expertise? 
a) How is expertise formally 
built and shared? 
b) How is it shared 
informally? 
How informal are tribunal 
proceedings? How does 
informality work?  
HRTO - all members have subject 
matter expertise, as absolute 
minimum criterion; 
adjudicative expertise can 
a) 
- quarterly mini-training 
sessions led by vice chairs are 
important; bi-weekly 
- even though the setting is 
informal compared to a court, 
for unsophisticated parties it 
seems formal and the process 
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be taught, aptitude for 
adjudication can be acquired 
on the job, but background 
knowledge is essential 
 
- tribunal expertise centres 
more on the area of law that 
they adjudicate, less on 
background of individual 
members  
- the tribunal is more expert 
than courts in its subject-
matter 
- term limits are inconsistent 
with merit-based 
appointments process; 
drains tribunals of expertise 
because terms run out or 
key people leave because of 
limited future  
 
meetings/conference calls 
where draft decisions can be 
voluntarily shared are helpful; 
Institutes are too general and 
wide-ranging, not enough 
common ground among 
tribunals to be effective 
 
b) 
- “tons” of informal 
consultation; will go to others 
with different background for 
input 
- there is an “open door” 
atmosphere and exchange of 
ideas 
- the legal department 
circulates new Divisional 
Court decisions 
 
is not informal; any 
informality comes from how 
adjudicators relate to people; 
some make a conscious 
attempt is made to put people 
at ease to make it a more 
accessible process 
 
- the HRTO has a certain 
gravitas because of the way it 
is set up; it is essentially an 
adversarial process with 
parties controlling the 
evidence, but adjudicators are 
generally friendly, 
approachable and try to put 
people at ease, do some 
“trust-building” 
- the tribunal is informal in 
mediation sessions but in 
hearings adopt a traditional 
judicial role 
- tribunal proceedings may be 
friendlier than courts but this 
does not extend to 
accommodations for SRLs 
- HRTO is informal in the 
sense that adjudicators can 
run hearings in any manner 
with which they are 
comfortable 
- the HRTO is not informal, 
but informality is a positive 
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value; SRLs are less 
defensive and proceedings 
flow better in informal 
atmosphere 
- HRTO is informal in that, 
unlike courts where clerks do 
all menial work, adjudicators 
will make copies of 
documents, set up own 
conference calls, don’t’ 
require people to stand or 
bow as in courts 
- HRTO could learn about 





HRTO - Expertise, Consultation, Informality and Guidelines 
 
 Do informal institutional 
understandings about how 
to apply the law exist? 
Would “best-practices” 
guidelines be helpful and 
feasible? 
HRTO - there is absolutely a sense 
of institutional perspective 
- accepted practices are 
communicated in training: 
there are shared 
understandings about 
approaches that the 
Divisional Court has upheld 
or vice chairs generally 
accept 
- a system other than CanLII 
for recording Board 
decisions, with commentary 
would be amazing, would 
create institutional memory; 
CanLII is a limited tool for 
searching procedural points 
 
-would welcome guidelines 
on substantive law, especially 
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on something like “duty to 
accommodate” which is 
amorphous 
- guidelines would assist 
adjudicators because 
precedent is effectively 
binding; it is part of the 
litigation orientation of the 
tribunal 
- the tribunal does not 
anthologize expertise; a “key 
cases digest” would be 
helpful 
- would help compensate for 
lost expertise when key 
people leave because of 
expired term limits 
 
 
- it would be impossible to 
compile a best practices 
digest; too many divergent 
views; guidelines - would be 
“unwieldly and fettering” 
- very opposed to guidelines of 
any kind; discretion should not 
be structured in any way and 
best practices are communicated 
in training, afterwards rely upon 
CanLII, it would be “legally 










 a)  
What is the approximate 
balance of SRLs as between 
applicants and respondents?  
b)  
is there a typical SRL profile 
or experience? 
a)  
Are adjudicators comfortable 
dealing with SRLs? 
b)  
What are main sources of 
frustration for applicants? 
What legal advice services 
are available for tribunal 
clients and are they 
effective? 
a)  
How does the tribunal 
prepare SRLs for hearings?  
b)  
How do SRLs prepare 
themselves; is this 
changing? 
SBT a) 
- majority of applicants are 
not self-represented, but 
many receive “self-help” 
legal aid coaching rather than 
full representation 
- legal aid clinics help to 
identify the evidence needed, 
helps to compile evidence 
and sends them off 
 
- only about 5-10% of 
applicants are self-
represented, although many 
are making simple claims that 
can be managed without 
counsel 
- some applicants are eligible 
for legal aid but decline it 
because they feel strongly 
they can handle it themselves 
 
a) 
- yes, members get lots of 
training in active adjudication 
so they have the skills needed 
to get necessary information 
 
- with SRLs adjudicator does 
more prep work, but hearings 
go faster and are more fluid 
 
b) 
- SRLs are not a big issue; 
there aren’t that many 
- SRLs are informed by 
letter and if Ontario Works 
recipients, also by OW 
worker, that legal assistance 
is available;  
- if not represented at 
hearing, again told that 
eligible for free legal 
assistance, and proceedings 
are adjourned to allow for 
this if requested (about 50% 
want to adjourn and get 
advice) 
- proceedings are eligible 
for legal aid, but 
representation is not 
guaranteed because of clinic 
capacity limits 
- legal aid is available to all 
based on income criteria, 
not complexity; low income 
a) 
- the tribunal is focused on 
getting SRLs legal advice 
 
- some have legal aid 
lawyers and some 
paralegals, legal aid lawyers 
and most paralegals are 
“very, very good”, know the 
system; rarely get non-legal 
aid lawyers (where ODSP 
part of a larger claim); can 




- some SRLs are highly 
competent but it is rare for 




- about half of applicants who 
are represented have para-
legal representation 
- on Respondent side, 
submissions are written; in 
about 30% of cases a CPO 
will appear at hearing 
- Ministry is increasingly 
sending CPOs to hearings 
 
b) 
- a “fragile community”; 
physical disability often leads 
to depression  
- hearings have emotional 
impact; inherent in subject-
matter 
- lots of people cry; do the 
utmost to ease the emotional 
impact of hearings by being 
“very good at dealing with 
people” 
is a proxy for “person with 
complex needs” 
- clinics and SBT have 
worked together to 
determine best triage 
practices – representation 
depends upon needs of 
individuals (language or 
other communication 
barriers and complexity of 
case) ie. capable people 
with simple cases do not get 
representation solely based 
upon low income 
- there is a “self-help” 
stream in legal aid clinics, 
lawyers take on a coaching 
role; unlike duty counsel, 
they are able to see people 
repeatedly and assist with 
advising as to needed 
evidence, helping to put 
together evidence if 
necessary, but do not appear 
at hearings; very helpful for 
adjudicators because 
appellants made aware of 
weaknesses in case before 
hearing, don’t see 
adjudicator as “bad guy” 
and more accepting of 
process and result 
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- extent of assistance given 
in “self-help” stream varies 
depending upon legal aid 
clinic; some clinics send 
written submissions for 




- tenants are almost always 
self-represented; about 50% 
of landlords are represented 
and of those about 75% by 
paralegals or “landlord’s 
representatives” who may not 
be paralegals, but rather 
property managers  
 
b) 
- self-represented community 
tends to be poor, 
disadvantaged, emotional, 
often with mental health 
issues  
 
- LTB clientele have a lot in 
common with family law 
clientele - they start off in a 
mutually beneficial 
relationship, something goes 
wrong, can end up hating one 
another, and may want to 
continue the relationship or 
a) 
- the Board is very 
comfortable with SRLS 
 
- tenants often have 
unrealistic expectations as to 
the level of help they will get; 
expect the adjudicator to tell 
them how to get the most out 
of the landlord 
 
b) 
- SRLs are frustrated with 
their circumstances in life, 
which often include poverty, 
and this extends to hearing 
room; they have difficulty not 
interrupting other side, 
applying information such as 
the difference between asking 
questions and giving evidence 
- duty counsel is available 
onsite in some locations: 
they are legal aid lawyers 
from local legal aid clinics 
and operate differently 
depending upon the clinic 
they are with; clinics have 
their own rules and 
processes 
 
- surprised that people often 
decline to talk to duty 
counsel, then appear with no 
argument, evidence or 
proposal in support of their 
position; sometimes directed 
to duty counsel but 
effectiveness of duty 
counsel varies greatly  
- duty counsel is not very 
effective; gives 15 minutes 
of advice and does not write 
submissions or go to 
hearings, may attend 
perhaps 10% of hearings, 
a) 
- parties are encouraged to 
see duty counsel in advance 
of and when appropriate in 
the course of adjudication 
and mediation  
 
b) 
- no significant changes in 





not; similar emotions are 
involved 
- people often use the Board 
to punish one another 
 
 
although some duty counsel 
will sit in back of hearing 
and become involved if 
there is a need  
- in locations where duty 
counsel is not available, 
legal aid clinics do not offer 
full representation; they 
focus on tenants facing 
eviction or illegally locked 
out; even then only appear 
on behalf of people who 
have some disability or if 
there is a legal issue that the 
clinic is interested in; there 
is little available in terms of 
full representation 
- the focus of clinics is 
saving tenancies; will often 
seek adjournment so tenant 
can make application  
 
- specialist paralegals can do 
a good job, but are a small 
minority 
 
- paralegal representation is 
generally of poor quality on 
the tenant side; there are 
some “top notch” paralegals 
that represent landlords 
- tenants are often “under-
represented” by paralegals 
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ie. worse off than if self-
represented because 
wrongly-informed 
- “shocked” at the low-
quality of paralegal 
services; there is a problem 
with inadequate training at 
community colleges and 
programs being too 
accessible  
 
- in general, the paralegals 
that appear before the board 
have more expertise than the 
lawyers; regulation of 
paralegals has made a 
difference; there are more 





SBT/LTB - Self-Represented Parties 
 
 Has goal of accessibility 
without representation been 
met? 
Are tribunal proceedings 
approached by SRLs with 
fear and dread? 
SBT - it is a goal of the tribunal to 
be manageable without a 
lawyer, and because of active 
adjudication it generally is 
- it is not a goal of the 
tribunal to be accessible 
- no, there is not an 
“avoidance atmosphere” with 
respect to adjudication; the 




without lawyers, it just 
happens to be “leaning that 
way” 
LTB - the tribunal is accessible for 
SRLs because it has to be 
- the tribunal is less 
complicated than court 
system so people can manage 
without lawyers; SRLs better 
off than those who are badly 
represented 
 
- for SRLS who are rational 
and able to communicate 
clearly the tribunal is 
manageable; where there are 
a comprehension problems, 
or complex issues such as 
bankruptcy, representation is 
obviously helpful  
- there is a perception that the 
tribunal is accessible without 
lawyers, so SRLs refuse duty 
counsel assistance; this is 
problematic, duty counsel 
should be advancing 
arguments about tenant 
claims, SRLs instead assume 
the truth will come out in 
hearing and/or they can get 
sympathy from adjudicators 
- no, parties do not approach 
adjudication with dread; they 
don't avoid hearings, in fact 
some want them 







SBT/LTB - Active Adjudication (AA)  
 
 a) What does AA mean? 
b) Do adjudicators have more 
latitude than judges to engage 
in AA? 
What are common AA 
strategies? 
If evidence missing would 
you suggest it be obtained? 
How important is AA to the 
work of the tribunal? Why? 
SBT a) 
- ensuring that SRLs are 




 - “I don’t know” – maybe 
tribunals have just taken 
active adjudication more 
seriously because they deal 
with so many SRLs 
- perhaps more comfortable 
conducting active 
proceedings because it is an 
appeal forum (although the 
tribunal does hear witnesses 
and make determinations of 
fact) 
- no sense of difference 
between courts and tribunals  
 
- making sure SRLs 
understand the issues, 
process, rules; explaining the 
role of CPO so they don’t feel 
attacked 
- asking questions to get 
information needed, being 
patient because people 
meander 
- balancing efficiency with 
letting people say what they 
need to say – up to a point, 
making sure they feel heard 
 
- much more active with 
SRLs; have to make sure that 
all necessary information 
obtained without being 
unduly interruptive; don’t 
need closing submissions; can 
shorten hearings by stopping 
repetitive testimony and 
continually focusing 
proceedings  
- if it looks like there is a hole 
in the applicant’s case; 
- the tribunal has no 
mandate to request new 
evidence; prohibited from 
doing so 
- it is rare to make a request 
for evidence, would never 
happen for medical 
evidence, which is 
responsibility of Appellant; 
Regulations prohibit 
adjournments to obtain new 
medical evidence 
- the tribunal expressly does 
not have authority to request 
new medical evidence 
 
- if evidence exists that is 
missing will adjourn to 
allow it to be obtained 
 
- the client community faces 
personal challenges; 
therefore, active 
adjudication has always 
been a natural component of 
adjudication with SRLs 
 
- it is very important; part of 
the reason that legal aid 
clinics adopted a “self-help” 
coaching model was that 
they “trusted” that 
adjudicators were active 
enough that this would be 
sufficient  
- proceedings are less 
adversarial because the 
“human dimension” is 
striking, stories are sad 
- legal tests require detailed 
information, such as effects 
of the disability on the 
“whole person;” therefore 





suggest legal counsel be 
obtained and adjourn 
- sensitivity to differences in 
sub-culture re comfort with 
eye contact, personal contact 
 
LTB a) 
- Board can only assist in 
getting information out; it is 
up to the applicant to make 
the case; the test is balance of 
probabilities; this balance 
should not tilt because of 
anything the adjudicator does  
- power imbalances are 




- adjudicators assume there is 
more latitude, but the extent 
of active adjudication 




- only have to explain to 
parties the “landmarks” that 
lead to a decision 
- clarifying testimony as the 
hearing progresses, not 
waiting for cross-examination 
to bring out more information 
- tell SRLs “you've asked for 
X, how do you plan to prove 
it” 
- tenants often go to duty 
counsel, don't take notes, 
come to hearing and ask for 
adjournment without 
knowing on what basis; 
adjudicator must unpack that  
 
Questioning Witnesses 
- try not to cross-examine, but 
do direct questioning and 
challenge a witness if 
necessary to get the 
information needed  
- if a witness is evasive it 
enough to notice and draw 
- the Board is empowered to 
request evidence; if 
reasonable explanation for 
not having it already might 
do so 
- would not adjourn to allow 
a self-represented party to 
put together evidence unless 
a good explanation for not 
having it; not because they 
are seeing the case unravel 
and wish they had thought 
of how to present it better 
- if a new issue comes up 
the tenant is advised to 
withdraw and file an 
application with the new 
claim and proper evidence; 
if a new defense comes to 
light that the tenant was 
unaware of - refer the tenant 
to duty counsel  
- might say to SRL “it is 
surprising you don’t have 
X”; might allow to 
withdraw and re-file rather 
- it is important because it 
allows information to be 
clarified as things move 
along and nobody who isn't 
a lawyer is comfortable with 
cross-examination 
- it is important for 
efficiency, moving things 
along and to address power 
imbalances 
 
- a lot of variation in 
adjudication styles, 
uniformity is not needed 
because people think 
differently and it's 
empowering for 
adjudicators to have process 
control; it contributes the 
sense of authority needed to 





adverse inference; don’t need 
to insist on clear answer 
- more inquisitorial powers 
would make the adjudicator’s 
job easier but would not be 
fair 
- sometimes ask if parties 
want to skip cross because 
they often start to give 
evidence not ask questions 
- will interrupt counsel to 
explore a particular area, not 
just to clarify evidence given, 
also to focus parties (ask 
“how does that fit in here; 
this is what I need to know”) 




- allowing almost all the 
evidence go in, and then 
letting rules of evidence go to 
weight, rather than going 
through the fuss of explaining 
hearsay and other rules of 
evidence 
- if a party shows up with a 
box of materials; adjourn and 
tell them to come back with 
everything organized and 
pages numbered; it is not the 
than adjourn; “adjourn” is a 
“bad word” 
- if a SRL says “I can get 
this” re evidence, sometimes 
allow this, other times say 
“your hearing is today”; 
depends on circumstances 
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tribunal’s job to organize 
people 
 
- have threatened to fine 
parties who are intrusive or 




SBT/LTB - Active Adjudication (…continued)  
 
 Is it difficult to draw the line 
on appropriate AA; are there 
often complaints?  
 
Is it the role of an adjudicator 
to level the playing field for 
SRLs? 
SBT - it is completely natural 
because client base consists 
of “vulnerable population” 
- members don’t struggle 
with active adjudication 
limits 
 
- very rare for other side to 
object to active adjudication 
- once cautioned by disability 
adjudication unit (“DAU”), a 
government representative, 
but very rare event 
- CPOs do not have a 
personal stake in outcomes so 
don’t tend to object to active 
approaches; not very 
- power imbalances exist 
because of the client 
community; conscious 
attempt is made to “level the 
playing field” 
- power imbalances are 






concerned about appearing to 
advocate for other side  
- don’t know if AA guidelines 
would be appropriate; have 
done a lot of training on it 
LTB - there are frequent 
allegations of bias dealt with 
through internal review 
process; not through judicial 
review 
- complaints are not a big 
problem, although there are 
internal reviews 
 
- when a member goes too far 
with cross examination it 
always results in complaint 
from the losing party; these 
are resolved internally, not 
through judicial review 
application 
- mindful of fairness to 
represented party; there is a 
difference between getting 
information and making 
someone’s case  
 
- it is the role of an 
adjudicator to level the 
playing field 
- leveling the playing field is 
“absolutely essential”;  
  
- Board can only assist in 
getting information out; it is 
up to the applicant to make 
the case; the test is balance of 
probabilities; this balance 
should not tilt because of 
anything the adjudicator does  
 
- in mediation power 
imbalances are dealt with by 
informing SRLs of their legal 
entitlements, telling them that 
the board promotes consistent 
decision-making and 
recommending a hearing if a 
proposed settlement falls 








SBT/LTB - Mediation and Case Management  
 
 How does mediation work at 
the tribunal?  
a) 
Is there an institutional style of 
mediation? 
b) 
Are mediated outcomes 
superior? 
Are there time limits; can 
they be exceeded? 
Are you concerned about 
settlement pressure? 
SBT - early resolution opportunity 
(“ERO”) is presided over by 
an appeal resolution officer 
(“ARO”) who is not an 
adjudicator, but rather an 
administrator trained in 
mediation; not only about 
resolving issues also about 
clarifying issues 
 
- AROs become contact 
person at tribunal 
 
 
  - there is no settlement 
pressure; hearings are 
highly accessible 
- emphasis has always 
been on getting people to 
legal aid, not settlement  
 
- there was no settlement 
mechanism at tribunal 
until recently, all matters 
dealt with by hearing, 
sometimes de facto 
consent orders (CPO 
indicates no resistance to 
order); moving toward 
review at government level 
- no significant settlement 
pressure because there is 
no “avoidance 
atmosphere” with respect 
to adjudication 
LTB - adjudication and mediation 
are separate functions 
performed by different 
personnel; the Board does not 
a)  
- mediators typically conduct 
interest-based mediation; 
sometimes the mediator has not 
- CMH, which is telephone 
mediation, can be extended 
to in person CMH or 
“special mediation”  
- efficiency driven 
adjudication leads to 




have adjudicators who are 
also mediators, but 
adjudicators can negotiate 
settlement in the hearing 
context; eg. “he/she seems to 
be saying X will work; or 
propose a payment plan, but 
must be clear that adjudicator 
is facilitating negotiation 
between parties, not 
mediating because mediators 
are unionized employees 
- case management hearings 
(“CMH”) are really a 
mediation session run by 
dispute resolution officers 
(“DROs”) who are mediators 
or case administrators 
depending upon location 
- CMH is mandatory for all 
tenant applications because 
they are the least organized 
group and these applications 
are the most easily settled 
- CMH done in person or by 
phone; 60 minutes to talk; if 
at the end of an hour there is 
no agreement, the mediator 
becomes a case manager; 
informs parties of what they 
need to do next: get materials 
together for hearing, notify 
even looked at the file; not 
coming from a rights-based 
perspective, want to get people 
talking  
- all mediation should be 
interests-based; highly 
evaluative mediation (eg. at 
HRTO) is not truly mediation  
- mediators should have their 
own style within an overall 
“holistic approach” 
- do not do interest-based 
mediation, it is a “beautiful 
concept” but so not have time 
for it and a legalistic approach 
is better for addressing power 
imbalances  
- do “broad-based” mediation; 
the relationships are not that 
important, at bottom it's a 
business relationship  
- part of mediator’s role is to 
educate self-represented about 
legal test that must be met, 
what to expect in hearing, how 
board has handled similar 
cases; goal is to ensure they 
arrived at the hearing prepared 
- do not do shuttle mediation, 
talk to people about rights and 
obligations and uses practice 
directions for self-represented 
 repeatedly throughout the 
process, and pressure 
against adjournment, 
which is sometimes 
granted for fairness but not 
with comfort  
 
- adjournments are 
frowned upon; fairness 
should be more important 
than efficiency 
- there is an expectation of 
getting through the docket 
for the day and need some 
cases to go to mediation to 
do so 
- mediators are aware of 
settlement statistics and 




witnesses, might suggest 
documents needed if asked  
- mediation at the board used 
to be very unstructured; 
mediators “wandered around” 
encouraging parties to 
mediate; the CMH project is 
an attempt to improve upon 
that 
 
- tribunal clients are not 
sophisticated; mediation 
helps parties to at least 
comprehend the dispute 
before hearing if no 
settlement is reached 
- “very often” direct people to 
get legal advice before 
mediation begins, or interrupt 
mediation to allow them to do 
so 
- some LTB locations hold 
mandatory case conferences 
if mediation fails  
- mediators do a lot of 
“behaviour agreements”; 
payment plans can be done 
more quickly and efficiently 
by adjudicators 
 
- in CMH if people have not 
had legal advice may tell 
parties to explain legal 
framework  
- style is very evaluative, uses 
the online practice directions to 
inform parties of substantial 
law; refers to paper copy of 
practice directions as way of 
treading the line between 
advice and representation; 
important to even out power 
imbalances that parties are 
informed of the legal 
framework before making 
settlement decisions  
 
b) 
- tenants may get less than they 
would in hearing because 
mediators conduct interest-
based mediation, not rights-
based mediation; mediated 
outcomes are not necessarily 
superior 
- med/adj would work for 
LTB; would allow more 
flexible adjudication; as it is, 
can get parties to consent order 
if one side makes offer and 
other agrees 
- as mediator would 
recommend against an 
improvident settlement; would 
recommend going to hearing 
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them to get advice and call 
back 
 
- tries to ensure that if no 
settlement at CMH at least an 
interim order (usually for 
disclosure); try to make sure 
there is some tangible take 
away like a statement of 
agreed facts, clear 
understanding of hearing 
requirements so that hearing 
is not adjourned 
 
- CMH is working great; 80% 
settlement rate, and those 
who don't settle arrive at the 
hearing with some semblance 
of organization; results in 
fewer adjournments  
- about 50% of mediated 
cases settle; settlement rate is 
higher for CMH mediation, 
about 90% 
- more mediated cases settle 
than CMH cases because the 
former is voluntary; but for 
CMH some parties never 
come back and this should be 
reflected in settlement 
statistics 
 
- as mediator would only allow 
improvident settlement after 
explaining that law entitles the 
disadvantaged party to more 
and recommending a hearing 
- mediated outcomes are 
encouraged for efficiency, a 
way of getting through the 
docket not because of superior 















- the focus of the tribunal is 
high-volume repetitive work; 
adjudicators typically start the 
day with about 60 files, in 
about half of cases a party 
doesn’t show up (often 
because parties have settled), 
some go to duty counsel 
which can result in 
adjournment, and some are 
streamed to mediation which 
is important to allow time to 




SBT/LTB - Expertise, Consultation, Informality and Guidelines 
 
 What is the nature of 
institutional expertise? 
a) How is expertise formally 
built and shared? 
b) How is it shared informally? 
How informal are tribunal 
proceedings? How does 
informality work?  
SBT - members have a broad range 
of backgrounds eg. teachers, 
police officers, lawyers, 
doctors  
- tribunal has some expertise 
in knowing its client 
community through training 
and experience 
 
- lawyers are not always the 
best adjudicators; police more 
a) 
- monthly training by 
teleconference; any new issues 
discussed 
- all relevant Divisional Court 
decisions are summarized in 
memos circulated to members 
 
- performance monitoring; 
random internal review of 
member decisions by vice-
chairs 
- proceedings are informal 
despite representation on 
both sides; the atmosphere 
is often collaborative 
 
- the tribunal’s proceedings 
are more manageable than a 
court process for people 
with physical and/or 
emotional challenges 
because they are less 
formal, people are more 
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likely to be convergent 
thinkers - decisive 
 
- term limits are not a 
problem; can move to another 
tribunal and new term starts; 
can make a career of 
adjudication 
 
- use CanLII to search law; 
legal department is comprised 
of “wonderful, skilled 
lawyers”; review member 
decisions for first 6 months 
- both training and ongoing 
supports for members are 
great; Institutes, conference 
calls, new member training and 




- a lot of multi-disciplinary 
consultation based upon 
differences in ODSP 
knowledge and litigation 
experience of members 
- it is not an expertise-sharing 
environment based upon 
background, but rather 
experience 
- phone and email contact 
among members and vice-
chairs and legal department are 
all helpful 
 
- don’t tend to consult with 
others who have different 
backgrounds because up to 
member to assess limitations 
implied by medical evidence, 
don’t want the medical people 
relaxed; CPOs do not 
approach proceedings 
aggressively 
- trying to get the best 
testimony from people and 
the more at ease they are the 
better 
 
- whether informality is a 
positive value depends on 




to be “in-house experts”; up to 
the adjudicator to assess 
disability based upon whole 
picture 
 
LTB - in some LTB locations all 
adjudicators are lawyers and 
in others not; tribunal 
expertise is not based on 
background, but develops 
through dealing repeatedly 
with similar fact patterns  
 
- some adjudicators develop 
specialties like long hearings 
or complex mental health 
issues 
- the vast majority of 
adjudicators are lawyers; 
expertise is re: subject matter 
of Board, not background 
- panels are only used when 
needed to clarify, eg. where 
there are conflicting decisions 
- there is a lot of internal 
consultation, about cases being 
decided and in general 
 
- new members will leave 
hearing room and seek 
guidance as needed from a 
colleague or vice-chair 
- cluster-wide Institutes are an 
effective umbrella approach to 
professional development; 
LTB also holds quarterly half-
day training sessions for all 
members to drill down on their 
own legislation/issues 
- legal department circulates 
new and relevant case law; 
Institutes also build expertise 
 
- the tribunal is not 
informal: the setting is 
formal, there is a raised dais 
in most hearing rooms, any 
informality comes from the 
personal style of the 
adjudicator; some are “diva-
like” others very  
informal in manner 
 
- it is not a priority to put 
the parties at ease; it is still 
a legal process  
- in LTB proceedings 
adjudicators have had no 
advance contact with 
parties, contributes to 
formality 
- it is a traditional litigation 
process: direct/cross/; 
direct/cross and seldom 
departs from this format; if 
parties start to give evidence 
rather than cross-examine 
will sometimes ask if they 
want to skip this step 
- adjudicators have personal 
styles but everyone 
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basically uses the same 
traditional process 
- needs to be formal enough 
not to be a free-for-all; a 
certain level of sternness 
helps to keep things moving 
 
 
SBT/LTB - Expertise, Consultation, Informality and Guidelines (…continued) 
 
 Do informal institutional 
understandings about how to 
apply the law exist? 
Would “best-practices” digest 
or decision-making guidelines 
be helpful and feasible? 
SBT  - an online digest-form record 
of decided cases (such as in 
criminal injuries 
compensation) would be 
useful, but would need 
frequent updating and 
refinement 
- not necessary, there is a 
“Hearing Handbook” that 
canvasses all issues 
LTB - yes, for example 
adjudicators can make 
decisions on compassionate 
grounds eg. to extend a 
payment plan or delay 
eviction eg. if children 
affected; assess relative 
unfairness to landlord 
- the role of an adjudicator is 
to apply the statute not to 
- guidelines exist in the form of 
practice directions which cover 
substantive law and are meant 
to inform the public; CanLII is 
the source of information for 
adjudicators 
 
- The Board used to have 
internal guidelines that were 
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force the landlord to be a 
creditor for the tenant’s 
benefit  
- can recommend to landlord 
that tenant be given relief or 
accommodation based upon 
life  
circumstances (length of 
tenancy, number of children 
in household); it is common 
to do so; can force this on 
landlord 
 
constantly tweaked, now use 
CanLII 
- new Divisional Court and 
Court of Appeal cases are 
distributed by legal department 
with memos attached 
 
- guidelines, an institutional 
memory, for issues that come 
up frequently would be a good 
idea; website information is for 
the public 
 
 
 
 
 
